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The Aral Sea is well known for its devastating regression over the second half of the 
twentieth century, and for its recent partial restoration. Environment and Post-Soviet 
Transformation in Kazakhstan’s Aral Sea Region is the first book to explore what these 
monumental changes have meant to those living on the sea’s shores.
Following the fluctuating fortunes of the pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet 
fisheries, the book shows how the vast environmental changes the region has 
undergone cannot be disentangled from the transformations of Soviet socialism 
and postsocialism. This ethnographic perspective prompts a critical rethinking of 
the category of environmental disaster through which the region is predominantly 
known. Tracing how the sea’s retreat and partial return have been apprehended by 
diverse local actors in the former port of Aral’sk and surrounding fishing villages, as 
well as by scientists, bureaucrats and international development workers, William 
Wheeler draws out the multiple meanings environmental change acquires within 
different contexts. This study of how people make their lives amidst overlapping 
ecological and political-economic upheavals is rich in ethnographic detail that is 
both rooted in Soviet legacies and alive to the new transnational connections that 
are reshaping the region.
Offering a rigorous political ecology of Soviet socialism and after, the book is a major 
contribution to the nascent environmental anthropology of Central Asia. It will be of 
interest to environmental anthropologists, environmental historians, and scholars of all 
disciplines working on Central Asia and the former USSR.
William Wheeler is Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in Social Anthropology, 
University of Manchester. He carried out fieldwork in the Aral Sea region of 
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Note on transliteration
For transliteration of Russian words, I use the modified Library of 
Congress transliteration. I transliterate Kazakh words from Kazakh 
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on the Turkish alphabet, I transliterate from Kazakh Cyrillic because this 
is the alphabet that my informants are literate in. For Kazakh words, 
I therefore also use the Library of Congress transliteration as for Russian, 









I use Kazakh versions of all place names in the region. The only exception 
is the town of Aral’sk, where I use the Russian form, because the Kazakh 
form, which is simply ‘Aral’, would be confusing. Where proper nouns are 
relatively well known in English, I use the conventional English spelling: 
thus Kazakhstan, not Qazaqstan; Baikonur, not Baiqongyr; Nazarbayev, 
not Nazarbaev; Syr Dariya, not Syr Dariia. Finally, several organisations 
in the region publish materials in English, so I use their own trans- 
literations: Aral Tenizi, Aral Aielderi, Kambala Balyk.
Russian and Kazakh are abbreviated as ‘Ru.’ and ‘Kaz.’, respectively, 
when translations are given in parentheses.

gLossary and abbreviations xix
Glossary and abbreviations
akim, akimat (Kaz.: äkïm, äkïmdïk): mayor, mayor’s office
aqsaqal: white-beard, elder
Aralgosrybtrest (1926–60), Aralrybokombinat (1960–77), Aralrybprom 
(1977–98): state fishing industry on the Kazakh part of the Aral
JSDF: Japanese Social Development Fund
KazNIIRKh (Ru.: Kazakhskii nauchno-issledovatelskii institut rybnogo 
khoziastva): Kazakh Scientific Fisheries Research Institute
Kazsovmin: Kazakh Council of Ministers
kolkhoz: collective farm
Minrybkhoz: Ministry of Fisheries
Minvodkhoz: Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Management
oblast (Ru.: oblast’, Kaz.: oblys): Soviet and post-Soviet territorial division 
below republic. Aral’sk is in Qyzylorda oblast.
raion (Ru.: raion, Kaz.: audan): territorial division below oblast. Aral’sk 
is the centre of Aral’sk raion.
sovkhoz: state farm
SYNAS: Syr Darya Control and North Aral Sea Project
tenge (KZT): Kazakh currency. For most of my fieldwork, the exchange 
rate was approximately 150 KZT to the dollar, though the currency 





























































































































Figure 0.1 The Aral Sea from space: (a) 1977, (b) 1987, (c) 1998, 
(d) 2010. Source: US Geological Survey, https://eros.usgs.gov/image-
gallery/earthshot/aral-sea-kazakhstan-and-uzbekistan#earthshot-
stories, accessed 18 May 2021.
(a) (b)
(d)(c)
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The Aral Sea is known to the world through images like Figures 0.1 
and 0.2. Ships stranded in the desert evoke a profound dissonance: 
the element of life has receded, leaving a sterile, barren landscape that 
affords a postapocalyptic look back on a modernity that has passed. The 
disruption of the natural order is visible from space, a matter of global 
concern. Before and after: a natural object destroyed. What happened 
is well known.1 This was the world’s fourth-largest inland waterbody, 
located in Soviet Central Asia between the Kazakh and Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republics. Lying amid arid steppe and desert, the sea was fed by 
two rivers, the Syr Dariya and the Amu Dariya, which rise thousands of 
kilometres away in the glaciers of the Tien Shan and Pamirs. The inflow 
from the rivers balanced losses to evaporation, keeping salinity levels 
low, and freshwater fish formed the basis of a thriving fishery. The sea 
softened the extremes of the continental climate and provided rainfall 
for pastures. However, the Soviet authorities, dreaming of making the 
desert bloom with cotton and, to a lesser extent, rice, diverted water from 
the rivers into vast irrigation projects. Aware of the consequences, they 
deemed cotton more valuable than the sea or the people who lived 
around it.
From 1960 the sea began to retreat. Salinity rose. Over the next 20 
years, the fish died out. The sea separated into a Small and Large Aral in 
1987–9. Windstorms blew toxic dust and salt from the desiccated seabed, 
Figure 0.2 Rusting ship on the dried-up seabed, 2004. Photograph by 
Vincent Robinot.
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poisoning the land around and its people, and spreading far beyond the 
region. A biological weapons laboratory on the remote Vozrozhdenie 
Island, abandoned after the Soviet collapse, was now connected to the 
mainland, posing an acute risk. Polluted water caused serious health 
problems. Thousands of people left. But the authorities continued to 
expand irrigation and failed to recognise the environmental disaster. 
Only in the more liberal climate of perestroika did the catastrophe 
become widely known across the USSR, becoming a cause célèbre for 
intellectuals and environmentalists. Popularised in the West in the 1990s, 
the Aral was located in Cold War categories, figuring, like Chernobyl, as 
a Soviet crime against people and against nature. It reads as a parable of 
Communist hubris: the totalitarian state seeks to control nature; nature 
takes its revenge. As a Canadian development worker wrote: ‘The Soviets 
targeted, condemned and sacrificed the Aral Sea’ (Ferguson 2003, 23).
After the USSR collapsed, the global notoriety of the disaster 
spawned scores of projects addressing the environmental degradation 
that stretched across the vast Aral basin. Most were unsuccessful. Locals 
would joke that, if everyone who had visited the Aral had brought a bucket 
of water, the sea would be full again. However, amid the many failures, 
two success stories stand out. Some Danish fishermen who visited 
the Kazakh shore in the early 1990s learnt that the sea was not dead, as 
was widely assumed: in the 1970s, as native species were dying, Soviet 
authorities had introduced flounder, a salt-tolerant fish; by the 1990s, 
flounder were thriving. Over the late 1990s and 2000s, the Danes set up a 
nongovernmental organisation, Aral Tenizi, and re-established a viable 
fishery on what was left of the Small Aral. Then, in 2005, efforts to stabilise 
the Small Aral finally bore fruit in the construction of the Kökaral dam by 
the World Bank and Kazakhstan government. As the level has risen, falling 
salinity has allowed the return of native fish (Micklin 2007; Micklin and 
Aladin 2008). The sea is now 15–20 km from the former Kazakh port of 
Aral’sk. The disaster is far from solved. While the acute danger posed by 
the exposed biological weapons laboratory resulted in a US-led clean-up 
operation in 2002, the Large Aral continues to shrink, and on the southern 
shore around the former port of Moynaq, despite some efforts to restore 
Amu Dariya delta lakes and wetlands, the situation remains bleak. Water 
is still withdrawn across Central Asia to grow cotton and rice. Nevertheless, 
the limited, technical solution for the Small Aral offers a hopeful, and 
photogenic, coda to the disaster story: images like those in Figures 0.3 and 
0.4 show nature’s force being channelled and contained, while fishermen 
turn again to their age-old occupation, interacting with their restored 
environment in a seemingly sustainable way.
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Figure 0.3 The Kökaral dam, 2015. Photograph by Vincent Robinot.
Figure 0.4 Fisherman casts his nets, autumn 2013. Source: author.
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It was with famous images like these in mind that I set off for 
fieldwork in late 2012. I was familiar with the extensive academic 
literature on the disaster, but this literature, while illuminating the causes 
of the sea’s regression and its multifarious effects on the local environment 
and human health, left little sense of the lives and livelihoods of those 
who have stayed in the region throughout. The view from space shows 
the global significance of the disaster, but occludes the lifeworlds of those 
who lived through it: global perspectives, like all perspectives, are partial 
and sited (Hastrup 2013). I had visited Aral’sk twice, like many foreigners, 
as a tourist, a disaster voyeur. In many ways it seemed not so different 
from other small towns in rural Kazakhstan – remote, economically 
depressed, the urban landscape still marked by the crumbling remnants 
of the Soviet past. Academic and journalistic accounts proposed a 
linear causation: politics destroys the sea; environmental change causes 
economic collapse and social rupture, a sea change in human society. Yet 
I was aware that people had lived through a different sort of sea change, 
the disintegration and transformation that followed the Soviet collapse, 
the birth of independent Kazakhstan and the move from a command 
economy to ‘wild capitalism’. How did these processes intersect with the 
environmental ruination wrought by the Soviet project? What futures did 
the restored sea offer to a region marginalised within Kazakhstan’s oil 
economy? Though I anticipated ambiguity, I expected that the disaster 
would constitute a ‘critical event’, a totalising framework overshadowing 
local imaginaries (Das 1995).
The view from Aral’sk
Alighting from the train in Aral’sk, I was greeted by a mosaic depicting 
a story from the Civil War (Figure 0.5): in 1921, Lenin wrote to Aral 
fishermen exhorting them to send fish to the Volga region, which was 
beset by famine. One winter’s night, fishermen from remote coastal 
villages – Bögen, Qarashalang, Qaratereng – went out onto the ice and 
caught a heroic haul of fish. Camels, ‘the ships of the steppe’ (dalanyng 
kemesï), invigorated with a swig of vodka and a chunk of pike, towed the 
fish by sledge to the nearest station. They filled 14 railway wagons, and 
the fish saved, I heard, millions from famine. Young people sometimes 
relate this story to the Second World War, but the point is clear: through 
Lenin’s letter, the sea was integrated into broader spaces. It was not only 
a natural object, not only the ancestral property of local Kazakhs: it was 
also a Soviet sea.
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Figure 0.5 Mosaic, Aral’sk station, 2009. The text reads: Na pis’mo 
Lenina otgruzim 14 vagonov ryby, ‘In response to Lenin’s letter, we will 
dispatch 14 wagons of fish.’ Source: author.
In the 12 months I spent in Aral’sk and surrounding villages between 
November 2012 and June 2014, I heard this story many times. It 
expressed pride in local identity. By contrast, many people were tired 
of the disaster narrative and the stigma it carries. Some critiqued the 
visual construction of disaster. As one friend told me, film crews search 
out the oldest, poorest inhabitants and the most decrepit houses, just to 
make everything look catastrophic. This framing, he implied, precludes 
the possibility that people might lead normal lives in the region. As a 
totalising discourse, global visions of disaster have little space for local 
perspectives. Similar to what Brown (2015, Chapter 3) finds in Chernobyl, 
while tourists and journalists wonder at the spectacularly photogenic 
environmental disaster and equally photogenic recovery, the region is 
rather more mundane. People are puzzled by the foreign visitors: what 
do they want to see in Aral’sk? Indeed, in the initial months of my 
fieldwork, I was struck by how little people talked about disaster. They 
looked blank when I explained my research in terms of Aral apaty, the 
Kazakh phrase I had learnt for ‘Aral disaster’.2 Perhaps this is unsurprising. 
Anthropological theorisations of disasters, as ‘revelatory crises’ (e.g. 
Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2002) that lay bare societal structures, are 
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informed by events such as earthquakes. Lacking the temporal bounded- 
ness of an event, the gradual regression of the Aral does not work on the 
imagination like one-off disasters: there is no clear before and after, no 
dividing line at which the world was turned upside down.3
Certainly, there is a register for mourning the sea, expressed in the 
idiom Aral qasïretï, the ‘grief’ or ‘sorrow’ of the Aral, but this was muted 
by the time of my fieldwork. Moreover, I found older people sometimes 
blurring the disappearance of the sea with the demise of the USSR. 
Others would insist that, even though the sea had gone, the eighties were 
a good time, because there was work. I came to see that the sea’s gradual 
regression had overlapped with processes by which the Soviet authorities 
sought to mitigate its effects. Though limited and uneven, these processes 
inflected memories of the sea’s regression, which did not always figure as 
the sea change that I expected.
Indeed, if the environmental disaster narrative elided the lived 
experience of Soviet socialism and its aftermath, I found that this story 
loomed as large for my informants as that of environmental change, 
sometimes larger. Everyone agreed that the really bad time was the 
1990s, when the USSR disintegrated and ecological devastation was 
compounded by widespread economic crisis, inflation and unemployment. 
Unsurprisingly, no one was keen to talk about this dismal time. There is a 
widespread consensus across the region that things have improved since 
then: people are now returning to the region. Yet I found more ambiguity 
than the well-worn narrative of environmental recovery implies. Images 
like those above depict a restored sea, but they occlude the complex 
mix of private and state regulation within which the post-Soviet sea is 
constituted; they do not show the lucrative markets for zander extending 
as far west as Germany, or the markets for illegal nets from China; they 
do not show the ailing fish plants in Aral’sk which suffer from a paradoxical 
shortage of fish. In short, they cannot capture the complex, variegated 
patterns of social change instigated by the restored sea.
Thus, rather than a singular critical event that overshadowed 
local imaginaries, I encountered multiple meanings ascribed to the Aral 
regression and partial recovery. In one register, the regression was a 
normal economic loss which could be absorbed by importing resources 
from elsewhere in Soviet space; in another, the Aral was the ancestral 
property of local Kazakh lineages. Some informants echoed the cata- 
strophic accounts of perestroika intellectuals; others polemicised against 
all forms of disaster narrative, which they took as an affront to local 
pride. For some, the dam and restored sea speak hopefully of the 
sovereignty of independent Kazakhstan extending to a remote region; 
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for others, the failure of the sea to reach Aral’sk, the failure of environ- 
mental restoration to translate into widespread employment, speaks of 
state failure that contrasts with rosy memories of Soviet socialism.
For the ethnographer, as for Bakhtin’s novelist, ‘the object is always 
entangled in someone else’s discourse (oputan chuzhim slovom) about 
it, it is already present with qualifications, an object of dispute that is 
conceptualized and evaluated variously, inseparable from the heteroglot 
social apperception of it’ (Bakhtin 1981b, 330). I initially construed the 
ethnographic endeavour naïvely, as a quest for the pure, uncontaminated 
discourse of ‘the local’ without the ensnaring discourses of outsiders. 
But hacking through the thicket of discourses surrounding the Aral 
only multiplied the object. There was no homogeneous, bounded local. 
Sometimes my informants would talk of scientists discovering salt from 
the Aral as far away as Japan. If their point was to illustrate the global 
significance of the sea’s demise, they equally showed how the Aral is 
reconstituted through this global connection: the local is inherently 
‘perforated’ (Hastrup 2009), local discourses ‘shot through’ with other 
discourses (Bakhtin 1981b, 276).
If there was little talk of ‘disaster’, I quickly became attuned to 
discussions about ekologiia (Ru./Kaz.: ‘ecology’), which locally signifies 
environmental problems affecting human health. This usage dates from 
the late 1980s, when the regression was finally officially recognised as an 
environmental disaster. In 1989 a decree of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR declared the region zona ekologicheskogo bedstviia, ‘an ecological 
disaster zone’ (Zonn et al. 2009, 267). Aral’sk raion, like its neighbours, 
became known as an ekologicheskii raion, ‘an ecological raion’. But 
ekologiia too is ambiguous. Certainly, many acknowledge the presence of 
ekologiia, as an explanation for the myriad health problems faced in the 
region. However, they do not unambiguously connect ekologiia with the 
sea’s regression. Just over 200 km from Aral’sk is Baikonur, from where 
Gagarin was launched into the cosmos. The cosmodrome, on land rented 
by Russia, is still active today – and on a day-to-day basis, ekologiia and its 
ill effects are blamed on the ongoing rocket launches.
Moreover, not everyone agrees there is ekologiia. As an outsider, 
I would be asked if I noticed ekologiia. Once a fisherman, out on the ice 
under pale blue skies in a howling gale, declared that people always said 
that there was ekologiia in the region, but he didn’t notice it – whereas 
the city, that was where the air was dirty. Having come from London via 
Almaty not long before, I had to concur. Others insist that local Kazakhs, 
because of their nomadic past, have got used to ekologiia (and vodka can 
help mitigate it), unlike the non-Kazakhs who used to live in the region 
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but left. Indeed, most people also talk extensively about the region’s 
natural bounty: Aral meat and dairy products are the tastiest in the 
country because of the salt in the vegetation.
Environmental anthropology of Central Asia
What we make of environmental change, then, and what it makes of 
us, depends on the multiple ways in which it is insinuated into our lived 
experience. In this book, I show that the regression and partial restoration 
of the Aral Sea cannot be analytically separated from the processes, 
continuities and ruptures of Soviet socialism and postsocialism. In 
fleshing out this claim, I advance two sets of arguments. First, within 
different sets of relations, environmental change comes to mean different 
things. Over the course of this book, the Aral regression will emerge 
as a necessary economic process, a bureaucratic problem, an escalating 
catastrophe, a cultural loss. If environmental change assumes political 
agency, this agency depends on how material effects are apprehended. As 
a bureaucratic problem, the sea’s regression prompted a specific, limited 
set of official responses; as an escalating catastrophe during perestroika, 
it prompted calls, albeit frustrated, for a far more wide-reaching transform- 
ation. The political agency of environmental change further depends on 
historical and material contingencies: if the perestroika vision was 
ultimately frustrated by the Soviet collapse, the Aral Sea disaster that 
was apprehended by the 1990s transnational development community 
would ultimately translate into the restoration of the Small Aral – but 
only after the disruptive agency of Danish activists and flounder together 
proved that the sea was alive.
Secondly, the capacity of environmental change to effect social 
change is bound up with the valuation, extraction, processing and 
circulation of natural resources, located within the wider political-
economic context. I explore this through the history of the fishery, whose 
trajectory does not map neatly onto the receding and return of the sea. 
The sea that receded was a socialist sea: its fish were extracted and 
processed within the command economy, and would circulate across 
Soviet ‘gridded space’ (Brown 2015) – and when the sea receded, this 
same gridded space facilitated the import of ocean fish for processing 
in Aral’sk, and the sending of fishermen to other lakes in Kazakhstan.4 
The survival of the Soviet fishery even without the sea afforded, amid en- 
vironmental devastation, a measure of continuity, and is even sometimes 
remembered as strengthening the social contract. The sea that has 
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returned is a postsocialist sea, subject to new forms of regulation, and 
fishing and fish processing depend on the divergent values ascribed to 
fish on transnational markets, driving variegated patterns of social 
change across the region.5
In making these arguments, I will be making a case for an environ- 
mental anthropology of post-Soviet Central Asia.6 Despite widespread 
ecological degradation, environmental concerns have been marginal 
to the regional ethnography. Foregrounding them, I suggest, enriches 
the wider field of environmental anthropology in three ways. First, a 
political ecology shaped by the state-socialist legacy provides a valuable 
counterpoint to accounts of environmental change in Western contexts 
or contexts shaped by Western colonial legacies. Indeed, if anthropologists 
are increasingly recognising the multiple ways in which nature is ‘done’, 
the state-socialist/postsocialist context shows how not all ‘versions’ of 
nature are equal, as the informal exercise of power has prioritised some 
over others. Secondly, the region’s ambiguous enrolment in modernity, 
whereby modernist models of nature were both imposed from outside and 
internalised, has resulted in heterogeneous ways of doing nature that 
cannot be reduced to compliance with or resistance to modernist projects. 
Finally, I will suggest that the intersection of large-scale political-economic 
transformation following the Soviet collapse with environmental change 
demands that we rethink concepts of adaptation and resilience.
A political ecology of socialism and after
The demise of the Aral Sea speaks to core concerns of contemporary 
environmental anthropology. The unceasing expansion of irrigation 
and cotton plantations is an instance of what Tsing calls the ‘scalable’ 
projects of modernity, premised on the quantitative growth of abstracted 
commodities, ‘as if the entanglements of living did not matter’ (2015, 5). 
Operationalising nature as a resource to be mastered to serve human 
progress, Soviet modernity violently reordered environments and human– 
environment entanglements, leaving ruination. No less than Tsing’s 
(2015) ruined industrial forests of Oregon, the dried-up bed of the Aral 
stands witness to the ruination inherent in modernist projects. After all, 
as Buck-Morss (2002, xi) reminds us, both socialist and capitalist systems 
were premised on similar dreams, with comparable catastrophic human 
and environmental outcomes.
However, while global comparisons are significant, there was 
something distinctive about Soviet modernity. If this story forms part of 
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‘the history of the human concentration of wealth through making 
both humans and nonhumans into resources for investment’ (Tsing 2015, 
5), how investments were made, how wealth was concentrated – and 
redistributed – differed between East and West. I thus take up Peet and 
Watts’ (1996, 10) call for a political ecology of state socialism. Such a 
political ecology starts, on the one hand, from the quantitative growth of 
fixed assets that maximised the power of the state apparatus (Fehér, 
Heller and Márkus 1983; cf. Weiner 1999, 15–16) and, on the other, from 
the ‘economics of shortage’ (Kornai 1980) that frustrated centralised 
control. Both these tendencies drove ecological degradation in Central 
Asia: quantitative expansion of irrigation maximised central control, 
which was simultaneously undermined by leaks, waste and competition 
over water at every level. So too with the Aral fisheries, labour and 
resources were largely controlled by a single state enterprise, but efforts 
to intensify fishing practices were undermined by lack of investment, 
poor labour discipline and pilfering. This legacy is critical for under- 
standing postsocialist transformations. While I am not proposing a 
unitary ‘political ecology of postsocialism’, the continuities with, as well 
as differences from, the socialist fishery help in understanding how 
the contemporary fishery has emerged as a ‘pericapitalist’ (Tsing 2015) 
formation within a heterogeneous terrain of new global connections.
These political ecologies are crucial for understanding not only 
what drives environmental change, but also what it comes to mean. 
Thinking through these questions, I will draw on approaches in environ- 
mental anthropology which, moving beyond modernist assumptions 
of a singular nature to be controlled by human society, explore how 
nature is ‘done’ in different contexts. Exemplary in this regard is Lien’s 
(2015) ethnography of Norwegian salmon farming. Despite the apparent 
singularity of the context, she shows that, as salmon are enrolled in 
heterogeneous assemblages of people and things, they emerge as different, 
if partially connected, entities – now as biomass, now as sentient beings, 
now as hungry, now as alien invaders. In what follows, I show how the 
Aral emerges at different moments in history as a multiple object as it is 
entangled in different configurations of space and time, infrastructures, 
structures of value and regimes of nature – although, while Lien (2015) is 
inspired by science and technology studies (STS), my theoretical pathway 
to multiplicity shall be, as I elaborate later in this Introduction, through 
Bakhtin and his concept of the chronotope.
However, where Lien (2015, 23) writes of ‘a multiplicity of ever-
emergent human-natural worlds that sometimes rub up against one 
another, sometimes cause controversy and friction, and sometimes 
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unfold quietly side by side’, in the post-Soviet context, multiple worlds 
coexist less comfortably. As Richardson (2014) notes, STS approaches are 
often couched within liberal assumptions about politics: the suggestion 
that reality can be multiple is a democratising force (e.g. Mol 1999). 
By contrast, in Richardson’s (2014) ethnography of a failed irrigation 
project in Ukraine, activists’ efforts to establish that the waterbody was 
toxic and valueless, and thus in need of environmental restoration, were 
frustrated by powerful interests that multiplied some connections while 
suppressing others, such that alternative, economically valuable, versions 
of the waterbody emerged: a drinking water reservoir, and a fishery. 
As Richardson (2014, 6) remarks, the STS focus on human–nonhuman 
symmetry risks occluding ‘which asymmetries among humans may affect 
which reality can exist’. If, then, multiple versions of the Aral have 
emerged before it receded, during its recession and since its partial 
restoration, not all have been equal; we will focus not only on the 
connections, but also the disconnections, the obfuscations, the cultivated 
ignorance that prioritise certain versions over others.
Ambiguous modernity
A further potential for environmental anthropology lies in the ambiguous 
relationship of Central Asian peoples to modernity, and to modernist 
paradigms of nature. Soviet modernisation processes both were and 
were not an alien imposition, leaving a legacy between postcoloniality 
and postsocialism (Abashin 2015; Kandiyoti 2002). This is evident 
in the recent historiography of the devastating famine that Bolshevik 
collectivisation policies unleashed in Kazakhstan in 1931–4 when 
‘backward’ Kazakh nomads were to be modernised by being forcibly 
settled in collective farms and their livestock requisitioned to feed urban 
centres outside Kazakhstan. In Cameron’s (2018) environmental history, 
as the Bolsheviks sought to remake the Kazakh nation and the steppe 
environment together, rigid economic plans ignored the ecological 
instability to which the flexibility of nomadic life had been adapted. In 
the appalling hunger that killed around 1.5 million people, pre-existing 
clan structures were shattered as the steppe descended into violence. 
And yet, both Cameron (2018) and Kindler (2018) stress that the famine 
cemented Soviet rule by leaving the survivors totally dependent on the 
state. Indeed, Kindler draws out how survival depended on complicity, 
compromise and silence. The networks necessary for survival during 
the famine, deeply implicated with Party-state structures, lived on in 
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post-famine collective farms, kolkhozy, what Kindler (2018, 2) calls 
‘Sovietization by hunger’.
The recent environmental historiography of the Aral Sea basin 
similarly draws out both the violence of early Soviet rule and the degree 
to which Central Asian people came to have a stake in, and desire, 
infrastructures and technologies of mastering nature. Peterson (2019) 
documents the tragic irony of the supposedly emancipatory Bolshevik 
project reconstituting that epitome of capitalist oppression, the cotton 
plantation. However, she also shows how what was, materially, a continu- 
ation of the colonial-extractive project came to be cast as liberation from 
the dual oppression of Tsarist rule and of the arid environment. Indeed, 
Obertreis (2017) describes how the proliferating technical and scientific 
networks that sustained the expansion of irrigation at any cost were 
deeply indigenised, and how the legitimacy of the entire Soviet project 
in Central Asia came to rest on irrigation, especially after economic 
growth accelerated in the 1960s. Thus, in Uzbekistan today there is deep 
ambivalence about cotton: while ecologically and socially damaging, it is 
nevertheless felt to represent modernity (Trevisani 2010; Zanca 2010).
More broadly, Central Asia’s place in the Soviet economy was 
premised on export of agricultural goods and, especially in Kazakhstan, 
minerals, with little development of heavy industry (Gleason 1991; 
Rumer 1989). However, not quite balancing this quasi-colonial extractive 
relation was a countervailing tendency to redistribution: the social 
contract of socialism promised a gradual rise in living standards – 
especially as post-Stalinist economic growth saw the Soviet welfare 
state extend into remote rural locations (Kalinovsky 2018). Modernity 
increasingly came with ‘expectations’ (Ferguson 1999). If, in Brown’s 
(2015) evocative description, space was organised into ‘gridded matrices’, 
the grid facilitated the flow of raw commodities to the centre and the 
redistributed fruits of modernity back into the periphery. In this way, 
people came to live ‘gridded lives’.
Certainly, Soviet space was not homogeneous. Recent ethnography 
has highlighted the diverse modes of connection between Moscow and 
Central Asia: some sites, of more material value to the centre, were 
more incorporated than others (Mostowlansky 2017; Pelkmans 2013; 
Reeves 2014, Chapter 3). Yet, while the fulfilment of the promise 
embedded in the social contract was wildly uneven, the promise itself is 
significant (Reeves 2014, 138). This ambiguous enrolment in Soviet 
modernity also involved enrolment in Soviet ways of ‘doing’ nature. 
Thus, in Mostowlansky’s (2017, 27–9) ethnography of the Pamir Highway 
in Tajikistan, an engineering feat that materialised modernity in the 
ENVIRONMENT AND POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAL REGION 14
Pamirs, ‘the roof of the world’, he describes how the road facilitated the 
stocking of a mountain lake with Siberian carp in the 1960s: what was a 
sacred lake is now a valued fishpond.
As Mostowlansky (2017) poignantly describes, amid material 
disintegration, there is a sense that modernity has passed, echoing 
Tsing’s (2015) and Buck-Morss’s (1999) evocations of the demise of 
dreams of mass utopia East and West. Yet, Mostowlansky also shows 
how ongoing state discourses and projects of modernisation continue 
to promise bright futures premised on new global connections. This is 
evident in the contemporary appeal of vast dam projects in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan (Féaux de la Croix 2016; Suyarkulova 2015). In Kazakhstan 
too, sovereignty is projected in official modernisation strategies: first 
Kazakhstan-2030, formulated in 1997, offered a vision for the long-term 
development of the country; in 2012, this future was superseded by the 
Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy. These visions of the future do not offer mass 
utopias, but rather the economic stability within which to realise private 
consumerist utopias (Adams and Rustemova 2009; Laszczkowski 2011, 
90). Unlike the Soviet social contract, compliance with authoritarian rule 
depends on modernisation which promises the conditions for private 
citizens to acquire wealth (Kudaibergenova 2015). Critically, this promise 
depends on the oil economy, which continues to exploit environments 
across Kazakhstan (e.g. Zonn 2002).7
However, processes of modernisation past and present are not 
unidirectional. Central Asian socialities cannot be reduced to the shadow 
of the ‘gridded lives’ of Soviet modernity. Indeed, Mostowlansky (2017, 
33–4) describes first encountering the sacred-lake-turned-fishpond while 
travelling to pilgrimage sites (mazar) that have developed along the 
road. The road, he thus argues, has reshaped local socialities in ways that 
exceeded the ideological expectations of its planners, reconstituting 
cultural forms that resist the teleology of modernisation. This is not to 
suggest a dichotomy between ‘modernity’ and recalcitrant ‘tradition’. As 
Kandiyoti (1996; 2002) argues, Soviet ‘modernisation without the market’ 
resulted in a complex transformation: formal dysfunction of the command 
economy necessitated informal practices, which reproduced pre-existing 
identities but transformed them in the process. Similarly, in his monumental 
historical ethnography of a village in Tajikistan, Abashin (2015) describes 
how modernisation processes embedded ‘Sovietness’ in everyday life, while 
simultaneously reconstituting local cultural practices, which increasingly 
became understood as national tradition. Showing how people moved 
without contradiction between spaces deemed ‘Soviet’ and spaces deemed 
‘our own’, ‘national’ or ‘Muslim’, Abashin thus replaces dichotomies of 
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modernity/tradition, compliance/resistance with a heterogeneous picture 
of Soviet Central Asian society as a ‘mosaic’ or ‘kaleidoscope’.
Féaux de la Croix (2016) draws out the geographical implications 
of this ambiguous modernisation in her exploration of the dams, sacred 
shrines and mountain pastures that coexist in the Kyrgyz countryside. 
Contrasting her material with the coherent landscapes described by eth- 
nographers of Mongolia, she describes a heterogeneous ‘moral geography’ 
where different understandings of value and worth, often held by the same 
people, are anchored in sites that are variously associated with resource 
politics, religious belief and the pastoral good life. If modernist dam 
projects seem to be located in an abstract space, this space ‘is not an 
a priori, but a vision’, and an achievement; it is the ‘quality of a place’, and 
as such, for Soviet nostalgics, it can even have a certain ‘romance’ (Féaux 
de la Croix 2016, 295). Thus, weighing various theoretical approaches to 
space/place, she concludes that different places ‘have more space-like or 
more landscape-like qualities’ (Féaux de la Croix 2016, 34). What emerges 
is a coexistence of different ways of doing space and nature which, though 
perceived as more ‘modern’ or more ‘traditional’, are coeval and mutually 
constitutive. This is a different sort of multiplicity to, say, Lien’s (2015) 
multiple salmon, which all emerge within a recognisably modernist 
paradigm, albeit a heterogeneous one. Thus, if Lien (2015, 22–3) opposes 
her practical ontological multiplicity to the radical alterity proposed in 
some non-Western contexts (e.g. Pedersen 2011), post-Soviet Central Asia 
forces us to think between the two: heterogeneous ways of doing nature 
within an ambiguous modernity where modernisation processes have 
repeatedly reconstituted their ‘traditional’ other.
Adaptation over a century of catastrophes
The final contribution this book will bring to environmental anthro- 
pology is to understandings of adaptation. ‘[E]nvironmental changes’, 
write Hastrup and Rubow (2014, 4), ‘cannot be kept apart from social life 
in general, or isolated as changes-in-themselves.’ Not only on the Aral, 
but across Kazakhstan, the ruination wrought by Soviet modernity 
intersects with the ruins of Soviet modernity. This offers a rich terrain 
for thinking through the analytical challenge of integrating our accounts 
of environmental change with a social that has been repeatedly, and 
traumatically, remade over the last century. Intertwined with what 
Grant (1995), in Siberia, describes as a ‘century of perestroikas’ was a 
century of catastrophes: the implosion of imperial space amid world war 
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and Civil War, the violent disentangling of the nomadic economy 
during collectivisation, the Great Patriotic War, nuclear testing in eastern 
Kazakhstan, the Virgin Lands programme, the Aral regression and the 
Soviet collapse, each followed by a rebuilding that reshaped social 
worlds and local environments. In the terms proposed by Alexander and 
Sanchez (2019), my informants have been dealing both with the wastes, 
environmental and human, produced by socialism, and with the new 
indeterminacies, between waste and value, of postsocialist disinte- 
gration and transformation. This is evident in Stawkowski’s (2016) 
ethnography of the former nuclear testing sites of eastern Kazakhstan, 
where ‘biological’ subjectivities emerge from the intersection of radio- 
activity with postsocialist marginalisation. Describing themselves as 
‘mutants’, Stawkowski’s informants claim to have adapted to radiation 
(as with Aral residents’ encounters with ekologiia, vodka helps). This 
mutant subjectivity, Stawkowski proposes, helps reassert local pride in 
face of the dual stigma of victimhood and rurality.
Both the Aral Sea and the nuclear Polygon are rhetorically located as 
victims of the Soviet project, thus stressing their value to independent 
Kazakhstan, founded on the equal value of all Kazakhs. However, the 
uneven development of the oil economy marginalises peripheral territories, 
producing surplus populations suspended between waste and value. How, 
then, are we to think about a concept like ‘adaptation’ to environmental 
change in a context where people have also had to adapt to the disinte- 
gration of material infrastructure, to the collapse of socialist frameworks 
of meaning and value, and to the emergence of new ideologies and 
actualities of the market? What happens to the concept of ‘resilience’ when 
local worlds have been repeatedly ‘perforated’ (Hastrup 2009) not only by 
environmental degradation, but also by integration into Soviet space, the 
disintegration of that space and reintegration into circuits of global capital?
In the following section, I introduce my fieldsites. Homing in on an 
ethnographic vignette about a fishing net, I will then lay out my particular 
theoretical approach, which integrates contemporary interest in material 
agency with a Bakhtinian approach to discourse, human history and 
political economy. I close the introduction by applying this approach to 
the history of the fisheries.
Locating the Aral
I flew to Kazakhstan’s former capital, Almaty (formerly Alma-Ata) in 
November 2012, the plane full of members of Kazakhstan’s new middle 
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classes, beneficiaries of the country’s oil wealth. I spent some time in 
Almaty, where the old gridded Soviet city was still just about legible amid 
glass office blocks and luxury flats. I found that ‘the Aral Sea’ was an 
object of curiosity among older inhabitants who remembered its fame in 
the 1980s and 1990s. However, amid present concerns about economic 
crisis, perestroika-era concern for the environment had largely faded, 
and the Aral region was marginal to most imaginings of contemporary 
Kazakhstan. My Kazakh teacher warned me of the dangers of going to 
such a polluted region, insisting that I wear a mask at all times, while 
simultaneously waxing lyrical about how I would find the most ‘authentic’ 
Kazakhs, their traditions still intact.
While in Almaty, I turned to the solid grey building which houses 
the state archives, seeking details and thickness to the Soviet past, about 
which official discourse today is muted. Indeed, though lip service is paid 
to the country’s sufferings (the Aral Sea, nuclear testing, the Virgin Lands 
programme), this does not constitute a strong anti-Soviet postcolonial 
narrative. After all, in an ethnically diverse country, the authorities 
have avoided encouraging strong ethnonationalist sentiment (Cameron 
2018, Epilogue; Davé 2007; Kindler 2018, Chapter 7). Moreover, the 
then president, Nazarbayev, and the country’s elite all rose through 
the Soviet system. So, while Kazakhstani statehood is legitimised by 
claims of cultural authenticity and continuity, based on symbols from the 
pre-Soviet past (Alexander 2004b; Buchli 2007; Dubuisson and Genina 
2012; Privratsky 2001), there is little narrative arc encompassing the 
recent past. Kazakhstan-2030 makes hardly any mention of Soviet 
legacies; Kazakhstan-2050 makes none. The overwhelming orientation 
is to the future: sovereignty is imagined in Astana, Kazakhstan’s shiny 
new capital since 1997, which promises a bright future for an imagined 
collectivity (Laszczkowski 2011; 2014; 2016).8
From Almaty I travelled by train to Aral’sk, a journey of 30–40 hours 
across 1,600 km of relentlessly flat snow-covered steppe and semi-desert. 
Fellow passengers included large families on their way to weddings; 
shift workers on their way to or from work on oilfields or in uranium 
mines (often drinking their way through the brief freedom between the 
constraints of home life and work life); students; parents visiting children 
working in oil on the Caspian; and Astana migrants visiting families in 
Qyzylorda. I took this journey several times over the following year. 
Conversations captured all the ambiguities of early 2010s Kazakhstan: 
the beauty of Astana; the pervasive corruption; the morality of the Soviet 
past; the bright future that might lie ahead if Kazakhstan could diversify 
its economy; the need for the younger generation to move away from 
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Soviet-era practices; the threat and opportunity posed by increasing 
dependence on China. Sometimes as we passed through the heavily 
salinised land in Qyzylorda oblast, older people would talk about the 
damage of the Soviet legacy – not just the damage to the Aral Sea, but the 
destruction of the nomadic way of life.
Aral’sk is the raion centre, a town of some 30,000 inhabitants, 
450 km from the oblast capital, Qyzylorda. In many ways, it is a typical 
small post-Soviet town. The old Soviet buildings are decaying; the 
closed factories are rusting. Sand swirls everywhere. Camels stroll up 
and down the streets, and cows graze off rubbish heaps. There are no 
cinemas and no supermarkets. There is, however, a bustling market and 
a range of bars and cafes; if the public space can seem depressed, new 
private houses abound. Clean drinking water from a vast aquifer in the 
desert was brought here in 1990. In the mid-2000s it was piped to 
individual households, and it now reaches all villages in the raion. There 
is no centralised sewage in Aral’sk, and during my fieldwork there was 
no piped gas, though it was promised soon. There is a perception that 
there are no jobs in Aral’sk, which relates to its peripherality within 
Kazakhstan. However, Astana is strikingly visible, depicted on billboards 
around the town and beamed into households in daily TV news – a 
constant reminder both of Aral’sk’s peripherality and of what its residents 
might aspire to.
I stayed with various families during my fieldwork. My first host- 
family kept livestock, and my obligations as a guest included feeding the 
animals, mucking out and keeping dung for fuel. My landlady worked in 
school administration; my landlord worked informally as a taxi driver. 
Later I lived with a retired Russian couple, among the few non-Kazakhs 
left in Aral’sk. On my final trip I lived with a couple who worked as an 
accountant and a vet. Much of my data from the town comes from 
conversations with my hosts, their relatives, friends and colleagues, and 
others I got to know: kitchen conversations over countless bowls of tea 
while Kazakh or Russian news played in the background. Daily comings 
and goings of relatives, friends and colleagues spoke of the connections 
people maintain both within the town and beyond, and the various 
means of sustaining these relationships: one day we would be drinking 
beer with a colleague among the tulips on the steppe for 1 May; another 
day there would be a feast with kin and the Mullah to commemorate 
a dead relative, involving bauyrsaq (fried dough), fried carp, qazy 
(sausage) and the Kazakh speciality besbarmaq.
I would travel to the village of Bögen in a rattling Soviet-era bus 
crammed with sacks of flour, potatoes and other goods. As the bus leaves 
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Aral’sk, it climbs to the main road above the town, where there is a large 
cemetery. Everyone wipes their hands over their faces and says Äumin, 
‘Amen’. As the bus joins the main road south, the under-construction 
Western China to Western Europe highway, modern container lorries 
thunder past. Freight trains laden with oil snake through the undulating 
dunes. Apart from the large herding village of Aralqūm, settlements are 
sparse and small.
A hundred kilometres from Aral’sk, the bus reaches the village of 
Qamystybas (‘reedy lake’), situated by the lake of the same name, which 
forms part of an extensive delta lake system. Fields of cereals lay here 
until the eighteenth century, when irrigation channels burst in spring 
floods and the lakes formed.9 At Qamystybas, one road branches to the 
south, towards Raiym, formerly a kolkhoz, which lies between a lake and 
a steep hill of mud and gravel. At the top of the hill, barely visible, are the 
traces of a fort built by Tsarist explorers in 1848. A view extends over 
expanses of interconnected lakes, deep blue amid the yellows and greys 
of the surrounding steppe. A mud dyke runs across the marshes, placed 
there by Nikolai Patsha (Tsar Nicholas II), to bring a water pipe to Aral’sk 
from the Syr Dariya (Figure 0.6). To the south the view extends to Lake 
Aqshatau, where the ülken ata (ancestor) of the Zhaqaiym lineage (ru) is 
buried; descendants from all over the country visit the shrine.
My bus does not go to Raiym, but turns off onto a road along the 
southern shore of Lake Qamystybas. This road has been tarmacked 
recently, some say because oil will be extracted. A few hundred metres 
from the road there are some mud structures: Stalin kolkhoz, established 
in the 1930s, later abandoned; the structures are the remains of the 
zemlianki, mud huts which passed for housing when Kazakhs were 
sedentarised. The next stop is Qoszhar, on the shores of Qamystybas, 
where the state fish-hatchery, established in 1966, hatches valuable 
carp species. Next the bus arrives in Amanötkel, a large village where 
livelihoods are based on herding, fishing and some cultivation. This is syr 
country, where the soil is not salty, and is suitable for cattle. Around the 
sea’s northern shores, towards Zhalangash, Tastübek and Aqespe, away 
from the freshening influence of the river, is arid qyr country (Figure 
0.7), the land heavily salinised and full of wormwood, suitable pasture 
for camels.
The bus now heads away from the river and lakes, across rolling 
steppe. Twenty kilometres from Amanötkel, we pass the eastern end of 
Lake Tūshchy. Tūshchy was restored as part of the Small Aral restoration 
project, when weirs along the Syr Dariya were renovated. Until the 1960s 
millet was grown here, but today around the lake all is bare. Beyond the 
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Figure 0.6 View towards Raiym from Nikolai Patsha’s dyke, spring 
2014. The fort was on top of the hill in the distance. Source: author.
Figure 0.7 Qyr country near Tastübek, spring 2014. Source: author.
lake the bus drives up a hill into Bögen, a village of 140 houses; from the 
hill, the traveller would once have seen the sea stretching out to the west. 
Down the hill there is a war memorial and a shrine to Zhamanköz, the 
ülken ata of a small lineage. The village cemetery is at a high point behind 
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the village, overlooking Tūshchy. At the foot of the hill, the scrubby sand 
runs down to meet a strip of salinised mud – once the bottom of the 
harbour. Nearby stands a decrepit compound, once the headquarters of 
the Bögen State Fishing Base. Today the akimat (mayor’s office) stands in 
this compound. On a wall, the painted Kazakhstan-2030 logo is fading, 
but a poster depicts the new future which has replaced it, Kazakhstan-
2050. Bögen has had electricity since Soviet times; piped water to every 
household is more recent. In the last few years, phone lines were installed 
in all villages in the region; mobile connection remains patchy. The main 
economic activity in Bögen today, as in Soviet times, is fishing. The sea is 
12 km away by rough track. The recovery of the fishery since 2005 has 
brought an influx of money to the village; most villagers now have UAZ 
jeeps, and many have built new houses.
After Bögen, the crumbling tarmac terminates and the bus will 
turn to the south, to Qarashalang (‘black seaweed’). Beyond Qarashalang 
the road crosses the river at Aghlaq, where a recently renovated sluice 
regulates the river flow. In Soviet times, after the sea had been written 
off, a dam was placed here, so that the trickle of water in the river 
would water lakes further upstream. Twenty kilometres to the south is 
Qaratereng (‘the black deep’), a large village once lying amid sea, lake 
and marsh; just a few small lakes remain. Soon after Qaratereng, the 
gravel track turns west onto the Kökaral dyke towards Aqbasty. To the 
south, along the former shoreline and on former islands, lie remains 
of abandoned villages, far from water sources: Ūzyn Qaiyr, Qasqaqūlan, 
Ūialy. It is three to four hours from Aral’sk to Bögen, depending on 
weather conditions, and another hour to Qarashalang. Previously, they 
would all have been connected to Aral’sk by sea – and in Soviet times 
Bögen, Qaratereng and Ūialy were even connected to Aral’sk by air.
Fishing and daily life
In Bögen, I stayed with Zhaqsylyq, an important figure in the con- 
temporary fishery. His family lives in a large house near the former 
shoreline. The house looks onto a courtyard, also enclosing the sarai, the 
shed which acts as summer quarters. Zhaqsylyq and his wife Gulzhamal 
live with their eldest son Zikön and his wife Gulnar, who, as kelïn 
(daughter-in-law), is responsible for most household chores. Two younger 
unmarried sons also live at home, Maqsat and Mūkhtar. The daughters 
are all married, most outside Bögen, as is usual in a strictly exogamous 
society. My access while in the village was predominantly to male worlds. 
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During fishing seasons, I spent most days accompanying Zhaqsylyq to the 
receiving-station, observing fish being handed in, chatting to fishermen 
as they sorted their nets, helping move sacks of fish. Periods of boredom 
would be spent squatting near the ground eating sunflower seeds 
(semechki), a habit which suspends time. During my first winter, evenings 
were passed drinking in Zhaqsylyq’s sarai while fishermen sorted their 
nets, divided up fish and quizzed me about prices in the UK.
When fishing was impossible in the summer, I was told that 
fishermen would be ‘relaxing’. But apart from the occasional tasty 
besbarmaq of newly fattened lambs, I have seldom spent a less relaxing 
time than those hot days in Bögen. I was enlisted into building projects: 
dusty seaweed (shalang) had to be gathered from the dried-up seabed 
(Figure 0.8), which was then laid on the roof as insulation with the 
collective help (asar) of a large group of men, rewarded with a besbarmaq; 
or hundreds of bricks had to be made from sand, clay and reeds in the 
baking sun while Enrique Iglesias sang from someone’s mobile phone.
Early in my fieldwork I watched the process of laying nets (au salu) 
through the ice with Zhaqsylyq’s sons and their fellow fishermen: two of 
their cousins, Bolat and Zhüman; Zhaqsylyq’s bazha (wife’s sister’s 
husband) from Amanötkel, Müsïlïm; and a neighbour, Aikeldï. The 
day begins as usual with Gulnar waking us with a brusquely repeated 
Tūr! (‘Get up!’). After some bread, butter and tea, and after swathing 
ourselves in layers of clothes, we are off. Zikön drives the UAZ; Müsïlïm, 
the oldest, sits in the front; the rest of us are crowded into the back, 
Figure 0.8 Gathering shalang from the dried-up seabed, summer 
2013. Source: author.
introduCtion 23
sitting uncomfortably on a plank which jumps around as we bounce 
over sand and snow. The air is thick with cigarette smoke, the smell of 
fish, Kazakh pop music blaring from an MP3, and Russian curses at the 
discomfort of an extra body in the cramped UAZ. Out on the sea, where 
it is bitterly cold with a howling wind, we encounter another group of 
fishermen and there is boisterous discussion. They have just made a 
hole in the ice, and Maqsat, the youngest brother, offers a little token 
help shovelling ice out. They tell us that yesterday they were unlucky 
here. We drive on, and stop about 5 km offshore. The older fishermen 
have a draught of vodka (Figure 0.9). Everyone except the two youngest 
brothers discusses where to lay nets.
Most fishermen have a handheld metal bar (lom) for breaking 
the ice, but we have a Soviet-era petrol-powered drill, towed behind the 
UAZ. Ice is removed from the drill and pole with a petrol-burner. Aikeldï 
and Zikön drill holes through the 45-cm-thick ice at 20-m intervals. 
Meanwhile, a long pole has been lowered into the water, and Zhüman 
manoeuvres it along under the ice with a two-pronged fork (Figure 0.10). 
A string is attached to the pole, and once this is pulled through, Bolat 
extracts it with the hook, and Mūkhtar uses it to haul the net through 
from one hole to the next. The net is a 100-m fixed gillnet, with stones 
tied to one edge to anchor it. Meanwhile, back at the first hole, Maqsat 
Figure 0.9 Warming up for a day’s fishing, winter 2013. Source: author.
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and Müsïlïm feed the net into the water. Maqsat does most of the work; 
Müsïlïm checks for tangles – as the oldest person, he is not engaged in 
onerous work. At the fifth hole, the whole net has been hauled through. 
Maqsat and Mūkhtar plant some sticks in the snow as markers, and tie 
them to the end of the net with a piece of string. Then the next net is 
started. The whole process is entirely seamless. No one directs operations. 
When a net is pulled through, this is communicated with a gesture or 
shout of OOO, or Boldy! (‘That’s it!’). A line of 12 nets, each 100 m long, 
is laid today, and holes are prepared to lay a further eight tomorrow.
Tangled nets
Such is one mode of engaging with the environment. It involves skill and 
local knowledge, which is acquired socially through daily embodied 
engagement with the sea (Knudsen 2008; Pálsson 1994; Vermonden 
2013). Though fishing has changed immensely over the years, there is a 
certain continuity to fishing as a way of life. Fishermen’s understandings 
of the environment, and of environmental change, are grounded in this 
daily interaction with it, and this description should inform the reading 
of Chapters 4 and 6. However, this embodied engagement with the 
Figure 0.10 Laying nets, winter 2013. Source: author.
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environment is just one link in a web of connections linking Aral fish to 
German consumers and Chinese net manufacturers. Indeed, as Howard 
(2017) shows in her ethnography of Scottish fishers, daily embodied 
encounters with the sea are directed and shaped by the shifting opportun- 
ities and constraints of capitalist markets. By exploring this web of 
connections, I will now introduce my approach to the relationship 
between people, materialities and political economies.
The net is a material technology through which two or three 
fishermen abstract fish from their marine surroundings. Dependent on 
these fish for their livelihoods, the fishermen are also tangled in a set of 
human dependencies. They are dependent on their employers for the 
right to fish and remuneration (while their employers are dependent, but 
rather less so, on them to go out and fish). Within Bögen, fishermen’s 
wives and children also depend on fishing for their livelihood, while 
fishermen depend on female household members for other forms of 
labour, including preparing some fish for domestic consumption. 
Fishermen and their families further depend on money from fishing to 
sustain ritual expenditure.
Beyond Bögen, others depend on fish for a different sort of labour, 
in processing plants in Aral’sk and Qazaly. Many others, whether or not 
connected to the fishery, consume fish, incorporating the protein and 
vitamins into their bodies during shared meals that reproduce relations 
with friends and family. Though meat is always preferred, my informants 
would particularly enjoy fatty fish like carp and bream: a carp besbarmaq 
is a local twist on a Kazakh speciality; qarma from bream is another local 
delicacy. Or smoked fish might be eaten with beer, as across the former 
USSR. However, the market is mostly driven by demand elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and, for zander, in Germany and 
Poland. As my Russian host, Aleksandr (Sasha), explained, zander is a 
‘capitalist fish’ because it can be filleted and served in restaurants, while 
Soviet man (sovetskii chelovek) prefers gnawing at smoked bream full 
of bones. Fish thus link different local worlds – their ecosystem, Bögen, 
Aral’sk, German supermarkets. These linkages, entangling fish and 
people in different ways and to different degrees, shape the meaning of 
environmental change: without the German supermarkets, the sea’s 
return would mean something different.
Thinking about entanglements as the messy mutual depend- 
encies among things and people across different scales (Hodder 2012) 
helps us move beyond simplistic notions of ‘resource dependency’. It also 
allows us to bring in the agency of the material. The word ‘tangle’ entered 
the English language from the Norse word for seaweed, something 
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that entangles technologies such as nets, oars and rudders. There is a 
pervasive sort of seaweed in the Aral Sea, shalang. If possible, fishermen 
avoid laying their nets where there is shalang. However, despite their best 
efforts, nets move in high winds, and may get tangled in shalang. This is 
what Hodder (2012, 158) calls ‘the unruliness of things’: they lie beyond 
the perfect control of humans. The net entangles human relations with 
natural forces beyond human intentionality. Different processes unfold 
according to their own logic and at their own tempo, but as they are 
entangled, they influence each other in contingent ways (Hastrup 2013; 
2014; Tsing 2015).
If the net is a monofilament ‘Chinese’ net, as most are, it was cheap, 
so can be abandoned. But, tangled up with the shalang, it will not 
decompose. Because of the low price, the temporal span of fishermen’s 
engagement with the net is of a different order from the perdurance of 
the physical substance of monofilament nylon. It will go on entangling 
fish, without any human intention, awareness or use.
As Chinese nets accumulate, scientists worry that fish stocks will be 
depleted. Chinese nets are therefore illegal: unruly in the water, they are 
an object of regulation out of the water, mediating relations between 
fishermen and inspectors. However, Chinese nets are no less unruly out 
of the water than in the water, and go on being used – and abandoned. If 
fish stocks are depleted, and catches fall, fishermen’s income will fall. But 
the German consumers of Aral fish will simply buy their zander from 
elsewhere: there are varying degrees of ‘tautness’ within an entanglement. 
Even the fishermen would not starve if resources were depleted, as 
most keep livestock too: their entanglements with the environment are 
‘dispersed’ across livestock and fish (Hodder 2012). Despite widespread 
use of Chinese nets, fish catches continue to grow in the restored 
sea, which itself is the contingent, ever-shifting outcome of entangled 
hydrological, biological and human histories across the whole Aral basin.
Materiality and discourse
Environmental anthropologists use ‘entanglement’ to break down the 
nature/culture dichotomy that has dominated Western thought for 
centuries. By attending to entanglements between different organisms, 
with their heterogeneous experiences of reality, or ‘lifeworlds’, we 
puncture human exceptionalism and decentre the human subject. The 
ethnography that follows is deeply sympathetic to this project. After 
all, the fate of the Aral speaks powerfully of what happens when we 
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treat nature as an object that can be subjected to human control. As 
the description above makes clear, I do not approach the net simply as 
a piece of technology for mastering nature: by attending to the relational 
materialities of the net and seaweed, we see how the net entangles 
fishermen in ‘more-than-human’ worlds.
Nevertheless, although the insight that everything is entangled 
decentres the sovereign human subject, I maintain a focus on human 
discourse. I approach entanglements as not only material but also 
discursive: through our social utterances, spoken and written, we produce 
images of the world. These images are consequential – the sea today has 
been materially shaped by Soviet understandings of nature and global 
visions of disaster. Discursive entanglements are open-ended, never 
finalised: objects are ‘conceptualized and evaluated variously’ (Bakhtin 
1981b, 330) within different systems of ideas, seen within different 
‘horizons’. If Chinese nets are evaluated as an object of regulation in the 
authoritative discourse of the state, in Aral’sk they are located within a 
discourse about danger from China. But in fishermen’s horizons, they are 
a matter-of-fact technology, cheap and effective, so they go on being 
used. These horizons are not fixed: they are themselves inflected with 
processes of environmental and political-economic change.
I contrast this approach with a passage in Lien’s (2015) text that is 
emblematic of a ‘more-than-human’ anthropology. Like Aral fishermen, 
Norwegian salmon farmers have trouble with nets getting fouled up. Lien 
describes how the function humans ascribe to nets, containment, is 
frustrated by algae growth, which has to be countered by laying the nets 
out to dry in the sun:
The work that the netting performs unfolds instead along the 
temporal ebb and flow of biofueling (algae growth) and human 
labor (tromling). Each of these heterogeneous practices relies on and 
enrolls either netting fibers or the sun and wind in order to achieve 
their opposite futures: a netting that is either lively with algae, 
relatively impermeable and incompatible with salmon growth, or 
relatively “dead,” permeable and conducive to salmon growth and 
well-being. (Lien 2015, 59)
While downplaying human agency, Lien talks up the agentive capacities 
of things by importing the language of human purpose. As her ‘view from 
nowhere’ posits a symmetry between human and (anthropomorphised) 
nonhuman worldmaking capacities, the social is extended to encompass 
the more-than-human. My concern is that this ‘view from nowhere’ (itself 
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a site of ethnographic privilege) can risk leaving little space for the 
subjective lives of our human informants. I would maintain that we can 
decentre the exceptional human subject while still attending to what it 
feels like to be human, what is distinctive about human experience, in a 
world that lies beyond human control. If, then, I take seriously the 
agentive capacities of things in relation to human lives, I shall be looking 
at how things exert agency as they are mediated through discourse.
I take the Soviet theorist Bakhtin here as my guide, as a thinker 
deeply attuned to the materiality of the word, and to the dialogical 
relationship between human subjects and the world around them.10 
Amid the intellectual ferment of 1920s Leningrad, and the progressive 
monopolisation of discourse by the Party state over the late 1920s and 
1930s, Bakhtin elaborated his ideas about dialogism, the non-finalisability 
of discourse, the many voices present in every utterance – ideas which 
resonate with contemporary concerns in environmental anthropology 
about multiplicity, indeterminacy and polyphony. Indeed, Bakhtin’s 
(1981b, 351) critique of the way scientific discourse approaches things 
as ‘mute objects, brute things’ seems to speak of a ‘vibrancy’ of matter (cf. 
Bennett 2010). However, where new materialists insist on the autonomy 
of matter, Bakhtin would insist that there are no unspoken objects. While 
he is alive to the creative, generative potential within nature, he also sees 
all nature as dialogically mediated (Last 2013). This is not to propose a 
discontinuity between the human subject and the material world: rather 
than taking discourse as a realm of abstract meaning, Bakhtin instead 
insists on the social and material sitedness of the speaking subject in the 
world.11 Between word and world stands the body, which for Bakhtin – as 
he was well aware from his experiences of disease and disability – is not 
sealed off from the world as a self-contained entity, but is continuous 
with it (Hitchcock 1998). If, then, I maintain more focus on speaking 
subjects than is customary in contemporary environmental anthropology, 
I approach these subjects as taking shape through their material, bodily 
encounters with a changing environment, and through their shifting 
social position within Soviet and post-Soviet political economies.
Chronotopes and political economy
In thinking through how our experience of the world is mediated, I am 
particularly inspired by Bakhtin’s 1937–8 essay on the ‘chronotope’, 
where he explores the structuring functions of time and space in narrative 
(Bakhtin 1981a). Though the essay primarily lays out a monumental 
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history of the novel, I suggest that it also holds a rich potential for 
linking embodied experiences of entangled lifeworlds, material historical 
change and discursive representation – domains which are often treated 
separately within environmental anthropology. Over the course of the 
essay, Bakhtin explores how the various constellations of space and time 
in narrative do not merely make up the background setting for action, but 
produce different kinds of person, different possibilities for action, 
different forms of causality – and, what has been little remarked upon, 
different conceptions of nature. Thus, in one passage, he shows how 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century novels oppose an idyllic, particular- 
ised space and time that generates an organic connection between 
persons and nature, to ‘a great but abstract world, where people are out 
of contact with each other, egotistically sealed-off from each other, 
greedily practical, where labor is differentiated and mechanized, where 
objects are alienated from the labor that produced them’ (Bakhtin 1981a, 
234). This opposition is echoed in Chapter 4, where I contrast fishermen’s 
narratives structured around the abstractions of Soviet plans with those 
structured around tughan zher, or homeland.
However, the relevance of Bakhtin’s essay to environmental 
anthropology goes beyond the structuring role of time and space in 
representation. In a tantalising footnote, Bakhtin (1981a, 84, n. 1) 
informs us that he came across the chronotope in 1925 in a lecture by 
the biologist Ukhtomsky. For Ukhtomsky, living organisms experience 
time and space variously, which defines how they perceive and act upon 
their environment (Chebanov 2015). Fascinated by contemporary 
advances in biology, Bakhtin was evidently deeply struck by Ukhtomsky’s 
take on Einsteinian ideas about relativity. If, as he tells us in a second 
footnote, Bakhtin (1981a, 85, n. 2) takes time and space as ‘forms of 
the most immediate reality’, he seems to be suggesting that reality is 
relative, encountered heterogeneously through different bodies’ diverse 
experiences of time and space. The resonances with contemporary 
anthropology’s attention to heterogeneous lifeworlds are striking.12
What the essay brings to this literature is the role of political 
economy, not only reordering times and spaces, but, in doing so, re- 
structuring embodied experiences of reality. Crucially, the Ukhtomsky-
derived time and space as the ‘forms of the most immediate reality’ and 
the cultural representations Bakhtin tracks in the novel are connected 
through processes of material historical change that, as they reorder 
time–space constellations, reconstitute persons, labour, nature and 
value. The increasing abstraction of time, space and nature, Bakhtin 
shows, accompanies the growth of class society.13
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Bakhtin was no stranger to such processes of historical change. 
Before writing his chronotope essay, he had been exiled to Kazakhstan, 
where he had worked as an economist in a District Consumers’ Union and 
in 1934 had written an article, very different from his more famous work, 
about growth in consumer demand among newly collectivised farm 
workers (Bakhtin 2019; cf. Balysheva 2019). In the early 1930s, kolkhozy 
were just emerging from devastating famine brought about by the violent 
integration of Kazakhs into Soviet gridded space during collectivisation. 
My informants’ parents and grandparents lived through this same 
period, expected to provide the state with ever greater quantities of fish 
while their livestock were confiscated and grain provisioning collapsed. 
Unsurprisingly, Bakhtin did not write about the famine in his article 
about growth in consumer demand. Nor, however, did he celebrate the 
successes of collectivisation, and, reading between the lines of his text, 
the abject state of kolkhozniks is plain to see.
In his chronotopes essay written later in that tumultuous decade, 
Bakhtin speaks of his hero Rabelais’s healthy chronotope of organic 
growth based on direct proportionality of body, world and value, 
where things were brought into organic relation with one another. In 
doing so, the Renaissance writer challenged official medieval versions of 
the world based on ‘false connections that distort the authentic nature 
of things’, on ‘false hierarchical relationships’ between objects and 
ideas (Bakhtin 1981a, 169). There are evident historical echoes with 
Bakhtin’s own time, when hierarchies of value were being established 
that prioritised quantitative growth of commodities abstracted from 
lifeworld entanglements.
What I take from this is that within heterogeneous orderings of 
time and space, the world emerges as multiple – but that not all ‘versions’ 
are equal, nor are all equally true. To relate this insight to contemporary 
environmental anthropology, modernist abstractions of nature as a 
manipulable domain of discrete entities, and of human bodies as fungible 
units of labour, misrepresent lifeworld entanglements (recall Tsing’s 
[2015, 5] phrase on abstraction cited above, ‘as if the entanglements 
of living did not matter’) – but these abstractions, their dominance 
reproduced by powerful interests, are materially consequential, reshaping 
natural environments and human relations with them. While multiple 
versions of the Aral emerge in the ethnography that follows, some have 
emerged out of ‘false connections that distort the nature of things’, and 
they have jostled awkwardly against one another as powerful interests 
have dictated which version has more capacity to exist (cf. Richardson 
2014). I shall therefore pay particular attention to political economy, to 
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how, as the Soviet plan and post-Soviet market variously order times and 
spaces, fish are abstracted as different kinds of value, both misrepresenting 
their watery entanglements with the marine environment and materially 
reshaping them.14 It is to the fishery that I now turn.
Approaching environmental change through the fishery
Running throughout this book is the story of how environmental change 
has been entangled in the history of the fishing industry, whose demise 
and rebirth have not mapped neatly onto the water levels in the sea. 
Building on the approach outlined above, my account of the fishery will 
be attentive both to the materiality of fish and to the structuring role of 
political economy.
As fish are invisible beneath the water, it is hard for humans to lay 
claims to ownership before they are extracted. Once out of the water, 
they are quick to spoil. So there is a certain immediatism about fish, 
connected with the here and now, as testified in the Kazakh proverb 
egenshï zhylda armanda, balyqshy künde armanda, ‘the sower dreams for 
the year, the fisherman dreams for the day’. In the past, and to some 
extent today, there is therefore a sort of hunter-gatherer attitude towards 
fish, in contrast to livestock. Sometimes when I went to Bögen, my hosts 
in Aral’sk would encourage me to demand fish from Zhaqsylyq. Sometimes 
this worked. Sometimes I would be met with a Balyq zhoq, ‘no fish’ – even 
when I was confident that this was not the case. But Zhaqsylyq had no 
connection with my hosts in Aral’sk, and no obligation to give them fish. 
They would never ask me to bring back meat from the village. When 
I asked Zhaqsylyq if I could buy fish from him, he was adamant that I 
could not. This seems to bear some relation to the hunter-gatherer ethic 
of claiming shares in environments of natural abundance.15 Myers (1988) 
relates how he became frustrated with this ethic among the Pintupi as 
they constantly demanded cigarettes from him; he only managed to keep 
his cigarettes when one helpful Pintupi told him to hide them. I suspect 
something similar was going on with Zhaqsylyq’s balyq zhoq.
The same material features also mean that, in Soviet times and 
today, fish are closely associated with money. As one young fisherman 
declared as he pointed to a heap of fish on the ice: Bïzge balyq aqsha!, 
‘Fish are money for us!’ (Figure 0.11). Like money, they are impersonal 
and fungible. Moreover, because they are quick to spoil, integration into 
wider time-spaces than the here and now – becoming scalable – requires 
some sort of ‘time machine’ (Lien 2015, 120–4), involving salt, ice and 
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processing infrastructure.16 In Aral’sk in particular, then, fish are 
associated with factory labour, mostly here female. Finally, invisible in 
the water, fish are also hard to pin down once out of the water: in an 
extensive landscape of sea, lakes and marsh with few roads, fisheries are 
hard to regulate. Another proverb plays on this tension: balyqshy aitpaidy 
rasyn, künde alady bïr asym, ‘the fisherman does not tell the truth, every 
day he takes a portion’. Indeed, lots of actors, not only fishermen, are 
creative in their accounting of fish. Within the command economy, this 
opacity further undermined centralised control, while today it shapes the 
movement of fish so that they largely bypass Aral’sk.
Within both state socialism and capitalism, natural resources, 
and the time-space within which they circulate, are homogenised. Both 
plans and market exchange require the commodification of nature: 
diverse natural objects are abstracted from their ecosystemic contexts as 
numbers, so that they are commensurable (Carrier 2001). As commodities, 
fish are arranged in a hierarchy of value that bears no relation to their 
lifeworld entanglements. This hierarchy of value also shapes fishing 
practices: as labour is commodified, the intentionality of embodied 
engagement with the environment is directed towards maximising 
value extraction (Howard 2017). However, plan and market organise 
materialities differently, which has consequences for what the sea’s 
Figure 0.11 ‘Fish are money’, winter 2013. Source: author.
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retreat and partial return have come to mean. To return to our net: in 
Soviet times, generally seine nets were used, which were much more 
selective. They involved different social relations, as they required more 
people to lay them; and they materialised a connection with the state, in 
the form of the local fishery managers, who provided equipment. The 
connection to the state was crucial: social entitlements depended on the 
practice of fishing. As we will see, the partial capacity of the creaking 
structures of the command economy to hold this set of relationships 
together afforded a level of continuity even when the sea disappeared. In 
this economy, money had less pressing value, so, despite rewards for 
overfulfilling plans, there was no strong incentive to fish without limit. 
This contrasts with the present, where, in the absence of the state as an 
‘over-arching structure of connection’ (Alexander 2004, 271), money 
acquires increasing value, creating high incentives to fish. Moreover, the 
circulation of fish out of the water differs within the plan and within the 
market: the fishery sustained by the gridded time-space of the USSR once 
supported a major processing plant in Aral’sk itself, but today, within the 
flexible, opaque time-space of the contemporary market, fish largely 
bypass factories in Aral’sk, frustrating widespread hopes of a return of 
employment.
This is not to claim that the meanings of the sea’s demise and partial 
return can be reduced to its political-economic entanglements. But amid 
the multiplicity that I will describe, I will afford a structuring significance 
to the point that it was a socialist sea that receded and a postsocialist sea 
that has returned.
Outline of chapters
The first four chapters explore the sea’s regression. In Chapter 1, I 
weave a narrative from secondary and archival sources about colonial 
and Soviet transformations of the Aral Sea itself, and the wider Aral 
basin. I locate the Aral regression in a century of catastrophes, involving 
dispossession, disaster and development: interdependencies of people 
and environments were reshaped as cotton, water and fish were enrolled 
in colonial and Soviet visions and, ultimately, integrated into gridded 
Soviet space. Chapter 2 looks at how the sea’s regression emerged as a 
bureaucratic ‘problem’, and the resultant efforts to mitigate it, especially 
by importing ocean fish and sending fishermen to other lakes. In Chapter 
3 we see how these efforts inflect perspectives in Aral’sk today: in 
nostalgic memories of gridded Soviet space, ocean fish are felt to have 
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sustained relations between Aral’sk and the centre, while ‘bad’ Soviet 
pasts are partitioned off. Chapter 4 turns to the meanings of the sea’s 
regression in Aral villages, which I locate in the broader history of 
transformation of understandings of nature. I show how hunter-gatherer 
ethics about fish are overlaid with visions of fish as exchange-values, and 
a discourse of homeland (tughan zher) oscillates with one based on 
labour and abstract space – with implications for understandings of the 
regression.
The three final chapters examine how the sea has been restored, 
and its divergent outcomes. Chapter 5 shows how the Aral disaster became 
an object for international development, culminating (though not 
inevitably) in the restoration of the Small Aral. The chapter tells a story 
of post-Soviet transformation that foregrounds the lively contributions 
of nonhuman actors, from flounder and mussels to wind, sand and 
concrete, to processes of ‘hegemonic fragmentation and reconstruction’ 
(Brandtstädter 2007). Chapter 6 shows how entanglements of restored 
environment, postsocialist property rights and regulations, and lucrative 
but opaque markets shape the extraction and circulation of fish, driving 
new-found prosperity and socioeconomic differentiation in Bögen. Fish, 
I argue, are both reproducing and transforming moral landscapes and 
local structures of value. As fish bypass Aral’sk, Chapter 7 explores the 
marginality of the fisheries to the town, and its economic marginality 
within Kazakhstan today. Economic marginalisation, I show, intersects 
with ekologiia as environmental affect to shape local subjectivities. Finally, 
the Conclusion draws out the multiplicity of environmental change, 
before critically relating my ethnography to theories of adaptation, and to 
the wider anthropology of the Anthropocene.
Notes
 1 See Glantz (1999a), Kostianoy and Kosarev (2010), Micklin (1988; 2000; 2007), Micklin et al. 
(2014), Weinthal (2002) and Zonn et al. (2009) for some of the vast academic output on the 
issue.
 2 Used in formal writing about the Aral, apat means ‘accident’ or ‘disaster’. 
 3 While ethnographers are well placed to draw out the processual quality of disasters like 
floods and earthquakes (e.g. Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; Simpson 2013), we should 
nevertheless distinguish between what is materially experienced as a temporally bounded 
event and environmental change whose material effects are themselves processual.
 4 Brown (2015, Chapter 6) introduces the phrase ‘gridded space’ in her comparison of Soviet 
Qaraghandy (Kazakhstan) and Billings (USA). While the metaphor stems from the similar 
urban layout of the two towns, Brown deploys it to talk about how space – and time – are 
abstracted, commodified and carved up into discrete, exploitable units. In her account, which 
focuses on the early Soviet period, gridded infrastructures facilitate the flow of resources to 
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the centre; as I elaborate in Chapter 2, in the postwar period they would also facilitate the 
redistribution of resources by the centre.
 5 My project is geographically limited. The Uzbek (Karakalpak) shore is particularly marginal 
within contemporary Uzbekistan. In Soviet times, there were similar processes of importing 
ocean fish and sending fishermen to other lakes there (Karimov et al. 2005; Karimov et al. 
2009). Recent efforts to restore Amu Dariya delta lakes and wetlands have been reasonably 
effective, but less so than the Kökaral dam (Karimov et al. 2005; Micklin 2014b). Environmental 
problems are of course not restricted to the sea itself: throughout Central Asia, continued use 
of monoculture is linked to ongoing environmental degradation.
 6 During my fieldwork more than 20 years after Kazakhstani independence, I still found ‘post-
Soviet’ a relevant category. Although trajectories across Central Asia have been diverse, and 
although the category makes less sense to a younger generation, social, political and natural 
landscapes are still heavily marked by Soviet legacies. While Ibañez-Tirado (2015) argues that 
such a label risks casting the region as temporally other, I hope that this charge is evaded 
through my attention to the Aral’s contemporary integration into transnational markets and 
independent Kazakhstan’s state-building processes. Indeed, given the historical amnesia of 
Kazakhstan’s elites, it is important to stress continuities with the near past. I concur with 
Trevisani’s (2014) proposal of a ‘second phase’ of postsocialism: after the disintegration of 
state socialism in the 1990s, something new has been built, albeit influenced by Soviet 
legacies.
 7 Kazakhstan-2050 is supposed to involve a transition to a ‘green economy’, based on market 
mechanisms like pricing and regulation of common-pool resources, and diversification away 
from oil (Brown 2014).
 8 In 2019, Astana was renamed Nūr-Sūltan in honour of the recently retired president, Nursultan 
Nazarbayev.
 9 Director of the scientific fisheries station V. O. Kochkarev, ‘Otchët o gidrotekhnicheskom 
obsledovanii rybougodii pri ust’e reki Syr-Dar’i’, 19 June 1930, Aral’skii filial gosudarstvennogo 
arkhiva Kyzylordinskoi oblasti [hereafter AFGAKO], f. 5, o. 1, d. 1, ll. 70–87.
10 Despite the materiality of Bakhtin’s thought and his focus on the body, Bakhtinian approaches 
within anthropology are often restricted to linguistic anthropology (e.g. Blommaert 2015; 
Smith 2004). Cruikshank (1998) draws on Bakhtin to oppose the dialogic quality of oral 
narratives about the environment with the monologic discourse of the state, but her focus 
remains on discourse itself. In the wider social sciences, there have been some attempts to 
think with Bakhtin about environmental change and political ecology (Gardiner 1993; 
Hitchcock 1998; Last 2013; Sandywell 2000), but these remain underdeveloped. 
11 If some new materialist approaches downplay discourse, this arguably relates to the association 
of language with a realm of abstract meaning where human intentions are negotiated, which 
ironically risks reinscribing the mind/matter dualism that such approaches (rightly) seek to 
overcome. 
12 Chebanov (2015) notes the connection between Ukhtomsky and Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt, 
which has been influential in the development of multispecies ethnography (e.g. Ingold 2000; 
Tsing 2015).
13 Cf. Hornborg’s (1996) suggestive connection between Polanyian ‘disembedding’ of economy 
from society and the separation of nature and society. Cf. also Thompson’s (1967) arguments 
about a shift from ‘task-oriented time’ to ‘industrial time’.
14 New materialist and historical materialist approaches are sometimes presented as if they 
have to be in competition (e.g. Bennett 2010, xv–xvi). It does not have to be so: Tsing (2015) 
masterfully integrates the structuring work of alienation of both persons and things into 
a thick description of ‘indeterminate assemblages’, while Li’s (2014) fine-grained account 
of shifting class relations among Indonesian highlanders includes in the analysis of the 
conjuncture close attention to materialities of different sorts of trees. 
15 Similar ethics of sharing fish are found in various cultural contexts: northern Russia 
(Nakhshina 2011), the Canadian Cree (Berkes 1987), Somalia (Dua 2017), southern India 
(Hoeppe 2007, Chapter 5).
16 Lien (2015) describes how canning processes of wild Alaskan salmon and desiccated anchovy 
pellets to feed farmed Norwegian salmon both act as ‘time machines’ that make production 
‘scalable’.
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1
The Aral Sea and the  
modernisation of Central Asia:  
a century of catastrophes
Accounts of modernist destruction of environments often assume that 
premodern nature existed in equilibrium. Such is also the case with the 
Aral Sea: ‘And the Aral lived its natural life, practically undisturbed by 
man’s interference, until 1960’ (Kosarev and Kostianoy 2010b, 46). Yet, 
in 2001, a medieval mausoleum was discovered on the dried-up seabed, 
providing clear evidence that the Aral had receded before (Oberhänsli 
et al. 2007). Geographers and scientists had suspected this since the 
nineteenth century, and, as we will see in Chapter 4, local people have 
long been aware of it. This wider temporal perspective troubles assump- 
tions about ‘man’s interference’ in premodern pristine nature.
The Aral Sea first emerged a mere ten to twenty thousand years ago, 
the blink of an eye in geological time, when the Amu Dariya happened to 
change course towards a shallow dip caused by wind erosion two million 
years earlier (Zonn et al. 2009, 21, 27). Throughout its existence, the sea’s 
level has varied, and several times the diversion of the Amu Dariya into 
the Caspian via the Uzboi channel has led to major regressions comparable 
to today’s, the most recent ending only in the mid-seventeenth century. 
Archaeologists debate the causes, but four factors have been involved: 
climate, earthquakes, irrigation, and wartime destruction of dykes – 
notably by Genghis Khan in the early thirteenth century, then by Timur in 
the late fourteenth century. Evidently, since the advent of irrigation in the 
region some three thousand years ago, the landscape has been profoundly 
shaped by human interventions. Indeed, the area of irrigated land in 
antiquity was comparable to that today (Oberhänsli et al. 2007).
Over the millennia, then, the lives of those living by the sea have 
been affected by distant happenings elsewhere in the Aral basin. Even in 
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the nineteenth century, the level fluctuated by several metres, fuelling 
theories that the whole of Eurasia was drying up (Kropotkin 1904). In 
part, this chapter offers a genealogy of the processes, far upstream from 
the sea itself, which culminated in its twentieth-century regression, 
processes rooted in histories of Tsarist colonialism and Soviet socialism, 
and also in the global history of cotton.1
If the sea itself has never been stable, nor have societies around it. 
I also therefore present an overlapping narrative, centred on fish, of the 
reshaping of social and environmental relations around the northern 
shores of the Aral, from the beginnings of Russian colonial rule to 1960, 
when the sea started to dry up. These transformations are crucial for 
understanding what the sea’s regression would come to mean. I put 
these two stories in the same interpretive frame, as two strands of the 
modernisation of Central Asia. Across imperial and Soviet Central Asia, 
there are homologous histories of dispossession. The sea’s regression 
was another episode in what might be termed a century of catastrophes. 
Peoples were deemed backward, and landscapes empty or wasteful. 
Beginning in the imperial period and accelerating under Soviet rule, 
human–environment relations were reorganised to make agricultural 
production ‘scalable’ (Tsing 2015). The promises of modernity rested on 
the quantitative increase in production of fungible commodities by fungible 
human labour, while new infrastructural connections integrated the region 
into wider imperial/Soviet space. As people came to live ‘gridded lives’ 
(Brown 2015), their dependency on their environment was mediated by a 
matrix linking them to the centre via flows of goods to and from it.2
However, the precise form that modernisation processes took 
depended on the diverse environments and societies that imperial 
and Soviet administrators encountered, from the pastoralists of the 
steppe, desert and mountains to the settled agriculturalists along the 
rivers and in the oases. The stories told here, of irrigation development 
and fisheries construction, may be homologous, but the heterogeneous 
material conditions, offering variable possibilities for scalability, shaped 
development in different ways. Nor was each afforded equal weight. As 
in many modernist visions, mastering water particularly captured both 
imperial and Soviet imaginations (Obertreis 2017; Peterson 2019). 
Development was therefore premised on irrigation projects, dams and 
canals. Beyond the massive Aral basin, there were plans, only dropped in 
the perestroika period, to bring the Siberian rivers Ob’ and Enisei to 
Central Asia (Bressler 1995).
These parallel stories about irrigation and fish diverged after the sea 
began to shrink in 1960: while irrigation expansion continued, the fishery 
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contracted. We pick up the story of the contracting fishery in Chapter 2. 
Later in the present chapter, however, I will ask why irrigation continued 
to grow even after its escalating consequences were evident. While it 
may seem to be an instance of the high modernist myopia described by 
Scott (1998) – seeing like a state – I root this myopia more specifically in 
a political ecology of state socialism in Central Asia.3 This entails a broader 
interpretation of Central Asia’s place in the USSR. As the underdeveloped 
Central Asian periphery produced primary commodities (especially 
cotton) cheaply for processing in the centre, where living standards were 
higher, some scholars at the time of the USSR’s demise, picking up on 
interpretations by Central Asian intellectuals, characterised the relation- 
ship as colonialism or dependency (Gleason 1991; Rumer 1989). What 
this perspective misses is the patronage relations both between republican 
elites and central leadership, and throughout Central Asian society 
(Kandiyoti 2002; Spoor 1993; Weinthal 2002). It also misses the (albeit 
limited) redistribution by the centre, and the concomitant enrolment of 
local populations in Soviet visions. I therefore suggest that we recast 
‘dependency’ as a web of interdependencies of varying tautness, which 
resulted in spatially uneven rates of development, and uneven distribution 
of vulnerability to ecological damage (cf. Hodder 2012).
From nomads to fishers
Kazakhs first came to the sea’s northern shores in the eighteenth century, 
deprived of access to their pastures by Russian and Dzungar incursions, 
and driving the Karakalpaks who were living there to the south 
(Jacquesson 2002). Though Kazakhs, like their predecessors, practised 
some small-scale irrigated agriculture and fishing on rivers and lakes, 
the economy centred on livestock (Khazanov 2012; Tolybekov 1959, 
95–6). In a decentralised political ecology, constant movement allowed 
flexibility in negotiating the changing environment, a flexibility that 
helped mitigate crises such as drought or zhūt, late-spring frosts that 
trapped fodder below a crust of ice (Campbell 2018). Like agriculture, 
fishing was subsidiary, practised by the poor, those with few or no 
livestock. Fish, unlike livestock, were not a source of prestige. It is unclear 
to what extent fish caught on the Aral’s northern shores were marketed in 
Central Asian cities far to the south, but without processing infrastructure, 
it seems unlikely that they were a source of accumulation of wealth.4 A 
proverb testifies to what fish meant in this economy: balyqshynyng 
bailyghy etek zhengï kepkenshe, ‘the fisherman’s wealth lasts until his 
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sleeve dries’. Livestock brought wealth and power; fish were about 
sustenance and immediate return. Nor did fishing require the careful 
husbandry of scarce resources that livestock demanded. Aulau, ‘to fish’ 
or ‘to hunt’, derives from the noun au, ‘trap/net’. When they fished, 
employing basic technologies, Kazakhs encountered natural abundance, 
lakes and rivers teeming with fish.5
Russian interest in the northern Aral was, initially, military. A fort 
was built above Lake Raiym in 1847 when the naval officer Butakov 
conducted an exploration of the sea. Next, a fort was built at Qazaly 
(Kazalinsk), the starting point for a gradual advance up the Syr Dariya. 
This culminated in the capture of Tashkent in 1865, a key moment in 
Russian expansion into Central Asia. Although Russian eyes were focused 
on the rich settled lands to the south, the Russian presence on the lower 
Syr Dariya and around the northern Aral had immediate consequences 
for local inhabitants. Russian settlers, themselves fleeing upheavals in 
Russian agriculture, were encroaching on the best pastures. Tsarist policy 
cast them as a progressive force in the ‘backward’ economy of the steppe.6 
This resulted in dispossession of local Kazakhs: as migration routes were 
curtailed, the fragile economy of nomadic life was disrupted and livestock 
numbers fell (Beknazarov 2010, 39–40). As Cameron (2018) describes, 
settler incursions rendered Kazakhs more vulnerable to climate variability, 
and increasingly dependent on Russian grain. Increasingly, winter quarters 
were established around Russian forts. After a zhūt in 1879–80 and again 
in 1892–3, increasing numbers of impoverished Kazakhs settled along the 
Syr Dariya, turning to fishing for survival (Tolybekov 1959, 299–300).
When the Tsarist authorities deported rebellious Ural Cossacks to 
the region in 1875, they brought new technologies for catching, smoking 
and curing fish, especially ship sturgeon (Pianciola 2019; see Figure 
1.1). Increasingly, Kazakhs began to fish for the market, and fish were 
exported overland by caravan in winter to the railhead at Orenburg 
(Beknazarov 2010, 31; Plotnikov et al. 2014, 56). Partially integrated 
into a market stretching across the whole Russian empire, the sea 
acquired a new sort of economic value. Integration into imperial space, 
and thus value, depended on infrastructure that could overcome the 
perishability of fish, so Russian industrialists opened ice houses and 
plants for smoking and curing Aral fish, taking advantage of nearby salt 
deposits.7 Those Kazakhs who were dispossessed of livestock had little 
choice but to subscribe to this vision of fish as value, and were increasingly 
hired to fish for Cossacks.
As the fishery grew, the Tsarist authorities recognised the need for 
science-based management to guarantee the future of the sea’s resources. 
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From 1886, access was regulated by permits; there was a banned zone 
around the Syr Dariya delta and bans on fishing during spawning season 
(Plotnikov et al. 2014, 56). Cossacks mediated the generation of en- 
vironmental knowledge: science-backed regulation focused on sturgeon 
(Figure 1.2), the key fish of interest to the Cossacks, while Kazakhs 
and Karakalpaks were pushed into ‘cognitive irrelevance’ (Pianciola 
2019, 629). Nevertheless, rich scientific studies emerged, notably the 
monumental monograph of L. S. Berg (1908), which detailed the sea’s 
geology, hydrology, flora and fauna, as well as exploring the oscillations 
in sea level and opposing the widespread theory of the ongoing 
desiccation of Eurasia. As Pianciola (2019, 667) suggests, the authority 
that administrators granted to scientific knowledge perhaps rested, 
paradoxically, on the Aral’s relative political and economic marginality 
within imperial projects.
A crucial moment in the fishery’s development was the con- 
struction in 1905–6 of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, which passes the 
sea’s northeastern corner, where the sheltered Saryshyghanaq bay was 
deemed a suitable site for a port. The station was named Aral’skoe 
more (Ru.: ‘Aral Sea’), and a village grew between station and sea. The 
railway opened new markets, and catches rose rapidly. The railway also 
dramatically expanded the fishing population, facilitating widespread 
immigration from western parts of the empire, especially the Danube 
delta and the Sea of Azov. Intensive fishing severely undermined fragile 
attempts at regulation (Pianciola 2019). On the eve of the First World 
Figure 1.1 Ship sturgeon. Drawing by Amelia Abercrombie, after 
Zenkevich (1956).
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War, some 15,000 were working in the industry, and 44,000–50,000 
tonnes of fish were caught and exported from the region annually.8 First 
the market, then the railway: both reconfigured human entanglements 
with the sea. As fish integrated local populations into imperial markets, 
new dependencies emerged. Fishermen were advanced equipment and 
food, in return for handing over all their catch to pay off the debt. A 1968 
book celebrating the glorious construction of the Soviet fishery waxes 
lyrical about colonial oppression: ‘And the family of the fisherman-
Kazakh struggled in hopeless destitution, entangled in debts like a fish in 
a net’ (Turmagambetov et al. 1968, 1).
Cotton famine, cotton fever
Meanwhile, a vision was taking shape centred on water and cotton, 
which decades later would be consequential for the sea. Though its roots 
dated to the 1820s, distant events gave it fresh impetus in the 1860s. 
As the American Civil War starved global markets of raw cotton, cotton 
manufacturing across the world was devastated by ‘cotton famine’ (Beckert 
2014, 140). The crisis sparked swathes of accumulation by dispossession 
Figure 1.2 Aral Sea fishermen with some vast sturgeon, c. 1900. 
Source: Museum of Fishermen, Aral’sk.
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across the globe. The British, whose Lancashire mills were paralysed, 
began to turn over swathes of their empire, especially India, to cotton 
cultivation; driven away from subsistence farming, primary producers 
became vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the global market, and to extreme 
climate events, resulting in devastating famines later in the nineteenth 
century (Davis 2001, Chapter 10; cf. Beckert 2014, Chapter 9).
Russian industrialists and administrators keen to secure the 
empire’s cotton independence looked to the warm lands of newly 
colonised Central Asia (Obertreis 2017; Peterson 2019).9 As in other 
expanding European empires, colonial eyes saw indigenous people as 
backward and the landscape as wasted. Indeed, ruined irrigation systems 
spoke of a region which had gone backwards from its medieval glories 
(Voeikov 1949b [1908], 157). The dream of turning the Amu Dariya 
again to the Caspian offered the opportunity both to connect Europe 
and Asia by water, and to restore the region’s glory through irrigation 
(Peterson 2019). Scientific theory supported this vision: the geographer 
Voeikov (1949a [1909], 149) argued that ‘Man must strive to ensure that 
water, when it evaporates, performs work that is useful for him, i.e. that 
it evaporates from the surface of plants’. Flowing into the sea, water was 
wasted. The Aral’s area could therefore be drastically reduced, if the 
water was used ‘usefully’ instead (Voeikov 1949b [1908]).
However, while colonial reforms undermined indigenous irrigation 
practices, Tsarist dreams of expanding irrigated area came to little: only 
two major irrigation works were completed, and the amount of water 
withdrawn from the Amu and Syr Dariya did not increase dramatically 
(Peterson 2019; Thurman 1999). Even so, amid ‘cotton fever’, the area 
cultivated with cotton grew and raw cotton exports from Central Asia to 
Russia increased dramatically. Central Asian farmers became entangled 
in debts, and the best irrigated lands were appropriated (Joffe 1995; 
Peterson 2019). Nevertheless, even at this stage, cotton was not just 
a colonial imposition: Penati (2013) stresses the active involvement 
of Central Asian entrepreneurs and farmers in the cotton boom.10 
Meanwhile, the sea acquired significance as a shipping route, linking 
the cotton-growing regions of Karakalpakstan to textiles factories in 
European Russia via the railway at Aral’sk.
Soviet dreams in Central Asia
Rapid growth in both fish and cotton production was abruptly halted 
by distant events again reverberating across the globe. Integrated into 
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Russian imperial space, dependent on imperial markets, the Aral region 
was vulnerable to the implosion of that space during world war, 
revolution and civil war. The fishery rapidly unravelled as provisioning 
collapsed, fishermen were conscripted into the army, and hastily built 
infrastructure crumbled. The stressed populations of sturgeon were, for 
now, saved, while the human populations around the sea faced famine 
(Pianciola 2019; 2020). Upstream, irrigation systems fell into disrepair 
and the area of irrigated land halved.
The Bolsheviks in Central Asia blended Tsarist visions with their 
own emancipatory and anti-colonial agenda (Obertreis 2017; Peterson 
2019; Teichmann 2007). Colonialism, they supposed, had exacerbated 
backwardness. In exploiting the wealth of the Aral to the full, men 
and women were to be freed from the bonds of debt and exploitation. 
Upstream, conquering nature through mastering water was at the heart 
of the Bolshevik decolonising vision (Peterson 2019; Teichmann 2007). 
However, another logic would crystallise during collectivisation: value 
created in agriculture would subsidise the industrialisation of the USSR 
as a whole, termed ‘primitive socialist accumulation’ (Spoor 1993). 
Central Asia remained, as in Tsarist times, a producer of agricultural 
commodities that would flow to the centre, a status that was in sharp 
tension with the anti-colonial vision (Peterson 2019; Teichmann 2007). 
Indeed, across the USSR, the promised utopia of industrial abundance, 
premised on the scalable production of commodities, came to override 
other utopian goals. Voices for nature conservation that had been present 
in the 1920s were silenced (Weiner 1988). Thus, because of decisions 
favouring modernisation by industrialisation, Buck-Morss (2002, 115) 
argues, ‘the Soviets missed the opportunity to transform the very idea of 
economic “development” and of the ecological preconditions through 
which it might be realised.’ Development, directed by the centre, was 
to proceed at maximum scale, entailing new forms of dispossession. In 
Tsing’s (2015) terms, entangled lifeworlds were destroyed to make way 
for scalable monocultures.
The consequences of this shift in policy for Central Asian irrigation, 
and thus, ultimately, for the Aral, are well documented. Previously, 
irrigation systems had been decentralised, access to water embedded 
in a range of social relations. After collectivisation, plans were dictated 
by the centre, and cotton monoculture displaced old patterns of 
crop rotation which had guaranteed food security and improved soil 
productivity (Micklin 2000; Peterson 2019; Teichmann 2007). With the 
completion of the Turksib railway in 1929, Central Asia was provisioned 
with Siberian grain, allowing more irrigated land to be devoted to cotton. 
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Despite promises of mechanisation, as Peterson (2019) stresses, irrigation 
projects were achieved chaotically through the mass deployment of forced 
labour. Deportations of enemy peoples (Pohl 2007) and, later, resettle- 
ments from mountain regions (Bichsel 2012; Loy 2006) also brought 
people to work on the reclaimed land. In this matrix, flows of water, 
cotton and labour were directed by the apparatus.
Scalability under state socialism, and its ruinous ecological and 
social consequences, has a different dynamic from its capitalist variant. 
Indeed, Fehér, Heller and Márkus (1983, 65) argued that the goal-
function of state socialist economies was not, as under capitalism, profit, 
but ‘the maximization of the volume of the material means (as use-values) 
under the global disposition of the apparatus of power as a whole’. 
Scaling up the resources under the control of the apparatus took priority 
over scaling up production of exchange-values. Legitimacy was based on 
the countervailing tendency to redistribute, but, as this would diminish 
the power of the apparatus, these tendencies were in tension (Verdery 
1996). Furthermore, different branches of the apparatus identified with 
their sector or region, as the source of their power, and competed to 
expand their allocated share of scarce resources by expanding their 
economic activity (Kornai 1980). This led to huge-scale development, as 
in the giant steel complex at Magnitogorsk (Kotkin 1995). In agriculture, 
there was a tendency towards centralisation and monoculture, regardless 
of economic efficiency or ecological sustainability (Weiner 1999, 15–16). 
As Wittfogel (1957) saw, because water flows, and can be manipulated, 
the urge to accumulate material assets could be satisfied by constantly 
expanding irrigation infrastructure (Wheeler 2019). Irrigation offered 
the opportunity to reshape landscapes so that fixed assets, agricultural 
output and the labour of millions of people were under the control of the 
apparatus.11
Nevertheless, the apparent rationality of the grid was belied by 
chaos on the ground. Control was, pace Wittfogel (1957), incomplete: as 
in modernisation processes the world over, it was belied by the unruliness 
of things and people involved. State power was limited both by local 
ecologies and by the recalcitrance of the local population, and projects 
proceeded more by improvisation than by planning (Teichmann 2018). 
Indeed, cotton yields only recovered from the shock of collectivisation 
when the level of coercion dropped: the resultant system was premised 
on complicity, so that informally arranged ‘accidents’ and ‘inefficiencies’ 
would provide enough water for personal plots (Teichmann 2007). 
Meanwhile, irrigation projects, delivered by mass manual labour, were 
built with rudimentary technologies. Though the effects were not 
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immediately evident, high losses to evaporation and seepage meant that 
large volumes of water that might have reached the sea were wasted.
Yet, despite the chaos and coercion, cotton became integral to Central 
Asian imaginings of modernity. As Peterson (2019) describes, propaganda 
cast ‘people’s construction projects’ like the Great Ferghana Canal as 
popular initiatives based on the Central Asian institution of hashar, the 
collective labour of the people propelling the region into modernity. 
Proliferating technical water management cadres were indigenised, and 
Central Asian elites at all levels acquired an interest in irrigation and 
cotton (Obertreis 2017). The First Party Secretary of Uzbekistan mobilised 
Voeikov’s theories for a patriotic socialism: ‘We cannot resign ourselves to 
the fact that the water-abundant Amudarya River carries its waters to the 
Aral Sea without any use, while our lands in the Samarkand and Bukhara 
regions are insufficiently irrigated’ (cited in Zonn 1999, 159). The task, he 
said, was ‘to bridle the Syrdarya and Amudarya rivers, to control them and 
to make their water serve the cause of socialism, for the purpose of raising 
the living standards of the population and developing the country’ (cited in 
Zonn 1999, 159). If steel represented the urbanist values of the USSR as a 
whole (Kotkin 1995), cotton represented development for much of Central 
Asia. As the state-socialist social contract took shape, compliance was 
secured by the promise of rising living standards and full employment 
(Verdery 1996), a promise that came to be imagined through cotton. This 
was a web of dependencies more complex than the flow of raw resources 
from periphery to centre.
Constructing a socialist fishery
Meanwhile related, but distinct, processes were playing out in the 
fisheries. During the 1920s, the fishing industry was gradually rebuilt. In 
1925, the Aral State Fishery Trust, Aralgosrybtrest, was established, its 
aims to harness the natural wealth of the sea and emancipate local people. 
Aralgosrybtrest provided credit for cooperatives to create independent 
fishermen, albeit bound to the state by debt.12 These cooperatives also 
engaged in salting and cottage production of smoked fish, and, in one 
case, in melioration work on a lake, which, according to the umbrella 
organisation of cooperatives, Aralrybaksoiuz, fishermen did enthusi- 
astically.13 By 1930, catches were approaching their prewar peak (see 
Figure 1.3). But there was little centralised control: Aralgosrybtrest 
managers competed with Aralrybaksoiuz for fish; and semi-nomadic 
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The cooperative model was enthusiastically defended when collectiv- 
isation of the fisheries was discussed at an all-Union level in 1929: fishing 
should not, it was argued, be an industry where ‘raw material’ (syr’ë) is 
later processed industrially; the seasonal variability of inland fisheries 
necessitated small-scale and decentralised cooperatives, with processing 
carried out within households.15 There are parallels with recent ideas 
about community co-management (see Chapter 5). But this was no 
time to defend the small-scale. Stalinist ideology was premised on the 
abundance of nature, and natural resources were to be exploited to the 
full. In fishing regions, Kazakhs were to be forcibly settled in kolkhozy, 
herdsmen were to become fishermen, to address the mismatch between 
‘the lack of fisher population and the natural riches of the water-bodies of 
Kazakhstan’.16 Female emancipation would be achieved by women fishing. 
Nomadic movement was replaced with a centrally ordered movement 
of people: populations were relocated, especially from delta lakes to the 
sea, where their labour was more useful. Deportations of ‘enemies of the 
people’ further served to fill the labour deficit. Settled in poor conditions 
on the far-flung Vozrozhdenie Island, these spetspereselentsy, ‘special 
settlers’, were regarded as an ‘obedient labour force’.17
If sedentarisation and collectivisation in the Aral region were 
directed at exploiting fish resources to the full, across Kazakhstan, as 
Cameron (2018) argues, the same policies sought, in a stroke, to turn the 
steppe into a reliable source of grain and to modernise ‘backward’ 
Kazakhs. The results were disastrous. Livestock were confiscated, and 
when wildly unrealistic grain procurement targets were compounded by 
drought, devastating famine resulted (Cameron 2018; Kindler 2018; 
Pianciola 2004; 2020). A third of the Kazakh population died, others fled 
to other parts of Soviet Central Asia and beyond – to China, Afghanistan, 
Iran. As Pianciola (2020) shows, the northern shores of the Aral were 
particularly vulnerable because the railway facilitated the transport of 
requisitioned livestock to feed urban centres in Russia. By contrast, the 
Karakalpak southern shores, in 1930 administratively detached from 
Kazakhstan, benefited from their relative marginality.18 While grandiose 
plans far exceeded the likely capacity of the sea, actual catches collapsed. 
In late 1932 fishermen were receiving 25 kg of flour per quarter, against 
a regulation 73 kg.19 In the Aral region, according to an oblast inspection, 
from Bögen 86 out of 264 households fled, while from settlements on the 
northwestern shores, 300 households fled; the inspection euphemistically 
blamed inadequate housing and low pay.20 The region was also a transit 
route for returning famine refugees (otkochevniki) who had fled to 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Pianciola 2020). Some attempted to 
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settle in Aral kolkhozy, although they knew nothing about fishing, while 
at the same time people were still fleeing the northern coastline.21
The period of collectivisation was thus the violent culmination of a 
decades-long disentanglement of local social and ecological relations. 
The process was chaotic, rapidly escaping central control. Yet, as Kindler 
(2018) argues, although the famine was unplanned, it consolidated 
Soviet rule, breaking resistance by forcing the population to become 
dependent on the state. The outcome was a reorganisation of local 
society: human relations with the environment were reconfigured 
according to a gridded matrix whereby labour was directed and forcibly 
relocated, and the circulation of fish was controlled by the apparatus. 
Nature was ‘disembedded’ from society (Hornborg 1996). In the new 
system, fishing was an industry (promyshlennost’), with extraction 
(dobycha) of raw materials (syr’ë) separated from processing (obrabotka). 
Output by type of production was centralised, and processing facilities 
came under the disposition of the apparatus. The labour of fishing was 
reduced to the mechanical extraction of resources. Goals of mechanisation 
and deep-sea fishing on ships were slow to materialise; but in the sense 
that the time and space of fishing were micromanaged by the apparatus, 
dobycha was industrialised no less than obrabotka.
The shift from cooperatives to kolkhozy reconstituted the fishing 
population. Confiscation of livestock also amounted to confiscation of 
the time devoted to them, time which was now to be given to the state in 
fulfilling the plan. Though kolkhozy had subsidiary agriculture and 
herding to give them a semblance of autarky, their primary function was 
fishing. Nets and equipment were kolkhoz property. Kolkhoz management 
received the plan from Aralgosrybtrest; the plan would be split between 
brigades and units who would be assigned to specific spaces; brigadiers 
would pass the plan on to individuals. Pay was defined by amount of fish 
caught, and there were rewards for overfulfilling the plan. Fishing labour 
was directed by the numbers imposed by the plan. If, during the colonial 
period, fish were increasingly translated into money under conditions 
of extremely unequal exchange, now, in addition, fish mediated the 
hierarchical, dependent relations between the fishing population and the 
state.
Central control was, again, undermined by the unruliness of people 
and things, as the material constraints of the environment intersected 
with the inherent difficulties of operating in a shortage economy, where 
managers’ authority was always constrained (Humphrey 1998). The 
relevant means of production could be formally put under the control of 
the apparatus, but bureaucrats’ capacity to actually control them was 
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limited. Bad weather disrupted the micromanagement of the plan.22 
Regulations about storing kolkhoz property like nets in centralised stores 
were routinely flouted.23 The military-style arrangement of brigades, and 
exhortations to fish systematically across the sea, were ignored in favour 
of easily accessible inshore waters.24 The capacity of the state to see what 
was happening along hundreds of kilometres of shoreline was limited.
Over the 1930s, plans were gradually relaxed; livestock numbers 
recovered slightly; and catches rose, though the centre of the industry 
shifted to Karakalpakstan in the south, which had been less affected by 
the famine (Pianciola 2020). In this new configuration, inhabitants of 
the region were dependent on provisioning with equipment and 
foodstuffs. Nevertheless, although local agency was thus constrained, in 
the archives there are glimpses of how these conditions enabled agency 
in other spheres. A report in the newspaper Priaral’skaia Pravda tells 
of how overfulfilment of the 1936 plan has brought a ‘prosperous 
(zazhitochnaia) life’; ‘European-style houses’ have replaced the ‘dark 
Asiatic zemlianki’, and some Stakhanovites – who, following the widely 
publicised example of the coal miner Aleksei Stakhanov, were rewarded 
for exceeding production norms – own gramophones and silk suits.25 
Though the claim of a ‘prosperous life’ is doubtless exaggerated, there 
was clearly an expectation that fishing should be connected to rising 
living standards. It was through fishing (Figures 1.4 and 1.5) that the 
Figure 1.4 Fishing boats, 1940. Source: Museum of Fishermen, Aral’sk.
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people of the region were entitled to redistribution from the state; as a 
result, local people had a stake in Soviet visions of nature.
While Kazakh kolkhozy gradually recovered, the region continued 
to be transformed by arrivals from elsewhere in the USSR. Many were 
fleeing famine or repression in the European parts of the USSR. From 
the late 1930s and throughout the Second World War, Koreans and 
a range of ‘enemy peoples’, including Volga Germans, Chechens and 
Kalmyks, whose loyalty to the Soviet state was doubted, were deported 
en masse and settled across Central Asia. Those deported from fishing 
regions in particular were settled in the Aral region. According to the 
1939 census, out of a total population of 65,295 in Aral’sk raion, 7,731 
were spetskontingent (i.e. deportees).26
Meanwhile, Aral’sk was growing, an important connecting node 
between the sea and railway, and an industrial centre. It was upgraded 
from a village to an ‘urban-type settlement’ (posëlok gorodskogo tipa), 
and then to a town (gorod) in 1938, when it became the raion centre. 
The cotton economy elsewhere in Central Asia did not result in the 
development of manufacturing centres, because raw cotton could be 
shipped to existing factories in European Russia. By contrast, since there 
were as yet no refrigerated railway wagons, fish had to be processed 
immediately, resulting in an integrated industry within the Aral region 
Figure 1.5 Ship in the ice, 1940s. Source: Museum of Fishermen, Aral’sk.
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Figures 1.6 and 1.7 Fish factory, Aral’sk, undated. Source: Museum of 
Fishermen, Aral’sk.
(Figures 1.6 and 1.7). There was a major plant in Aral’sk, where 
Aralgosrybtrest’s headquarters were. Fish processed elsewhere on the 
sea would be brought to Aral’sk for distribution. Aral’sk was also the hub 
for provisioning remote fishing settlements. Other enterprises contributed 
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to the industrial character of the town: in the port, Karakalpak cotton 
was unloaded and transferred onto the railway, while grain from Russia 
would be loaded onto ships for the return journey; there was also a 
shipyard, building vessels for the transport and fishing fleets. Until after 
the Second World War, the town was predominantly non-Kazakh.
Nevertheless, while collectivisation was directed towards quantita- 
tive growth in fisheries production, the sector did not offer the same 
possibilities for scaling up as irrigation. Indeed, while planners talked of 
the sea’s natural ‘wealth’, ichthyologists deemed the sea poor, in terms 
both of limited species composition, and of biomass of fish, zooplankton 
and zoobenthos. As Berg (1908, 449–59) explained, the sea’s ‘poverty’ 
related not to its chemical composition, but to its geological history. Its 
aboriginal fauna dated from the distant past when it was connected with 
the Caspian. Since its separation from the Caspian basin, it had been 
freshening, so most of the Caspian fauna had been dying out; but, as a 
relatively young freshwater lake, it had not had time to ‘be populated’ 
(zaselit’sia) with new freshwater species.27 This suggested the possibility 
of acclimatising new species, to maximise the sea’s potential. Results 
were disastrous: most notably, stellate sturgeon introduced from the 
Caspian, while failing to reproduce, brought with it a parasite which 
proved fatal to the local ship sturgeon, which died off in large numbers 
(Plotnikov et al. 2014, 59–68).
At the same time, institutions to manage nature were developed. 
Their logic was not reducible to the economic vision of nature as wealth, 
and they acted as a brake on the constant demands to scale up. A conser- 
vationist vision lived on in the circumscribed territory of a nature 
reserve (zapovednik) established on Barsakelmes Island in 1939.28 Even 
fisheries management, based on scientific research conducted by a 
research station, KazNIIRKh (established in 1928), was not just about 
unrestrained quantitative growth. A separate body regulated the fishery, 
introducing new rules to guarantee reproduction of stocks (Plotnikov et al. 
2014, 57). Spatial and temporal bans were expanded to protect spawning 
grounds. Inputs were regulated, as were sizes of fish caught (Mitrofanov 
et al. 1992, 399). Further management measures included amelioration 
works such as clearing spawning grounds, dredging channels to connect 
lakes and clearing reeds which choked water of oxygen.
The Second World War led to yet another catastrophic collapse 
in catches, as women and children were left to fulfil the plan. Only by 
the late 1950s were catches approaching the levels of the late 1920s 
and the early 1910s. Some mechanisation had taken place, notably the 
introduction of motors and refrigerated ships (Figure 1.8). But the 
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fisheries were never thriving. In the late 1950s, people in many remote 
fishing settlements still had to drink sea water. Leprosy had not been 
eradicated. Villages lacked electricity and housing, and other amenities 
on which the USSR prided itself.29 Centralised control was still weak: 
fishermen, allowed 100–120 kg of fish per year for their families, often 
took home that quantity every month without paying for it.30
Finally, there was ongoing financial crisis. Kolkhozy had bought 
new ships to master deep-sea fishing and finally develop the fishery to its 
full potential. But this expenditure had saddled them with debt, and they 
suffered chronic lack of circulating assets. The majority of the kolkhozy 
were liquidated and replaced with state fishery bases (bazy goslova), 
directly subordinate to Aralgosrybtrest, leaving only kolkhoz Zhambul 
(today Zhalangash village) and kolkhoz Raiym.31 But Aralgosrybtrest too 
was saddled with debts, and fish production was consistently of a low 
quality. Indeed, the main processing plant in Aral’sk, built in the 1930s, 
was in a state of decay.32 Supplies of equipment were hoarded throughout 
the system, contributing to financial difficulties. Most of the industry was 
not mechanised. In a shortage economy characterised by interdepart- 
mental competition, inland fisheries were not prioritised, so investment 
tension (Kornai 1980) precluded the growth that was always planned. 
This, then, is the preceding history of the twentieth-century regression 
Figure 1.8 Unloading from refrigerated ship, undated. Source: Museum 
of Fishermen, Aral’sk.
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of the Aral Sea, in which movements of fish, people and capital were 
reconfigured and integrated into the gridded time-space of the USSR.
The region was integrated in darker ways too, into the Soviet 
military-industrial complex. After the Second World War, military bases 
were established in Aral’sk. One provisioned the highly secret biological 
weapons laboratory on the remote island of Vozrozhdenie. After the 
construction of the cosmodrome at Baikonur, other bases ran search-
and-rescue missions for cosmonauts who landed in the sea. Formally, 
these bases were not connected with the rest of the region: the secretive 
space of the military-industrial complex was distinct from the space of 
the command economy.
‘The needs of agriculture’
Meanwhile, irrigation expansion took off. As Soviet plans to modernise 
Central Asia were renewed in the post-Stalin era, living standards were to 
be raised by economic development premised on irrigation and cotton.33 
In 1954 work began on the Karakum canal, leading across the deserts of 
Turkmenistan towards the Caspian, as Tsarist colonialists had dreamed. 
As economic growth accelerated in the 1960s, the legitimacy of Soviet 
rule came to rest on water infrastructure (Obertreis 2017). From 1960 
the sea began to retreat as a cycle of low rainfall years accentuated the 
effects of irrigation withdrawals: in the 1960s the level fell by nearly 2 m, 
in the following decade by 5.3 m (Micklin 2014a, 121–4). Development 
around the sea itself now began to take a different path, as we see in 
Chapter 2. Ironically, inland fisheries were one sector which was relatively 
well managed across the Soviet Union, but they always bore the brunt 
of development priorities in agriculture (Berka 1990).34 From 1960 the 
Kazakh Fisheries Ministry shifted its emphasis from intensifying existing 
fisheries to establishing new fisheries on remote lakes and reservoirs 
(Mitrofanov et al. 1992, 400). In 1965 the Presidium of the Council of 
Ministers of the USSR made a resolution, ‘About measures for the preser- 
vation of the fishery significance (rybokhoziaistvennogo znacheniia) of 
the Aral Sea.’35 An integrated plan (kompleksnaia skhema) was to be 
drawn up for the rational use of the water resources of the whole Aral 
basin, taking into account the interests of the fishery.
However, the integrated plan was slow to materialise, and 
water withdrawals continued to grow. In the Brezhnev era, patronage 
relationships between Moscow and Central Asian elites facilitated the 
flow of investment into agriculture. Republican leaders, despite their 
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awareness of the damage wrought by cotton, were also aware that their 
political capital with Moscow depended on it. Irrigation specialists, 
recognising the widespread wastage of water, stressed the need to raise 
efficiency, but to little avail as farm managers continued to waste water 
(Kalinovsky 2018, 110–15). At the same time, low levels of mechanisation, 
coupled with rising wages on cotton farms, tied people to the land. In 
what Kalinovsky (2018, 177) describes as ‘involution’, the amenities of 
modernity, in the form of schools and hospitals, reached cotton-growing 
kolkhozy, even as practices like child labour persisted. As the cotton 
monopoly transformed local formal and informal economic relations 
right down to the level of the kolkhoz, all levels of society in cotton-
growing regions came to have a stake in irrigation, and developments 
were thus not always top-down. Describing how one kolkhoz chairman 
played on his political connections, with dubious legality, to develop 
irrigation schemes that would attract investment into his kolkhoz, 
Abashin (2015, 359–64) shows how local actors, standing up for local 
interests, played their role in shaping policy.
The environmental scientist Glantz (1999b) explains the Aral 
regression as a ‘creeping environmental problem’. Because the onset is 
gradual, there is no objective threshold after which behaviour might 
change: postponement is always possible. Rather than seeing this, as 
Glantz (1999b, 16) does, as a problem of ‘human nature’, the previous 
sections suggest instead that we should locate this particular creeping 
environmental problem in the specific path of development taken in 
Soviet Central Asia. As expectations of modernity were invested in a 
tangled web of dependencies linking centre and periphery via cotton, 
any change of policy was increasingly difficult – which Hodder (2012) 
calls ‘entrapment’. This was accentuated by the labour surplus (Lubin 
1984): most state-socialist economies faced an overall deficit of labour 
(Kornai 1980), but in predominantly rural Central Asia, provision of 
work was outstripped by population growth. The authorities proposed 
more of the same: expanding irrigation and hastening the Siberian rivers 
diversion, dubbed proekt veka, ‘the project of the century’ (Lubin 1984, 
131–4). As population growth outstripped the provision of work on 
kolkhozy, and as irrigation continued to be the easiest way to satisfy 
bureaucrats’ urge to accumulate fixed assets, development continued 
as before.
There was also a wilful myopia: planners refused to take into 
account the escalating effects of the sea’s regression. As we will see in 
Chapter 2, a limited vocabulary developed over the 1960s and 1970s to 
talk about the sea’s retreat as a ‘problem’, but it was not acknowledged as 
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a disaster or catastrophe until perestroika. This myopia echoes Scott’s 
(1998) famous account of ‘seeing like a state’: from a synoptic but myopic 
utilitarian viewpoint, things and people are seen out of context, with 
disastrous consequences. Indeed, the Aral’s global notoriety lies in the 
way planners weighed the costs and benefits: the economic value of 
cotton exceeded that of fish (e.g. Ellis 1990; Zonn 1998). But the thrust 
of my narrative so far suggests that this viewpoint lies not in ‘the state’, 
but in powerful departmental and regional interests that were backed by 
central decision-making bodies in Moscow. From an abstract cost–benefit 
perspective, raising the efficiency of existing irrigation infrastructure 
would have been more beneficial than building new infrastructure with 
diminishing rates of return. The unfinished integrated plan for the water 
resources of the whole basin could also have made water use more 
efficient – which required a more synoptic viewpoint. If the roots of the 
Aral regression lie in the competitive urge to accumulate use-values, the 
cost–benefit rationality which weighed the sea against cotton emerges as 
less abstract than it may seem.
Take this 1971 resolution about ‘the problem of the Aral Sea’ issued 
by the all-Union scientific council ‘Integrated Use and Preservation of 
Water Resources’.36 I do not suggest that this particular document played 
any major instrumental role, but it illustrates the sort of discourse 
used pervasively to justify political decisions as rational necessity. The 
resolution begins:
The problem of the Aral Sea is acquiring ever greater importance in 
relation to the development of the national economy in its basin. 
Water withdrawals from rivers feeding the sea for the needs of 
irrigated agriculture and other branches of the economy are 
growing continuously, which is leading to (vedët) a fall in the level 
of sea. The problem is made sharper in connection with the presence 
of a significant fund of lands suitable for irrigation, the possible 
prospective water demands of which exceed the available water 
resources of the basin.37
Sentence structure precludes debate. ‘Irrigated agriculture needs a lot of 
water’; ‘significant funds of lands are suitable for irrigation’: compressed 
into noun phrases, these questionable claims cannot be questioned. 
The verb vedët mechanically connects the falling sea level with ‘water 
withdrawals’, eliding the causation which reaches back to a political 
decision about the definition of the needs of agriculture. Later comes the 
cost–benefit analysis:
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The fall in the level of the Aral Sea will cause specific adverse 
economic consequences: there will be radical changes in shipping, 
reproduction of fish stocks of the sea, muskrat-breeding, livestock-
herding and other branches of the economy in the neigh- 
bouring regions. Nevertheless, the national-economic (narodno-
khoziaistvennoe) and economic (ekonomicheskoe) effectiveness of 
the development of irrigation and agriculture on the basis of 
irrigation in the basins of the Syr Dariya and Amu Dariya by far 
exceeds the damages which can be expected from the fall in the 
level of the Aral Sea.38
Notice how costs and benefits are weighed: adverse consequences are 
determinate and separate; they are also postponed to the future, which in 
1971 was a basic misrepresentation. Rising salinity, which was more 
destructive to fish stocks than the shrinking of the sea, is absent from 
the analysis. By contrast, the benefits are a tautologically interconnected 
whole. The author goes on to note: ‘It is also necessary to take into account 
factors not measurable by direct economic evaluation: the influence of 
the changes in the regime of the sea on the nature of the surrounding 
territories.’39 But these are only ‘factors’: they are not acknowledged as 
‘consequences’, though they would become famous visual symbols of 
disaster.
Such monologic discourse establishes a particular constellation 
of logical connections, silencing other voices, closing down other per- 
spectives. Form (‘the needs of irrigation’) conceals the arbitrariness of 
the content (‘we’ve decided irrigation is more important than the sea’). 
Like all discourse, and like other decontextualising visions the world 
over, it is sited.40 This is not the abstract rationality of a monolithic state. 
The claim of abstract rationality – the claim to follow fixed rules – may be 
the foundation of bureaucratic legitimacy (Herzfeld 1992). However, as 
Bakhtin (1986) argues, rules do not precede discourse but are produced 
by it, sited in social practice. Powerful interests defined the question in a 
particular way, drawing on scientific theory going back to Voeikov to 
discursively abstract people and resources from their contexts. The 
centralising tendencies within Soviet political economy had, as Bakhtin 
(1981b, 270–2) arguably saw, a centripetal corollary in discourse. This 
discursive abstraction of resources legitimised extraction and accumu- 
lation under the disposition of the apparatus. This discourse was a key 
element of the ‘creeping environmental problem’. The ‘needs of irrigation’ 
provided what Herzfeld (1992, 81) calls an ‘ethical alibi’, justifying 
bureaucratic indifference by presenting the interests of particular 
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bureaucratic departments as the common good. Within this discourse, 
the Aral was a ‘mute object’, a ‘brute thing’ (Bakhtin 1981b, 351).
Aral-88 and the emergence of the Aral catastrophe
In the 1970s, a handful of scientists were trying to draw attention to the 
ecological crisis, to establish that a threshold had been reached (Obertreis 
2017; Weiner 1999, 417–19). These voices were stifled by bureaucratic 
discourse, which lacked resources to speak up for the Aral. The regression 
remained a ‘matter of fact’ (Latour 2004): determinate effects which 
could be known and accounted for. As a ‘matter of fact’, the regression was 
addressed in a limited, circumscribed way, as we will see in Chapter 2. 
However, during perestroika, environmental activists, building on those 
earlier efforts, turned the Aral into a ‘matter of concern’ (Latour 2004): a 
proliferation of interconnected crises involving humans, water, salt and 
dust, far beyond scientific and bureaucratic control (Obertreis 2017; 
Wheeler 2016). Environmental protests were erupting across the USSR 
and, alongside Chernobyl, the Aral catastrophe became a cause célèbre. In 
response to public pressure, the long planned Siberian Rivers scheme was 
cancelled in 1986, in what was deemed an important victory for the 
environmental movement. The dried-up Aral was first shown on television 
in 1988. As the materiality of the crisis was mediated through images and 
texts, the Aral acquired a voice in Soviet society. In the freer discursive 
environment of glasnost, the sea’s regression became a ‘revelatory crisis’, 
laying bare uncomfortable truths about Soviet society (Hoffman and 
Oliver-Smith 2002). At last, it was officially recognised as a disaster.
In 1988 a well-publicised expedition of environmental activists, 
scientists and writers, including Central Asian intellectuals, was organised 
by Novy Mir and the Central Asian newspaper Pamir.41 They travelled 
across Central Asia, seeking the truth about the causes and consequences 
of the catastrophe. In a diary of the expedition published in Novy Mir 
the following year, the expedition director, G. I. Reznichenko (1989, 83), 
described the devastation they found, the sea now 60–90 km from its 
former ports, which were full of rusting boats. Yet his description 
extended far beyond the sea itself:
On our journey we constantly encountered women and children, 
gathering cotton from dawn till dusk. In the Kyzylkum and Karakum 
deserts we would often stumble upon lakes filled with salty drainage 
water. The majority do not have a name. But they should, perhaps, 
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for clarity, be labelled one hundredth, one fiftieth or one twentieth 
of the Aral. For in them is now accommodated a good half of all the 
waters of the Aral Sea. And these lakes are useful for absolutely 
nothing. (Reznichenko 1989, 183)
If the scientific council resolution analysed above fixed the drying sea 
as a knowable, containable waste of the progress of modernity, these 
countless unnamed lakes spoke of indeterminacy, destabilising the 
metanarrative of Soviet progress (Alexander and Sanchez 2019). The 
picture is one of modernity gone disastrously wrong. The expedition’s 
painstaking research across Central Asia found that colossal wastage 
occurred as water seeped through, and evaporated from, rudimentary 
earth canals. Without proper drainage, water laden with pesticides was 
reused, polluting the soil; yet more water was needed to flush chemicals 
out. The land became less fertile, and productivity fell.42 Intertwined 
with wastage of water was wastage of money, which the expedition 
located in the same systemic source: the competition for centrally 
allocated resources engendered by the command economy. The Aral 
regression was therefore just part of a complex ecological crisis across 
the region.
Not only did they find unemployment and proliferating health 
problems by the sea’s former shores: the human crisis too extended 
across the whole basin. While cotton had seemed to promise progress, it 
had facilitated clientelism and entrenched corruption, most notably the 
infamous cotton scandal in Uzbekistan, implicating the entire political 
class.43 The expedition concluded that the scandal was rooted not, as was 
widely assumed, in backward cultural practices, but in the economic 
unviability of cotton. Soviet cotton was of poor quality, and prices 
were too low to sustain kolkhozy, which necessitated falsification of 
accounts in the practice known as pripiska. After pripiska was stamped 
out, plan fulfilment increasingly rested on coercion. Farm workers were 
malnourished. If cotton purported to be the vehicle of Central Asian 
modernisation, perestroika activists found a negation of the urbanist 
values of the Soviet Union.
As a catastrophe, the crisis was extended spatially from the sea 
itself to the whole of Central Asia and indeed the entire USSR; and it was 
extended temporally, involving a rereading of the Soviet past, and eschato- 
logical hope that the moment might prove a turning point for a better 
future. As Reznichenko (1989, 194) wrote, ‘[t]he Aral and, together with 
it, man too, can be saved by a new ecological way of thinking and glasnost, 
which give hope – albeit small, but urgent for all of us; they offer a chance 
ENVIRONMENT AND POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION IN THE ARAL REGION 60
for survival’. Soon after the expedition commenced, a decree by the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union set out 
measures to guarantee an inflow of 21 km3/year to the Aral by 2005, 
ensure safe drinking water supplies, improve ecological conditions in 
delta lakes and improve the efficiency of irrigation systems (Micklin 
1998, 404). For activists, this was too little too late. The expedition 
materials published in Novy Mir and distributed to relevant ministries 
culminate in a wide-ranging proposal for reform by the economic 
journalist Seliunin (1989), centred on land reform: land was to be rented 
to peasant households.44
For a brief moment, the sea’s regression acquired major political 
agency, prompting radical systemic change. Yet, as environmental concerns 
were displaced amid the escalating crisis of late perestroika, a major 
paradigm shift faded from view (Ianitskii 1995; Sigman 2013). Over the 
next few years, there were further decrees about the Aral, but there was, as 
yet, no reduction in the area sown with cotton. In 1991 the newly formed 
State Commission for the Aral proposed diversifying the economy away 
from cotton and irrigation, but these recommendations were immediately 
frustrated by the collapse of the USSR (Micklin 1998, 404).
Conclusion: uneven development in Soviet Central Asia
Travelling the length and breadth of Central Asia, the Aral-88 expedition 
concluded that socialism had never existed in peripheral areas 
(Reznichenko 1989, 192). For these writers, the catastrophe revealed the 
uneven development of state socialism. The tangentially related stories I 
have told in this chapter, about fish and irrigation, entangled local 
populations in multiple dependencies, with spatially divergent outcomes. 
Space was homogenised by the plan; natural resources and labour power 
were abstracted as numbers and rearranged in a gridded matrix. However, 
space was also differentiated by the uneven investment of capital, which 
related to the apparatus’s urge to accumulate fixed assets and to the 
hoarding and blockages inherent in the shortage economy. Thus space 
and nature were differentiated according to their divergent political value 
to the apparatus.45 The materialities of the assets involved (fisheries, 
irrigation systems), offering different possibilities for scaling up, shaped 
processes of accumulation and the sorts of infrastructures which were 
developed.
Entangled in different sets of relations, two incompatible versions 
of the Aral emerged within the project of Soviet modernity. Within an 
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assemblage involving railway, processing plants and fishing kolkhozy, it 
was an object of economic value; in an assemblage of irrigation systems 
and cotton plantations, it was an aberration, wasting water that could be 
fuelling progress. Concomitantly, discursive resources were unevenly 
distributed: as the centralising tendencies of Soviet political economy 
were matched by a centripetal tendency in discourse, more powerful 
branches of the apparatus were able to define the terms of the question, 
making it all but impossible to speak up for the Aral. Sustained by 
radically asymmetrical human interests (cf. Richardson 2014), the 
coexistence of the two versions of the sea was impossible.
The modernisation processes described in this chapter both drove 
the sea’s regression and radically reshaped the relations between people 
around the Aral and their environment before the sea dried up. People in 
the Aral region were doubly vulnerable. First, the consolidation of the 
sea as economic value involved the region in an extractive relationship 
with Moscow. People were dependent both on fish as a resource and on 
the centre for provisioning. While Aral people were dependent on the 
Soviet centre, the centre was much less dependent on them. Central 
Asian Fisheries Ministries were subordinate to the USSR Fisheries 
Ministry, whose jurisdiction extended from the Baltic to the Pacific 
and for whom the Aral was a drop in the ocean. Within the region this 
vulnerability was unevenly distributed: the port of Aral’sk, because of its 
strategic location, attracted much more investment than the villages 
scattered along the remote shoreline, which were of little political value 
to anyone, and remained underdeveloped into the 1950s.
Secondly, the region was vulnerable to the uncompromising 
logic of ever-expanding irrigation, according to which the sea was an 
aberration. After all, the few hundred thousand people around the Aral 
were a small fraction of the tens of millions living in Central Asia. The 
Aral fisheries were relatively marginal in republics whose economies 
were based on agriculture and (in Kazakhstan) mineral extraction. 
Constant quantitative growth in cotton and rice meant more strategic 
resources for the apparatus to accumulate, and Central Asian cotton fed 
the Russian textiles industry. Though the same urge towards centralisation 
drove development in the fisheries, this was never a capital- or labour-
intensive industry. Whatever improvements could be made by mechanisa- 
tion, management and amelioration, expansion would always be limited 
by the total stocks in the sea. By contrast, expansion of agriculture could 
only be limited by water availability, and there was always the expectation 
of diverting the Siberian rivers to Central Asia. This promised to solve the 
region’s water issues altogether, and, in doing so, massively increase the 
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fixed assets under the disposition of Central Asian elites and the Ministry 
of Land Reclamation and Water Management (Minvodkhoz) in Moscow 
(Bressler 1995).
If the centralising tendency of state socialism drove uneven 
development, I have also suggested that compliance was secured, in part, 
by the countervailing tendency within state socialism towards redistri- 
bution which somewhat equalised Soviet space, as sympathetic observers 
argued at the time (Khan and Ghai 1979; Nove and Newth 1967). While 
these two tendencies were sharply asymmetrical, the equalising tendency 
would, as the following chapter shows, dictate the authorities’ responses 
to the Aral regression.
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2
Seeing like a bureaucrat:  
problems of living standards  
and employment
A 1962 document signed by the vice-chairman of the South Kazakhstan 
Sovnarkhoz, outlining measures for the development of the Aral fishery, 
begins:
As a result of (v rezul’tate) the deterioration of the hydrological 
regime of the sea and the rivers Amu Dariya and Syr Dariya, [and] 
the sharp contraction in flow of fresh water into the sea, the raw-
material stocks (syr’evye zapasy) of the Aral have been under great 
strain in recent years, and catches of such valuable species of fish as 
barbel, bream and shemaya are sharply contracting.1
Scientists, he continued, predict that annual catches on the North Aral will 
fall from 21,300 tonnes to 15,800 tonnes by 1966. He made no explicit 
mention of the cause. Instead, he blamed fisheries managers: rapidly 
falling catches were due to their failure ‘to take effective and immediate 
measures to restore the raw-material stocks of the water-bodies’.2 He 
therefore instructed them to carry out amelioration measures, construct 
artificial spawning grounds and acclimatise new species. He also urged 
mechanisation of the fleet in order to maintain catches at 19,500 tonnes.3 
This document is typical of official responses to the sea’s regression over 
the coming years: further regulation and reorganisation of people and 
environment, continuing policies of previous decades. As the sea 
contracted, deep-sea fishing, with newly acquired ships, assumed more 
importance, especially in remote western waters. However, there was no 
paradigm shift in fisheries management, nor could those responsible for 
the fishery officially voice complaints against irrigation policies.
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Environmental historians have offered rich accounts of the processes 
driving irrigation expansion and environmental degradation in Soviet 
Central Asia. This chapter focuses on the branches of the state that bore 
the brunt of these processes, asking how fisheries managers and regional 
bosses responded to the sea’s retreat. The quotation above is indicative of 
the limited framing of the issue. Narrative arc is kept to a minimum, as 
causal connections (‘the hydrological regime is deteriorating, so stocks 
are under stress, so catches are falling’) are syntactically reduced to 
parenthetic background factors through the subordinating phrase ‘as a 
result of’. There is no possibility of asking why the hydrological regime is 
deteriorating. Such language obscures the root cause of the problem, 
irrigation. It is hardly surprising that no paradigm shift occurred.
Indeed, in the documents lying in the dust of the archives, at every 
level of the state, there are scant discursive resources for speaking up 
for the sea. The state of fish stocks could be described as ‘catastrophic’ 
(katastroficheskii); the state of the region, or its human population, could 
not. The ‘sharp fall in the sea level’ is related to ‘the withdrawal of water 
for the needs of irrigation’, which has raised ‘difficulties’ for the fishing 
industry to fulfil its plans. Clauses are articulated through mechanical 
connecting phrases, so that isolated causes and effects are abstracted 
from their contexts. This is typical of the ‘contorted redundancy of 
bureaucratic speech’ (Brown 2015, 31).4 Narrative, the basis of moral 
evaluation (Cronon 1992), is reduced to bureaucratic formula.
Ostensibly, these documents reveal bureaucratic indifference to the 
plight of the Aral region and its population at every level and in every 
branch of the Soviet state, the myopic focus on irrigation providing an 
‘ethical alibi’ (Herzfeld 1992). The language of the state seems to close 
down meaning, restricting other ways of talking about the sea’s regression 
(Cruikshank 1998, Chapter 4). The forms of discourse within which the 
issue was framed precluded the emergence of a ‘critical event’ (Das 1995) 
or ‘matter of concern’ (Latour 2004).
However, many bureaucrats were far from indifferent to the Aral’s 
plight. Insofar as the receding sea impinged on their domain, they had no 
choice but to respond. The next part of the chapter examines efforts to 
maintain the productivity of the sea through introducing salt-tolerant 
species. However, these had no immediate positive effect. The rest of the 
chapter, therefore, explores how bureaucrats responded to a rapidly 
deteriorating environment and the loss of the sea’s ‘fishery significance’. 
As we shall see, investments were made during the 1970s to develop 
infrastructure that responded to what was described as a crisis in living 
standards. Despite the Aral’s specificity, this story is part of a broader 
SEEING L IKE A BUREAUCRAT:  L IV ING STANDARDS AND EMPLOYMENT 67
picture of intense investment across rural Central Asia, as the institutions 
of the Soviet ‘welfare state’ were to modernise local society (Kalinovsky 
2018).5
Furthermore, while the port closed, other enterprises kept going, 
including the fishery itself. After a sharp contraction in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, the fishing industry stabilised and continued to operate even 
after fishing became impossible on the sea itself after 1978. Like many 
stagnation-era enterprises, it was in permanent crisis, but continued to 
operate by importing frozen ocean fish and sending fishermen to fish 
elsewhere in Kazakhstan. The population of the raion fell from nearly 
80,000 in 1970 to 70,000 in 1979 as the non-Kazakh population in 
particular left – but this fall halted in the 1980s.6 In the Moynaq fishery 
on the Karakalpak shore too, ocean fish were imported (Karimov et al. 
2005, 90), while the fishing operation moved away from the sea to newly 
created reservoirs across Uzbekistan, where aquaculture yielded 20,000–
25,000 tonnes per year (Karimov et al. 2009, 3).
This chapter therefore adds further nuance to the political ecology 
of state socialism developed in Chapter 1. If ecological damage derived 
from state socialism’s centralising tendency, this chapter focuses on the 
redistributive tendency of late socialism which, in limited, prescribed 
ways, mitigated some of that damage. Interventions did not simply 
respond to material changes but to how these material changes emerged 
as a bureaucratic ‘problem’. As we saw in Chapter 1, the irrigation vision 
was, pace Scott (1998), not so much that of the state as that of specific 
bureaucratic interests, albeit backed by the Communist Party leadership 
in Moscow. However, other bureaucrats, with their own interests, had 
their own ways of seeing the Aral. No state is a monolith, and, while 
bureaucrats might write like cogs in a machine, the Soviet state was 
not a homogeneous cohesive machine. Bureaucrats encountered the 
deteriorating environment through the web of dependencies, obligations 
and constraints that made up the Soviet state. Managers were obliged to 
fulfil plans set by superiors, but were dependent on superiors for inputs, 
and on those beneath them to fulfil the plan. They were also constrained 
by endemic shortages, which set bureaucrats in competition over the 
allocation of scarce resources (Kornai 1980). For the bureaucrats 
discussed here, the constraints of the shortage economy were compounded 
by the constraints of a deteriorating environment.
These structural constraints and dependencies have discursive 
implications: the ‘speech will’ (Bakhtin 1986) of bureaucrats derived, at 
least in part, from their position within the apparatus. The Aral may have 
been doomed by the dominance of irrigation interests, but there were 
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plenty of actors at different levels of the state who cared about it: whether 
or not they cared about ‘nature’, or the livelihoods and health of the 
people working and living there, they were structurally inclined to care 
about their domain. Of course, they may also have been interested in their 
personal enrichment, but their departmental interests cannot be reduced 
to their personal interests. For these bureaucrats, then, the sea’s 
regression, insofar as its material effects impinged on their domain, 
emerged as a ‘problem’.
Thus the ‘needs of irrigation’, while an ethical alibi for some, were a 
discursive constraint for others. Bakhtin (1986), critiquing the Saussurian 
view of language as an abstract set of rules, introduces the notion of 
‘speech genres’, which are marked by varying degrees of constraints on 
what may be said. While some are very free, even the strictest contain 
some freedom. The speech genres open to bureaucrats writing to higher 
authorities about the Aral’s regression were particularly constrained, as 
they had to follow the ‘authoritative utterances’ of superiors which 
‘set the tone’ (Bakhtin 1986, 88). There were constraints not only on 
what might be said but on who might be addressed: there was no official 
speech genre for fisheries managers to complain to water-management 
organisations. However, although discursive resources were unevenly 
distributed across different departments and regions, some speech genres 
offered certain affordances. Bureaucrats could appeal to other rationalities 
than the cost–benefit analysis, or they could use the sea’s regression as a 
rhetorical tool for seeking investment or negotiating a lower plan.7
As bureaucrats were constrained both by the deteriorating 
environment and by the linguistic resources to address it, the sea’s 
regression emerged as a limited, circumscribed fact – a problem of living 
standards and of employment. Certain crucial material effects were 
occluded from view: the proliferating dust storms, or the damage to 
human health. Nevertheless, even in this limited form, the fact of the sea’s 
regression would be materially consequential. It assumed a degree of 
political agency, prompting measures to maintain the overall shape of the 
assemblage of fish, infrastructure and labour even as the sea at the heart 
of the assemblage vanished from sight.
This chapter is necessarily limited to official discourse: the archives 
I examined did not include the ‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott 1990) that 
doubtless played a role in negotiations between different branches of the 
state. A Tastübek fisherman once showed me a huge dried-up channel 
that previously led to a pool for keeping sturgeon. When a gift was needed 
for a minister, the sturgeon would be taken out and dispatched by train to 
the ministry in Alma-Ata (Almaty). Similarly, when my host in Bögen, 
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Zhaqsylyq, caught a large carp, he would tether it by its gills to a reed until 
he needed to present it as a gift for a visiting dignitary. Such practices are 
not recorded in the archives; nor are offstage communications like angry 
telephone conversations between local bosses and the fisheries minister. 
Privately, officials may have been appalled at what was happening to the 
sea. The documents I saw offered only tantalising glimpses of this offstage 
discourse, when bureaucrats endeavoured to drag it onstage, as we will 
see at the end of the chapter. But even within official discourse, there is 
space for heterogeneity, competing claims and hence some agency.8
Making full use of the sea’s biological resources
Before embarking on this story, an excursus is necessary into efforts 
to preserve the sea’s productivity by introducing salt-tolerant species, 
which would have profound effects on the species composition of the sea 
(Plotnikov et al. 2016). The full significance to humans of these efforts 
would only become evident after the Soviet collapse, as we will see in 
Chapter 5. In the short term, they did not halt the catastrophic decline 
in catches and, indeed, some interventions accelerated it. If prewar 
acclimatisations had sought to address the ‘poverty’ of the Aral’s 
ichthyofauna, the expected decline in sea level and rise in salinity after 
the war heightened the need to acclimatise new species. Before the 
sea started to retreat, mullet were introduced from the Caspian in the 
mid-1950s. Unused to the cold Aral waters, they failed to reproduce. 
Accidentally introduced with them were gobies and atherines, as well as 
a shrimp, P. elegans, which established itself as part of the benthic fauna. 
While the mullet failed to reproduce, the population of gobies and 
atherines exploded. Shortly afterwards, Baltic herring were introduced, 
but, contrary to scientific recommendations, without any measures to 
increase the ‘poor’ planktonic food base. The herring multiplied rapidly, 
ate all the zooplankton and then starved. Meanwhile, the gobies, of no 
commercial value themselves, were competing with native fish over 
benthic fauna. Commercial catches of fish like bream and carp fell, but 
gobies provided food for predator fish such as asp and zander, catches of 
which rose.
Ichthyologists were not deterred by these results. As Karpevich 
(1960b, 77), an ichthyologist at the All-Union Research Institute 
of Fisheries and Oceanography, VNIRO, wrote, ‘To maintain the fishery 
significance of the Aral Sea as far as possible in the future, it is necessary 
even now to introduce to its fauna more euryhaline, eurythermal species 
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of fish and non-fish objects, capable of making full use of its food 
resources.’9 Thus, after 1960, as salinity levels rose, more systematic 
measures were taken to reconstruct the whole ecosystem. Elaborating the 
new approach, Karpevich (1960a, 11) started from Michurin’s principle 
of ‘the unity of the organism with its conditions of life (edinstvo organizma 
i uslovii ego zhizni)’ to view acclimatisation as a complex process of 
organisms adapting to their new habitat. Successful acclimatisation 
depended both on the survival of the individual organisms and on 
the growth of the species population to occupy an ‘ecological niche’. 
Thus, whereas the Azov Sea, rich in small fish, was suitable for the 
introduction of predators, the Aral, deemed ‘poor’ in biomass, first 
required the introduction of invertebrates at the base of the food chain. 
This was a ‘utilitarian’ (Karpevich 1960a, 25) project, its goal the scalable 
growth of commercial fisheries (cf. Lien 2015; Tsing 2015). However, 
acclimatisations were not about abstracting fungible commodities from 
their lifeworlds: the quantitative growth of species of commercial value 
was premised on the interrelations between different species throughout 
the food chain.10
Karpevich (1960b) recognised that it was initially preferable to 
enrich the food base (kormovaia baza) of native fish rather than introduce 
new fish, which might compete with existing ones. Thus, in this period, 
only silver carp and belyy amur, plant-eating species from the Far 
East with no local competitors, were introduced. However, a range of 
euryhaline invertebrates were introduced, some more successful than 
others. To replace the zooplankton wiped out by Baltic herring, a small 
crustacean, C. aquaedulcis, was introduced, quickly spreading across 
the sea. To enrich the benthic fauna, under stress from rising salinity 
and from the voracious gobies, the bivalve mollusc A. ovata and a 
polychaete worm, N. diversicolor, were introduced from the Azov Sea. In 
previous decades, they had already been introduced to the Caspian with 
positive results. Amid rising salinities, they became dominant species in 
the Aral’s invertebrate population. Indeed, as salinity rose, biomass of 
benthic fauna increased tenfold (Krupa and Grishaeva 2019). Biodiversity, 
however, fell, with many species wiped out by the rising salinity; 
chironomid (midge) larvae, a key benthic foodstuff, probably also 
suffered from predation by the polychaete worm (Plotnikov 2013).
In the 1970s, rising salinity levels and shrinking spawning grounds 
made it impossible for native species to reproduce. By the late 1970s, only 
gobies, atherines and a few Baltic herring were left. Yet, in terms of its 
invertebrate population, the sea was far from dead. In her major work on 
the acclimatisation published in 1975, Karpevich affirmed that, with the 
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expected diversion of Siberian rivers, the Aral regression would not last 
long; in the meantime ‘it is necessary to continue both theoretical and 
practical works to maintain life in this difficult period for the sea, and to 
preserve its biological and economic significance, however small’ 
(Karpevich 1975, 356). Recognising the uncertainty surrounding the 
sea’s future as it continued to shrink, Karpevich proposed a range of 
experiments, following which efforts were made to introduce euryhaline 
fish species: two types of flounder, Caspian sturgeon, Pacific salmon.11 Of 
these, flounder glossa, introduced from the Azov Sea in 1979–87, thrived, 
feeding on N. diversicolor and two bivalve molluscs – A. ovata (introduced) 
and C. isthmicum (aboriginal).12 Flounder faced competition for food only 
from gobies. Able to cope with salinities of 15–50 g/l, the flounder quickly 
adapted to its new environment, shortening its spawning time in response 
to the more rapid ice melt than on the Azov (Ermakhanov et al. 2012). It 
also, throughout the 1980s, faced no predation from humans, who were 
now fishing elsewhere. We will pick this story up in Chapter 5.
Problems of living standards and of employment
In the short term, these efforts did not halt the fall in catches. Despite the 
Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers’ 1965 resolution to preserve 
the sea’s fishery significance (rybokhoziaistvennoe znachenie), the amount 
of water reaching the sea continued to decline. In 1969 the Kazakh 
Council of Ministers (Kazsovmin) referred to the resolution when they 
sought investment in the Aral region from the USSR Fisheries Ministry 
(Minrybkhoz) and the USSR Water Management Ministry (Minvodkhoz).13 
However, their attempt to use the resolution to bolster the case for 
investment failed.14 Critically, the decision to preserve the sea’s economic 
significance did not trump the needs of irrigation. So in their letter, 
Kazsovmin asked Minrybkhoz USSR and Minvodkhoz USSR to petition 
Sovmin USSR ‘about hastening the resolution of the question of preserving 
the Aral Sea by means of diversion of the flow of Siberian rivers’.15 It was 
thus possible to talk about preserving the sea itself only on the basis of 
diverting Siberian rivers; otherwise, within the limits set by the necessity 
of irrigation, it was only possible to talk about saving the Aral’s ‘fishery 
significance’. In practice, this related only to delta lakes – and talk did not 
easily translate into action. As one arm of the state continued as normal, 
water continued to be withdrawn for irrigation and the sea receded 
further; for other state organs, preserving even the economic significance 
of the Aral was a race against time. By the early 1970s, the situation was 
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worse than foreseen: a 1973 Union-level commission forecast, accurately, 
that the ‘industrial significance’ of the sea would be almost entirely lost 
by 1980.16
The Kazakh authorities now began to talk about the regression as a 
problem of employment (trudoustroistvo) and of living conditions 
(sotsiial’no-bytovye usloviia). One solution to the problem of living 
standards was pereselenie, deportation/relocation. Over the course of the 
1970s populations of former islands were relocated to Qaratereng, while 
inhabitants of the villages Ūialy and Ūzyn Qaiyr, far to the south of the 
delta, with no fresh water, were relocated to Aral’sk, continuing earlier 
policies of settling and concentrating populations. While the USSR 
Fisheries Ministry suggested relocating all the coastal villages to another 
region altogether, this met stiff resistance from both the Kazakh 
authorities and local people.17 In contrast to the deportations of the 
Stalinist era, it is a mark of the less repressive atmosphere of the late 
Soviet period that this resistance was successful.18 With mass relocation 
out of the question, the focus fell on improving living conditions. As 
outlined in a 1973 directive of Kazsovmin, living conditions in villages 
were to be improved through construction of water pipes, field hospitals, 
schools, nurseries and shops; and villagers were to be provided with feed 
for livestock and Ural motorcycles.19 Work was also conducted to create 
lake fish farms (ozërno-tovarnye rybokhoziaistva), while investment was 
sought for other sorts of employment, most importantly a canning factory 
in Aral’sk.
That the sea’s regression should emerge on the political agenda as a 
problem of employment and living standards – rather than, say, an 
ecological problem, or a problem of falling economic output – relates to 
the tacit social contract of state socialism, which rested on full employment 
and steadily rising living standards. Living standards in the Aral region 
had always lagged far behind those of metropolitan regions of the USSR. 
As the sea receded, the worsening living standards, falling pay, and layoffs 
further jeopardised the social contract. The sea’s regression thus became 
bureaucratically known through these effects, and investment was sought 
to mitigate them. As Kornai (1980) explains, ‘investment hunger’ was 
characteristic of socialist economies. Amid perennial shortages, both 
fisheries bosses and regional officials had to seek investment from higher 
bodies to ensure the functioning of their sector or region, the locus of 
their political authority and prestige. The sea’s regression exacerbated 
the difficulties of functioning within the shortage economy, prompting 
further investment hunger. Since the violation of the social contract 
threatened regional and fisheries bosses’ own legitimacy, investment 
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hunger was expressed in the politically acceptable terms of living 
standards and employment.
Allocative bodies tended towards postponement, because savings 
from postponement were immediate, certain and quantifiable, even if 
in the long run this meant higher social costs, requiring more investment 
to resolve the problem (Kornai 1980). Furthermore, most spare funds 
were being used for investment in cases which had reached the tipping 
point. Investments therefore would only be made after ‘tolerance limits’ 
had been reached, after a problem had become a crisis. However, Kornai 
(1980) argues, recognition of tolerance limits was not automatic, but 
required bureaucrats to forcibly voice them. This point was particularly 
salient in a ‘creeping environmental problem’ where change was 
incremental and thresholds were not objectively given (Glantz 1999b). 
Many of these documents show bureaucrats struggling, within constrained 
speech genres, to establish that tolerance limits had been breached, while 
higher-level authorities sought to downplay the problem to avoid 
assigning funds. In this process of toing and froing, in an economy that 
was, on the one hand, legitimised by a social contract of full employment 
and rising living standards and, on the other, hampered by endemic 
shortages, the Aral Sea regression emerged, haltingly, as a ‘problem’ 
demanding specific sorts of action.
Improving living standards by decrees
Accordingly, Kazsovmin passed a series of resolutions about living 
conditions and employment. Each was preceded by correspondence 
between Kazsovmin, the planning body (Gosplan KazSSR), the fisheries 
ministry (Minrybkhoz KazSSR) and the Qyzylorda oblast authorities 
(obkom/oblispolkom). Minrybkhoz and oblast authorities sought 
investments, with varying degrees of success. For example, in 1974 
Minrybkhoz KazSSR tried to insert a clause to ask Minrybkhoz USSR for 
investment for hatcheries in the Syr Dariya delta and a fish farm on the 
Aqshatau lake system, and for assistance in relocation of villages, which 
‘cannot stand further delay since the social conditions of the existing 
villages are difficult’.20 This attempt to establish tolerance limits was 
unsuccessful: when the resolution was drafted, there was no reference to 
investment from Minrybkhoz USSR (although the Kazakh Minrybkhoz 
was told to allocate funds for construction of water pipes).21
The following year, a letter from Qyzylorda obkom/oblispolkom 
prompted another Kazsovmin resolution. As the regional authorities 
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strove to make their voice heard, they began with some flourish, and an 
unusual sense of narrative arc:
The Aral water-body is one of the oldest fishery basins in the 
country. In the past on the Aral Sea up to 500 thousand tsentners 
[50,000 tonnes] of high-quality table fish were extracted (zander, 
asp, carp, barbel, bream, roach). However, since 1965 the Aral Sea 
and the fishery lakes of the oblast, because of the sharp increase in 
the abstraction of water from the rivers Syr Dariya and Amu Dariya 
for agricultural needs, have been shallowing, which has led to a 
serious deterioration in the natural reproduction of fish stocks in 
the basin and reduction in the volume of fish catches.22
As usual, the needs of agriculture are a parenthesis (indeed, the oblast 
authorities themselves had an interest in the development of irrigation in 
Qyzylorda oblast for rice). However, the emplotment in the glorious past, 
though exaggerating both quality and quantity, rhetorically boosts the 
claim for investment. The authors note efforts to maintain water levels 
and fish stocks in lakes, but stress that these measures cannot solve 
the problem of employment. They therefore make a series of requests, ‘in 
the interests of preserving a contingent of fishermen and workers in the 
fishing industry and making full use of the labour resources existing in the 
region’.23 Most ambitiously, they demand the construction of a canning 
factory in Aral’sk, processing 20,000,000 cans per year, employing 
500 people – a clear case of investment hunger. Other requests include 
hydrological installations on lakes, and the hastening of the construction 
of Qamystybas fish farm; funding for flats in Aral’sk for relocated families; 
and money for loans for fishermen to build new houses. There are also 
smaller requests relating to the increasing difficulty of reaching the 
receding sea, including refrigerated lorries for receiving fish, mobile 
banyas (steam baths), Ural motorbikes for fishermen and trucks to 
transport drinking water.
The final resolution of Kazsovmin, ‘About measures for labour 
organisation (trudovoe ustroistvo) of fishermen of the Aral region and 
improvement of their living and cultural conditions’, was more muted than 
the florid tone of the oblast authorities: ‘In the interests of improvement 
of everyday cultural conditions of fishermen of the Aral region and 
employment of workers in the fishing industry who have been released 
(vysvobodivshiesia) in connection with the contracting fishery on the Aral 
Sea, the Council of Ministers of Kazakh SSR resolves: […]’.24 The 
constraints of the speech genre are evident: the participle phrase ‘the 
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contracting fishery’ conceals both the glorious past described by the oblast 
authorities and the reasons for its contraction, while the euphemistic 
vysvobodivshiesia casts the problem of employment as the natural 
consequence of a normal economic process. Not all the demands of the 
oblast authorities were met. The resolution approved the construction of 
the Qamystybas fish farm and other interventions in delta lakes, and 
instructed Gosplan KazSSR to assign necessary equipment. It also included 
a range of measures to improve living conditions, including water pipes 
and field hospitals. It approved the decision to relocate 520 families from 
remote villages to the town of Aral’sk, and instructed Minrybkhoz KazSSR 
to house them, and Gosplan ‘to provide measures for improving the use of 
labour resources of the Aral region’.25 Despite this vague gesture towards 
providing employment for the relocated families, however, the oblast 
authorities’ central demand for a canning factory was ignored.
In 1976 the pattern was repeated. A letter from the oblast authorities 
stressed the effects of the sea’s retreat on water provisioning, transport, 
fisheries, the shipyard and the port. The effects are stark:
This has led to the reduction of workers in the last 10 years by 2,000 
people. At the present time in the whole Aral region it is not possible 
to provide with work 10,500 people capable of work (including 
6,000 women), of whom in the town of Aral’sk 6,600 people 
(including 2,300 women).26
These figures represent approximately 30% of the working-age 
population, a proportion that was in fact broadly typical of Central Asia 
(Lubin 1984, 58). Occluded from this picture are the informal means by 
which people supported themselves, whether by keeping private livestock 
or by trading. However, statistics baldly demonstrate that tolerance limits 
have been reached, presenting a severe problem of employment that 
requires investment.
The resulting decree from Kazsovmin, ‘On urgent measures for the 
further development of the economy and improvement of everyday-
cultural conditions of the population of the Aral raion of Qyzylorda 
oblast’,27 included only some of the oblast authorities’ requests. The 
canning factory was now included in the decree, as well as new fish farms. 
However, funds were not allocated: Minrybkhoz KazSSR was to ‘discuss’ 
funding with Minrybkhoz USSR. New enterprises in Aral’sk were planned, 
including a sewing factory and a meat processing plant; but other 
requests, such as a glass factory and a brick factory, were not included. 
According to the decree, fishermen’s pay also rose to compensate for 
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falling catches. The oblast authorities had requested that, in accordance 
with a previous directive, Minvodkhoz KazSSR be obliged to deliver 
50 m3/s (1.57 km3/year) of water below Qazaly, for lakes and fish farms.28 
In the final decree, this figure was to be defined each year by Minvodkhoz, 
in dialogue with Minrybkhoz.
In sum, although Kazsovmin recognised that tolerance limits were 
reached, not all the demands were fulfilled, and many measures were 
tacitly postponed simply by not allocating resources. Nevertheless, 
according to later reports on the progress of implementing these 
resolutions, some concrete action ensued.29 Relocated populations from 
islands were housed in Aral’sk, and hospitals, shops and schools were 
built in villages. A stud farm was established at Qūlandy to provide 
employment. Water pipes were, eventually, built to most villages, while 
others were provided with wells. A water-purifying station was built at 
Amanötkel in 1977, although this could not mitigate the heavy 
mineralisation of drinking water caused by agriculture (Elpiner 1998). 
Electricity was provided to many villages for the first time. In other words, 
some basic aspects of state-socialist development, new forms of gridded 
connection, which had long been absent from the region, finally arrived.
However, not all measures were fulfilled. Two fish farms were 
created, but Minrybkhoz USSR refused to assign funds before water 
provisioning for the lakes was guaranteed in the integrated plan for 
water use in the whole Aral basin – which never materialised. Indeed, the 
decree stipulated that Minvodkhoz KazSSR define the quantities of water 
to be delivered to the lower reaches of the Syr Dariya, and this varied 
from year to year. In 1981–2 total flow below Qazaly was more than the 
oblast authorities had requested, 1.63 km3 and 2.04 km3 respectively, in 
1983 much less, just 0.39 km3.30 Some of the enterprises to provide work 
were cancelled: the sewing factory was never built; the canning factory, 
for which funds had been unsuccessfully sought from Minrybkhoz USSR, 
was cancelled by decree of Kazsovmin in 1982; and the meat-processing 
factory was cancelled. The ‘problem of employment’ was not resolved.
In 1984 another letter from the oblast authorities to Kazsovmin 
sought help for the Aral region. Gosplan carried out investigations, 
focused on the village of Qaratereng, where they found that, despite some 
positive results of the measures taken, there was still a labour surplus 
comparable to that identified in the region nearly 10 years earlier. The 
investigation also found that, while some families had been relocated to 
rice-growing sovkhozy (state farms) elsewhere in Qyzylorda oblast, most 
of the population categorically refused to leave, for reasons we explore in 
Chapter 4. Gosplan’s solutions were more of the same: Minvodkhoz was 
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to guarantee 30 m3/s (0.95 km3/year) below Qazaly; the Ministry of 
Agriculture was, in compensation for the damage done to the fisheries, to 
allot funds for building a dam on a delta lake; electricity lines were to be 
built to power pumps for the lakes.31
Even when investment was allocated, it could never resolve the root 
cause of the region’s problems, lack of water. Critically, because of the 
discursive constraints of these speech genres, the problem could only be 
constructed in a limited way, disaggregating cause and effect. In a 
mechanical chain of consequences, regulation of rivers is a parenthetic 
background factor. The end consequence is a problem of 10,500 surplus 
workers. Through the statistic, the problem of employment is abstracted 
from the complex set of material effects brought about by the sea’s 
regression. A problem of living standards entailed some investment in 
basic infrastructure, but dust storms and their effects could not be 
recognised as problems. As a problem of living standards and employment, 
the regression did not constitute a critical event mobilising large-scale 
transformation. Entering the political sphere through this very limited 
optic, the sea’s regression prompted a limited set of actions that broadly 
sought to maintain the status quo.
Nevertheless, as we will see in the following chapters, Soviet times 
are remembered as a period of full employment. Employment was 
provided even in the late Soviet period, if not the full employment which 
was promised. Certainly, the fishery shrank dramatically. In the postwar 
period, about 8,000 people were working in the industry, including 
2,000–3,000 men and women fishing on the sea, lakes and lower reaches 
of the Syr Dariya.32 Over the coming years, the fishery upstream on lakes 
in Qazaly raion sharply contracted as irrigation systems were developed 
to grow rice. Fisheries in uninhabitable villages like Ūialy and Ūzyn Qaiyr 
were liquidated. By 1970 the number of people fishing had fallen to about 
650.33 Women were the first to stop fishing as the fishery contracted over 
the 1960s, though they continued to work in processing plants. In 1976 
Avan’ fish plant was liquidated, and some of the fishermen from Aqespe 
and Aqbasty villages were laid off and transferred to the nearby Qūlandy 
stud farm.34 However, this was the last case of workers being laid off until 
perestroika. If challenging the needs of irrigation was politically 
unconscionable, so was suggesting layoffs – a point forcibly voiced by 
an Aralrybprom accountant at a Minrybkhoz meeting in 1986.35 The 
function of the enterprise shifted from exploiting the wealth of the sea 
to supporting the workers in the region, and Aralrybprom went on 
employing some 2,000 people: fishermen mostly in coastal villages, and 
workers, mostly women, in processing plants in Aral’sk, Bögen, 
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Qaratereng, Qazaly, and Aqtöbe to the north. Although the port closed, 
analogous processes maintained employment in the shipyard and other 
enterprises in Aral’sk.
Fish farms
As the industrial character of the Aral Sea disappeared, attention turned 
to developing fish farms (ozërno-tovarniia rybokhoziaistva) on delta lakes, 
which seemed to promise a sustainable supply of fish, and employment, 
over the years.36 If they were provided with fresh water, cleared of weeds 
and stocked with valuable carp species, lakes promised up to 4,500 tonnes 
of fish per year.37 Even as the environment deteriorated, the ozërno-
tovarnoe rybokhoziaistvo offered a form to be regulated. Yet the promise of 
control was, as ever, frustrated. Aralrybprom decrees reiterate the need for 
the ‘rational use’ of the farms, involving stocking, cleaning canals and 
pumping in fresh water.38 Weeds and low-value fish like pike were not in 
fact removed.39 All lakes were supposed to be assigned to a single enterprise 
or kolkhoz, which would be responsible for the lake, but poaching was 
rife, and inspectors and managers did little to stop it. An order from 1981 
found enterprises fishing on forbidden lakes; in one instance, a local 
manager was complicit.40 Given the difficulties of fulfilling the plan in the 
deteriorating environment, such behaviour is unsurprising.
The biggest constraint on the development of fish farms was, of 
course, lack of water, which lay far beyond fisheries managers’ control. 
But within official speech genres, blame could only be passed downwards, 
not upwards and/or sideways, to Minvodkhoz for example. Thus a 1984 
Minrybkhoz USSR commission sternly instructed Minrybkhoz KazSSR to 
ensure that lakes were supplied with water – although the commission 
explicitly recognised that water-management institutions were failing to 
assign water for fishing. The commission also found an absurd situation 
whereby Qamystybas, an important fish farm, was being used by 
subsidiary enterprises based in Aral’sk, who were growing watermelons 
along its shores, withdrawing water and polluting with pesticides.41 Local 
fisheries managers, as well as the ministry, were aware of this practice – 
and had complained to the raion authorities, who, it turned out, had been 
organising it! People from Aral’sk had even been keeping boats and nets 
by the lake – a hint of the informal practices lying behind the official 
statistics of dire unemployment.42
Meanwhile, Aralrybprom managers blamed those below them for 
failing to stock lakes and supply them with water. In 1984, they complained 
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that Lake Aqshatau, managed by kolkhoz Zhambul, had not been watered 
since 1970.43 They also found that kolkhoz Raiym had taken things into 
their own hands: their lake was separated from Lake Qamystybas by a 
dam, which the kolkhoz managers had destroyed, to raise the level of their 
own lake. This behaviour prompted the ministry to remove the lake from 
the kolkhoz’s control. But a delegation of kolkhozniks to the ministry 
successfully requested that it be returned to the kolkhoz; the ministry even 
agreed to put in a sluice to improve water supply to the lake.44
In the late 1970s the Syr Dariya was dammed at Aghlaq, so that 
what little water there was would not flow into the sea but could be used 
on the lakes and provide drinking water (Plotnikov et al. 2014, 160). But 
there was never enough water. In 1985 a famous brigadier fisherman and 
Party member, Narghaly Demeuov, wrote to the oblast newspaper Put’ 
Lenina criticising Aralrybprom. The managers defended themselves by 
blaming water-management organisations, in particular for their failure 
to build a dam at Qarashalang which would provide for the ‘rational use 
of limited water resources’. Kazsovmin had decreed that water-
management organisations build this dam, but five years later they had 
failed to do so.45 However, although fisheries managers could make these 
points to defend themselves in the press, there was no official channel for 
them to address the water-management organisations directly.
Expeditionary fishing and ocean fish
Nevertheless, these fish farms were not futile. In 1979 the total caught in 
the lakes of Qyzylorda oblast was 1,153 tonnes; in 1988, 1,540 tonnes.46 
However, they could not provide enough work for fishermen or processors. 
Fishermen were therefore sent to fish on lakes hundreds or thousands of 
kilometres away elsewhere in Kazakhstan: if earlier in the century labour 
had been forcibly relocated to places where resources were abundant 
and labour in deficit, surplus labour was now dispatched to regions 
where there were resources left to exploit. But all major lakes in 
Kazakhstan were damaged by the insatiable demands of agriculture, and 
fish stocks across the republic were under pressure.47 The Caspian was out 
of bounds, as it was not managed by Minrybkhoz KazSSR but by a trans-
republican authority. Most promising were the lakes on the Yrghyz river 
in Aqtöbe oblast, some 300 km north of Aral’sk. Though initially poor in 
ichthyofauna, they were successfully stocked with carp – loaded into oak 
barrels from the Aral and flown to the Yrghyz by AN-2 aircraft – which 
grew rapidly and proved the basis of a successful fishery.
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The other two biggest lakes in the country, Balqash and Zaisan, had 
their own fisheries. Even more isolated than the Aral, their ‘poor’ 
ichthyofauna had also been ‘enriched’ by acclimatisations of carp, bream, 
zander and so on. Kolkhoz Zhambul fished on Balqash from 1976, and in 
1978 a Minrybkhoz decree allocated Aralrybprom a sector of northeastern 
Balqash, ‘in the interests of the full development (osvoenie) of the lake’.48 
In this remote region Aralrybprom set up a receiving station with a salting 
workshop. Ekspeditsionnyi lov, ‘expeditionary fishing’, was contingent on 
permission from Glavrybvod, a regulatory body directly subordinate to 
Minrybkhoz USSR, not Minrybkhoz KazSSR. As a practice of providing 
employment, it was therefore constrained institutionally, and by the 
limits of a damaged environment. This was not full-time work, though 
fishermen were paid extra for the time away (komandirochnye raskhody). 
When not fishing, they would be employed in ‘subsidiary enterprises’, 
gathering hay, tending to Aralrybprom livestock.
In 1979, 1,887 tonnes were caught from other oblasts; in 1988, 
3,420 tonnes.49 However, the majority of fish processed in Aralrybprom 
factories was from the oceans – vast enterprises deploying factory ships 
in the Pacific (Dal’ryba), the Arctic Ocean (Sevryba) and the Baltic 
(Zapryba). Pollock, capelin, herring, sardine, sardinella, mackerel, horse-
mackerel: all were brought in refrigerated railway wagons to Aral’sk and 
small plants in Bögen, Qaratereng and Qazaly for smoking or curing. This 
was common practice in all fish plants in Kazakhstan as catches fell. From 
the late 1970s, up to 5,000 tonnes a year were imported to Aral’sk. But 
ocean fish had their own problems, connected with the dysfunction of the 
Soviet economy: despite their abundance in the ocean, deliveries were 
highly irregular, and rarely conformed to what was promised, still less to 
Aralrybprom’s annual plans. There was a tendency to dispatch fish such 
as pollock, which was unprofitable to process, being as unpopular in the 
USSR as it is in Britain.
Because of the cost of importing fish and sending fishermen 
thousands of kilometres to fish, the enterprise went from being profitable 
to loss-making, dependent on subsidies from Minrybkhoz KazSSR, which 
itself was subsidised from the republican budget. Even so, there were 
almost constant financial difficulties. While output plans tended to be met 
(after some tweaking), cost of production was generally higher than 
planned. So, while planned losses were automatically covered by the 
ministry, there were also over-plan losses; and there was a chronic shortage 
of circulating assets (oborotnye sredstva). From the late 1970s onwards, 
losses oscillated between 500,000 and 1,000,000 roubles per year.50
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Trouble with the bank
Despite chronic difficulties, the industry kept functioning – in which 
sense, this is also a typical story of a struggling stagnation-era enterprise. 
Indeed, while ‘financial difficulty’ was a result of all the constraints which 
we have explored, it was not, in itself, an insuperable constraint. In 
Kornai’s (1980) terms, because state-socialist enterprises were always 
bailed out, budget constraints were ‘soft’, and enterprises therefore 
treated money as ‘passive’: their behaviour was not affected by how 
much money they had. While the material below supports that point, 
bailouts still required negotiation. After all, only in the 1950s most Aral 
kolkhozy had been liquidated precisely because of financial difficulties. 
Thus, fisheries managers were caught up in various constraints and 
dependencies: the ministry set the plan, and they were dependent both 
on the ministry and on their workers to fulfil it. They also depended on 
the local branch of the state bank (Gosbank) for financing everyday 
operations, including purchasing ocean fish.51 They were constrained 
both by the dysfunction of the shortage economy and by the deteriorating 
environment. However, certain forms of agency were open to them as 
they negotiated their awkward situation. After all, their superiors also 
depended on them to maintain the industry and prevent the crisis 
worsening.
When negotiating bailouts, all the discursive constraints we have 
looked at applied: fisheries managers could not protest officially about the 
loss of the sea or claim compensation from water-management or 
agriculture ministries. There was no official idiom for expressing the 
severity of the crisis, or for addressing anything other than the economic 
symptoms. Take this 1975 letter to Minrybkhoz KazSSR. Seeking to raise 
the limits for production costs and personnel, managers cite several 
reasons, including costs of ocean fish. Only the fifth reason touches 
directly on the drying up of the sea:
As a result of the deterioration of the industrial significance of the 
Aral Sea and lakes belonging to it, as in fact the first quarter showed, 
to fulfil the state plan we have been forced (vynuzhdeny) to carry 
out expeditionary fishing in the 2 and 3rd quarters of 20,000 
tsentners [2,000 tonnes] of fish on the lakes of Aqtöbe oblast, which 
are delivered to Aral’sk and Aqtöbe fish-plant by auto-transport, 
which just for the additional transport costs requires more than 
450,000 roubles.52
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The complex ecological crisis is reduced to a single-stranded economic 
problem – deteriorating industrial significance, a technical problem 
obstructing fulfilment of the state plan. Within these discursive 
constraints, what can be claimed from the higher organ is also limited. 
Nevertheless, claims can be made. Highlighting constraints allows the 
authors to disavow agency (‘we have been forced to’), thus forestalling 
any charge of mismanagement, and bolsters their claims for leeway. The 
speech genre thus also has its affordances: reductions in plans and 
economic assistance could be negotiated by highlighting environmental 
constraints.53 Indeed, Minrybkhoz KazSSR and Gosplan KazSSR gave the 
enterprise considerable leeway, often on that very basis.54 In turn, Kazakh 
fisheries ministers would try to negotiate with USSR ministers and with 
their colleagues in Kazsovmin. Of course, while local managers would 
highlight only the constraints within which they operated, communi- 
cations from the ministry would, as well as acknowledging the ‘objective 
reasons’ for their difficulties, also blame mismanagement, especially 
hoarding, and would instruct them to take measures to improve 
management.55 But this was a generic feature, part of the performative 
aspect of the document. It never translated into sanctions from the 
ministry. Doubtless informal pressure, involving other ways of talking 
about the problem offstage which are not recorded in these documents, 
also played its part, particularly when Sarzhanov, former director of 
Aralrybkombinat, was Fisheries Minister in the 1980s.
Relations between Aralrybprom and Gosbank were more fractious, 
and a file of correspondence between them from 1979 offers insight into 
the (dys)functioning of the fishing industry.56 Gosbank was less interested 
in Aralrybprom’s plan fulfilment than in resolution of its chronically dire 
financial situation and improving its ‘economic efficiency’. Thus further 
bargaining was necessary to secure loans to cover shortages in working 
capital and purchase of ocean fish. On Aralrybprom’s side, correspondence 
draws attention to a permanent state of ‘temporary financial difficulty’, 
which managers blame on various factors beyond their control: irregular 
delivery of ocean fish; the high expense of fishing on Balqash; the failure 
of the ministry to top up their working capital as promised; and shortage 
of railway wagons delaying dispatch of finished production. Managers 
also voiced the measures being taken to rectify the financial situation: 
sending their fishermen to the southern Aral (before 1978) and Balqash, 
and making full use of the delta lakes. They stressed that the factory was 
working as hard as possible to process all the fish which had arrived to 
avoid accumulating excess stocks, and that they were trying to get hold of 
profitable fish.
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In reply, Gosbank would never mention the sea’s regression – 
although the sea’s retreat from the town would have been perfectly visible 
to Aral’sk Gosbank managers. They focused on the overdue loans owed by 
Aralrybprom; their over-expenditure on pay and travel expenses; their 
hoarding of materials, especially fish; and their failure to call in debts 
owed to them. Threats would involve ‘special regimes of financing’, which 
aimed to reduce indebtedness. Faced with such threats, Aralrybprom 
managers would write to the ministry for help. There would be less 
explanation of the root causes of the problem than in letters to the bank 
– a sign, perhaps, of a more sympathetic addressee. The standard format 
was simply to state the shortfall in working capital, the various overdue 
loans and the threats from Gosbank, before requesting a loan or subsidy. 
A particularly desperate telegram from 1978 adds that deliverers of ocean 
fish are refusing to deliver because of problems in paying them, and that 
the enterprise will be ‘paralysed’ without the ministry’s help.57 In this 
instance, the Aralrybprom director requested that the minister petition 
the republic office of Gosbank for a one-million-rouble loan.
Generally, special regimes of financing would be avoided. But when 
one such regime was applied, in 1979, the director and accountant 
of Aralrybprom wrote to the local manager of Gosbank: ‘The experience 
of recent years has shown that when the association Aralrybprom has 
experienced tough financial difficulty, Minrybkhoz has always come 
forward and through the Ministry of Finances has paid off all the debt 
on Gosbank loans.’58 They note that the fishery on local lakes and on 
Balqash is going well; that an agreement has been reached with 
Zaprybsbyt about more marketable ocean fish like mackerel and horse-
mackerel; ‘experienced comrades’ are being sent all over the USSR to 
choose suitable fish for processing. A week later the regime was cancelled.
Gosbank was also under constraints. Their goal was to make the 
enterprise run more efficiently, but the only pressure they could apply 
threatened the working of the enterprise altogether, and in the stagnation 
era the rationality of meeting plans – not to mention keeping people in 
work – trumped that of economic efficiency. An internal Aralrybprom 
document from 1979 mentions that the local bank has applied to the 
oblast office of the bank to apply the most serious sanction of all: forced 
sale, implying the dissolution of the enterprise and the distribution of 
its assets to other enterprises.59 But there is no mention of it anywhere 
else. From a strictly economistic perspective, it may have seemed the 
only solution to a chronically failing enterprise, but it was politically and 
socially unconscionable: the rationality of economic efficiency was 
subordinate.
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The limits of bureaucratic discourse
And so the industry limped on. In the local archives, after a flurry of 
correspondence in 1978–9, there is no more about financial difficulties 
until 1985, but there is no reason to suppose that they went away. Indeed, 
files from 1985 containing the correspondence between Aralrybprom, 
Minrybkhoz and Gosbank follow the same pattern as earlier documents.60 
However, in some letters from Aralrybprom managers there is a shift 
in the language used, a new level of exasperation, and bureaucratic 
discourse almost breaks down. In late 1985 Gosbank applied a credit 
sanction without warning and cut off all forms of credit. In outrage, the 
director and accountant of Aralrybprom wrote to the Gosbank oblast 
office, sending copies to the ministry, and to the Gosbank republic and 
local offices.61
After explaining how the regression of the sea has led to the 
necessary reorganisation of the fishery so that it is based on ocean fish 
and expeditionary fishing, they state bluntly: ‘The sharp retreat of the sea 
has caused anxiety (vyzval bespokoistvo) for the local inhabitants, and 
they have started moving to other life favourable regions of south 
Kazakhstan (drugie zhiznennye blagopriiatnye raiony iuga Kazakhstana).’62 
This is the most evident expression of concern for the local population 
that I found in the archives – and the closest to their voices. But the 
Russian is strange. As Bakhtin (1986, 80) notes, even people competent 
in a language may lack the generic repertoire to partake in certain forms 
of discourse. Here the writers, native Kazakh speakers, are well schooled 
in official bureaucratic genres of Russian, but the Russian becomes 
ungrammatical as their speech incorporates other forms of discourse 
about the sea, exceeding the limits of those genres. They then refer to a 
further constraint, imposed by higher authorities in line with the social 
contract:
In the interests of supporting the indigenous fishermen and 
processing workers of the Aral, the TsK KP Kazakhstan and 
Kazsovmin have adopted a special decree, where it is categorically 
forbidden to dissolve any sections, brigades, units, both of fishermen 
and processors. Accordingly technical-economic assistance 
has been given, both of an individual and societal character of 
production (we adduce these facts for the information of the 
employees of the bank who are not acquainted with the exhausted 
[?] situation of the Aral and with its labourers [s istomnym [?] 
polozheniem Arala i s ego truzhenikakh]).63
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The parenthesis at the end of the paragraph is sarcastic: the employees of 
Aral’sk Gosbank would have been well acquainted with how Aral’s 
situation far exceeded the limits of official discourse. With this phrase, the 
authors, usually restricted by generic rules to talking just about the ‘loss 
of industrial character’ or ‘deterioration of hydrological regime’, gesture 
towards the whole complex of ecological, economic and social effects, 
and the sorts of discourse with which people were talking about them. 
Official discourse holds a trace of hidden, offstage transcripts.
The authors go on to complain that, although the plans have been 
fulfilled and Minrybkhoz is helping, the financial situation has 
deteriorated. At this point, their frustration bubbles over:
Consequently, just for the normal work of the Association, a constant 
overdraft limit of no less than 1.5 million roubles is necessary; 
factually the matter far from corresponds to what was expected, 
since ocean raw-material from the main basins of the USSR arrives 
with interruptions (s pereboem); everyone knows that fish is not ore, 
or coal; suppliers dispatch whatever they have in stock. Here we are 
forced to accept without analysis of species of fish, whether they are 
included in the plan, whether they are profitable or not; the fact is 
that if we refuse, because the goods are not foreseen in the delivery 
plan or for some other reason, then we will be left without raw 
materials, and the 2000-strong workforce collective will be left with 
nothing. We have been through that bitter experience (gor’kii opyt) 
several times. Actually in recent years by seasons there is a practice 
of stocking up with raw materials 3–4 times more than the required 
norm. And the sequence of shipping to customers, in contrast to a 
combination of regional fish, dictates its own: they demand ordinary 
species of fish from local water-bodies, which we often don’t have.64
The language breaks down here. The sense is clear: consumers want local 
fish, not fish from the oceans. But there is some odd phraseology, 
punctuation is lacking, and the syntax is unclear, with verbs lacking clear 
subjects. The sheer frustration of trying to function in the shortage 
economy boils over in a discourse lacking the resources to express 
such frustration. They continue to point out that supply is seasonal, 
and processing is also seasonal since it is impossible to process fish in 
the summer heat, before highlighting another constraint, the ‘law of 
socialism’: ‘At that time, we present the workers with leave without pay, 
however we do not reduce the whole collective, since that is not stipulated 
in the law of socialism.’65 Thus, they explain, materials and debts 
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accumulated together. When production was ready to be dispatched in 
September, all the railway wagons were busy transporting watermelons. 
This explains the current financial difficulties. The bank has ignored their 
letters and imposed a regime of special crediting. The authors further 
remark that the bank has omitted to consider Aralrybprom’s early 
overfulfilment of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, and the overfulfilment of 
the plan for the first nine months of this year. On this basis, they urge, the 
bank is obliged to help. The managers have also appealed to the minister, 
Sarzhanov, both orally and in writing, but still the special regime of 
financing has been imposed. The sense of outrage accumulates as more 
arguments are adduced.
Finally, the authors spell out the consequences of Gosbank cutting 
off credit: ‘Production is on the verge of final paralysis (na grani 
okonchatel’noi paralizatsii), since in days suppliers can refuse to deliver 
raw materials and other materials necessary for production, which 
will sharply influence the fulfilment of the state plan and without 
doubt will disrupt the pre-Congress obligations of the association.’66 
While bureaucratic discourse may be at its limit, the authors are still 
writing according to the rules of the genre, drawing attention to their 
legal obligations before the state. They use the genre’s affordances 
to strengthen their hand in fulfilling what remains a relatively modest 
‘speech will’. They indicate clearly that tolerance limits, ‘the verge 
of paralysis’ of the fishery, have been reached. After this letter, and a 
phone conversation with the oblast bank manager, the credit sanctions 
were lifted.67
Conclusion
Over the coming years, in the climate of perestroika, central subsidies 
were cut, and the ban on layoffs was breached, with the remaining 
fishermen in Aqbasty transferred to the Qūlandy stud farm.68 But 1988 
saw some success: a new refrigeration unit was purchased from Denmark, 
a storage facility from Japan, and new lines of production, including 
spiced kippers, were mastered; that year saw an extraordinary above-plan 
profit.69 Nevertheless, the basic pattern of financial difficulties, resolved 
at the last minute by intervention from the ministry, persisted. At the 
same time, as we saw in Chapter 1, the freer political atmosphere of 
glasnost brought a new way of talking about the sea, as activists’ work 
established that tolerance limits or thresholds – economic, social, 
ecological and medical – had been passed years ago.
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The story lying in the archives is rather different. In a century of 
catastrophes that included the destruction of the pastoral economy, the 
sea’s disappearance both was and was not a sea change. As the sea’s 
regression emerged as a ‘problem’, in a process of top-down adaptation to 
environmental change, the assemblage of people, fish and infrastructure 
was maintained, even once the sea at its centre had gone. Of course, this 
top-down adaptation introduced new dependencies and new vulner- 
abilities – as became clear when the Soviet Union collapsed. Nevertheless, 
this story of top-down adaptation casts further light on the relationship 
between the Soviet periphery and the centre, and on the political ecology 
of Soviet socialism. Chapter 1 demonstrated how interdependencies 
characterised by unequal exchange resulted in spatially uneven 
development. When the sea receded, the Aral region’s dependence on 
gridded space was accentuated, but the unequal exchange was now 
reversed. In the less authoritarian context of the late USSR, rather than 
imposing forced relocation or deportation, bureaucrats at different levels 
were able, in limited, prescribed ways, to stand up for the local population. 
As the increasingly uncontrollable environmental consequences of 
uneven development threatened the social contract, and as the sea’s 
regression emerged as a problem of living standards and employment, 
the equalising, redistributive tendency of late Soviet socialism became 
prominent, mitigating some of the damage wrought. Hence the financial 
subsidies, the redistribution of ocean fish, and the redistribution of 
the right to fish on other lakes to Aral fishermen. Tendencies towards 
centralisation and redistribution, though contradictory, were connected, 
resting on integration into Soviet space: the capacity of Minrybkhoz to 
redistribute depended on centralisation of resources. Had Balqash been 
managed by local communities, or the ocean fish managed by their own 
fishermen, this would not have happened.
Nevertheless, bureaucrats always struggled to deal with even the 
limited problem of employment and living standards. Indeed, the uneven 
distribution of discursive resources and the constraints of official speech 
genres circumscribed how the sea’s regression could emerge as a fact, 
and hence limited the possible official responses. Surplus labour or a 
paralysed fishery could constitute a tolerance limit; more complex 
problems could not. Indeed, these contradictory tendencies, towards 
centralisation and towards redistribution, were sharply asymmetrical: 
redistribution could not make up for the escalating damage wrought by 
irrigation projects, even in the very limited terms in which this damage 
was understood. The following two chapters explore what these processes 
look like to people in the region today.
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3
Ocean fish, state socialism  
and nostalgia in Aral’sk
Mūrat Sydyqov is a poet and musician known across Kazakhstan. My 
friend Edïge, who is in his early thirties, suggested I visit him. Edïge had 
been telling me how little he had heard about the sea from his parents, 
saying that everyone in Aral’sk today is mostly concerned about money 
and everyday pressures. He recommended I talk to Mūrat, as a fund of 
cultural knowledge, someone who truly cares about the sea and the 
region. Mūrat was born in 1941 to a fishing family in Qarashalang. His 
descriptions of his childhood emphasise the heroism of Aral fishermen, 
the wealth and holiness of the sea, the natural wonders of the landscape. 
His talent, he maintains, comes from being washed in the sea as a baby. 
Injured in an accident on the ice as a child which left half his face 
paralysed, he moved to Aral’sk, and later studied in Kazakhstan’s then 
capital Alma-Ata (now Almaty). He and his wife Bazar worked on the 
kul’tsudno, the ‘culture ship’, performing national music for fishermen at 
sea. Since the sea dried up, he has composed songs lamenting its loss and 
expressing hope for its return. In the early 1990s, he raised money 
through his concerts in the region, and donated them to a fund for saving 
the Aral Sea.
Our conversations reflected the topics of his songs, and accorded 
with what I had been expecting before I went to the field – integrated 
narratives of the sea’s regression, encompassing issues about politics, 
ecology, morality and personal health. In our recorded interviews, 
Mūrat presented his public self, an artist who stands up for and defends 
the people (khalyq). He talked extensively about Kazakhstan’s bright 
future as a sovereign state, its success in restoring the sea, and his hope 
for further restoration of the sea in the future. His account of the sea’s 
regression spoke of the proper, divinely ordained, relations between 
humans and their environment: ‘We have an enemy, ekologiia … the sea 
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is disappearing, wealth is disappearing, but nature – if you defend 
it, such a disaster (Ru.: bedstvie) won’t happen. Wealth wasn’t valued.’ 
He cited the Koran, saying that God had given all the wonders of nature 
on condition that humans should only take what was needed. He 
stressed the need for qanaghat, meaning ‘sufficiency’ or ‘moderation’: 
‘Between heaven and earth there will be wealth, but if someone destroys 
qanaghat, there will be suffering, you spoil nature, you spoil wealth, 
ekologiia comes.’ Weaving together ecology, economy and health, Mūrat 
posits the failure to observe qanaghat as a breach of the divinely 
ordained relations between humans and their environment. But I did 
not hear anyone else use qanaghat in this context, and whereas Mūrat, 
in his public voice, talks in abstract terms about ‘wealth’ (bailyq), others, 
including the unofficial Mūrat, talk more concretely about money and 
work, and connect them to the political economy of contemporary 
Kazakhstan.
More typical was a conversation with the grandmother in the house 
where I initially stayed in Aral’sk. She told me how her husband had sold 
dried fish illicitly from their household in the 1960s, as well as deer, ducks 
and geese which he hunted. She concluded: ‘There was a lot of wealth in 
the sea. We lived very well in those days, under Communism, but now 
we’ve gone past that.’ There was no contradiction between the informal 
practices endemic to lived socialism and the abstract idea of Communism. 
Most striking was her equation of natural abundance, a good life, and 
Communism. She did not mention that in the 1960s the sea was already 
shrinking and fish catches were falling dramatically. I tried to clarify the 
date. She said something vaguely about the sixties and seventies, before 
declaring firmly that it was in 1990 that the crisis started. I tried to press 
her about what life was like in the town in the 1980s, when the sea was 
already long gone, but she contradicted me: ‘It didn’t go suddenly – it 
went gradually, gradually …’ This is certainly true, but even so most 
people agree that the sea had disappeared from the town by 1978. Her 
memory collapsed the loss of the sea and the fall of the USSR: both 
are periods of abundance defined against the indisputable scarcity of 
the 1990s.
Indeed, during my time in Aral’sk, I did not encounter integrated 
narratives of total disaster, a critical event touching on all aspects of 
people’s lives. People are certainly aware of the global disaster narrative, 
but, as something that is felt to have come from outside, it is often felt to 
be stigmatising. People who grew up in the USSR remember the late 
Soviet period as a time of stable employment, facilitated by ocean fish; a 
time of relative abundance, of cinemas and workers’ clubs in the town, of 
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powerful industrial enterprises (krupnye predpriiatiia), even a naval 
college (morskoe uchilishche); a time when people’s lives were integrated 
into the encompassing, gridded space of the USSR, which sustained a 
sense of belonging (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Jansen 2014). While talk 
about the loss of the sea tends to be muted, the collapse of the USSR is 
narrated as a sea change: a contraction of space, a loss of connections 
and belonging – of the ‘expectations of modernity’ (Ferguson 1999). 
These memories of the late Soviet period are in stark contrast to outsiders’ 
impressions at the time: for the Aral-88 expedition, the town was ‘the 
epicentre of an ecological disaster’ (Reznichenko 1989, 191), a chaotic 
and disordered sprawl that negated the urbanist values of Soviet 
socialism.
This is not to say that the sea itself is not mourned. However, while 
nostalgia for the USSR prompts litanies about jobs, the cost of groceries 
and pensions, nostalgia for the sea is invariably compressed into memories 
of swimming: ‘We swam, where the restaurant “Aral” is today, we swam 
there.’ Memories of the sea are memories of leisure. After all, while the 
town’s growth had depended on the sea’s economic significance as a 
transport route and a fishery, the livelihoods of many in the town did not 
depend directly on the sea: they interacted with it as a space of leisure. 
My landlady Ornyq happily told me how her mother forbade her to go to 
the sea; when she came back covered in salt (salinity levels were rising 
then!), her mother scolded her. These memories of leisure tend to be 
private, happy reminiscences of childhood. Although most people 
understand why the sea dried up, there is little sense of contradiction 
between the two sorts of nostalgia. Indeed, often the demise of the sea 
and the demise of state socialism are blurred: the two sorts of nostalgia 
leak into each other, both expressing longing for a time-space of 
abundance, or just for a time-space away from the stresses and concerns 
of the present. Memories of being Soviet are of course not the only 
meaningful framework of belonging, and may be less salient for recent 
migrants to the town; like the villagers of the next chapter, most Aral’sk 
inhabitants are deeply attached to the region, the home of their ancestors 
and of most of their kin today. But the memories of being Soviet are the 
key focus in this chapter.
Postsocialist nostalgia
The official efforts to mitigate the sea’s regression, described in 
Chapter 2, partly explain why it can seem less than the sea change one 
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might expect. Ocean fish, realising the abstract promise of employment, 
are often narrated as strengthening the state-socialist social contract. 
Nevertheless, as I stressed, there was a gap between the escalating 
material effects on the ground and the limited emergence of the Aral 
regression as a ‘problem’. Moreover, the centralising (environmentally 
devastating) and redistributive (mitigating) tendencies of state socialism 
cannot be separated, at least at the level of analysis. How, then, to explain 
the nostalgia for late socialism among the older generations? Why does 
nostalgia for the Soviet Union often overshadow nostalgia for the natural 
environment? How is the moral content of the nostalgia for Soviet space 
sustained despite awareness that the sea was destroyed by Soviet 
development projects? This chapter argues that the nostalgia for the 
Soviet project, focused on labour and livelihood, speaks to the present, 
and offers an implicit critique of the present (Boym 2002). Nostalgia for 
the sea does not easily lend itself to articulation, and, when it does, it does 
not speak to the present. Nor are political explanations of the desiccation, 
or outsiders’ narratives of an environmental disaster, salient to present 
concerns.
However, the past is not simply reconstructed from scratch to suit 
the needs of the present. Certainly, the content of nostalgic narratives is 
often the loss of the promise of socialism rather than of its actuality. 
Certainly, memories are selective, and there is a degree of (conscious or 
unconscious) ‘memory management’ (Sorabji 2006). But I also take 
seriously the reality of the past to the people who lived through it. 
Perspectives on the past today derive, in the first instance, from lived 
experiences of the sea’s retreat. If the consolidation of the Aral as an 
object of economic value had integrated the town into Soviet space, the 
provision of ocean fish as the sea receded maintained the town’s 
integration, inflecting the meaning of the sea’s demise for those working 
in the industry, as well as the wider population. Perspectives on the past 
have also been reshaped by layers of change in the intervening period, 
particularly the rapid unravelling of the 1990s. These past experiences 
are further interpreted through tangled discourses past and present, 
which constitute shared (but not all-encompassing) frameworks within 
which people use the past to make sense of present and future. These 
frameworks may be variously rooted in pre-Soviet understandings of 
nature, or in the authoritative utterances of the Soviet state, or in the 
critical perspectives of perestroika intellectuals, or even in the global 
disaster vision. I do not propose a singular ‘official’ framework which 
people either resist or conform to. Certainly, the Soviet state’s monopoly 
on many forms of discourse engendered oppositional private narratives 
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or counter-memories (Boym 2002, 61; Pine et al. 2004; Watson 1994), 
while in many postsocialist contexts, nostalgia is a way of resisting new 
hegemonic narratives (e.g. Berdahl 1999). But the relative absence of 
strong official narratives about the Soviet period today means that 
remembering is taking place in something of a historiographical vacuum. 
There is little sense of an authoritative or hegemonic discourse about the 
late Soviet period.
Postsocialist nostalgia is not unique to Aral’sk: across the former 
Soviet bloc, the disintegration of Soviet space produced a defensive 
nostalgia, as people sought to stabilise the past amid rapid change (Boym 
2002, Chapter 6). Reeves (2014, Chapter 3) emphasises the sense of loss 
and disorientation that accompanied the disintegration of the manifold 
modes of connection by which Central Asia was incorporated into the 
USSR. Thus, even in a small town like Aral’sk, people are nostalgic for an 
urbanist identity based on order and legibility, which allowed people to 
imagine their futures and pasts within the future and past of the Soviet 
Union (Alexander and Buchli 2007; cf. Buck-Morss 2002; Kotkin 1995, 
18). Across Central Asia, ethnographers find similar litanies about 
employment and pensions – from urban Almaty (Alexander 2004a; 2007; 
2009a), to decollectivised rural Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Féaux de la 
Croix 2014; McMann 2007; Toleubayev et al. 2010, 363–5), to 
postindustrial Kyrgyzstan (Pelkmans 2013), to urban Uzbekistan 
(Dadabaev 2010). These laments point to a moral connection between 
state and citizens that has been breached. When memories of being Soviet 
focus on the measures taken to mitigate the sea’s demise, ocean fish are 
remembered as materialising this moral connection between state and 
citizen.
However, when I was doing fieldwork more than 20 years after the 
collapse of the USSR, differences across the region had widened. In much 
of Central Asia, ‘memories of having been modern’ (Reeves 2016, 4) 
centre on the material markers of modernity, such as constant electricity 
supply and decent roads which integrated far-flung locales into Soviet 
space; but in Aral’sk, much of the infrastructure has improved, most 
notably the clean drinking water which arrived on the eve of the USSR’s 
demise and since then has been piped to all households. Nor is the pace 
of change the same as in the 1990s. There is a sense of chronic instability, 
but it is possible to get by and imagine a future for oneself and one’s 
family, even if hedged around with uncertainty and financial tension. My 
informants are not stuck in the past: certain aspects of Soviet rule, notably 
the lack of variety in the shops, are contrasted negatively with the present; 
and there is a broad recognition that things have got better since the 
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disastrous 1990s. Sovereign Kazakhstan provides a new sort of belonging, 
which is certainly meaningful for many, though it does not preclude 
regret at the loss of the older, more encompassing sense of belonging. A 
further question, then, is why postsocialist nostalgia persists in these 
circumstances – particularly when the ecological devastation wrought by 
the Soviet project might be expected to destabilise the longing for a return 
to the Soviet ‘home’.
Ruins
When I look back on my time in Aral’sk, I see the cranes which loom, 
rusting, over the dried-up harbour. From almost anywhere in the town 
they are visible, rising like dinosaurs’ heads above the skyline – fossils, 
metonyms of a lost world. Ships bearing raw cotton would arrive from 
Karakalpakstan, and the cotton would be unloaded and loaded onto 
trains to be sent for processing to Ivanovo, in the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic. In the museum a grainy black-and-white photograph 
shows cotton being unloaded (Figure 3.1, cf. the later scene in Figure 
3.2); a caption states what is happening but makes no comment. Ships 
would then be laden with grain from the northern parts of the Soviet 
Union, for the return journey to Moynaq and Nókis to feed the cotton-
growing regions of Central Asia. The port was kept open until 1978 by 
dredging a channel through the Berg Strait that separated the Small and 
Large Seas, and along Saryshyghanaq bay. When this too dried up, the 
port closed. Over the course of the 1970s, most of the non-Kazakh 
population left. Many moved to Togliatti, where AvtoVAZ (the car plant 
which was to make the famous Zhiguli, or Lada) was being constructed 
– and today former Aral’sk residents meet up in Togliatti. For many older 
Kazakh inhabitants of Aral’sk, the loss of the sea is associated, with regret, 
with the departure of the non-Kazakh population, and a loss of the 
cosmopolitan, urban nature of Aral’sk.
The area around the former harbour, once a hive of activity and a 
focal point of the town, is today peripheral. Cement is sold out of the back 
of the port. The enterprises connected with the sea are largely ruined. 
Sometimes, when at a loose end, I would be drawn to these spaces. I 
would walk past the Hotel Aral, past the fishermen’s museum and the 
crumbling fisheries research institute, past a large new school which 
overlooks the harbour, round the corner and towards the remains of the 
fish processing plant (Figure 3.3). Though a new fish plant has opened in 
the old building (see Chapter 7), there is an overwhelming sense of 
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Figure 3.1 Cotton being unloaded from Aral’sk harbour, undated. 
Source: Museum of Fishermen, Aral’sk.
Figure 3.2 Aral’sk harbour, summer 2013. Source: author.
abandonment. The former shore is today littered with rubbish. Once, 
there were pontoons where fish would be unloaded for processing. Old 
residents reminisce about children stealing fish from these pontoons, and 
no one cared because there were so many fish; about fish being used as 
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fuel because the fish were abundant and worthless; about catfish so large 
that they could feed an entire village.
Across the harbour from the fish processing plant stand the long 
sheds of the shipyard (sudoremontnyi zavod; Figure 3.4), where vessels 
for the fishing industry and the transport fleet were built and repaired. It 
now stands largely empty. An attempt to install a plant for repairing 
railway wagons was unsuccessful. Inside the shipyard stands stanok 
Lenina, ‘Lenin’s lathe’ (Figure 3.5), donated to the people of the region in 
thanks for the 14 wagons of fish. This event is also commemorated in the 
mosaic in the station, and in the central square. Even for young people 
who never saw the sea full, this story functions as a metonym for the 
golden age of the Aral fisheries.
To return to the shipyard: like the fish processing plant, it was kept 
open even when the sea had dried up. My host Sasha worked there as an 
electrician until it went bankrupt in 1995, leaving him unemployed. He 
talks enthusiastically about how, once the sea had gone, the principal 
activity of the shipyard shifted to the construction of barge sections. 
These would be loaded onto trains and assembled in Siberia into 200-
tonne barges, used to transport oil and other key goods in a remote region. 
In the winter, Sasha explained, shipyard workers would go on ‘business 
trips’ (komandirovki) to Termez, where the Amu Dariya forms the border 
between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. They would repair barges used for 
ferrying goods up and down the river and across the border. Locals, Sasha 
added, lacked the expert knowledge of the Aral shipyard workers. In this 
typically Soviet solution to the problem of employment, space is abstract, 
Figure 3.3 Old fish plant, Aral’sk, summer 2013. Source: author.
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Figure 3.4 Shipyard, seen from harbour, summer 2013. Source: author.
Figure 3.5 Stanok Lenina (Lenin’s lathe), Aral’sk shipyard, summer 
2013. Source: author.
and production is divorced from place. But this in itself becomes part of 
local identity: as the productive labour of shipyard workers incorporated 
Aral’sk into Soviet space, Sasha is proud of his role in maintaining 
infrastructural connections elsewhere.
Near the end of my fieldwork, I was talking with Ornyq, who is in 
her forties, about these measures to maintain employment. She said that 
all the same it would have been better to have the sea. She proceeded in 
the subjunctive, imagining what it would be like if the sea was still there: 
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there would be a beach, and tourists would come here rather than go to 
the Black Sea; the port would be open and ships would sail on the sea; the 
rybokombinat would be working (she ignored the several fish plants that 
are open in the town today); young people would all become sailors. This 
longing for the sea was strikingly distinct from a longing for socialism. 
While her words drew on her childhood memories of the remnants of the 
sea in the harbour, she was imagining what the present-day town would 
look like if the sea was there. Capitalism and socialism were irrelevant to 
that vision. But then the subjunctive slipped into past historic:
Before, the fish plant operated, and the shipyard … And 
every morning there would be a siren from the shipyard: 
WOOOOOAAAAAAA! We would all check our watches and say, 
‘Time for work!’ And off we’d go, in buses, big buses, not these taxis 
that we have today … Not like today, now … what? People just sit in 
the market and trade.
Her longing for the sea slipped into a straightforward reminiscence 
about the late Soviet years, with no reference to the sea. The content of 
the reminiscence is instructive: she recalls order, rationality, the labour 
discipline of industrial time, in contrast to a present of small-scale market 
trading. Ornyq came of age in the mid-1980s, her working life began 
when the sea was already long gone, and the siren sounded from a 
shipyard which was making barges for Siberia. Yet it was the sea that 
prompted this reminiscence. Brown (2015, 52) suggests that one reason 
why the Chernobyl catastrophe was so unexpected was that the ‘orderly 
modernity’ in towns like Pripiat lulled any sense of danger. Given the 
chronic difficulties of the Aral fishing industry explored in the previous 
chapter, it is questionable whether there was a sense of orderly modernity, 
yet, looking back, Ornyq produces a narrative of orderly modernity, 
of gridded lives, which precludes reading the past as catastrophe 
(Figure 3.6).
There is another, much more ambivalent, ruined space in Aral’sk – 
the old military town, where just a few crumbling apartment blocks 
remain (Figure 3.7). This was part of the Soviet military-industrial 
complex, built for provisioning the top-secret biological weapons 
laboratory on Vozrozhdenie Island. This is an eerie space, nearly always 
deserted – though it has been plundered for building materials. My friend 
Mūrat took me there with his young son, saying that it was important for 
him to see it. As we drove, Mūrat told us stories about accidental deaths 
when people took bricks and the buildings collapsed on them; he talked 
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Figure 3.6 Orderly modernity? Fish plant, Aral’sk, 1983. Source: 
Museum of Fishermen, Aral’sk.
Figure 3.7 Military town, Aral’sk, winter 2013. Source: author.
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about the thieves and prostitutes loitering there after dark. He stressed 
that they had not known what happened in here in Soviet times.
For the most part, however, this space is marked off with silences, 
oblique remarks that it was all secret. Nowadays, people are aware of the 
weapons laboratory. Ornyq told me of reading in the press during 
perestroika about lepers being taken there. Soldiers sent there were 
blindfolded, she went on, so they would not know where they were; she 
had later read on the internet how those sent there remembered the 
smell of chlorine for the rest of their lives. They should not have used 
Kazakh land for all that, she concluded. This is the bad Soviet past, 
the unspoken and unspeakable. But 25 years on, this bad past was, in 
general, partitioned off in memory, just as the space is largely avoided. 
Contradictions between good and bad pasts are, usually, smoothed over: 
potentially troubling memories do not disturb cherished memories of 
good Soviet times. Indeed, even this eerie space is sometimes reintegrated 
into fond memories of the informal side of socialism: sailors would signal 
when they needed alcohol, and children would row it over to trade for 
lemonade; the military was provisioned with high-quality foodstuffs, 
which the soldiers’ wives would bring into the town to exchange. In such 
stories, the unspeakable is domesticated. Nevertheless, it is a significant 
space, significant for its abandonment, and for the way in which it is 
avoided in stories about the good Soviet past.
Indeed, such horrors are not always neatly partitioned off from 
nostalgia, as became clear in the following conversation with Sasha. He 
started out his normal jolly self, reminiscing about the other nationalities 
that had lived in the town, the cosmopolitan past which defined Aral’sk 
as an urban Soviet space. As he fleshed out his narrative, however, he 
talked about their status as enemy peoples, forbidden to talk about what 
had happened to them. I mentioned a line I had heard from others, that 
Aral’sk was a site of exile for some and a ‘heaven on earth’ for others. But 
I was being naïve, and had missed the seriousness of his tone. He 
immediately cut in that it only seemed like heaven on earth because there 
was famine all over the country at that time. He explained how his mother 
had fled here in the 1930s, before asking if I knew about the famine 
all over the Volga region, all over Ukraine. He was now visibly distressed, 
and said slowly: ‘What a story! The Communist Party! Lenin … Stalin … 
Fucking hell …’. He paused – the air thick with the horrors he had left 
unsaid – before adding half-heartedly, as if from force of habit: ‘Of course, 
there were benefits … free education, free healthcare …’, but he trailed 
off. The collective framework of nostalgia which so often affords meaning 
in the present could not be sustained here. In other contexts, as when 
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talking about the shipyard, Sasha would reminisce happily about life 
under socialism, but this flood of memory recalled the terrifying 
arbitrariness of Soviet space. Different elements of the Soviet state could 
not be compartmentalised, and the contradiction was untenable.
Both Alexander (2009a) and Pelkmans (2013) find that nostalgia 
can, as here, be destabilised by memories of dark pasts. Alexander describes 
the sense of spiralling disintegration in the rapidly changing city of Almaty 
in the late 1990s, while Pelkmans evokes a context of despair and stagnation 
in a postindustrial mining town in Kyrgyzstan in the 2010s. If nostalgia in 
Aral’sk does not tend to be destabilised by darker memories, this is perhaps 
because, despite the dissatisfaction with the present, there is a sense that 
things have stabilised since the collapse of the 1990s, and a sense of future. 
Accordingly, the object of nostalgia itself is more stable, and the good past 
can, for the most part, be separated from bad pasts.
‘To provide work’: remembering the state-socialist  
social contract
If the sea’s recession had emerged as a problem of employment and living 
standards, it is employment that is remembered as the locus of state 
paternalism. Former employees of the rybokombinat stress that importing 
ocean fish was loss-making (Ru.: ubytochno). But they equally stress 
that ‘the state’ did this so as ‘to save rybprom’ and ‘to provide work’ (Ru.: 
chtoby obespechivat’ rabotu). Former managers describe their role as 
providing work for people. This narrative, then, provides a collective 
framework of memory. There is little reflection on where the ocean fish 
came from: their provenance is thought of not as an issue of natural 
resources but of allocation, not a question of what nature gives but of 
what the state provides. No one suggests that sending frozen fish from, 
for example, Riga for processing in Aral’sk was economically irrational. 
On the contrary, people imply a certain rationality to the practice, 
describing the USSR as odin kotël, ‘a single pot/cauldron’, highlighting 
its capacity to absorb the losses of any industry. In these narratives, as 
ocean fish circulate around the unitary, homogeneous space of the USSR, 
they materialise the moral connection between state and citizens via 
Minrybkhoz and factory managers. Paradoxically, the sea’s regression 
gives shape to the social contract in these memories.1
As we saw in Chapter 2, provisioning of fish, the prerequisite of 
employment, was fraught. Daniiar, a friend of Sasha’s, worked in 
Aralrybprom in the 1980s – one of the ‘experienced comrades’ mentioned 
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by Aralrybprom managers as they negotiated with Gosbank. When Sasha 
first took me to meet him, Daniiar declared: ‘I personally loaded fish in 
Kaliningrad, in Riga, Sakhalin, Murmansk … I personally was there …’. At 
this point Sasha interjected, relating Daniiar’s personal narrative to the 
collective framework of the town: ‘So there would be work.’ Daniiar’s list 
of places takes us to the furthest corners of the USSR, as the state’s abstract 
promise to provide work is personalised in himself. When I met Daniiar on 
other occasions, he expanded on his role in procuring fish. Before working 
in the fishing industry, he had already established networks of acquaint- 
ances across the country while working as a lorry driver in the 1970s, 
apparently unaware that the cargoes of nuts and tomatoes he was driving 
from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were concealing narcotics. Networks of 
acquaintances were to prove crucial in his work in the fisheries:
Daniiar:  You put in an application, and if they aren’t your 
acquaintances (znakomye), they send your orders to 
Sakhalin! Understand?! How can you get fish from 
Sakhalin? You need to get across to Vladivostok, then 
from the ship to the railway, and from Vladivostok to 
here – it’s 13, 14 days by freight train … I travelled! Then 
I started to understand, I started … Russians, those who 
work in deliveries, I started to get to know them, in 
Moscow I had good acquaintances, I went through them 
and so … they started to stand by me.
William: So to get fish, you needed acquaintances?
Daniiar: But of course …
William: You needed connections (sviazy) …
Daniiar:  Of course. Without that you won’t get anywhere … In 
Kaliningrad, the director of the rybzavod … I couldn’t 
go in for three days … Busy, busy, busy …
William: Nightmare …
Daniiar:  Nightmare! Then I had to treat (ugoshchat’) the 
secretary … there was French eau de cologne, er, 
Chanel, French eau de cologne, yes … and flowers, for 
the secretary … and she let me in! There, you see?!
William: What else did you treat people to?
Daniiar: Well it wasn’t about money then, nothing like that …
William: In the eighties?
Daniiar:  Yes. Flowers, eau de cologne, or shampanskoe [Soviet 
Champagne] – a bottle … or cognac. It was enough. 
Understand? And now – only dollars.
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The gridded space of the USSR is crisscrossed with networks of 
acquaintances fostered by Daniiar on his travels. As he recalls the informal 
connections necessary to procure fish, he portrays himself as the 
cosmopolitan man of the world, with the charm and cultural knowledge 
to navigate the informal channels of the Soviet economy with the 
appropriate gifts.2 In this account, then, informal practices were 
embedded in ideas about gift exchange, in moral relations between 
persons. Today, he implies, everything is mediated only by the abstractions 
of dollars: moral informal practices give way to damaging corruption, 
carried out through the impersonal medium of money.
I again mentioned the lack of the sea in the 1980s, at which Daniiar 
responded:
Daniiar:  Well, the sea had gone away … there were few fish … 
somehow it was necessary to maintain the people 
(narod) … that’s why we went off to other republics, 
from there –
William: Looking for fish?
Daniiar: So as to maintain workers here, there was work …
William: So it was loss-making?
Daniiar:  It was loss-making, but they were maintained, the 
workers …
William: Quite right …
Daniiar: The state was socialist. Not capitalist.
William: It was necessary to help people?
Daniiar:  Socialist. And when the socialist state was ruined, 
we proceeded (pereshli) to a capitalist one, but the 
capitalist one isn’t working out for us.
He explained that the local capitalists have not read Marx, and do 
not understand that they should reinvest capital rather than pocketing 
their profits: ‘They don’t know what capital is.’ Again, the past acts as a 
commentary on the present. Notice the seamless transition from the 
personal narrative about the procurement of fish to the abstract state–
citizen relation – there is no sense of contradiction between the two. 
Socialism, in this account, was both the abstract, ordered, rational 
promise of the state to provide work for its citizens, and the chaotic, 
disordered, contingent processes by which the promise was delivered, 
which necessitated the fostering of personal relations. In Daniiar’s 
account, as in the archival documents, the sea’s disappearance is just a 
fact, devoid of human agency, which sharpens the need for the state to 
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fulfil its moral obligations. It is the ‘transition’ (expressed in the verb 
pereshli) to capitalism which is the major rupture.
As we saw, despite Daniiar’s best efforts, deliveries of fish from 
the oceans were sporadic, with lengthy periods of no fish at all, followed 
by the arrival of more than could be handled. Aqshabaq was born in 
the kolkhoz Zhambul and is now in her early fifties. In 1980 she started 
working for Aralrybprom in Aral’sk (Figures 3.8 and 3.9). After it 
collapsed in the late 1990s, she was instrumental in setting up the 
nongovernmental organisation Aral Tenizi. She now works in the 
management of a shiny new, but chronically failing, fish factory in Aral’sk 
(see Chapters 5 and 7). When I visited her in the factory, our conversations 
would veer unpredictably between these three periods of her life. Whether 
reminiscing about her time working for an apparently successful state 
enterprise, or about her quite different work setting up a nongovernmental 
organisation with Danish assistance, the past featured in a positive light 
compared to the present of working in a failing private enterprise. The 
contrast in her tone was marked: world-weary, disjointed remarks about 
the present; animated, engaging narratives about the past. Picking up on 
my finds in the archives about irregular deliveries of ocean fish, I asked 
whether deliveries were reliable:
Yes! Distribution, deliveries: it was all according to contract 
(dogovor). If they didn’t deliver, then there would be a fine. 
Everything was according to plan: annual and five-yearly plans. 
They were obliged to deliver, and if they didn’t deliver, the director 
in Vladivostok or wherever would be sacked … and we were obliged 
to process it! Everyone chased the plan – by quantity and quality. 
Everywhere it was written [chuckling]: THE PLAN IS THE LAW – 
TO FULFIL IS A DUTY, TO OVERFULFIL IS AN HONOUR.
Given her position today, it is unsurprising that Aqshabaq should miss a 
time when everything was planned, and unsurprising that she claims that 
things went according to plan rather more than they may have done in 
fact. Unlike Daniiar’s account of the informal practices and relations 
through which the enterprise functioned, she remembers a congruence 
of moral and legal obligations. In other contexts, or differently framed, 
obligations to fulfil the plan might imply an absence of agency. But in this 
context, they are precisely the inverse of state paternalism: the state 
supported citizens, and in return citizens played their active part. Again, 
ocean fish materialised this relationship. The authoritative discourse of 
the Party state, picked up in dialogue more than 20 years later, is treated 
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Figures 3.8 and 3.9 Smoking workshop, undated. Source: Museum of 
Fishermen, Aral’sk.
with affectionate humour; evoking an overarching rationality connecting 
the obligations of a director in Vladivostok with the obligations of the 
Aralrybprom workforce, it is recontextualised as an implicit comment on 
a present of chaotic, unplanned capitalism.
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One paradoxical consequence of irregular deliveries of ocean 
fish was that, despite the overall problem of surplus labour, when several 
big deliveries arrived at once, Aralrybprom lacked the labour resources 
to unload and process them all. Here the functioning of the economy 
through informal relationships became noticeable in the interstices of 
Aqshabaq’s narrative: there was never any labour shortage, she said, 
because soldiers from the military bases could be enlisted to help with 
unloading, the boss of the factory being an acquaintance of their 
commander. Soldiers enjoyed it, she emphasised, especially because they 
could take some fish for their wives and children. She also told me, with 
much hilarity, that schoolchildren were forced to work: ‘Anyone in the 
town will tell you about it!’
Indeed, Ornyq enthusiastically reminisced with her sister about 
their praktika (‘work experience’) in the fish factory while at school, 
recalling how they would steal fish and take them home; they remembered 
capelin and mackerel (nowadays unavailable in Aral’sk) as particularly 
tasty. Ocean fish, then, not only incorporated Aral’sk into Soviet space 
both formally and informally; they also became part of the identity of 
the town. Reminiscing together, Ornyq and her sister reproduced their 
Aral’sk identity by affirming a shared past, characterised by material 
abundance. As much as the formal channels of redistribution, affectionate 
memories of the lived experience of socialism include such informal 
practices as pilfering.
After Aqshabaq had told me about all that, I made an inconsequential 
remark about my surprise at there being jobs even when the sea went 
away. This prompted a lengthy dreamy reminiscence, unconnected to my 
remark, about the town when the sea was there: about ships in the port 
unloading cotton from Karakalpakstan (she made no comment on the 
role of cotton in destroying the sea); about the floating restaurant in the 
harbour; how people relaxed by the harbour; how when she was a little 
girl they would swim all day every day, and when they came home their 
parents would shout at them. Nostalgia for the sea, and for the innocence 
of childhood, here seeps into the nostalgia for late socialism.
More often, however, nostalgia for the sea is submerged in nostalgia 
for the Soviet Union. This is because, I suggest, the contrast between the 
supposed full employment of Soviet times and the low employment of the 
present acts as a commentary on the present in a way in which nostalgia 
for the sea does not. This is a yearning for encompassment within wider, 
gridded space (Jansen 2014). Nevertheless, people are also broadly 
aware that the sea’s regression related directly to the region’s unequal 
integration into Soviet space – Aqshabaq’s silence on the role of cotton in 
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the sea’s demise should not be mistaken for unawareness. How, then, do 
people who yearn for the Soviet past account for the sea’s regression?
Understanding the sea’s regression
I first went to the old processing plant one eerily still and warm winter’s 
day, the sun veiled behind hazy cirrus; the light was watery and the air 
heavy with silence, punctuated only by the distant barking of dogs. A man 
was standing gazing up at a red metal skeleton which was part of the 
plant. He asked me for matches, and we got talking. Aslan was born in the 
mid-1960s and remembers the sea, though he never saw it full. He studied 
in Orenburg, Russia, but is long-term unemployed. I asked him if he had 
understood at the time why the sea was drying up. He said: ‘There were 
different versions. They said that there is another channel from the 
bottom of the sea, connecting it to the Caspian … That was the scientific 
version.’ But, he said, the ‘fundamental reason’ was the Uzbek authorities’ 
withdrawals of water for cotton and the Kazakh withdrawals for rice. We 
chatted a bit more and then I asked who was guilty for the sea going away. 
His reply was surprising: Gorbachev. Why? He let the Soviet Union be 
divided into 15 republics. Had the Soviet Union continued, the Siberian 
rivers project would have been carried out; the Ob’ and Irtysh would have 
been brought to Central Asia and the sea would have been saved. I was 
taken aback: what about irrigation? He reiterated that irrigation was the 
‘fundamental reason’ why the sea had dried up. As in the archival 
documents, the needs of irrigation are taken for granted; Aslan did not 
question the political decisions that lay behind them.
Indeed, official accounts in the late Soviet period, which are still 
taught in schools today, primarily blamed the Uzbeks for taking all the 
water. In Aral’sk today, most people relate the irrigation explanation, 
without mentioning Moscow’s role. It is told blandly, usually as a matter 
of objective fact, without resentment or a sense of victimhood. Younger 
people say that this is what their parents told them. The scientific theory 
about the Caspian which Aslan alluded to responded to the unexplained 
rise in the level of the Caspian in this period: the theory, long since 
discredited, posited that as one fell, the other rose. Accordingly, people in 
Aral’sk often supplement the irrigation thesis with the Caspian theory, 
and occasionally reject the irrigation explanation altogether. I even heard 
that boats from the Caspian resurfaced on the Aral, proving the existence 
of extensive underground waterways. There is also a near-universal belief 
that the desiccation was hastened or even caused by rockets being 
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released from the nearby cosmodrome, Baikonur, which apparently bring 
about evaporation and cause ekologiia. These accounts bear some 
similarity to explanations of climate change in post-Soviet Siberia, which 
is ascribed either to local projects, such as a nearby reservoir, or to people 
going into the cosmos disturbing a natural balance, or to the agency of 
nature itself (Crate 2008). The Baikonur explanation alludes both to 
ongoing local concerns (see Chapter 7) and to anxiety about destabilising 
cosmic relations, while the Caspian explanation alludes to an agency 
greater than human agency, without which it is hard to make sense of 
such massive changes in the environment. Because none of these accounts 
blame the Soviet system itself, they do not destabilise the object of 
nostalgia.
However, there are also political explanations, blaming the 
Communist Party leadership and their ideology of nature. Such 
explanations tend to be voiced by well-educated older people, who would 
have been immersed in the critical perestroika discourse of disaster. Iura, 
a laboratory technician in a school, is one of the few Koreans remaining 
in Aral’sk. Talking about those who left, he told me in hushed tones how 
everyone who remembers the sea sees it in their dreams, and the sea 
‘draws them to itself’. Iura’s parents were deported from the Vladivostok 
region in the 1930s, and his father worked as a fisherman in Ūialy and 
Bögen before moving to Aral’sk in the 1950s. This deportation was part 
of stalinskaia politika, ‘Stalinist policy’, he said. His account was hedged 
with silences, stalinskaia politika gesturing to the unspeakable horrors of 
that period. Although for his parents the Aral region was a place of exile, 
Iura sees the region as his homeland (rodina), and recalls a childhood of 
long summer days spent on the sea, perpetual good health and abundant 
fish. While serving in the army in 1976, the sea came to him in his sleep. 
But on his return from the army, he immediately noticed that the sea had 
gone away.
His account for the sea drying up was overtly political:
William: Did you know why the sea was going away?
Iura: Yes of course. Everyone knew.
William: Knew what?
Iura:  That they were taking water. There are records … They 
were taking water in the 1930s, in the time of Stalin …
While 1960 is usually cited as the year when the sea started to recede, 
Iura went back to the hydraulic projects of the Stalinist era: as with his 
parents’ deportation, the name of Stalin gestured at a catalogue of 
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horrors, commonly known but not voiced beyond allusion. Later in the 
interview he told me of the utter powerlessness of local people: ‘It was the 
Communist Party then. That was something (eto bylo chto-to).’ He did not 
elaborate: like the name of Stalin, ‘the Communist Party’ stood for 
something vast and unspeakable.
Later he discussed more explicitly Soviet ideology and nature, 
talking about his reading on the subject – and his account was shot 
through with other people’s discourses: he quoted the language of 
planners and scientists, polemicising with them and holding them up to 
critical scrutiny in the manner of perestroika intellectuals. He cited 
contemptuously a famous line of the Soviet scientist Michurin: ‘We cannot 
expect favours from nature: our task is to seize them.’ He juxtaposed it 
with the line of another scientist, Vavilov: ‘For every such victory, nature 
will take a cruel revenge.’ At this he reeled off the health problems that 
the sea’s desiccation had caused, as instances of the revenge that nature 
had taken. Finally, he leant forward and said slowly and quietly, 
emphasising every word:
Everyone needed cotton and rice. That’s all. And the fact that they 
destroyed the sea: they didn’t care … [raising his voice, gesturing] 
There were lots of grandiose projects: the Enisei – they wanted to 
bring the Enisei to fill the Aral! If they’d done that we’d all have been 
underwater! It was stupidity, idiotic!
The Siberian rivers scheme, the ever-deferred future, stood as the final 
proof of megalomania and heroic disregard for nature.
Madi is the director of the town museum and a friend of Iura. Both 
his parents were Party officials, and his father established the museum in 
1988. He was brought up in a street on the seafront inhabited by Russians 
and other nationalities, and he relates his good education to the Russian 
and Ukrainian intellectuals who were exiled to Aral’sk. He maintains 
active links with the remaining non-Kazakh families in the town, and his 
everyday talk over beer and dried fish with other old inhabitants is full of 
nostalgia for the cosmopolitan Soviet past.
One day he took me on a tour of the dried-up seabed outside the 
town. Although he talked a little about the final abandoning of the ships 
when the port closed, on this occasion he focused on when the sea was 
there. His manner was celebratory, without regret. It was only later on in 
our acquaintance that I asked him directly about the causes behind the 
sea’s regression. On that occasion his account was strikingly similar to 
Iura’s: the command was in Moscow; the Communist Party always knew 
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best; man should not have interfered with nature. This narrative, however, 
did not surface before or after. After all, it has less relevance to Madi’s 
daily concerns than post-Soviet decline, and it sits uneasily with his rosy 
memories of the Soviet period. Different memories are compartmentalised.
Indeed, at the time of my fieldwork in the early 2010s, this political 
narrative has little salience to everyday concerns. People who grew up in 
the 1980s and 1990s say that they were informed that the water was used 
for irrigation elsewhere; then after a pause, or when pressed by me, they 
declare that in their opinion it was the fault of the authorities, or of the 
Communist Party; that ‘up top’ (sverkhu) they knew what was going to 
happen to the sea. This is presented as personal, private knowledge, 
inferred from their awareness of the Soviet system and the gaps in official 
stories. Such knowledge is not related to the present. The dark side of 
socialism is relegated to the unknowable upper reaches of the Soviet 
state, distinct from (and not in contradiction to) the lived actuality 
of socialism (cf. Dadabaev 2010, 44). In late Soviet times, when the 
monologic utterances of the state were everywhere, such stories may 
have been a locus of opposition to the state (Watson 1994), but in the 
historiographical vacuum of contemporary Kazakhstan, they are less 
pertinent.
There are hints, however, that the political narrative had more 
salience before, and with it a sense of victimhood. The director of the 
local archives, Bolatbek, told me about the region’s glorious history, and 
the fish they gave to the state when the rest of the Soviet Union was 
starving in the 1920s, before remarking bitterly, ‘But no one helps us 
now.’ It is not a phrase I heard in any other context – and indeed, it was 
contradicted by the rest of our conversation, in which Bolatbek told me 
about the positive effects of the Kökaral dam, and the beneficial role the 
Kazakh government plays today. His ‘no one helps us now’ seemed to be 
an echo of a now submerged discourse of political victimhood.
Indeed, political accounts of the sea’s desiccation can take 
unexpected forms, blurring with nostalgia for the grandeur of the Soviet 
project itself, as we saw with Aslan. Daniiar talked in detail about Stalin’s 
plans to connect all the rivers and lakes of the Soviet Union with canals so 
that it would be possible to transport cargo from the Far East to the Black 
Sea by water, enthusiastically drawing a map in the sand as he explained 
it. If this had been implemented, he said, vast swathes of desert would 
have been irrigated, and moreover the sea would have been saved. ‘But,’ 
he said regretfully, ‘the war got in the way.’ When I asked about the 
promise of the Siberian rivers scheme in the 1970s and 1980s, he declared 
that the Soviet Union was no longer at full strength: since Stalin’s death 
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it had been taken over by rogues (zhuliki) and weakened by American 
rock music. If for Iura the name of Stalin gestures towards the unspeakable, 
for Daniiar it signifies a time of greatness, looked back to wistfully after 
years of decline and collapse. The problem was not the ideology, but the 
failure to implement it, and the loss of the long-promised utopia. The loss 
of the sea is blurred with the loss of the Soviet dreamworld (Buck-Morss 
2002), the lost promise of a utopian hydraulic civilisation (cf. Wittfogel 
1957). If the sea’s demise related to the uneven integration of the Central 
Asian periphery into Soviet space, for Daniiar, as for Aslan, the problem 
was rather a lack of integration, a failure to develop the grid to the full 
through hydraulic connections.
Even so, in another register, Daniiar would distinguish between 
‘those up there’ who knew that the sea was being destroyed and the 
ordinary citizen, suggesting a disconnect within Soviet space which did 
not quite tally with his nostalgia for Stalinist hydraulic despotism. Indeed, 
from his family history he was keenly aware of the repressive side of 
Soviet power: his mother was from a wealthy family in southern 
Kazakhstan and had fled to Aral’sk in the 1920s, where she had lived with 
a disguised identity. Daniiar keeps this private past separate from his 
nostalgias both for the lived space of socialism and for the utopian 
promise of Stalinism.
Conclusion
As should be evident from my perhaps too ready agreement with 
Daniiar’s assessment of socialist employment policies, I suggest that we 
take seriously not only the function but also the content of postsocialist 
nostalgia in Aral’sk. After all, environmental change did not come 
alone: Aral’sk residents’ encounter with the changing environment was 
mediated by the measures taken by the Soviet authorities. Limited as 
those measures were, they are today recalled as meaningful. The critique 
of the present which nostalgic voices articulate will become clearer 
in Chapter 7, when we look at the town today. Critically, rather than 
breaching the Soviet social contract, environmental change is felt to have 
strengthened it, so that ocean fish became the means by which the 
promise was delivered, connecting state and citizens within a moral space 
of belonging. It is the promise of these connections which has been lost. 
The inefficiency of the Soviet state in making investments and the chaotic 
and, ultimately, incomplete manner in which work was provided are not 
remembered: it is the promise of socialism – the promise of providing 
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employment in response to ecological crisis, the promise that local 
resilience can lie in integration into broader, gridded spaces – which is 
remembered, and which forms a critique of the present. Insofar as the 
informal relations which crisscrossed gridded space are remembered, 
they are not remembered in resistance to the grid; rather, they are felt to 
have sustained moral relations between persons within an encompassing 
space of belonging.
However, this nostalgia, and the critique it contains, are maintained 
at the expense of social forgetting, compartmentalising the good past 
from the various bad pasts which threaten to subsume it – and as these 
are not transmitted, memory of them fades, just as the military town, 
embodying another dark Soviet past, gradually crumbles. Political 
accounts of why the sea dried up, or other Soviet horror stories, which 
would destabilise the nostalgic reconstruction of the USSR, are seldom 
voiced. Accordingly, what is also suppressed is Aral’sk’s vulnerability 
within Soviet space. This social forgetting, I have argued, depends on the 
relative stability of the present, and the sense of a future. The dis- 
connection of the 1990s has been replaced with new forms of connection 
within contemporary Kazakhstan: under circumstances of greater 
uncertainty, this compartmentalisation may be less effective. Ultimately, 
the social forgetting will be more encompassing. This is not a ‘restorative’ 
nostalgia (Boym 2002): no one foresees (or even wants) a return to the 
Soviet system in the future. It is not a project. Perhaps as a result, the 
content has little traction for the post-Soviet generation. Though young 
people are aware of Soviet times as a period of abundance, and proud of 
the town’s role in providing 14 wagons of fish (even if they tend to 
associate it not with the Civil War but with the Second World War), the 
specifics of how employment was provided are of less interest in a context 
where no one foresees the Soviet Union returning, or an alternative to the 
present of deregulated capitalism.
At various moments in this chapter, memories of the sea overflow 
nostalgic commentary on the present. But while experience may be 
resilient, some experiences resist narration. Even if they are narrated, 
there are certain embodied experiences that cannot be verbalised – except 
in the elliptical ‘we swam’, which says so little and hints at so much. The 
difficulty of transmitting those embodied experiences to a generation that 
never partook in them emerged poignantly when my friend Edïge told me 
that his parents had not told him anything about the sea, except that they 
had swum. Without transmission of meaningful memories, Edïge and his 
friends would, he told me, play on the rusting ships, trying to imagine 
what the sea had been like.
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Notes
1 By contrast, Trevisani (2010, 217) argues that decollectivised Uzbek farmers do not miss the 
social contract so much as the decent standard of living and the possibility of moving forward. 
Again, the sense of a future in Aral’sk today perhaps makes people here focus more on the 
promise of socialism.
2 Gifts like cognac and French perfume were appropriate symbolic tokens to acknowledge 
favours, being of low monetary value but hard to obtain (Ledeneva 1998, 152–5).
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4
Rupture and continuity in  
Aral fishing villages
One summer’s evening, I was sitting in the sand on the edge of Bögen with 
Aikeldï and two other men enjoying some well-earned drinks after a hard 
day’s work on Aikeldï’s new house. All are in their forties. As usual, Aikeldï 
was doing most of the talking. At one point he wanted to know about 
meat in England, and asked if we ate pork; the answer, as always, attracted 
much hilarity.1 Aikeldï then started talking about how important pigs 
were to Russians, before asking rhetorically: ‘And what is our bailyq?’ 
Bailyq, literally ‘wealth’, here suggests cultural property. The answer was 
obvious: fish. Eighty per cent of the fish eaten in the USSR, he declared, 
were from the Aral Sea. The others then told me about Bögen’s glorious 
past, about the factory which had stood very near where we were sitting. 
Today barely a trace remains (Figure 4.1). Slipping from Aikeldï’s talk of 
the natural wealth of the sea, they told me about how fish were sent here 
from the Far East for processing. In this display of local patriotism, there 
was no narrative of loss, or sense of rupture between Aral fish and the 
ocean fish which replaced them. Aikeldï did not mention that he first 
fished several thousand kilometres away on Balqash and had never seen 
the sea when it was full, its shore at the edge of the village. There was no 
mention of the disaster by which outsiders know the region, or of the 
many who left the region.
On another occasion, I was talking with Zhūbatqan, who was born 
in 1936. At 14, Zhūbatqan started fishing, working first for the kolkhoz, 
then for the state fishing base until retiring in the 1990s. He worked on 
ships travelling all over the sea, before fishing mainly on Balqash. Today 
he lives in Bögen with his son, daughter-in-law and small grandchildren. 
He has another son in the village; his other children have all left for 
Aral’sk, Qazaly, Aqtöbe, Almaty. One son fishes, and has just bought a 
UAZ jeep. Although Zhūbatqan is well liked and respected, he does not 
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Figure 4.1 Stump of post for pontoon in former harbour, Bögen, autumn 
2013. Source: author.
command the authority that many men of his age command, and while 
he often recounts tales about the Soviet fishery, he is not always listened 
to – except by me, and I draw on his stories in this chapter. On this 
occasion, Zhūbatqan began by telling me about the different sorts of 
vessel which came to the region, how ‘we fished’ (auladyq) first with 
wooden boats then with fibreglass boats, how Kawasaki engines were 
brought from Japan in 1954, gradually replacing sails and oars. He told 
me about the ships that came to the kolkhoz in the 1950s; how small 
fishing boats would be loaded onto them by crane and how they fished for 
months at a time in distant waters.
Zhūbatqan: Then in 65 the water receded (qaitty).2
William: In 65?
Zhūbatqan:  It receded, the water … disappearing, 
disappearing, disappearing (qūryp, qūryp, qūryp) 
… 75, it stopped. Then we left for Balqash, we 
fished on Balqash (Balqashta auladyq).
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In this narrative of gradual change, in which the constant is fishing, the 
retreat of the sea forms a rupture. But unlike events like earthquakes, the 
retreat of the sea insinuates itself into the everyday, and the rupture is 
immediately covered over by the repetition of ‘we fished’. Everything 
changed – but still fishing went on. In such stories, the sea’s disappearance 
is less of a sea change than one might expect.
In this chapter, I contextualise the sea’s regression in local notions 
of space, place and nature, which, in a century of catastrophes, had been 
transformed long before the sea dried up, as commodified understandings 
of fish as exchange-values overlaid, but did not fully displace, older ideas 
about natural abundance. As we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, the unevenness 
of state-socialist development, consolidating two incompatible versions 
of the sea, positioned Aral villages ambiguously within Soviet Central 
Asia. They were extremely marginal to the irrigation complex, which was 
sustained by powerful interests that prioritised cotton over the sea. But 
within the socialist fishery, the sea connected them to the state via 
Minrybkhoz: daily bodily interactions with the marine environment were 
embedded in a relationship that was both extractive and redistributive. 
Both marginality and connectedness within Soviet space emerge in 
villagers’ narratives of Soviet times. Yet the sense of place that emerges 
is not reducible to the political-economic relationships within which 
Aral villages were positioned. People also stress the relationship to the 
land going back generations, embodied in graveyards and shrines. In this 
register, the sea figures as ancestral property. Indeed, there is an 
oscillation between a discourse based on place and belonging, and one 
based on labour and livelihood. While not contradictory, these discourses 
are distinct. To understand local meanings of environmental change, 
then, requires attention to how the Soviet project had already reconfigured 
indigenous relationships with the environment. Drawing on Bakhtin 
(1981a), I explore how persons and nature are variously constituted 
within different ‘chronotopes’, or orderings of time and space: the abstract 
chronotope of the plan, and the particularised chronotope of tughan zher, 
or homeland. Within these different time-space configurations, the sea’s 
retreat holds different meanings.
My account of the interplay between rupture and continuity will 
offer an intervention into theories of resilience. Deriving from ecologists’ 
accounts of the capacity of ecosystems to absorb shocks (Holling 1973), 
resilience has been applied by social scientists to understanding flexibility 
and adaptation within ‘socio-ecological systems’ (Adger 2000; Berkes and 
Folke 1998). In the next part of this chapter, I present seemingly opposing 
narratives: if the Aral emerges as vulnerable when it can be arbitrarily 
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exchanged for rice plantations, narratives of attachment to tughan zher, 
embodying continuity that transcended the changes to the environment, 
suggest a local resilience. However, the material that follows throws that 
dichotomy into question, suggesting that resilience lay both in the local 
attachment to land and in the wider political-economic structures that 
facilitated it. Indeed, the later parts of the chapter show how local identity 
was Sovietised, and how fishermen internalised the state’s gridded 
divisions of space and time, and the concomitant understanding of 
nature.
The chapter also speaks to concerns of political ecology. If, for some 
political ecologists, the Aral case might seem to present a lack (why did 
no one protest?), it would be tempting to appeal to the total nature of 
Soviet power. Certainly, many narratives stress the constraints on agency, 
a point that is reinforced by documentary evidence of the very limited 
contestation that was possible. However, although the nostalgia we saw 
in Chapter 3 is much less marked among villagers, they were enrolled in 
the Soviet project, and in its ways of dealing with the problem. Rather 
than starting from an absence of protest, I instead explore how shifting 
understandings of nature informed experiences of ecological change. In 
keeping with other accounts of Soviet Central Asia, I stress the ambiguous 
compliance with the Soviet modernising project, which did not so much 
destroy ‘traditional’ identities as transform them in their articulations 
with Soviet modernity (Abashin 2015; Kandiyoti 1996; 2002; Kandiyoti 
and Azimova 2004; Tett 1994).
A subtheme running through this chapter is the question of how 
past difficulties and suffering are socially forgotten in a present filled with 
hope about the restored sea. As an old man in Qaratereng announced 
after listing the benefits of Communism: ‘We’ve passed the former time 
of Communism, but now … now we don’t slander ourselves, we are a 
sovereign country, Kazakhstan … now we are good … we’re good now.’ 
Communism is not the ever-deferred endpoint of history, but another 
stage which has been passed on the way to sovereignty. Traumatic 
memories are fading as they are not transmitted. When I asked people 
born in the 1940s and 1950s if they had heard about the period of 
collectivisation from their parents, they would say ‘we didn’t ask’, or ‘they 
didn’t say’. The same is true, I think, of more recent traumas. As a result, 
many of the narratives which emerged in formal interviews, often in 
response to my questions, did not emerge in other contexts, and some of 
these stories are alien to young people. This does not mean that 
individuals do not hold memories. Nor is it to suggest that there is no 
register for mourning the sea; but, as in Chapter 3, I suggest that register 
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has little salience today amid high fish catches. This is in part, therefore, 
a story about how the immense traumas of a century of catastrophes are 
smoothed over.
Vulnerability
As in Aral’sk, everyone knows that the sea dried up because water was 
used elsewhere for agriculture, and the most common account blames 
Uzbekistan for ‘not giving water’, so that ‘the Amu Dariya and Syr Dariya 
didn’t flow properly (dūrys qūmaidy)’. Nevertheless, many older people 
are aware of Moscow’s role in the sea’s regression, although, also as in 
Aral’sk, this would only emerge when I asked directly who was responsible. 
Most strikingly, some accounts allude to the cost–benefit analysis we saw 
in Chapter 1, like this interview with an aqsaqal (elder), Rai, in Raiym:
Someone was looking at the sea and said, ‘In place of the Aral Sea 
it’s necessary to sow rice’ … One minister from there (ana 
zhaqtaghy) said it. Then they divided the water. Rice doesn’t grow 
at all, and now they can’t fill it again. Now they can’t fill it with water 
again. They transferred it all to Karakalpakstan, and our river is left 
dried up.
The phrasing captures nicely the arbitrariness of the synoptic viewpoint 
from which a sea can be exchanged for rice: local particularities are 
abstracted in a political ecology whereby natural resources can be 
dispatched across homogeneous gridded space. This account is theodical, 
locating agency far away from the individual (Herzfeld 1992) – and far 
from the local. Bureaucratic structures are reduced to the figure of a 
capricious minister who has the power to divide the water. In this 
narrative, local people are vulnerable to a state optic which is blind to 
the Aral region. Looked at in this light, the silence of other informants on 
the political context of irrigation may be read as misinformation by the 
authorities, who cast all the blame on Uzbekistan; moreover, overtly 
critical narratives about Moscow were risky in Soviet times, hence 
their mutedness even today. This suggests a further dimension to vulner- 
ability: an inability to voice what had happened. As in other remote parts 
of post-Soviet space, Soviet modernity is felt, in this register, to be 
something which has happened to people, changes on the local wrought 
by distant, powerful forces (Alexander 2004b, 54; Grant 1995; Humphrey 
1998, viii).
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There is no sense of communication between the two levels. The 
minister was ‘from there’, from elsewhere. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
throughout the Soviet state, the resources to raise the issue of the sea’s 
regression with higher authorities were limited. Discursive resources 
were even more sparsely distributed at the village level: it was impossible, 
my informants would tell me, to complain to anyone. In fact, there is 
evidence of a letter in 1977 from inhabitants of Bögen to Qonaev, the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, demanding better use 
of the delta lakes and improvement of living conditions. The letter also 
protested against the transfer of a melioration station, along with all its 
machinery, to another village. This caused a flurry of communication 
between Minrybkhoz and the Central Committee, in which the fisheries 
minister blamed Minvodkhoz for failing to deliver 50 m3/s below Qazaly. 
The villagers received a reply only from the vice-minister of fisheries, who 
noted the measures being taken to improve their living standards, 
including a water pipe and a banya (steam bath); he also noted that 
measures were being taken to exploit the delta lakes but that these could 
not, owing to the ‘low water level of 1974–77’, be implemented in full. But 
some glimmer of hope was promised, as the vice-minister noted that the 
integrated scheme for use of the Aral water resources should be finished 
in 1978 (it was not, of course). The letter stated that the melioration 
station had to be moved to a region where there was more water. The only 
positive response to the villagers’ attempt to protest their plight was 
compensation with a single bulldozer.3 It is hardly surprising that the 
letter should today be forgotten. The locality and ‘higher up’ are thus felt 
to have been unconnected. When I asked Zhūbatqan directly whether the 
government helped, he replied: ‘They didn’t. They said “move (kösh)”. If 
we moved, where would we go?’ In this way of talking, then, villagers 
were vulnerable to the optic of the distant and uncaring state, which sees 
only abstract space and reorders environments accordingly, blind to local 
lives and local meanings.
The resilience of local identity?
Many, of course, did leave, and narratives of the sea going away often slip 
into narratives of people leaving. First, the non-Kazakh population left 
over the 1950s and 1960s: while ecological conditions deteriorated, a 
freer political climate allowed ‘enemy peoples’ to return to their 
homelands. Later, local Kazakhs began to leave, seeking work elsewhere, 
with some being resettled in rice plantations elsewhere in Qyzylorda 
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oblast. Yet, though many did leave, most of my informants did not. 
Indeed, as we saw in Chapter 2, the refusal of the majority of the 
population to leave was another constraint for the authorities dealing 
with the Aral. Early in my fieldwork, a conversation with my host 
Zhaqsylyq suggested a reason why they stayed. We were driving over the 
dried-up seabed towards the sea, when he stopped beside a rusting heap 
of metal, the remains of a ship, which Zhaqsylyq pointed out with a laugh. 
But we had stopped to look at his camel, which was grazing with the 
village herd. Zhaqsylyq stood for some time gazing at it (Figure 4.2). As 
we walked back to the UAZ, I asked him how he had felt when the sea 
disappeared. He replied: ‘We always thought it would come back.’ When 
I asked why, he explained: ‘Because we knew that long ago, the sea wasn’t 
there, then it came back.’ I had read about the previous regressions, but 
I had not suspected that local people would have been aware of these 
even before the archaeological discovery in 2001. In this temporal 
framework, the sea is a transient object which comes and goes. Hence this 
knowledge about the deep past was oriented towards the future. It is 
striking that Zhaqsylyq spoke in the first-person plural. At an earlier time, 
when many were leaving the village, such a story may have maintained 
a shared sense of hope.
This local knowledge is no closed tradition, but has been reproduced 
through encounters between people and environment. Fishermen 
describe dredging up with their nets bits of saxaul (a desert shrub), 
Figure 4.2 Zhaqsylyq on the dried-up seabed with his nar camel 
(Bactrian camel–dromedary hybrid) on the left, winter 2013. Source: 
author.
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remains of jugs, cradles, parts of yurts. People also cite the recent 
discovery of the mausoleum as further evidence of what had long been 
known. Although this provided the definitive proof for archaeologists that 
the sea had gone away and come back before, locals make no distinction 
between legend (angyz) and archaeological proof. During my fieldwork, 
I often heard versions of this story, presented as something that had been 
passed down through the generations, local knowledge transmitted by 
the elders (aqsaqaldar). When I would ask if they had thought the sea 
would return one day, people might reply in the past tense, saying that 
the sea had disappeared and reappeared before. This is the third time that 
it has gone away, they would say. This story alludes to a time span far 
beyond that of the human life, a time span in which, in the narratives of 
older people, the sea itself assumes agency: I was told that the sea ‘slept’; 
that it ‘came to itself’; that when it returned, it came ‘in a single day’. 
Sometimes, when people mention the populations living on the dried-up 
seabed who were wiped out when the sea returned, the sea’s agency 
transcends that of humans.
If these stories provide one explanation for why my informants 
stayed, a further answer lies in the strong local identity connected with 
place. When I asked people why they did not leave, the dominant response 
was that this is tughan zher, ‘homeland’, ‘land of birth’. This phrase 
captures the relationship between people, place and ancestors. Important 
sites indexing the land as tughan zher include the shrines of ülken atalar, 
founders of lineages, where rituals bring together descendants now 
scattered across the country. There are also the cemeteries on the high 
ground above villages, a visible reminder of the dead. Whenever anyone 
passes them, they pass their hands over their faces, a gesture which 
embodies a connection to the past; longer prayers evoke the more recent 
dead. This connection to the land emerged most clearly in a conversation 
in Aqespe, a village on the northwest of the sea, far from the delta, far 
from Aral’sk and paved roads, where ecological conditions continue to 
deteriorate owing to an advancing sand dune. Only 40 houses remain 
today. One fisherman, Zhengïs, told me how all his brothers and sisters 
had left and gone to Aral’sk, Qazaly, Qyzylorda; but, he said as he pointed 
at the hillside opposite, their ancestors are buried here and someone 
needs to stay to watch over them. In addition to this sense of moral 
obligation, many, as in Aral’sk, also insist on their emotional, even bodily 
attachment to the land where they were born, despite the ecological 
devastation: some from Qaratereng who were relocated to rice farms 
elsewhere in Qyzylorda oblast could not cope with the climate, I was told, 
and died there. Ancestors are not restricted to sacred sites. In the home, 
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before a besbarmaq for example, a verse from the Koran recited in Arabic 
is followed by a Kazakh blessing (bata) invoking the spirits of the 
ancestors. Indeed, the ancestors link people in the present through their 
relatedness within a particular lineage.
The importance of tughan zher to Kazakhs as ancestral homeland is 
attested by Privratsky (2001), Post (2007) and Dubuisson and Genina 
(2012).4 In contrast to the abstractions of the plan that rendered villagers 
vulnerable, tughan zher is a chronotope in which the permanence of sites 
connects people to the ancestral past; persons are constituted through 
their connections to the land and to each other. Taken together, stories of 
previous regressions and the discourse of tughan zher seem to point to the 
resilience of the local, making connections between people and place 
which transcend the visible changes in the environment wrought by the 
abstractions of the Soviet project. By drawing attention to temporal 
connections far beyond the reach of individual lifetimes, and indeed that 
of the projects of the Soviet state, they suggest compelling reasons why 
people stayed, despite the rupture of the disappearing sea.
Things are not, of course, that simple. The story about previous 
regressions is not unambiguous. Many draw the same conclusion as 
Zhaqsylyq, that the sea will come back again. But not everyone grants this 
knowledge the same significance. Some say straightforwardly that if the 
Syr Dariya and the Amu Dariya flow into the sea again, then the sea will 
return; if not, it will not. Although Zhaqsylyq seemed to affirm a collective 
sense of hope in his use of ‘we’, he was by no means talking for everyone. 
Indeed, I found that some younger people did not know about the 
previous regressions. Given the sea’s partial return, and its renewal of 
community relations, this story has lost its social function. Furthermore, 
although there is certainly an ideology of tughan zher, and although 
stories of previous regressions provided some sort of hope, for those who 
did leave, economic exigency trumped attachment to place.
Even those who stayed do not always account for their decision in 
terms of tughan zher. As Zhūbatqan said, ‘Where would we go?’ In the 
1970s and 1980s, the authorities were encouraging Qaratereng villagers 
(including those resettled from the now abandoned islands and villages 
to the south) to work on rice plantations elsewhere in Qyzylorda oblast, 
but those who stayed stress that they knew nothing about rice: they only 
knew fishing. They stress the limits of their knowledge, the limits of their 
horizons. Others wanted to leave, particularly in the 1990s when the 
situation was increasingly dire, but they stress the constraints they faced 
– they lacked money to leave, or perhaps an elderly family member 
needed to be looked after. More than the moral connection to the land 
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and ancestors, obligations to actual family relations in the present needed 
to be sustained.
Batyrkhan was born into a fishing family on the island of Qasqaqūlan. 
His family was relocated to Qaratereng in 1974. Today, he is an important 
figure in the Qaratereng fishery and, on the basis of his success, has built 
a huge house in the village. But he had never wanted to stay in Qaratereng: 
in 1980 he left school and entered a railway college; in 1982 he went to 
serve in the army in Hungary (he showed me his tank unit tattoo with 
pride) and decided he wanted to become a professional soldier. We were 
talking in Russian, which he spoke fluently from his experience in the 
army:
William:  Many say that this is tughan zher, their homeland 
(Ru.: rodina) –
Batyrkhan:  Well, homeland, homeland (rodina, rodina) … If 
there’s no water here, no food, then it’s not a 
homeland! This is people’s emotion, that this is 
tughan zher … Well, I stayed here with my father, my 
youngest brother was little, our mother had died, I 
had little brothers and sisters at school.
In contrast to others who stress the limitedness of their horizons, 
Batyrkhan presents himself as someone who had seen the world, and 
could see through the ideology of tughan zher, distancing himself from it 
by citing the Kazakh phrase in a Russian sentence. He too knew the legend 
of the previous desiccation, telling me how settlements had been wiped 
out when the sea returned; after the flood, just one kulan (a wild horse), 
with a white spot on its head, had been left alone on Qasqaqūlan, giving 
the island its name.5 But he insisted that there had been no hope of the 
sea returning, and that he had stayed only to fulfil family duties.
Batyrkhan rejected the power of tughan zher when the environment 
has been ruined. Others, however, would dispute the idea that the 
environment has been ruined: after all, people have gone on living there. 
Certainly, the damaging effects of ekologiia, visible in the salt which lies 
on land, are acknowledged. When the sea receded, villagers explain, 
salt went up into the air, creating ekologiia. Understood as salt and dust 
in the air from the dried-up seabed, ekologiia is a transitory phenomenon, 
and indeed, around Bögen and the lakes, some assert that ekologiia has 
gone away. Crucially, fluctuations in numbers of livestock are related to 
political-economic factors as much as to ecological factors: immediately 
after collectivisation, people had few or no private livestock, and 
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only after the war did they start acquiring more livestock, though seldom 
more than a few heads. The bankruptcy of the fishing industry in 
the 1990s is related to an increase in private livestock, when working 
animals were distributed to fishermen as pay. Meanwhile, large herds, 
especially those belonging to the fishing kolkhozy Zhambul and Raiym 
and the large livestock sovkhozy elsewhere in Aral’sk raion, were 
massively depleted as collective and state farms went bust. At the same 
time, while salt is acknowledged to have damaged the pastures, the 
region has always been salty (especially around the northern coast), 
which is why Aral meat is deemed the tastiest in the country. Indeed, 
today the dried-up seabed around Bögen is considered good pasture 
for camels.
Attachment to place, therefore, needs to be contextualised in the 
significance of the landscape within socialist and postsocialist spaces. In 
the following sections, I show how, before the sea’s retreat, colonial and 
Soviet regimes of nature had transformed local structures of value, and 
the meaning of the sea itself. Tughan zher, I suggest, was thoroughly 
Sovietised, its reproduction resting on the gridded chronotope of the 
plan. This transformation, coupled with Soviet practices to maintain the 
fishery in the 1970s and 1980s, helps in understanding how the rupture 
of the sea’s regression is smoothed over.
The sea, famine and mutual aid
On one occasion, I asked Zhūbatqan whether there would be fish in the 
future, given current intensive fishing practices. To my surprise, his reply 
was couched in the past: ‘There will … The Aral Sea in 32, in 41, in the 
war, fed all people. You eat fish, and it’s enough.’ Another chronotope 
thus emerged, one of timeless natural abundance, in which the sea 
directly sustains the human body. Zhūbatqan collapsed temporal 
differences: throughout the years of collectivisation and war, the constant 
is that the sea fed people – and this is a guide to the future of the sea, the 
years of the sea’s absence notwithstanding. He continued:
Then how many people flocked (auyp)6 here from other places: this 
place fed them. They ate fish, they drank sorpa [stock], they ate 
it fried, they ate it boiled, they put it in a pan, made qarma and ate 
it … you don’t die. Far away, they were people from far from the sea, 
they don’t have fish. They came to the Aral Sea, lots of people. It fed 
them, this is what feeds them (osy asyrady ghoi, būl asyraidy).
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Mass migrations of famine refugees from other parts of Kazakhstan in the 
early 1930s, deportations of enemy peoples from all over the USSR before 
and during the war: all are blurred in a narrative where the sea is the 
centre, the source of sustenance for all, assuming agency in feeding the 
bodies of those who flocked around it. This image of natural abundance, 
I suggest, originates in precolonial practices of fishing, when, in a pastoral 
economy predicated on scarcity and differentiated ownership, fish were 
abundant, a common resource owned by no one. Hence the representation 
of the sea as centre, sustaining all people, regardless of their attachment 
to the locality.
In this narrative there is no trace of the famine in the Aral region 
itself, and Zhūbatqan, like many others in Bögen and other villages in the 
delta, explicitly denied that there had been famine, drawing a contrast 
with other regions in Kazakhstan. As Rai put it: ‘At that time, if a man 
came to this lake and laid two nets, his stomach would be full.’ Stories of 
people coming from other regions are also common: ‘food was necessary’ 
(tamaq kerek qoi). In Aqespe on the northwestern shore, I heard a slightly 
different story from Tasbolat, who was born in 1949. When I asked 
explicitly, he at first said that he did not know anything about famine 
because his parents had not told him about it. But later in our conversation, 
he mentioned how all his parents’ livestock had been confiscated ‘when 
there was famine’. He told me that his parents had moved away, to Bögen, 
where his mother had relatives. Although people were fleeing Bögen too, 
this is consistent with the documentary evidence which suggests that the 
famine was more severe on the northwest shores, where, with no fresh 
water, nothing grew.7
Interwoven with these links between the sea and famine are stories 
about other nationalities coming in the 1930s and 1940s – Koreans, 
Chechens, Kalmyks, Germans. Explanations for why they came are vague. 
Sometimes it is because of famine, sometimes because ‘Stalin brought 
them’. Stories about other nationalities emphasise reciprocity: the help 
that the local Kazakhs gave them, inviting them into their houses; how 
they learnt Kazakh while Kazakh children learnt Russian and Kalmyk; 
how they fished together. Most left in the 1950s, after Stalin’s death, 
when enemy peoples were allowed to return; the rest left when the sea 
began to retreat. The arrival of deportees is not presented as an intrusion 
or rupture. The narrative format is: ‘they came … and then they left, to 
their own countries (öz elderïne)’.
In the chronotope of abundance, the sea transcends economic 
valuation. This became clear when I asked Zhūbatqan about the famous 
story of Lenin’s letter. He told me that ‘our fathers’ had fished and loaded 
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the fish onto sledges, and camels had dragged them to Qamystybas, 
where they were cleaned, processed and stored, before being loaded onto 
trains:
There had been a call for help. The old men [here] had seen poverty 
(zhoqty, lit. ‘nothingness’) before, and those guys there [in the 
Volga region] were on the brink of death … so they said, ‘Come on, 
send something, food is needed.’ So they fished and fished, saying 
‘We won’t take money, this is our help, we’re giving those guys help’ 
… By camel, lots of camels … they brought it and loaded into 
wagons.
There is a sense of generalised reciprocity between the Aral region and 
the outside. The refusal of money suggests that the sea’s wealth is more 
than an economic resource: the sea as a source of sustenance connects 
the locality with the outside through help (kömek). There is a parallel 
with hunter-gatherer ideologies of sharing natural abundance, rejecting 
calculated exchange (e.g. Woodburn 1982). At the same time, this 
account establishes a moral connection between the sea and elsewhere in 
terms compatible with the utopian ideology of Communism.8
Nevertheless, this relationship between the sea and the Soviet 
outside would transform what the sea was. The commodification of 
nature started well before the Soviet period: stories about Russians, 
stories about encounters between different sorts of knowledge, already 
establish an association between fish and money. Such stories describe 
a period when the local – and local understandings of nature – was 
becoming increasingly ‘perforated’ (Hastrup 2009). Yet these early 
encounters are still couched in terms of reciprocity. The gradual process 
of colonisation, which from the outside looks like a rupture of local 
knowledge, is domesticated, and rendered in local idioms: Zhūbatqan 
told me that before the kolkhoz was constructed, Russians and Ukrainians 
‘came to help’, because Kazakhs had not known about fishing and did not 
have nets. They had brought nets and hooks and had installed ice houses. 
Zhūbatqan described them as bai (rich men, kulaks), emphasising that 
they were private (zheke), paying the Kazakhs money. But he framed this 
in terms of ‘help’ rather than exploitation: they helped by giving money, 
clothes and boats. The tangle of debts and exploitation which the 
Bolsheviks saw was, in Zhūbatqan’s account, a relationship embedded in 
reciprocity. The new vision of the sea as an economic resource was, in this 
account, assimilated to local understandings of mutual aid. Thus, if, 
according to Zhūbatqan, fishermen refused to accept money for the fish 
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they gave in response to Lenin’s letter, it was because fish were not yet 
pure commodities.
Kolkhoz construction
Collectivisation, as we saw in Chapter 1, was to bring fishers into the 
industrial, homogeneous time-space of the Five-Year Plan. The clan 
structures of Kazakh society were to be broken down, and people and 
nature were to be separated, mediated by the numbers of the plan. 
Policies of sedentarisation, collectivisation and deportation instigated a 
political form of movement which treated space and time as abstract, 
overriding the ecological movements of people in tune with geographical 
particularities, clan affiliations and the rhythm of the seasons. Chapter 1 
showed this moment to be a significant rupture, the official Soviet 
narrative of a glorious socialist construction contradicted by archival 
evidence of chaos and collapse.
Zhūbatqan’s take was different. He said that the kolkhoz was 
founded ‘when the government was constructed’, explaining that before 
the 1930s ‘the kolkhoz couldn’t be organised’. But he did not mention the 
reasons, or the chaos of relocations and sedentarisation. He explained 
that the private employers had to leave when the kolkhoz was constructed, 
because it would not allow them to work privately, but he did not pass 
judgement on either. Rather, he explained the practical advantages of 
the kolkhoz: ‘The government gives you money, it gives you a boat for 
free; your boat, nets, it gives them for free. The kolkhoz, the committee 
maintains it. They don’t ask money from you. Koptit’ (Ru.: smoking), sale, 
the Trust does that. Then … for free they give nets to the kolkhoz.’ Indeed, 
some accounts of the period of collectivisation and famine stress not 
natural abundance, but state provisioning.
Möngkebai, another Bögen villager slightly older than Zhūbatqan, 
told me about the confiscations, emphasising that they were ‘not 
right’ (dūrys emes). In his telling, this encounter with the outside (‘the 
government’) produced a sense of rupture, and, unlike Zhūbatqan and 
many others, he did say that there was famine in the region. He continued 
to tell me that when people started fishing for the kolkhoz, ‘the Soviet 
government took the fish and brought groceries, Lenin-Stalin gave 
money’. After this, he said, things got better. In this phrasing, it is not just 
natural abundance that is important, but the encounter with the outside, 
embodied in ‘the Soviet government’ or ‘Lenin-Stalin’, which provisioned 
the region (eventually) with foodstuffs. The state is personalised in the 
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figure of Lenin-Stalin, and the relationship is one of reciprocal exchange. 
Crucially, the sea is a source of money as well as a sustaining centre. 
Möngkebai added with a laugh that this was before his time, but ‘the 
aqsaqals told us’. Though I was often told about the people who came to 
the region, I was never told about the 84 households that left Bögen in 
1931: either this was not something the aqsaqals told Möngkebai, or it 
was something which he, himself an aqsaqal now, omits from his 
narratives. He smoothed over other traumas with laughter, joking about 
how he had first fished during the war, when women and children were 
fishing to fulfil the plan in a time of ‘shock work’ (Ru.: udar).
When rupture is smoothed over, collectivisation does not figure as 
an alien imposition on the native tughan zher. Family histories express 
pride in generations who fished first for the Russians, then for the kolkhoz, 
then for the state fishery base (Figure 4.3). This Sovietisation of the local 
landscape comes out particularly clearly in a famous terme, a sort of song, 
which I first heard blaring from an MP3 player in the UAZ while fishermen 
drew their nets through the ice. It begins:
My Aral’s endless surface, mine (Aralym aidyn shalqarym) – land 
blessed with abundance (qūt-bereke qonghan zher).
Land which left its mark in history, land where Nūrtughan9 wrote 
my precious zhyr [poem].
My Aral (Aralym), land thus blessed with happiness and wealth 
(däuletpen bailyq).
As the terme stresses the connections between the singer and the land 
with the repeated possessive suffix -ym/-im, the Aral emerges as a place 
of natural wealth and abundance compatible with the accounts above. Yet 
the rest of the terme lists labour heroes, war veterans and writers from the 
region famed across the Soviet Union. The patriotism expressed is for a 
Sovietised tughan zher.10
Indeed, while collectivisation marked an assault on the clan 
structure of Kazakh society, the kin-based ordering of space and time 
was not destroyed, but was articulated with socialist logics. Clan 
identity remains salient today, with particular ru (lineages) rooted in 
specific villages, even if the ru no longer constitutes a corporate unit of 
production.11 Although the economic functions of clan institutions were 
formally replaced with the institutions of Soviet governance, industrial 
space and time provided the conditions for the perpetuation, and 
transformation, of family space and time. After all, given the difficulties 
of the shortage economy, state-socialist time was in practice arhythmic 
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(Verdery 1996, 57); and, while space was formally homogenised, 
development was, as we saw in Chapter 1, uneven, with widely hetero- 
geneous distribution of resources over space. As Humphrey’s (1998) 
classic ethnography of a Siberian Buriat kolkhoz demonstrates, the 
concomitant formal difficulties of fulfilling the plan necessitated informal 
practices, which were organised according to kinship logics.12 Hence, 
local, place-based identity is neither autonomous of, nor opposed to, the 
gridded time and space of state socialism: the two are articulated.
Rybatskii zhizn’: the fisherman’s life in the late Soviet 
fishery
‘We had food to eat, vodka to drink [flicking throat]13… it was 
Communism.’ – Tolpash, fisherman
After camping in the back of a draughty GAZ-66 truck for several days by 
Kökaral in spring 2014 (see Chapter 6), Zhaqsylyq and I were travelling 
back to Bögen in driving sleet. Zhaqsylyq asked me, not for the first time, 
what I thought of the ‘fisherman’s life’, using a Russian phrase, rybatskii 
zhizn’.14 I had not been fishing, but I had lugged sacks of fish around and 
Figure 4.3 Fishing on the Aral, undated. Source: Museum of Fishermen, 
Aral’sk.
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dragged boats over the mud and loaded them onto the roof of the truck, 
and was cold, wet and exhausted, so I replied, as I was expected to reply, 
that it was ‘difficult’ (qiyn ghoi). He concurred with a hearty laugh. But 
when I asked if it had been the same in the past, he said that it was much 
easier today: until recently, there had been no jeeps and trucks, only 
camels. Older people remember still more difficult times, when there 
were no motors and they had to row for hours against strong winds. 
Recall Zhūbatqan’s narrative at the opening of this chapter: the regression 
of the sea formed a rupture in the progressive arrival of newer sorts of 
technology. Rybatskii zhizn’ has changed dramatically since Zhūbatqan’s 
youth, both because of environmental change and because of techno- 
logical improvements. It still, however, provides narrative continuity even 
in the late Soviet years after the sea had gone away.
Narratives of fishing in the late Soviet period should be 
contextualised in memories of the period as one of abundance. Indeed, 
my incessant questions as to how things were different before and 
after the sea went away would elicit comparisons between an often 
undifferentiated ‘Soviet time’ (kenges kezï) and today. As in Aral’sk, the 
presence of the sea becomes blurred with the late Soviet period in general. 
Fuel was free, groceries were abundant, everything was affordable 
because ‘money had value’: all this is characterised as ‘Communism’, 
understood as a historical stage in the Brezhnev era, now passed. Small 
factories in Bögen and Qaratereng continued to function, where women 
worked processing ocean fish delivered by lorry from Aral’sk; through 
such factory labour many local women participated in the public sphere. 
This was also, as we saw in Chapter 2, a period of infrastructural 
development: water pipes, electricity cables, field hospitals. Although 
these changes are not narrated by villagers, it is significant that the period 
when the sea finally retreated was also the period when some, albeit 
limited, amenities of modernity reached many of the villages in the 
region. This also helps us understand why there is no clear narrative 
of decline. Much of the infrastructure remains or has been improved. 
Some elements, like the public banya, the canteen, the factory and the 
wireless station, have gone, along with the stable currency and efficient 
provisioning. As the public sphere has sharply contracted, women’s roles 
are increasingly restricted to the household.
Against this backdrop of late Soviet abundance, accounts of fishing 
elsewhere in Kazakhstan smooth over the rupture of the sea’s regression. 
Indeed, litanies of places fished are often woven into official presentation 
of biography, as seen with this Qaratereng fisherman, who announced, as 
soon as my dictaphone was turned on:
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My name is Küntughan, Tūrghanbaev Küntughan. I started fishing 
on the sea in 73, I worked in this fish system (balyq sistemasynda). 
It was good. When the sea went away, after it disappeared, in the 
Aqtöbe region there is a place called Yrghyz, the fish on the sea was 
becoming scarce (azaidy), when it became scarce they sent us 
(zhïberdï) on komandirovka (Ru.: business trip) to Aqtöbe … We 
fished from this place. There is a place called Yrghyz. Baitaq. So we 
fished. There are lots of names of the lakes. There’s Baitaq, there’s 
Lake Qarmaq …
He went on to talk of fishing on Zaisan (east Kazakhstan) and Qapshaghai 
(south Kazakhstan), expressing pride in a life spent fishing all over 
Kazakhstan. Such stories reflect the hierarchical structure of the fishery: 
‘they sent us’ is a recurring phrase. Sometimes it is the local director 
who is said to have sent them, sometimes the kombinat. Sometimes it was 
the minister himself, an emphasis that personalises the distant state. 
However, there is less emphasis on the state providing work than we saw 
in the previous chapter, less sense of a moral space affording an 
encompassing sense of belonging than we saw in the last chapter.
My informants stressed the importance of labour discipline, and of 
fulfilling the plan. By contrast, documents from the late Soviet period are 
full of complaints about poaching and about poor labour discipline. 
Sometimes in the 1970s fishermen refused to go out and fish. On 
one occasion, Bögen fishermen wrote to the chairman of Kazsovmin 
complaining about not receiving the minimum pay grade in the winter of 
1977–8, when fishing on the sea was nearly impossible; a Minrybkhoz 
investigation found that they had been breaking labour discipline by not 
going fishing at all, so were not entitled to the minimum salary – indeed, 
they should have been punished.15 If this may be interpreted as a minor 
act of resistance against their plight in a situation where agency was 
severely constrained, it is not remembered today. Indeed, in contrast to 
the archival evidence, fishermen today insist that the fishery was well 
managed: poaching was minimal, and banned seasons were respected. 
Both people and nature were, they say, better managed than today: lakes 
were stocked with fish and provided with water, and monitoring deterred 
poachers. The Yrghyz lakes are said to have deteriorated dramatically 
since Soviet times because now they are private, so there is no water; 
within the Aral region, there are complaints that Lake Aqshatau also does 
not have enough water and is not stocked with fish, while on Lake Raiym 
stocks are declining because of poor monitoring and no possibility for 
villagers to fish legally. Crucially, labour discipline and plan fulfilment are 
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associated with economic security, as this exchange with Zhūbatqan 
shows:
William: So discipline was good?
Zhūbatqan:  We were OK. The Soviet government looked after 
us. They didn’t let anyone eat up [i.e. embezzle] 
our salary, they didn’t allow it. If you tell the raikom, 
they’ll get it, if you say they’ve eaten up your 
salary. They can’t eat it up, back then they can’t eat 
it up. If you say I’m going to work, pozhaluista 
(Ru.: ‘by all means’ [lit. ‘please’]). You must fulfil 
the plan (Ru.: ‘plan’). Plan, if you fulfil the plan, 
that’s enough.
William: And did you fulfil the plan on Balqash?
Zhūbatqan:  We fulfilled it, we overfulfilled it! We overfulfilled it, 
twice over.
In such accounts, fishing for the plan materialises a connection with the 
state, albeit one more limited than the encompassing incorporation 
that we explored in the previous chapter. However, Tasbolat, from 
Aqespe, talked much more critically about the connection with the state 
materialised through fishing for the plan. He had fished all his life under 
Narghaly Demeuov, a brigadier and labour hero (and Party member) 
famous across the region. There was a clear contrast between Demeuov’s 
discipline and Tasbolat’s irreverent views of the system. Edïge, my friend 
from Aral’sk, had accompanied me to help with the interview. Tasbolat 
mixed Russian and Kazakh, but seemed to prefer speaking to me in 
ungrammatical army Russian, partly sensing that it was easier for me to 
follow, but partly also because it offered him the opportunity to show off 
his swearing:
William:  And when you fished then, did you always fulfil 
plan?
Tasbolat: Yes, we fulfilled the plan.
Edïge:  (in Kazakh) There was no perevypolnenie (Ru.: 
overfulfilment)?
Tasbolat:  (in Kazakh) There is … (in Russian) there was 
perevypolnenie … ninth, tenth five-year plans, there 
was … they’d give a little medal – fucking cheating 
us! No gold for fuck’s sake, just metal crap … 
Bullshit. Crap. All politics cheats. It’s state politics, of 
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course they cheat people, all of them … bullshit, 
they gave money …
Edïge:  (in clean, grammatical Russian) They rewarded 
them with medals, they claimed that this is gold but 
it was ordinary metal he says, not gold.
Tasbolat:  They gave a certificate … utter crap … paper … 
it’s all fucking shit, they clap and say ‘go on, work’. 
Fuck it … There, William … And now it’s the same 
too!
Yet, in the same interview, Tasbolat also talked of the benefits of Soviet 
modernity, and did not question Soviet conceptions of the environment. 
Indeed, over the generation or so since collectivisation, subjection to the 
plan, which situated fishermen as resource extractors, had transformed 
local understandings of fish, advancing the colonial-era process of 
commodification. The political ecology of numbers was internalised, with 
implications for conceptions of space and time. When I asked how they 
would decide where to lay their nets, Zhūbatqan told me simply: ‘You fish 
where you’re taken.’ Others point to some agency, albeit constrained and 
within a limited space. This is how Rai put it:
From dawn till dusk you go on laying the seine. In the end you have 
to go over the whole surface of this lake [Raiym] and find fish. If you 
sit in the middle, the fish won’t come. Now if I’ve fished from this 
place, tomorrow I must fish from Qoszhar. I have to fish from 
Qambash. I have to go right round and fish. Then the fish will enter 
[the net].
In this description of fishing labour, the plan structures the everyday 
embodied practice of fishing. Fishermen are constrained to extract the 
requisite amount of fish from the lakes, and the lakes are reduced to 
resources. Local knowledge is applied according to the logic of fulfilling 
the plan. Lakes are, in this register, homogenised. This is not, of course, 
to say that fishermen did not have local knowledge or agency in their 
fishing activities. However, in narratives like these, they present 
themselves as extracting resources to fulfil the plan; their bodily 
engagement with the environment is constrained by higher agency.
This same logic applies on the much larger scale of the Kazakh 
republic. After Zhūbatqan had told me about overfulfilling the plan on 
Balqash, I asked if they were sent there specifically to fulfil the plan: ‘If 
there’s no fish here, you have to fish in that place (ana zhaqta). They’re 
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all Kazakhstani lakes. Then… There was a single minister, in this 
place (myna zhaqta) there’s no fish, davai … in this place the fish are 
disappearing, and it’s necessary to fish.’ When people say, for example, 
‘Stalin sent Kalmyks here’, there is a clear sense of bounded locality, an 
inside and an outside. Here Kazakhstan is an undifferentiated space, 
united by a single minister. When the plan must be fulfilled, there is no 
difference between lakes: fish are equivalent wherever they are. When 
I pressed fishermen further, they would, of course, talk about the 
differences between places fished: Balqash fish are thin, because the 
bottom is rocky and lacking in shalang; zander on Balqash had scabs; 
some of the fish on Zaisan had worms; the Yrghyz system on the other 
hand, after it was stocked with new species, was rich in fish, especially 
carp. However, these differences are subsumed in the continuity provided 
by the phrase ‘we fished’: the logic of the plan just demands fish. Indeed, 
when I suggested that life must have become much harder after the sea 
went away, Zhūbatqan responded: ‘There was work. We fished from 
Balqash, then we’d take our salary.’ From this perspective, the association 
of fish with money means that it is not significant where one fishes, so 
long as one has work and money (Figure 4.4).
Figure 4.4 Fishing, late Soviet period. Source: Museum of Fishermen, 
Aral’sk.
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Conclusion
In the narratives explored in this chapter, the sea’s regression both is 
and is not a sea change. Amid devastating environmental change, there is 
also continuity. If resilience is about the endurance of a set of relation- 
ships even when some of those relationships have been ruptured, it makes 
sense to talk about resilience. However, this chapter suggests that 
resilience does not lie solely in the local, beneath or in resistance to the 
externally imposed grids of the state.16 If long-term relationships between 
people and place were resilient, this lay in their incorporation into 
gridded time and space, via fish, money, infrastructure and entitlements. 
Local resilience depended on the top-down adaptation described in 
Chapter 2. This is not simply a matter of linkages between scales. 
Incorporation into the imperial and then the command economy 
transformed local conceptions of time, space and nature. The colonial 
and Soviet periods saw a new meaning of bailyq, whereby fish were 
abstracted as exchange-values. Translated into money and linking the 
region to gridded infrastructure, fish came to be associated with rising 
living standards. This conception overlaid but did not quite displace a 
local conception whereby the sea is valued as an agent sustaining life 
itself. Within the new conceptualisation, fish and water are both fungible, 
so it does not matter where you fish, so long as you fulfil the plan, 
hence the level of continuity which fishing provides. Space becomes 
homogeneous, place loses meaning and local agency is limited. The 
locality is connected to broader spaces by ministers and authorities giving 
money, making orders, sending fishermen here and there. When Aikeldï 
spoke of the bailyq of the region, both understandings of wealth could be 
signified.
Crucially, as tughan zher itself was Sovietised, there is no clear 
opposition between a ‘traditional’, cultural landscape and a ‘modern’ 
space of economic gain. As Abashin (2015, Chapter 9) shows in his 
discussion of the development of wedding rituals in Tajikistan, as wages 
rose, the lack of opportunities for financial investment resulted in 
investments in social capital in the form of increasingly lavish weddings 
and extravagant gift-giving. Indeed, even from the late 1930s, money 
from fishing was reinvested in livestock, which circulated in the ritual 
economy. Rai, who married in the 1950s, remarked laconically that the 
wedding feast was great because there were lots of fish and lots of money. 
The association of connections is instructive: social reproduction, which 
is rooted in place, and which also reproduces place, is dependent on the 
abstraction of nature and its transformation into monetary value. Local 
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resilience – the maintenance of relationships among people and between 
people and place despite the loss of the sea that lay at the heart of these 
relationships – depended on the articulation of chronotopes of plan and 
tughan zher. If tughan zher suggests a permanence that transcends the 
rupture of the sea’s retreat, this ongoing connection between people and 
place was maintained by the abstract chronotope of the plan, within 
which the sea was a replaceable economic resource.
Nuances of past narratives are fading. One day I was sitting with 
Zhūbatqan near Zhaqsylyq’s house. Elzhas, a recent arrival in the village, 
was repairing a truck. Zhūbatqan was telling him in detail where the 
kolkhoz had been, how the management had given nets and clothing, 
where fish had been received. I was (of course) listening to all this avidly, 
but Elzhas devoted most of his attention to repairing the truck. Younger 
people in Bögen know that the sea came up to the village, that there had 
been a quay and a factory in the village; they told me how ‘the old men 
(shaldar) said’ that the sea dried up when Uzbeks did not give water; 
when it dried up, salt spread up into the air and into foreign countries, 
then there was ekologiia. Narratives about the past are being transmitted, 
and when prefaced by ‘the old men say’, there is a sense of a homogenised 
narrative, crystallised local knowledge. But the texture of the past, with 
all its trauma, is not transmitted, just as, at an earlier stage, other traumas 
were not transmitted.
Notes
 1 Kazakhs do not generally eat pork on religious grounds, though many fishermen are partial to 
salo, salted pork fat, a Russian and Ukrainian delicacy.
 2 The verb qaitu means, primarily, ‘to return’, but also means ‘to be lost’ and is used as a 
euphemism for ‘to die’; with water it means ‘to fall, recede’.
 3 This story emerges from correspondence between the ministry, TsK KP Kazakhstana, 
Aralrybprom and the Bögen villagers: letter from deputy minister Duisenov to TsK KP 
Kazakhstana (General’nyi otdel), 16 June 1977, TsGARK, f. 1130, op. 1, d. 1722, l. 39; letter 
from deputy minister Duisenov to comrades A. Baitakhanov, T. Balkybaev, T. Zhopaev, 
S. Sydykov, I. Ibraimov, Zh. Zhanuzakov, 1 July 1977, TsGARK, f. 1130, op. 1, d. 1722, ll. 40–1; 
letter from deputy minister Duisenov to ARP director K. Sarzhanov, 1 July 1977, TsGARK, 
f. 1130, op. 1, d. 1722, l. 42; letter from minister Utegaliev to secretary of TsK KP Kazakhstana 
A.I. Klimov, 20 July 1977, TsGARK, f. 1130, op. 1, d. 1722, ll. 43–4.
 4 Privratsky argues that landscape embodies Kazakh collective memory and, in the relative 
absence of mosques, defines Kazakh Islam. While his argument about a teleological 
development towards universal, global Islam, and his suggestion that this form of Islam is 
linked specifically to ethnic (as opposed to local) identity, are problematic, this particular point 
is well taken. Both Post (discussing Mongolian Kazakhs), and Dubuisson and Genina 
(discussing Kazakhstani Kazakhs), argue that tughan zher is more real to people than the 
macronarratives of the state.
 5 Qasqa, ‘white spot’; qūlan, ‘kulan, wild horse’.
 6 The verb signifies ‘to move en masse, migrate’.
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 7 The social forgetting of the famine here and elsewhere in Kazakhstan contrasts strikingly with 
memories of the famine in Ukraine, which is integral to nationalist narratives. This forgetting 
is evidently linked both to the official Soviet silence on the famine and to the danger of speaking 
out, as well as the mutedness of official discourse about it today. Kindler (2018, Chapter 7) 
suggests a darker possibility, that silence is, beyond fear of the state, the outcome of an inability 
to come to terms with the complicity that survival had depended on.
 8 The nuances about not exchanging fish are absent from most accounts of this story. For younger 
people, as in Aral’sk, the story simply expresses local pride in the connection between the 
region and the outside.
 9 Nūrtughan Kenzheghūlūly: an aqyn, musician/poet, of the Aral region in the early twentieth 
century.
10 Cf. Beyer (2012) on the connections between descent, place and relatedness in the present in 
rural Kyrgyzstan. Beyer argues that the process of ‘settling descent’ is inflected with Soviet (and 
post-Soviet) modes of governance which have transformed but not destroyed clan identity. 
Conversely, Beyer argues, villagers ‘customised’ collectivisation, relating to it through 
genealogy and landscape. There is thus no clear opposition between a Soviet landscape and a 
resistant ‘traditional’ landscape. By contrast, Privratsky (2001) ignores the Sovietisation of 
Kazakh landscapes (and indeed of Kazakh identity and religion in general): he only sees Soviet 
modernity as a threat to a resilient local identity.
11 See further Chapter 6. Cf. also Cameron (2018, 173) on the persistence of clan identities within 
kolkhozy.
12 See Kandiyoti (2002) and Abashin (2015, 398–400) for the relevance of Humphrey’s argument 
to Central Asia.
13 A symbol for drinking ubiquitous in the former USSR.
14 Like many who learnt their Russian in the army, Zhaqsylyq has a cavalier attitude towards 
gender: in formal Russian the phrase would be rybatskaia zhizn’.
15 Prikaz po proizvodstvennogo ob’edineniia ‘Aralrybprom’ No.161r ‘O faktakh narusheniia 
trudovoi distsipliny, oplaty truda rybakam i slabyi kontrol’ nad raskhodami sredstv na 
gosudarstvennom love Bugun’skoi bazy goslova’, 26 May 1978, AFGAKO, f. 4, op. 1pr, d. 584, 
ll. 98–100. Fishermen received pay per amount of fish caught, but in case of poor catches, they 
were entitled to a minimum salary.
16 Cf. Hastrup (2009) for a critique of the tendency in much of the social science of adaptation 
and resilience to locate resilience in local ‘socio-ecological systems’.
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5
From Soviet ruins: flounder,  
the Kökaral dam and the  
return of the Small Aral Sea
Figure 5.1 Poster, Aral’sk, 2011. Nazarbayev and Kökaral: Men Aralgha 
kömektesemïn degen, armanyma zhetkenïme quanyshtymyn (‘I said I would 
help the Aral, and I am glad to have fulfilled my dream’). Source: author.
This chapter tells of how, amid Soviet ruins, a small part of the Aral 
returned, of how fish populations recovered and of how a fishery 
was rebuilt, stories that are entangled with broader processes of post-
Soviet transformation. There are different ways of narrating the Small 
Aral’s return. The posters in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 link the sea’s recovery to 
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Figure 5.2 Poster, Aral’sk, 2013. Nazarbayev and Kökaral: Kökaral – 
ghasyr zhobasy (‘Kökaral – the project of the century’). Source: author.
the benevolent desires of the president, mastering water through the 
completion, in 2005, of the Kökaral dam.1 A more modest account is 
offered in a 2010 National Geographic article:
For many years, the Aral – the infamous sea-turned-desert, the one 
historians and environmental scientists still place among the worst 
ecological disasters ever – gave [local fishermen] nothing to 
celebrate. The fishery died in the 1980s, after the Soviet government 
drained the sea to feed thirsty cotton fields planted in the inhospitable 
landscape surrounding it … But with help from the government, the 
World Bank, and scientists, the northern part of the Aral 
has started to make a recovery. There are fish in the water again, 
and for the past four years, fishermen have gathered to celebrate. 
(Walters 2010)
This, then, is a technopolitics that, in implicit contrast to Soviet 
megalomania, works with nature. With ‘help’ from the new hegemonic 
actors – unlike the billboards in Aral’sk, Walters includes the World Bank 
and scientists in their number – nature has started to recover. The sea that 
has been saved is only a small fraction of the former Aral, but some of the 
mess left by the Soviet regime has been cleared up.2
I will tell a rather different story. Contrary to the reassuring 
certainties of both the state-centred and the World Bank-centred 
narratives, there was nothing inevitable about the sea’s restoration. After 
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all, the disaster was popularised in the West in a National Geographic 
article that proclaimed: ‘a Soviet sea lies dying’ (Ellis 1990). Indeed, to 
most of the many development workers rallied by this disaster narrative 
to the Aral’s former shores, the distant sea was dead or dying. Even at the 
end of the 1990s, a World Bank annual environmental review described 
the sea as ‘biologically dead’ (World Bank 1999, 21). The disaster 
narrative was a monologic form of discourse, fixing the sea as a knowable, 
determinate ‘mute object, brute thing’ (Bakhtin 1981b, 351), a waste of 
the defunct time-space of the USSR. What changed? How did the sea 
come to speak, to offer an alternative future for itself? Two factors were 
key: as the sea separated in two in 1987–9, the level of the Small Sea 
stabilised somewhat, offering hope that it might be preserved, while at 
the same time, the flounder population introduced over 1979–87 had 
grown significantly, offering a possible basis for a fishery. These 
developments were bolstered by local efforts to dam the strait between 
the two seas and a Danish aid project to encourage people to fish for 
flounder.
As an ‘indeterminate assemblage’ (Tsing 2015) of nonhuman and 
human processes, what the Small Aral was was not a given. The sea’s 
indeterminacy posed a question: could the waste of the Soviet project 
become a source of value for the future? To be an entity worth saving, 
the ‘biologically dead sea’, the Soviet ruin known through the disaster 
narrative, had to be cast in a set of relations within which it could become 
a living sea, and a future object of post-Soviet fishery. Amid heterogeneity, 
openness, uncertainty, this required the cooperation of flounder and 
mussels, of wind and sand, of water flow and salt. It also required holding 
together a rapidly disintegrating fishery. Indeed, compounding the 
indeterminacy of the sea’s existence was the heightened precarity of 
those living on its former shores following the Soviet collapse. As previous 
chapters suggested, local resilience had depended on the circulation of 
goods, subsidies and entitlements across Soviet gridded space. As all this 
disintegrated over the 1990s, the fishery, which had staggered on despite 
the sea’s demise, gradually unravelled. This was the context that the 
Danish project intervened in, focusing on basic material provisioning to 
get people fishing again.
As Brandtstädter (2007, 138) claims, ‘the postsocialist transition is 
best explored as a period of hegemonic fragmentation and reconstruction’. 
Brandtstädter’s (2007, 133) comparison of the project of postsocialist 
‘transition’ to the ‘hegemonic discursive formation’ of international 
development is helpful for exploring how the Aral, through the disaster 
narrative, became an object of transnational governmentality in the 
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post-Soviet period. However, attending also to material disintegration 
and restoration highlights the contingency and heterogeneity of this 
‘hegemonic fragmentation and reconstruction’. This chapter juxtaposes 
two very different projects, responding to different sorts of instability and 
operating at different temporal scales: the Danish project to restore the 
fishery in the immediate term through basic material provision of nets, 
boats and so on; and the World Bank/Kazakhstan government project of 
stabilising the sea level into the future through the Kökaral dam. These 
two projects participated in very different forms of hegemonic re- 
construction: if the Kökaral dam has come to materialise the Kazakhstani 
state, the Danes’ urgent material provisioning facilitated, for a time, the 
emergence of a small-scale, relatively equitable fishery.
Indeed, in the early postsocialist years, the region diverged from 
other agrarian postsocialist settings that were marked by increasing 
inequality (Hann 2003; Hivon 1998; Shreeves 2002; Toleubayev et al. 
2010; Trevisani 2010). Nevertheless, despite the very specific shape 
of post-Soviet transformations in the Aral region, by the time of my 
fieldwork the ‘hegemonic reconstruction’ resembled other postsocialist 
settings more closely, with the fishery increasingly dominated by a few 
big players. Explaining how this came about requires attention to a final 
sort of indeterminacy surrounding the post-Soviet Aral: the legal 
uncertainty surrounding property rights over the sea following the 
demise of Aralrybprom. Over the 1990s and early 2000s, this legal 
uncertainty did not provide an obstacle to the reconstruction of a 
small-scale flounder fishery. In the final part of the chapter, however, 
we see how this indeterminacy was resolved, in a way that contradicted 
the hopes of the Danes and their local colleagues, and how, as a result, 
patterns of social change came to conform more closely to other 
postsocialist settings.
Disaster development
We saw in Chapters 1 and 2 how, after decades when the Aral struggled 
to figure as anything more than a ‘problem’ of living standards and 
employment, during perestroika the sea became a ‘matter of concern’, a 
crisis that revealed the catastrophic outcome of the Soviet project. We 
closed Chapter 1 with belated official measures to tackle the crisis, which 
were almost immediately frustrated by the Soviet collapse. The Aral basin 
was divided between five successor states, whose interests over the sea’s 
feeder rivers diverged dramatically: downstream Uzbekistan and 
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Turkmenistan, dependent on cotton, still needed water for irrigation, 
while the mountainous, energy-poor Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan needed 
water for hydroelectricity.
At the same time, the famous disaster rallied a vast array of actors, 
including national governments in the region and beyond, international 
institutions, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and scientists. In 
the 1990s, over a thousand books and articles were published on the 
Aral and more than 30 international projects initiated (Kosarev and 
Kostianoy 2010a). This emerging ‘global’ vision, driven by the famous 
‘before and after’ pictures from space and images of rusting ships, was 
embedded in the post-Cold War imaginary. The Aral was an environmental 
problem ‘left over from the Communist era’ (World Bank 1999, 23). As 
Western eyes focused on post-Soviet environmental crises, the USSR was 
situated as the unsustainable, destructive other, incapable of mitigating 
destructive effects (Oldfield 2005). Melodramatically entitled works like 
Ecocide in the USSR (Feshbach and Friendly 1992) featured the Aral, 
along with Chernobyl, in prime position.
As the Aral disaster was positioned as a problem of the Soviet past, 
there was also a blindness to the economic crisis unfolding amid the 
promised ‘transition’ to capitalism. For most development workers, the 
unemployment that beset the region stemmed directly from environ- 
mental disaster. Moreover, many aid projects, particularly in the densely 
populated Ferghana Valley, were based on the spectre of interethnic 
conflict fuelled by water scarcity.3 Unlike the perestroika vision of disaster 
as a catalyst for radical transformation from within, the global vision was 
one of technical solutions from outside, through knowledge transfer from 
the ‘normal’ West to ‘backward’ post-Soviet space.
The United Nations Environment Programme, invited by the Soviet 
authorities to address the problem in 1990, completed a diagnostic study 
for conserving the Aral in 1993. Its scope was the whole Aral basin. It did 
not offer concrete proposals for preserving any of the sea itself. Flounder 
– key actors in this chapter’s narrative – were mentioned only in passing 
(UNEP 1993). In 1992 the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea 
was established, comprising all post-Soviet Central Asian republics. In 
1994 the Aral Sea Basin Program was launched by the post-Soviet Central 
Asian republics together with the World Bank. Its objectives were 
rehabilitating the disaster zone around the sea, improving international 
water management and building institutional capacity. An initial goal of 
stabilising the sea level was rapidly dropped as too difficult (Micklin 
1998, 406). Although deltas were identified as sites for intervention, no 
future was seen for the sea itself.
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Weinthal (2002) relates the proliferation of development initiatives 
in the region to an elective affinity between Central Asian leaders and 
‘third-party actors’, including Western governments and international 
institutions. National leaders could enhance their legitimacy, while third 
parties, by helping solve a ‘global’ disaster, could raise their prestige in the 
region. Weinthal’s argument can be pushed further. For Brandtstädter 
(2007), ‘transition’, like international development, was a utopian project 
that fixed an idealised construct of ‘the West’ as the centre, the only viable 
future to which peripheral others could aspire. With Soviet governmental 
practices now cast as backward, development would be managed by 
a ‘transnational apparatus of governmentality’ (Ferguson and Gupta 
2002). As the environment was identified as a priority for transnational 
development in postsocialist space (Wedel 1998, 33–4), and as the Aral 
disaster so clearly showed the ‘backwardness’ of Soviet environmental 
policy, it was an obvious area for international institutions to intervene in. 
The region was positioned not as ‘underdeveloped’, but ‘misdeveloped’ 
(Wedel 1998, 21).
Despite vast global interest, results were slow (Micklin 1998; 
Sievers 2003; Weinthal 2002). Central Asian leaders still talked about 
restoring the whole sea through diverting Siberian rivers, while 
international lenders advised that the whole sea could not be saved, 
stressing instead institutional reform and poverty alleviation. The only 
other ‘solution’, stopping cotton cultivation, was unconscionable for 
governments dependent on cotton. Meanwhile, energy-poor Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan started using reservoirs, which had been built for irrigation, 
for hydroelectric energy instead. Fraught negotiations took place about 
water, or about water and energy, but agriculture was never discussed 
(Weinthal 2002, Chapter 7). Although international consultants’ dire 
warnings about conflict did not materialise, there was little improvement. 
In 2003 Médecins Sans Frontières researchers identified a second disaster, 
a ‘disaster of international assistance’, a landscape littered with the ruins 
of unfinished projects, as donors retreated from earlier goals of environ- 
mental rehabilitation and abandoned the sea to its fate (Small and Bunce 
2003).4
For Brandtstädter (2007, 138), the inevitable failure of grand plans 
of transition lies in the ‘dissonance between administrative spaces and 
local worlds’. On the Aral, the discourse of environmental disaster did not 
resonate with local worlds partly because it ignored the compounding 
effects of post-Soviet economic breakdown. However, there was a further 
dissonance. The disaster narrative fixed the Aral as a stable, knowable 
entity, a ruin left by the Soviet past. The view from space of a dying sea, 
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the rusting ships and the collapsing fishing industry all pointed to an 
environmental disaster that had profound impacts on human livelihoods. 
However, some of those closer to the sea itself saw a more lively sea, with 
a possible future.
Salvaging the sea from Soviet ruins
In contrast to the dead sea known to development actors, the Small 
Aral of the 1990s resembled what Tsing (2015) calls an ‘indeterminate 
assemblage’, its elements precarious and vulnerable, but full of potential- 
ity and, indeed, of life. Let us first focus on hydrological processes. The 
ruination left by the Soviet project involved escalating nonhuman forces. 
As water was withdrawn from the rivers, evaporation from the sea 
exceeded inflow. The sea receded from its shores and the level fell. By 
1988 it had fallen to 40 m above sea level (asl) from its 1960 level of 
53 m asl, and salinity had increased from an average of 10 g/l to 30 g/l, 
killing off native species. The Berg Strait, between the mainland and the 
former island of Kökaral, which connected the Small Sea with the much 
larger body of water to the south, now dried up. This coincided with a 
reduction in water withdrawals in the late perestroika and early 
independence years, and in 1988 the Syr Dariya again reached the 
sea (Plotnikov et al. 2014, 164). Previously, this water would have spread 
across the whole sea, but now it flowed only into the Small Aral. 
Less water evaporated from the much smaller waterbody, so, in 1990, 
the Small Aral rose. As it rose, however, it overflowed back through the 
Berg Strait.
The ichthyologist N. V. Aladin had first suggested damming the Berg 
Strait in 1988. However, unable for several years to visit the strait, it was 
only in spring 1992 that he witnessed what was happening – and he 
foresaw disaster. In the late 1970s, to maintain navigation across the 
sea, a channel had been dredged through the strait. Though this was 
silted up, the water flowing through was washing the silt out. By spring 
1992 it was 2 m deep and 100 m wide, stretching for 5 km, with 100 m3/s 
flowing through it, raising the fear that the ‘self-deepening channel 
(samouglubliaiushchiisia kanal)’ (Aladin and Plotnikov 1995, 8) might 
reach the mouth of the Syr Dariya just to the north, which could 
divert the river entirely into the Large Sea. In this dire prognosis, the 
‘self-deepening channel’, an outcome of the ruination left by the Soviet 
project, was an actant that, unchecked, could lead to the Small Sea’s 
disappearance.
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After Aladin took his warning to the local authorities, permission 
was granted to construct a dam, though central government funding was 
not forthcoming. After an initial attempt to block the channel failed, an 
earth dam was constructed in July–August 1992. Rudimentary though it 
was, the sea level stabilised (Figure 5.3). The Syr Dariya now exerted a 
freshening influence in its estuary, and freshwater fish could forage in the 
sea (Figure 5.4). Reeds began to grow again in the delta, and pelicans, 
ducks, swans and cormorants began to nest.
The following spring, the Syr Dariya was swollen with meltwater. 
The sea level rose, breaching the dam. Even so, the outflow from the sea 
was less than previously. In the short time of the dam’s existence, other 
materials had reinforced its effect: to the south, the wind had formed 
sand dunes 2–3 m high, while to the north, wave action had formed 
sandbanks – processes Aladin and Plotnikov (1995, 14) describe as 
‘natural reinforcement (estestvennoe ukreplenie)’. Over the coming years, 
local authorities rebuilt the dam, eventually extending an earth dyke 
across the Berg Strait in 1996–7. The structure remained fragile: as it 
was made only of earth and reeds, there was a high level of filtration; 
meanwhile, waves driven by the prevailing northerly wind eroded the 
structure. Amid acute economic crisis, continuous efforts to reinforce the 
dyke were hampered by a shortage of resources. Much machinery stood 
idle, lacking spare parts.
Shifts in human–hydrological relations upstream had mixed effects. 
Independent republics, no longer supported with grain from Russia, 
shifted somewhat from cotton to wheat cultivation. Less water was 
withdrawn from the Syr Dariya, leaving more to flow into the Small Aral. 
However, upstream reservoirs in energy-poor Kyrgyzstan, constructed 
in the 1970s to provide water for irrigation in summer, now shifted to 
continuous use for hydroelectricity. What had been a summer flow river 
became a winter flood river, for which hydrological installations were not 
designed. Bottlenecks formed, and water was lost to desert sinks (World 
Bank 2001).
Throughout the 1990s, the existence of the Small Aral remained 
very fragile: the interventions of local dam builders were a small part of 
a precarious assemblage of human, hydrological and climatic processes. 
Holding the assemblage together was the hybrid object of a ‘naturally 
reinforced dam’. Despite its precarity, the sea’s level stabilised. The Syr 
Dariya began to form a new delta slightly to the north, diminishing the 
risk of it being sucked through the Berg Strait. Critically, as the fresh 
water brought by the river exceeded evaporation, salinity fell dramatically. 
Freshwater fish were foraging in the sea, although it was still too salty for 
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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 Changes in sea level (above) and salinity (below) 
in the Small Aral Sea, 1990–2008. Prepared by the author. Data from 
Micklin (2010, 201) and Plotnikov (2013, 43). The shaded areas mark 
periods when dams are present.
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them to reproduce. Aladin and his colleagues noted with delight how 
invertebrates not seen in the sea for decades were reappearing, such as 
the planktonic crustacean Moina mongolica, seed shrimps (ostracods) 
and midge larvae (Chironomidae), blown in by the wind from nearby 
lakes. These increased the nutritional value of the benthic fauna, with 
potential benefits for freshwater fish species (Aladin et al. 2000; Aladin 
et al. 2004).
Yet throughout this period, investments from either the Kazakh 
government or international institutions were not forthcoming, despite 
lobbying from the regional authorities. The World Bank was considering 
the project from 1994, but a 1995 report on the Aral Sea Basin Program 
concluded that, with the current water availability, the sea level would 
remain well below its 1960 level, ‘and the benefits of such a project would 
be limited’ (World Bank 1995, 7). A later report was more positive but 
identified lack of water and low economic impact as substantial risks 
(World Bank 1997, 7). Amid the pervading sense that the sea was dead, 
the project held little appeal. After all, the fishery was lying in ruins, and 
there was no guarantee that, even if the fish returned, a fishery could 
recover on a much smaller sea.
In spring 1999 meltwater pouring down the river raised the sea 
level by nearly 2 m. On 20 April a northerly gale breached the dyke in 
three places (Micklin 2014b; Figures 5.5 and 5.6). Two workers carrying 
out emergency repairs were killed, and the akim of Aral’sk was fired. The 
nonhuman had intervened spectacularly in human affairs. The dyke was 
irreparable, and the sea level fell rapidly.
However, at this lower level, outflow through the Berg Strait 
decreased again, and the following spring the sea began to grow again, 
only to recede over the course of the summer. In 2001, after increased 
precipitation across the Syr Dariya watershed, the sea level did not fall 
so far in the autumn. As water flowing through the Berg Strait was 
replenished by the Syr Dariya, the sea oscillated around 40–41 m asl. 
Continued inflow of fresh water meant that salinity levels went on falling, 
even though the sea was leaking. The presence or absence of a dam did 
not map directly onto sea level or, crucially for the fish, salinity levels.
Following the dam’s collapse in 1999, local and regional authorities 
lobbied intensively for a more stable structure. After a draft report for the 
‘Syr Darya Control and North Aral Sea project phase 1’ (SYNAS-1) was 
submitted in 1999, the World Bank finally approved the project in 2001. 
What had changed since 1995, when the project was deemed to have 
‘limited’ benefits? To understand how the ‘biologically dead’ sea had 
become a living sea that could sustain a viable fishery, we need to explore 
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three further elements of the Small Aral assemblage: the flounder 
introduced by the Soviet authorities; the unravelling fishing industry; and 
the Danish activists drawn to the Aral by the famous disaster narrative.
The flounder and the Danes
After native fish had died out, flounder, a salt-tolerant species, had been 
introduced over 1979–87 (see Chapter 2). A bottom-feeder, flounder 
had a wealth of benthic fauna to feast on: the native bivalve mollusc 
C. isthmicum; the accidentally introduced shrimp P. elegans; and the 
deliberately introduced bivalve mollusc A. ovata and the polychaete worm 
N. diversicolor (Figure 5.7). Benthic fauna, though less diverse than before 
the sea’s regression, was substantially greater in terms of biomass (Krupa 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 Kökaral dam before and after it was breached, 
14 April 1999 (above) and 23 April 1999 (below). Source: US Geological 
Survey, LandLook Viewer, https://landlook.usgs.gov, accessed 3 June 
2021.
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Figure 5.7 A dead sea? A selection of the aquatic fauna of the Small 
Aral before its restoration. Drawing by Amelia Abercrombie, after 
Zenkevich (1956). 1. Bivalve mollusc C. isthmicum, 2. Shrimp P. elegans, 
3. Bivalve mollusc A. ovata, 4. Polychaete worm N. diversicolor, 5. Copepod 
C. Aquaedulcis, 6. Flounder, 7. Baltic herring, 8. Goby.
Figure 5.8 Flounder. Drawing by Amelia Abercrombie.
and Grishaeva 2019). Native fish having died out, flounder (Figure 5.8) 
faced competition only from the gobies and atherines that had been 
accidentally introduced in the mid-1950s.5 Amid the ruins wrought by 
Soviet irrigation projects, flounder – which had largely done what 
ichthyologists had expected – could have been a small Soviet success story.
Flounder, a flatfish, was unlike any native species. When visiting 
Tastübek, I met Qydyrbai, who, in his booming voice, told me and his 
cousin Samalbek about the first time flounder was caught:
’87, October ’87. Ah, no, flounder was released in September ’84, in 
’87 it began to be seen. Elubai was a fisherman, this was the first 
fisherman to catch a flounder. Then he came and showed it to my 
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father: ‘Agha, what is this fish? It looks like a tortoise.’ Then my 
father said: ‘This fish was released by KazNIIRKh.’
Qydyrbai explained that a man had come to their house from Alma-Ata 
in 1984, telling them that flounder had been released into the Aral, from 
the Pacific Ocean. He went on: ‘So, he brought in one flounder. The next 
day my brother laid a net and seven fish were caught. Then my brother – 
the whole family was scared – my brother said, “If I die I die …” and fried 
it and ate it. Tasty. So.’ Samalbek was confused, having thought, like 
many in the region, that the Danes had introduced flounder. Qydyrbai 
corrected him:
In ’96 the Danes came. Autumn ’96, at the end of September they 
came. So. Kurt, Knud, Henrik, Ruud. Four of them came. Then they 
began. They gave the people nets, Danish nets. They brought a re- 
frigeration unit. Clothes. They brought everything except for boats. 
Clothing, life-rings, anchors, life-jackets, rubber boats, nets, needle 
and thread, crates, basins, seines, they brought all the equipment to 
give us. Only boats they didn’t bring, they brought everything else.
Samalbek’s confusion is not uncommon: memories closely link the Danes 
and the flounder, two foreign arrivals that together reshaped local worlds. 
However, the Danish project did not respond just to the presence of the 
flounder but also, as Qydyrbai’s narrative suggests, to the disintegrating 
fishery.
In February 1991, on the orders of the fisheries ministry, there 
had been an ‘experimental catch’ of flounder.6 That year approximately 
50 tonnes were caught, the following year more than 100 tonnes 
(Landsforeningen Levende Hav 1998). However, just as the flounder 
population reached a size where it could form the basis of a fishery, the 
fishery itself began to unravel. With the demise of the command economy, 
the webs of dependency between people and things sustained across 
Soviet space were becoming disentangled. Ocean fish landed in Russian 
ports no longer crossed the new border into Kazakhstan. State subsidies 
evaporated, making trips to other lakes increasingly infrequent. 
Equipment and boats urgently needed repair. Aralrybprom limped on, 
bartering fish for fuel, foodstuffs, goods and services; only zander from 
delta lakes, which was exported to Germany, brought in cash.7 Official 
catches fell: by 1995, just a little freshwater fish from delta lakes was 
caught. Fishermen were paid infrequently, in livestock, equipment or 
cheap foodstuffs like margarine.8
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Most development workers, drawn by the famous disaster, saw a 
ruined environment and ruined fishery. There was a double dissonance 
between administrative and local worlds: seeing a dead sea, development 
workers were blind both to the economic crisis that exacerbated the 
ecological crisis, and to the lifeworlds of flounder, mussels and worms 
that made up what was, even amid the ruins, a living sea. For this to 
change, the flounder needed to be enrolled in human relations. This is 
where the Danes came in.
Kurt Christensen first visited the Aral in 1991. As a grassroots 
activist, he had been invited to Alma-Ata (now Almaty) to foster 
environmental activism in Kazakhstan. When I talked with him on Skype 
after my fieldwork, he explained how, as a former small-scale fisherman, 
he travelled to Aral’sk to witness the famous disaster, which resonated 
with his experience in Kattegat of fishing grounds damaged by agricultural 
pollution and trawling. In the 1980s he and other fishers had formed an 
NGO, Landsforeningen Levende Hav (LLH; Society for a Living Sea), to 
stand up for small-scale fishers. The NGO worked on the principle that 
only those suffering from environmental mismanagement can protect 
their environment. He was also concerned about what humans were 
doing to the planet, and was following the Nevada-Semipalatinsk 
movement, an antinuclear movement linking the USA and Kazakhstan. 
While in Aral’sk he heard the familiar refrain: if everyone who had visited 
the Aral had brought a bucket of water, the sea would be full again.
On his return Kurt wrote an article critical of the disaster narrative: 
so many publications talked about the disaster but ignored the people still 
living there. He also criticised the delegations which seemed to offer 
people hope, but simply reproduced the view of their position as hopeless 
(Christensen 1996 [1991]). Determined to do something, in 1994 he 
returned with others from LLH. Staying in kolkhoz Zhambul (Zhalangash 
village), they were told that the sea was not dead, but was teeming with 
flounder. However, nets needed repair and replacement. The kolkhoz 
chairman showed them a Russian book from 1936 that mentioned the 
Danish seine net, designed for catching flatfish, and asked if it could be 
used on the Aral.
Such were the now legendary beginnings of the project ‘From 
Kattegat to the Aral Sea’, which established a commercial flounder fishery. 
Kurt found international organisations obstructive. They suggested 
moving people away or providing some other (unspecified) livelihood. 
So LLH organised a delegation of fishermen to Denmark, where they 
were introduced to small-scale cooperatives. The Kazakhs talked about 
the Aral’s problems, but also about the flounder; they explained that the 
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situation was not as catastrophic as portrayed, and that many of their 
problems were logistical (Sørensen 1996). Articulating this point helped 
mobilise funds from Danida, the Danish agency for international 
development, and in 1995 a ‘Protocol of Our Common Aims’ was signed 
with Kazakhstani partners, including Aralrybprom.
The Danes recognised that the primary obstacle to catching flounder 
was lack of equipment and money. They also recognised the infrastruc- 
tural difficulties: processing facilities were far off, and the sea’s new 
shoreline was inaccessible by road; motorised transport was scarce, 
so most fishermen could only reach the sea by camel. There were dif- 
ficulties in marketing flounder to a population accustomed to freshwater 
fish. Many feared flounder’s monstrous appearance. Locals joke about 
people in the market asking for 1 kg of black flounder and 1 kg of white 
flounder.
Given these obstacles, and given the uncertainty regarding the sea’s 
future, the Danes adopted a step-by-step approach. The first step was to 
prove that the flounder could be an object of fishery. Flounder, whose 
cooperation was key to the nascent project’s viability, were enrolled 
in human relations in three ways (Knudsen 2014; Lien 2015). First, in a 
one-month trial fishery near Tastübek in 1996, four Danish fishermen 
instructed Kazakh fishermen in the catching and primary treatment of 
flounder. The seabed proved too muddy for Danish seines, but flounder 
could be caught with gillnets, which Aral fishermen were familiar 
with. So flounder were enrolled as a viable object of a fishery. Secondly, 
the fish were processed in Aral’sk and sold in the market, where a stall 
demonstrated how flounder is cooked in Denmark. A cookery competition 
was organised among the town’s cafés. As Kurt told me, the flounder’s 
diet of the mussel A. ovata made it even tastier than Danish flounder. The 
monstrous fish thus became a viable foodstuff and commodity. Finally, a 
biological test established that the flounder were exceptionally clean, far 
cleaner than Danish flounder. Altogether, flounder exploded the vision of 
the sea as dying.
Rebuilding a fishery
The Danes found Aralrybprom, especially the director, Aimbetov, less 
cooperative. While it had been agreed that Aralrybprom would provide 
transport to and from the sea, this did not materialise since fuel was 
a scarce resource that was used as a means of payment. Worse still, a 
year into the project fishermen were still not being paid in cash, despite 
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the Danes forwarding money. So they began to bypass Aralrybprom, 
encouraging fishermen to set up their own cooperatives and limited 
liability partnerships (LLPs). In 1998 Aralrybprom finally went bankrupt. 
The new juridical bodies became the main channel for Danish aid: 
registering as a cooperative or partnership was the condition for receiving 
equipment. While this was a pragmatic response to Aralrybprom’s 
demise, it also aligned closely with LLH’s philosophy of fishermen taking 
responsibility for their environment. The Danes envisaged a break from 
the hierarchical Soviet system that constrained lower-level agency: 
fishermen would decide for themselves when and where to fish, and 
would engage in processing and marketing. When they set up workshops 
to repair engines, they insisted that fishermen pay. When I talked with 
Kurt, he stressed the centrality of personal responsibility: the aim was to 
inculcate a sea change in consciousness.
As Aralrybprom materially disintegrated, the hegemony of Soviet 
institutions fragmented. New juridical forms and the language of personal 
responsibility conformed to the neoliberal discourse reshaping post- 
socialist societies. However, the Danes were not part of a homogeneous 
process of ‘hegemonic reconstruction’ (Brandtstädter 2007). They 
recognised what most aid ignored: that ‘transition’ was experienced as 
the collapse of material conditions for taking responsibility for one’s own 
life. Rather than engaging in grand plans of transformation, they started 
from the here and now, seeing that just a little material provisioning could 
bolster livelihoods, despite the ecological devastation. Nor were they 
part of a homogeneous transnational apparatus of governmentality. 
They may have come from the ‘centre’ of the post-Cold War world, but the 
waters of Kattegat were peripheral in EU space: as with the Aral, economic 
marginalisation was accompanied by environmental vulnerability. 
Moreover, Kurt’s support for the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement 
suggests a planetary concern at odds with the moralising othering of the 
mainstream disaster narrative.
Accordingly, the fishery that was rebuilt diverged from the sorts of 
hegemonic reconstruction seen elsewhere in postsocialist space. 
Organising cooperatives, the Danes worked through villagers with social 
capital who could act as local leaders. In Aqespe they worked with the 
famous labour hero and Party member Narghaly (described affectionately 
by Kurt as ‘an old dictator’); in Bögen with the former director of the state 
fishery, Äskerbek, and with Zhaqsylyq, an ex-fisherman now working as 
a livestock herder for the fishery (malshy); in Tastübek with Düzbai, 
another fisherman turned herder; and in Qaratereng with Batyrkhan, 
who had previously worked in provisioning.9 Postsocialist rural change 
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elsewhere in Kazakhstan has been characterised as ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’, as former managers leveraged their authority to take 
advantage of privatisation (Toleubayev et al. 2010). In the Aral region, it 
is widely assumed that, in particular, the Aralrybprom director, Aimbetov, 
enriched himself from the enterprise’s collapse. However, although local 
leaders were sponsored by the Danes, the pattern of class differentiation 
attested elsewhere in Kazakhstan was less marked. The nascent flounder 
fishery offered scant opportunity for profit, and there was little else to 
accumulate: key productive capital, notably livestock and boats, had been 
distributed as pay, while processing plants, without any fish to process, 
had been demolished and scrapped. Indeterminate, precarious, with an 
uncertain future, the sea did not promise a reliable source of value to be 
accumulated.
The second phase of the Danish project, 1999–2000, established 
receiving stations around the sea. As flounder promised a small-scale, 
sustainable fishery supplying local markets, the Danes foresaw processing 
being carried out near fishing grounds – not unlike the 1920s vision 
which was steamrollered by collectivisation (see Chapter 1). Most 
importantly, the Danes worked with local partners to establish the NGO 
Aral Tenizi, based in Aral’sk. State control was lax: many fishermen were 
unregistered, and much of the catch went undeclared. So NGO workers 
would tour villages, gathering data about catches, nets and vessels. The 
NGO also acted as an umbrella organisation, agreeing prices, seasons, 
amounts to be caught. Democracy was key:
The focus of Aral Tenizi as well as of LLH is the sea, and in order to 
protect the common interests of all parties living from and by the 
sea, conflicting interests must be accorded. NGO Aral Tenizi is 
aiming to be an independent and democratic organisation with 
numerous national and international contacts and projects. 
(Landsforeningen Levende Hav 1999)
According to this conception of democracy, conflict is inevitable, but a 
democratic forum can rationally align interests and find compromises. 
Simultaneously, local women established, with Danish support, another 
NGO, ‘Aral Aielderi’ (‘Aral women’), which worked on environmental 
projects: saving juvenile fish; planting trees; reopening canals to small 
lakes; training schoolteachers to teach children about the environment. 
Schools would have an ekologicheskii ugolok (ecological corner), echoing 
the Bolshevik practice of installing a krasnyi ugolok (red corner) for 
propagating Communist ideology.
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Both NGOs were staffed largely by women who had worked in 
middle management in Aralrybprom in the 1980s and 1990s. Aral Tenizi’s 
first president was Aqshabaq, whom we met in Chapter 3 reminiscing 
about Soviet-era Aralrybprom. She first got involved with the Danes while 
working in Aralrybprom, and went on collaborating with them after its 
bankruptcy. During my fieldwork, she was working for another chronically 
failing fish plant (see Chapter 7) and, when I talked with her, would 
reminisce happily about her time working for Aral Tenizi. Her narratives 
are well rehearsed: fishermen had absolutely no hope before the Danes 
came, but through the NGO’s work, she recounts proudly, they regained 
a sense of dignity.
Baqytzhamal had worked in Aralrybprom from 1988. In the late 
1990s her husband gained villagers’ trust by setting up a small fish 
receiving centre, distributing flounder and lake fish in Russia, and settling 
up with fishermen in cigarettes and groceries. Baqytzhamal describes her 
time at Aral Tenizi helping fishermen register, creating databases about 
fishermen, boats and nets. She did not, she stresses, share this database 
with state inspectors. She also stresses fishermen’s trust in her, and their 
honesty with her, in contrast to their attitude to inspectors. She looks 
back on that time favourably: although fish today are more abundant, 
there was less state control in the past. For Baqytzhamal, NGO activism 
provided an alternative to the hierarchical structures of the state.
Aral Tenizi’s most influential member was Zhannat, who, like 
Baqytzhamal, came of age in the perestroika era. A former Komsomol 
(Communist Youth League) member and energetic organiser, she left her 
job as a physics teacher to participate in the NGO. In the 2000s she studied 
applied ecology in Almaty. She has worked with foreign specialists, 
contributing to Food and Agriculture Organization and World Bank 
reports on fisheries in Kazakhstan (Timirkhanov et al. 2010; World Bank 
2005). She sees a continuity between her Komsomol activism and her 
NGO activism, linked by the feeling that ‘we can build a fair society’.
Whereas Aqshabaq talks mainly about ‘raising the economic level’ 
of fishermen, in my conversations with Baqytzhamal and Zhannat, they 
both, like Kurt, talked about the importance of responsibility, democracy 
and sustainability. However, there are subtle differences: Kurt emphasises 
personal responsibility; he is unconcerned about the structure of the 
juridical body. For Zhannat and Baqytzhamal, on the other hand, infused 
with perestroika visions of rebuilding socialism, cooperatives were 
preferable to LLPs, because of the collective decision-making and sense of 
shared property; they had been impressed by these features in the Danish 
fisheries. Arguably, what they saw in the Danish cooperatives was an 
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idealised vision of the kolkhoz, where people lived in harmony with each 
other and with their environment.
Flounder, then, were not only to provide livelihoods. They were, 
amid Soviet ruins, to participate in a hegemonic reconstruction of a 
sustainable and democratic fishery. This hegemonic reconstruction 
was located within the ‘transnational apparatus of governmentality’ 
(Ferguson and Gupta 2002) shaping post-Cold War power relations – but 
its shape was driven by local trajectories, by the lively interactions 
between mussels, flounder and fishermen, between Nordic individualists 
and perestroika dreamers. The transition from krasnyi ugolok to ekolo- 
gicheskii ugolok nicely illustrates the resonances and translations in these 
encounters.
However, these visions would be frustrated, ironically, by the 
improving environment. As Figure 5.4 (page 149) shows, over the early 
2000s, even without a dam, salinity levels fell. Bivalve molluscs became 
scarcer as the sea grew fresher, to the detriment of the flounder that 
fed off them. By contrast, freshwater fish, including zander, began to be 
caught again on the sea (Aladin and Plotnikov 2008). After the World 
Bank dam project was confirmed in 2001, the assemblage that made up 
the Small Aral seemed less indeterminate. With the expected construction 
of a more substantial dam, a further freshening of the sea could be 
anticipated, and with it, a further shift in species composition. If flounder 
supported a vision of a small-scale industry supplying local markets, 
zander promised lucrative export markets. As Kurt put it, they promised 
dollars. They had been romantic in their initial preference for the small-
scale, Kurt told me, so they shifted their priorities, establishing in the third 
phase of the project (2000–4) a processing plant in the former state bakery 
in Aral’sk. Kambala Balyk10 was to help fishermen process and market their 
catch, and to provide sustainable financing for Aral Tenizi.
Stabilising the Small Aral and materialising sovereignty
Thanks to the renewal of relations between fishermen and flounder over 
the late 1990s, the sea emerged as a living sea. Rather than a poisoned 
ruin of the Soviet past, it was a sea that could offer something for the 
future for local people. For the World Bank, it was now worth saving. 
When the Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea (SYNAS) project was 
eventually confirmed in 2001, the project appraisal document stressed 
the successes of the earlier dams and widespread local approval of 
the Danish project. Moreover, a pre-investment study had identified 
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that fishing was still important to the local economy and was seen as 
having potential for growth (World Bank 2001). The project, funded by a 
$64.5 million World Bank loan, was designed by international consultants 
together with Kazgiprovodkhoz, once a prestigious arm of Minvodkhoz, 
but now a nonstate, underfunded cooperative. The aim was to stabilise 
the Small Aral at 42 m asl.
The low dyke, built over 2003–5 by a Russian company, stretches 
13 km across the former Berg Strait, holding the Small Aral in place 
(Figure 5.9). It is just 4–6 m high, its crest standing at 44.5 m asl, more 
than a metre higher than the sea level in April 1999 that had breached the 
previous dyke. Along the top of the dyke runs a gravel road. On the 
downstream, southern side, the dyke is steep, but on the northern side it 
slopes gently, like a beach, down to the sea, to minimise wave erosion. 
Moreover, while the dyke’s core is sand mixed with limestone, it is lined 
with a 30-cm concrete shell, which blocks water from seeping through 
and undermining the dyke. Since even this more secure structure would 
remain vulnerable to spring floods, a discharge facility was installed 
across the channel with nine concrete gates, 5.6 m high and 5.3 m wide. 
When the sluices are open, the gates can release up to 110 m3/s. Below 
the sluices is a concrete spillway to prevent undermining, with concrete 
Figure 5.9 Kökaral dyke under construction, 2004. Southern slope of 
dyke. The dam and sluice gates have yet to be installed. The cliffs of the 
former Kökaral island are visible in the background. Photograph by 
Vincent Robinot.
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deflectors to slow the speed of water flow. Additionally, hydraulic 
infrastructure was restored along the Kazakh reaches of the Syr Dariya to 
guarantee a constant water flow and minimise losses to desert sinks. This 
element of the project was subject to delays, which the World Bank 
blamed on old ‘Soviet’ practices in the Committee for Water Resources 
(successor to Minvodkhoz) and increasing costs of materials amid 
Kazakhstan’s oil-fuelled construction boom (World Bank 2011). Delays 
were also due to water levels in the river exceeding predictions, as the 
high-water climate cycle continued.
Yet, while upstream hydraulic infrastructure was delayed, the sea 
itself – for the same reason – filled far more rapidly than predicted, 
reaching the 42 m mark in just nine months, rather than the projected 
10 years. The sea was now 15–20 km from Aral’sk (Figures 5.10 and 
5.11). Once restoration of upstream hydraulic infrastructure was 
eventually completed, losses to desert sinks were reduced to nearly zero, 
while the construction of a sluice at Aghlaq allowed the restoration of 
Lake Tūshchy, near Bögen. The fall in salinity levels accelerated, and 
freshwater fish – including carp, bream and zander – migrated 
downstream from the Syr Dariya, rapidly re-establishing populations in 
Figure 5.10 Restored Aral Sea, 2013. Source: US Geological Survey, 
https://eros.usgs.gov/image-gallery/earthshot/kazakhstan-north-aral-
sea, accessed 3 June 2021.
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Figure 5.11 Kökaral dam and Syr Dariya delta, 2013. Source: US 
Geological Survey, LandLook Viewer, https://landlook.usgs.gov, accessed 
3 June 2021.
Figure 5.12 A selection of the aquatic fauna of the Small Aral following 
its restoration. Drawing by Amelia Abercrombie, after Zenkevich 
(1956). 1. Chironomid larvae, 2. Polychaete worm N. diversicolor, 
3. Bivalve mollusc C. isthmicum, 4. Bivalve mollusc A. ovata, 5. Bream, 
6. Carp, 7. Roach, 8. Zander.
the freshening sea (Figure 5.12). Not all indigenous species returned: 
shemaya and barbel remain very scarce, while ship sturgeon, on which 
the World Bank (2001) had premised the economic benefits of the project, 
remains absent, because its migration routes along the Syr Dariya are 
blocked by dams. Long-term changes in the benthic fauna continued, 
with salt-tolerant bivalve molluscs retreating and other species returning. 
By 2013 midge larvae, valuable fodder for fish like bream, would make 
up about 30% of the zoobenthos biomass (Plotnikov et al. 2016). The 
biggest losers of the sea’s return were flounder. In addition to increasing 
competition for food, the low salinity levels made it increasingly difficult 
for flounder to reproduce.
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The high-water years which filled the sea so quickly brought a 
further complication. Once the sea level reached its target, water brought 
down in spring floods was surplus. The possibility of building the dyke 
higher had been considered, but, given the low-water years of the 1990s, 
there was no guarantee that the sea would be filled at this level. Moreover, 
the cost of an additional dyke on the other side of the former Kökaral 
island rendered the project prohibitively expensive (Aladin and Plotnikov 
2008). So every year water is released through the sluices, taking fish and 
fry together into the remnants of the Large Sea. The problem provokes 
bitterness from the local director of the fisheries research institute, 
KazNIIRKh, who argues that a fish ladder should be installed. My 
informant at Kazgiprovodkhoz, however, claims that a fish ladder, aside 
from being expensive, would not guarantee the return of all the fish.
Kazgiprovodkhoz engineers remain sanguine about this problem, 
describing the results of SYNAS-1 as ‘intermediate/transitional’ 
(promezhutochnye). Indeed, owing to the project’s rapid success, the 
World Bank was, unusually, willing to fund a second phase, involving 
further restoration of delta lakes. It also involved a feasibility study for 
further rehabilitation of the Small Aral Sea, a point of considerable 
contention. One variant would raise the existing dyke to bring the sea 
level to 48 m asl. The other would create a new waterbody in Saryshyghanaq 
bay, near Aral’sk, at elevation 50 m asl, which would almost bring the 
water back to the port. This would be fed by a canal from the river near 
Qamystybas. Regional authorities favour the first variant: they do not 
want to divide up the sea still further. International consultants and, 
now, Kazgiprovodkhoz favour the two-level variant. My informant 
in Kazgiprovodkhoz explained that, if there was enough water to fill 
it, of course the one-level variant was preferable. But the dyke might 
take 10 years to build, and another 30 to fill. While there is enough 
water today, there is no guarantee that there will be in 40 years’ time as 
populations grow and water demands increase. Uncertainty is 
compounded by climate change, as shrinking glaciers in the Tien Shan 
may reduce flow in the Syr Dariya.
Whatever the uncertainties over the lost fish and the sea’s future, 
with the construction of a concrete dam the assemblage of water, 
salt, aquatic flora and fauna that made up the Small Aral became less 
indeterminate, less precarious, less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of 
climate and upstream water politics. The sea’s stabilisation gave the 
World Bank a photogenic success story. In contrast to the famous images 
of ships rusting in the desert, pictures of the restored sea evoke rebirth 
and renewal. International media reports like the National Geographic 
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article cited above juxtapose Soviet unsustainable mismanagement with 
the modest, competent approach of the World Bank. In this sense, the 
dam materialises new post-Cold War hegemonic formations, in which the 
World Bank is a technocratic institution of government, sitting above the 
state (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). The story reads as a rare success story 
of transition to globalised transnational governance.
Locally, however, the dam materialises a rather different sort of 
hegemonic reconstruction: Kazakhstani sovereignty, embodied in the 
president. If the indeterminate Aral of the 1990s was suspended between 
waste and value, the restored, determinate sea is, as an object of value, 
enrolled in the teleology of the state (cf. Alexander and Sanchez 2019). 
Children are taught about Nazarbayev’s concern for the region. Through 
posters like those in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (pages 141–2), the dam is enlisted 
in what Laszczkowski (2016) calls the ‘propaganda of emotion’ through 
which the Kazakh state is projected to its citizens. In post-Soviet Central 
Asia, as around the world, dams are a powerful form of nation-building 
(Bromber et al. 2015; Féaux de la Croix 2016; Suyarkulova 2015). The 
control of water – a mutable substance that epitomises raw nature – is a 
particularly spectacular materialisation of technopolitical power (Féaux 
de la Croix 2012). The technopolitical mastery of the state is deployed to 
reverse the disaster left by the Soviet project, and a peripheral region is 
integrated into the state by the benevolent desires of the president. The 
poster in Figure 5.2 characterises Kökaral as ghasyr zhobasy, a translation 
of the Russian proekt veka, ‘the project of the century’, the phrase used for 
the Siberian rivers scheme. If a project is about appropriating a chunk of 
the future, this promises, in Soviet fashion, a very large chunk of the 
future.
Of course, the Kökaral project is on a far smaller scale than the 
Siberian rivers scheme, or indeed big dam projects elsewhere in Central 
Asia. There is a modest simplicity about the project: holding in place a 
fragile assemblage, rather than dramatically reshaping landscapes by 
blocking or diverting vast volumes of water. Ironically, the pictures do not 
show the water of the Small Aral that is contained, but the surplus water 
that is released, water that will be lost. However, the images work through 
associations: concrete and the president together channel the power of 
the water, securing the future. The messy, contingent processes which 
went into assembling the dam, including the World Bank’s role, are 
occluded from this vision. In this hegemonic reconstruction, the dam 
becomes a ‘matter of fact’ (Latour 2004), a singular entity through which 
the state acts on nature, the permanence of concrete embodying the 
permanence of the Kazakh state.
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Indeed, the dam is often related to Kazakhstan’s egemendïk, 
‘sovereignty’. When I asked why the central state did not assign money in 
the 1990s, I was told that Kazakhstan was still a young country then. 
Kökaral thus embodies mature statehood, where the encompassing 
reach of the centre is fully realised. Indeed, Kazakhstani sovereignty is 
sometimes the telos of narrative progressions, the next stage after 
Communism. Infrastructures, however, are unruly: not only do material 
processes exceed the control of planners, but infrastructures further 
‘become entangled with a variety of local hopes, desires, fears, and 
contestations in ways that are themselves consequential’ (Reeves 2017, 
716). The following chapters explore the dam’s divergent results across 
the region: while fishing villages benefit to varying degrees from rising 
catches, fish largely bypass Aral’sk, rendering the restored sea marginal 
to the town. Many in Aral’sk have never seen the restored sea, which 
remains far from the town; hardly anyone has seen the dam itself, remote 
and inaccessible as it is. As a result, how people relate to the dam can 
diverge from the official ‘propaganda of emotion’.
I had expected that the loss of fish would be a matter of dissatisfaction 
to fishermen. However, although they also deemed a fish ladder necessary, 
they insisted that it was a problem to be resolved zhoghary, ‘higher up’. 
After all, despite the losses through the dam, fish today are abundant. 
As fishermen extract fish from the restored environment and translate 
them into money, the dam provides the solid background conditions 
which enable life to go on: it is not an object of contestation. In locating 
the solution ‘higher up’, fishermen highlight the limits of local agency. 
In Aral’sk the dam is more controversial, even among those unconnected 
with the fisheries. Many complain that the sea does not reach the former 
port, because the dam was not built high enough: the connection is 
incomplete. Indeed, some townspeople claim that the project has 
achieved nothing, because there are no jobs in fisheries in the town. This 
further leads to accusations of corruption on the part of the bureaucrats 
and engineers responsible. These accusations form part of a broader 
discourse of corruption and marginalisation, which in Chapter 7 I relate 
to Aral’sk’s place in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. After all, though Kökaral 
materialises the reach of the state, it does not integrate the region into 
anything resembling the incorporating grid of Soviet space. If the 1990s 
was a period of hegemonic and material fragmentation, the reconstruction 
that has followed is felt to be incomplete.
As such, while the state is materialised through the dam, the 
unruliness of materials can simultaneously undermine the state, and its 
promised future. When I was talking with a pair of teachers, they were 
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privately critical of the president wanting his stamp on everything. 
Pointing to local involvement in the early dams, they insisted that the idea 
had come from ‘the people’. The encroachment of sovereignty from afar 
on the local world was presented as unwelcome. But after distancing the 
president from the dam, they immediately commented on the fish being 
swept through the dam to their death. The dam’s promise of solidity, 
containment, and rebirth is frustrated. If the first comment dissociated 
the dam from state-building, with the second the dam became a vehicle 
for critiquing the state.
SYNAS-2 was getting under way during my fieldwork, and everyone 
expected that a decision on the two variants was imminent. Most were 
unclear about the details: there is a desire for a single sea, but residents 
of Aral’sk also have a strong desire for the water to reach the town – and 
few recognise the incompatibility of these desires. If the present dam is 
felt to be incomplete, its very incompleteness becomes the site where 
future interventions are desired: a fuller, more encompassing state will 
restore the connection between Aral’sk and the sea, and make the marine 
landscape whole again. In autumn 2013 the president was to visit Aral’sk. 
Everyone expected that he would make the decision, and the thought of 
the sea returning to Aral’sk assumed substance. Selected parts of the town 
were spruced up: some roads were repaved; streetlamps and road safety 
signs were installed; photographs of generic watery locations were put up 
around the shabbier parts of the town. But the president did not come, 
and no decision was made.
As people speculated about the president’s non-arrival, imaginings 
of personalised sovereignty went askew. One account started from the 
president’s ill health (a controversial topic), before veering into regional 
politics (Nazarbayev was offended at Medvedev and Putin), terminating 
in a critique of Kazakhstan’s economic dependency on Russia. If sover- 
eignty is imagined in the figure of Nazarbayev, it is imagined as all too 
human, and international relations are reduced to interpersonal relations 
between presidents. The president’s non-arrival became a joke: would 
that he would promise to come every year, and the town would get an 
annual makeover! If Kökaral, as the ‘project of the century’, materialises 
the new hegemonic formation of Kazakhstani statehood, it can always be 
held up to critical scrutiny. As we saw in Chapter 3, memories of the sea’s 
regression are caught up in nostalgic memories of the command economy. 
So too, the hopes and fears attached to the ongoing project of the sea’s 
restoration are entangled with affective orientation to the political 
economy of independent Kazakhstan. They are not straightforwardly 
enrolled in the state’s ‘propaganda of emotion’ (Laszczkowski 2016).
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Becoming a postsocialist sea
The new dam may have rendered the Small Aral assemblage materially 
less indeterminate, but that was not the end of the story: the fishery was 
also part of the assemblage. Entangled in postsocialist property relations 
and management practices, the restored sea would become a rather 
different sort of entity from the Soviet sea that had receded, which is key 
to understanding the divergent outcomes of the sea’s restoration across 
the region. In this final part of the chapter, I show how the restored sea has 
participated in a hegemonic reconstruction that, unlike developments in 
the early postsocialist years, more closely aligns with regional patterns. 
After all the uncertainty and instability of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the Aral was stabilised as an object of value, and the introduction of private 
property rights (albeit combined with state control) accelerated the 
hitherto limited socioeconomic differentiation in the region, as the myriad 
cooperatives and small LLPs gave way to a few large-scale operators.
In 2005 this did not seem inevitable. Before the dam’s construction, 
the indeterminacy of the Small Aral assemblage included also legal 
uncertainty surrounding its status as a property object and object of state 
management. What sort of an entity the restored sea would become, and 
the shape of the hegemonic reconstruction it would participate in, was 
open. Thus, although SYNAS-1 was primarily technical, the project was 
accompanied by a vision for how the restored sea would be enrolled in 
human relations. Recognising the economic constraints on rebuilding a 
fishery, World Bank staff mobilised a parallel $1.9 million grant from 
the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF). ‘Community-based Aral 
Sea fisheries management and sustainable livelihoods’ was drafted by 
foreign consultants in collaboration with Aral Tenizi and managed by the 
SYNAS team. The project involved infrastructural measures, including 
investments in roads and quays; radio communication for fishermen; an 
ambulance for one village; a water lorry for another village; medical 
supplies; and sleeping quarters near the sea. It also involved sub-grants 
for local businesses to diversify incomes. But the project’s main goal 
was to create a sustainable fishery: human relations with the restored 
environment were to undergo a hegemonic reconstruction, with 
fishermen actively involved in resource management. In terms of this 
central goal, the project was a failure, and the hegemonic reconstruction 
that ensued would take a very different form, ultimately marginalising 
Aral Tenizi’s role as an agent of change.
While the dam was being built, the Fisheries Committee (the former 
ministry now subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture) was preparing 
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a new legal framework for Kazakhstani fisheries, which had been in 
crisis since the 1990s. Amid the disintegration of state enterprises like 
Aralrybprom and legal uncertainty over property rights, official catches 
across the country had collapsed. A World Bank (2005) report, with 
contributions from Zhannat from Aral Tenizi, found that most fishermen 
were unregistered, and actual catches were up to four times higher than 
declared catches. The report, which was presented to the Fisheries 
Committee in 2003, blamed the verticality of the system: quotas were 
allocated to small companies and sold on to individual brigades. As quotas 
were expensive, fishermen would buy a quota for one tonne and then fish 
as much as they could. Efforts at enforcement only alienated fishermen 
further. Moreover, total quota sizes were arbitrary: research into stocks 
was only carried out on two lakes in the whole country. The report made 
recommendations for the new law about fisheries management, including 
piloting co-management on the soon-to-be-restored Aral.
The JSDF project responded directly to this report. Its centrepiece 
was co-management. Cooperatives would become co-management 
organisations, which would register legally and work with KazNIIRKh 
and the inspectors. They would help decide how much could and 
should be caught. Fish would be bred in growing ponds, and village 
processing workshops would be developed. With top-down Soviet-style 
management relegated to the past, fishermen were to be reconstituted as 
environmentally-minded subjects. In a hegemonic reconstruction based 
on ‘communities’ and ‘sustainability’, fishermen were to care about, and 
take responsibility for, the resource; the vertical authority of the state was 
to be replaced with horizontal collaboration between fishermen and 
inspectors. If the project, ultimately, failed, this would seem to relate to 
Brandtstädter’s (2007) ‘dissonance’ between World Bank notions of 
sustainability and local priorities. However, the JSDF project was not only 
linked to the World Bank’s work on SYNAS-1, but was also the outcome 
of the work of the NGO Aral Tenizi. ‘Sustainability’ and ‘community’, 
watchwords of neoliberal governance, also resonated with Zhannat and 
Baqytzhamal’s vision of the idealised kolkhoz.
Managed by state officials involved in the SYNAS project, the JSDF 
project was slow to start. Prepared in 2005, the project was not approved 
by the relevant state organs until 2008. Even once started, bureaucrats 
were slow in disbursing funds, so that by 2011, when the project should 
have been finished, only 22 per cent of the funds had been disbursed. 
Furthermore, without a central coordinator, most of the money was spent 
supporting the management teams. Some infrastructure was, eventually, 
delivered: wagons were placed near the sea for sleeping quarters – some 
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are used, others lie empty; most fishermen today have radios connecting 
them with the shore; some stretches of road were upgraded. Sub-grants 
were distributed, to little effect: in Bögen today, an unfinished petrol 
station stands idle; in Qaratereng, equipment for breeding sturgeon lies 
unopened in the hatchery. Most importantly, co-management was never 
trialled, and none of the planned training ever took place. Part of the 
problem was staffing: the charismatic Zhannat left Aral Tenizi in 2008 to 
live in Finland. Meanwhile, the fish plant, Kambala Balyk, built to 
guarantee the NGO’s financial viability, went bankrupt in 2011. As Aral 
Tenizi was left without any source of funding, Baqytzhamal went to 
resurrect the factory.
Most importantly, while the JSDF project was being prepared, 
the legal uncertainty surrounding the sea had been resolved, and the 
postsocialist sea was assuming a more determinate form, one that 
was not conducive to co-management. Shortly after the World Bank 
recommendations were presented to the Fisheries Committee, a new 
legal framework was elaborated (Timirkhanov et al. 2010, 44). The 
hierarchical system remained, and exclusive access rights defined to 
particular areas of water. In 2006, therefore, the Small Aral, like 
other major waterbodies, was divided into plots (Kaz.: uchaske/Ru.: 
uchastok). While the sea remained state property, plots were put out to 
tender for 10 years to a ‘nature user’ (Kaz.: tabighat paidalanushy/Ru.: 
prirodopol’zovatel’).11 Nature users, which are either cooperatives or, 
more commonly, LLPs, have the right to exploit their plot up to an 
annually defined limit of catch per species, their quota; they employ 
fishermen and provide boats; and they are obliged to deliver a fisheries 
development plan. All these responsibilities would previously have been 
carried out by the state fishery or the kolkhoz. The JSDF project was 
designed in 2005, under the old system. By the time it was confirmed in 
2008, the tender system had already been in place for two years, which 
precluded trialling co-management.
The new law consolidated two subtly different versions of the sea. 
On the one hand, the sea is an object of environmental management: fish 
are a scarce resource, and private interests must be managed by the 
state through allocating quotas, or ‘virtual fish’ (Minnegal and Dwyer 
2011), limiting the number of real fish that can be caught. Accordingly, 
fisheries development plans include environmental measures such as 
clearing weeds. On the other hand, the sea is a property object where 
fish are commodities that are to fuel future development, and fisheries 
development plans also include costly infrastructural measures: installing 
refrigeration units, buying new boats, and building receiving stations, 
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sleeping quarters and roads to the sea. Although fisheries development 
plans show continuities with Soviet planning, their formal logic is to make 
nature users behave like good capitalists: profits are to be reinvested 
to further growth. Despite the congruence between management by 
numbers and the commodification of nature, there is a formal tension: 
if virtual fish are scarce, profits are too low to make investments; and if 
investments are made but virtual fish do not increase, there is a risk of 
overcapitalisation.
On most plots on the sea, tenders were initially won by local leaders 
who had worked with the Danes. Aral Tenizi’s factory, Kambala Balyk, 
gained one plot. In Bögen, however, the tender was won by Amanbai, 
from the town of Qazaly, who had no previous connection to fisheries. 
The former Aralrybprom director, Aimbetov, did not bid, focusing instead 
on opening a processing plant in the old Aralrybprom building. The new 
system did not dispel the problems raised in the World Bank report. 
Indeed, the tender process lacked transparency and was ruled unlawful 
by the General Prosecutor’s Office (Naumova 2012; Timirkhanov et al. 
2010, 45–6). With little capital, nature users had difficulty keeping up 
with the extensive financial obligations in their development plans. The 
tension between sea-as-management-object and sea-as-property-object 
was heightened by the constraints nature users faced. If in Soviet times 
plan fulfilment was constrained by material shortages, fulfilment of 
fisheries development plans was constrained by lack of money and credit. 
Infrastructure like refrigeration units required credit, and falling behind 
with payments jeopardised the future of the enterprise. Hence nature 
users kept prices for fish low and avoided registering fishermen officially. 
Crucially, the formal tension between development plans and scarce 
‘virtual fish’ created an incentive to fish above quotas, ignoring virtual 
fish. A 2010 Food and Agriculture Organization report, again coauthored 
by Zhannat, estimated that less than 30 per cent of catches was reported, 
with high levels of illegal export (Timirkhanov et al. 2010, 1, 53).
Over the years several nature users, unable to keep up with their 
obligations, had their plots confiscated. As plots were left empty, 
fishermen in the villages of Aqespe, Tastübek and Qarashalang could not 
fish legally unless someone from Aral’sk bought a temporary licence to 
organise a brigade. Another nature user, LLP Asta, consistently failed to 
fulfil its obligations, including installation of a freezer, and, it is widely 
understood, only kept the plot through the director’s personal 
connections with the inspectors. Eventually, in 2014, at the end of my 
fieldwork, new tenders were granted on the empty plots, and LLP Asta’s 
plot was also reassigned. Six plots were awarded to Aimbetov, former 
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director of Aralrybprom. With his factory in Aral’sk, which meets EU 
standards, Aimbetov now had an opportunity to consolidate his business, 
although his obligations for so many plots were expensive, and many 
doubted his capacity to exploit the remote plots in the west of the sea. 
Amanbai, building on his successful fishery in Bögen, won the other two 
vacant plots. Thus, as small-scale operators have given way to larger 
players, the trend resembles what happened earlier in the postsocialist 
period elsewhere in rural Kazakhstan (Shreeves 2002; Toleubayev et al. 
2010).12
This process has also seen the decline of Aral Tenizi as an agent of 
change. Given the unresolved problems, Zhannat continued to draft 
projects to trial co-management. However, with Zhannat in Finland, and 
Baqytzhamal running Kambala Balyk, their influence in the NGO was 
waning. The new director, Aina, had previously worked in the judiciary, 
and had initially been invited to advise fishermen on legal rights. The 
contrast between Baqytzhamal and Aina is evident in their respective 
offices: Baqytzhamal takes pride in sitting with a mess of papers around 
her, the accountant in the same office, while Aina sits authoritatively at 
the centre of a desk below a picture of the president, with everything tidy 
and ordered. Aina explained the role of the NGO to me as follows: ‘We do 
projects to improve the condition of the fishermen. They receive benefits 
from our projects.’
During my fieldwork, Baqytzhamal was fired from her post as 
director of Kambala Balyk, a moment that marks the final demise of plans 
for co-management. The story of her dismissal speaks powerfully of the 
form that hegemonic reconstruction has taken as the new system has 
been consolidated. Her dismissal centred on her mortgaging the factory 
to pay for a refrigeration unit, in line with her obligations under the 
development plan. In summer 2013, she fell behind with loan repayments 
when a criminal investigation was opened against her for overfishing 
flounder. The case dated back to April: although she had a quota for 15 
tonnes of flounder up to 10 April, she had not received any; the inspectors 
pressurised her to record that she had caught some, saying that she would 
receive a lower quota next time otherwise. She made a mistake, recording 
13 tonnes before, and 2 tonnes after 10 April, when she did not have a 
quota. Picking up on the mistake, the inspectors took the case to the 
prosecutor’s office. Baqytzhamal insisted that she had been pressurised 
by the inspectors to come up with a number, and had made an honest 
mistake; in any case, she argued, the mistake had not damaged the state, 
since, with flounder dying out in the freshening sea, the quota has 
been free since 2007. Eventually, Baqytzhamal wrote to the Fisheries 
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Committee in Astana, who issued a reprimand to two senior inspectors 
in Aral’sk.
In this episode, a gap is evident between the formal institution of 
virtual fish as tools of environmental management, and their practical 
deployment in the informal exercise of power. Boundaries between the 
different versions of fish are blurred, as personal connections allow some 
nature users to ignore virtual fish while others are pursued for the same 
practice. The consequences of this muddy relationship between virtual 
fish and real fish will be explored in the following chapter.
In the meantime, Baqytzhamal was banned from fishing, and could 
not keep up with the loan repayments. After the case was dropped in 
November 2013, the factory began to operate again and the outstanding 
debt was paid off. However, in January 2014 there was a quarterly 
meeting in Bögen of the Aral Tenizi board, including senior fishermen and 
Aral Tenizi staff. Baqytzhamal was accused of mortgaging the factory 
for the purpose of embezzlement. While she suggested that an audit 
commission should investigate, they demanded to see all the relevant 
documents at once. She had left the paperwork in Aral’sk. Baqytzhamal 
suspected a hidden agenda behind this denouncement, and felt that she 
had been tricked into going to Bögen without the relevant paperwork. 
She remarked bitterly that this was the upshot of teaching the fishermen 
democracy: that they elected to sack her. Arguably, at stake in the whole 
saga were different ways of doing politics: Baqytzhamal’s insistence on 
procedure was trumped by a reality of politics as backstage intrigue and 
denunciation, extending across state and nonstate institutions.13
Conclusion
The hegemonic fragmentation and reconstruction that I have narrated 
in this chapter has been interwoven with material disintegration and 
restoration. It was the powerful materiality of the disaster, seen through 
the lens of post-Cold War power relations, that first drew development 
actors to the region, and set the path that hegemonic reconstruction 
in Central Asia would take. The high-water years in the 2000s, the 
impermeability of concrete, the cooperation of fish migrating downstream 
and reproducing in the freshened sea: all were crucial to the very rapid 
success story whereby the dam came to materialise Kazakhstani 
statehood. The material stabilisation of the sea has further driven the 
hegemonic reconstruction of the fishery, but one far from the various 
hopes of World Bank planners, Danish activists or Aral Tenizi. Apart from 
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Narghaly and Äskerbek, who have died, during my fieldwork all those 
sponsored by the Danes still occupied positions of authority in their 
villages. In the long term, then, the Danish project bolstered their social 
capital, putting them in strategic positions to benefit from the sea’s return 
and the new management system. Local leaders, who now are either 
nature users themselves or have close connections to nature users, today 
reproduce their social capital through their position on the board of 
Aral Tenizi.
Amid the material instability and legal uncertainty of the immediate 
postsocialist years, a small-scale fishery emerged, facilitated by the efforts 
of the Danes and their colleagues in Aral Tenizi. If the region did not see 
the level of social differentiation and accumulation by dispossession 
attested elsewhere in postsocialist Eurasia, this relates to the multiple 
forms of indeterminacy, which precluded the sea’s integration into 
circuits of value extraction. Yet, by the time of my fieldwork, the dam had 
stabilised the sea level, guaranteeing the sea’s existence into the future; 
and the legal uncertainty surrounding the sea had been resolved. The 
ensuing hegemonic reconstruction was also driven by the changing 
species composition of the sea; the materiality of zander in particular, as 
I explore in the following chapter, has entangled the newly determinate 
sea with lucrative transnational markets. As the sea, stabilised and more 
determinate, has thus become integrated into circuits of value extraction, 
a few large players have come to dominate the fishery, mirroring patterns 
elsewhere in postsocialist Kazakhstan and beyond.
Given the continuities between Soviet and post-Soviet hierarchical 
management, the return of the sea has not been accompanied by the sea 
change in consciousness that Zhannat and Baqytzhamal hoped for. 
Zhannat and Baqytzhamal have consistently dreamed of an equitable, 
open and democratic fishery, a small-scale, artisanal fishery where every 
village has growing ponds and villagers are involved in processing. In one 
telling moment, Zhannat told me that co-management might not make 
the fishermen richer, but at least they would not be slaves. Whereas 
fishermen have a practical preference for the sea being held by a single 
factory, Zhannat and Baqytzhamal have a strong moral sense that it 
should be held in common. When I was talking with Baqytzhamal after 
her dismissal, she reminisced about her and Zhannat’s dreams for the 
fishing industry: there would be roads and quays; fishermen would wear 
special clothing; they would neatly pack fish into boxes and unload them 
onto quays. As it is, she said, they just haul the fish in through the mud 
in sacks. Her environmentalist vision gave way to a yearning for order, 
formality, visibility. As we see in the next chapter, such principles – on 
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which the success of co-management would depend – are anathema to 
most fishermen.
Notes
 1 What is commonly described as the ‘Kökaral dam’ is in fact a dyke stretching across the former 
Berg Strait with sluice-gates in the middle to release water into a channel to the south. The 
Kazakh böget and Russian plotina may both signify either dam or dyke. For the most part, I use 
the more usual term ‘Kökaral dam’.
 2 Efforts to preserve part of the Large Sea failed when a discharge facility to provide its eastern 
part with water from the Amu Dariya was destroyed in floods (Aladin et al. 2009, 181). 
Nevertheless, though the situation around Moynaq remains bleak, some interventions there 
have been positive. Internationally funded efforts to restore Amu Dariya delta lakes and create 
artificial wetlands have been fairly successful, though new waterbodies suffer from highly 
variable inflow (Micklin 2014b, 376–8). Pollution from agriculture remains a serious problem 
for the fisheries (Karimov et al. 2005). Meanwhile a German-funded project has successfully 
stabilised 2,000 km2 of dried-up seabed through phytomelioration (Micklin 2014b, 378).
 3 As social scientists argue, neither water nor ethnicity are in themselves drivers of conflict. Such 
projects, misrepresenting and reshaping local categories, have often heightened inequalities 
(Heathershaw and Megoran 2011; Reeves 2014, 94–100; Thompson and Heathershaw 2005).
 4 This is broadly typical of aid to Central Asia and wider postsocialist space, which often 
exacerbated problems and entrenched elites (Babajanian et al. 2005; Pétric 2005; Wedel 1998, 
86–7; Werner 2000).
 5 Baltic herring had also survived, but, as a planktophage, did not compete with flounder.
 6 Prikaz po proizvodstvennomu ob’edineniiu ‘Aralrybprom’ No 78r, 14 February 1991, AFGAKO, 
f. 4, op. 2pr, d. 923, ll. 143–4.
 7 Bank spokesperson A. Doskabilova, Aralrybprom president A. Aimbetov, and chief accountant 
M. Tleulesov, ‘Akt proverki o postavkakh ryboproduktsii snachala 1996 goda do 1 iunia t.g.’, 
12 June 1996, AFGAKO, f. 4, op. 2pr, d. 986, l. 11.
 8 Such practices were common in rural Kazakhstan (Toleubayev et al. 2010, 358).
 9 It is striking that both Zhaqsylyq and Düzbai had worked as herders in state enterprises. This 
position may have been strategically useful, offering access to fodder supplies, which, given the 
importance of private livestock to livelihoods, would have been a ‘manipulable resource’ 
(Humphrey 1998), enhancing the social capital of those controlling it. Similarly, Batyrkhan, 
working in provisioning, would have controlled various manipulable resources.
10 Kambala is Russian for ‘flounder’, also used in Kazakh; balyq is Kazakh for ‘fish’.
11 Though nature users are also obliged to act as environmental managers, the term, dating from 
Soviet times, implies a utilitarian vision of nature.
12 Aimbetov won Asta’s plot near Zhalangash, one near Qarashalang, one in Saryshyghanaq bay 
(near Aral’sk) and three in Shevchenko bay in the west; Aimbetov won the other half of 
Saryshyghanaq bay and the plot near Tastübek.
13 Cf. Richardson (2015), who describes the failure of a World Bank community-based 
conservation project in the Ukrainian Danube delta: project managers’ liberal practice of 
openness was trumped by a local political context of intrigue and denunciation.
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Zander and social change in Bögen
In spring 2014 Aral fishermen from several villages, and one group from 
Shardara reservoir, near Shymkent in south Kazakhstan, had permission 
to fish at Kökaral. Being near the spawning grounds in the Syr Dariya 
mouth, this is normally a forbidden zone, but fish will be lost through the 
dam at this time of year, so fishing is allowed for a brief period. I stayed 
with Bögen fishermen, who were camping in UAZ jeeps and GAZ-66 
trucks. They had permission to catch 12 tonnes between 1 and 9 April. 
Every morning, after washing hands and faces in the cold morning air and 
drinking tea, fishermen set off in their Soviet-era boats through dense 
reeds to haul in their nets in the fresh northerly breeze. I stayed behind 
with a few older fishermen, including my host Zhaqsylyq. Zhaqsylyq 
would fiddle with the wireless, tuning in to invisible global connections 
(including English-language news about separatist unrest in Ukraine and 
the missing Malaysia Airlines flight in the South China Sea), while 
fishermen were extracting fish which would plug them into transnational 
markets.
From midday the fishermen would trickle back in. Usually someone 
would catch a large carp, which was boiled and shared out. At around 
four o’clock fishermen would bring in their catch, lugging sacks of fish 
through the shallows and over the muddy foreshore to the ZiL truck, 
where the driver and I would heave them into place. Fishermen then 
headed out again to lay their nets, returning as darkness was falling. 
Supper would be tinned meat, or fried fish with roe. On several occasions, 
the Bögen fish receivers were approached surreptitiously by fishermen 
from another village. Muttered negotiations were held a few metres 
away from the main camp. The next morning a few sacks of fish would 
mysteriously appear by the Bögen ZiL truck. For official purposes, these 
were recorded as the ZiL driver’s catch. After supper, exhausted bodies 
would relax, huddling together for warmth, wind-burnt faces animated 
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as fishermen discussed the movement of ice floes and where they had laid 
their nets.
After four days the weather deteriorated: the northerly wind picked 
up, bringing snow, sleet and rain. The fish were not moving around, 
owing to the cold weather. Moods became fractious. Nets were dis- 
appearing. While the wind and ice were evidently wreaking havoc, there 
were suspicions of theft (ūrlyq) by fishermen from other villages. 
Nevertheless, Bögen fishermen were catching reasonable quantities of 
fish, and were on course to catch about 12 tonnes, their quota. But it was 
decided to go home early. Balyq zhoq, Zhaqsylyq said to me curtly: ‘no 
fish’. Then he added: Tïstï zhoq, aqsha zhoq, ‘No zander, no money’. In 
driving rain, we hauled boats over the mud and lifted them onto the roofs 
of the trucks, pouring cold muddy water over ourselves in the process. 
The Shymkent lorry got stuck in the mud. Another lorry got stuck trying 
to haul it out. Everyone agreed: it was bardak, ‘chaos’.
The incident illustrates three points about the contemporary 
fishery. First, fishing is a way of life, an identity, involving embodied skill, 
environmental knowledge and masculine camaraderie. It is not a way 
of life for everyone: one young man present at Kökaral, Ghalymbek, is 
studying to become a fizkul’tura (physical education) teacher, and is 
fishing temporarily to earn some ready money. He would not want to fish 
forever, he said, because of its toll on health. For others, though, the fact 
that fishing is ‘heavy work’ (auyr zhūmys) is a source of pride. Most 
fishermen in Bögen plan to fish in the future, and plan for their sons to do 
so as well.
The second point is the pervasive invisibility. As ethnographers 
explore, fishing involves detailed environmental knowledge about 
an underwater reality invisible to the human eye (Hoeppe 2007; Howard 
2017; Knudsen 2008; Vermonden 2013). However, the human elements 
of a fishery are also hard to see, and to regulate. According to my 
informants, the Kökaral expedition descended into bardak because 
outsiders were there. Invisibility, however, pervades the fisheries, 
frustrating attempts at regulation and shaping relations between 
fishermen and fish receivers. We closed the previous chapter with Zhannat 
and Baqytzhamal’s yearnings for order and visibility. These are anathema 
to most fishermen. According to the proverb, Balyqshy aitpaidy rasyn, 
künde alady bïr asym, ‘The fisherman doesn’t tell the truth, every day he 
takes one portion’. Invisibility offers fishermen opportunities to ‘take a 
portion’ within a hierarchical, inequitable system.
Finally, the incident illustrates the significance of zander (Figure 
6.1), which is caught in abundance, far above official quotas.1 Previously 
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fishing, as a way of life, met the gridded time and space of the plan; today 
it meets the elastic time and space of global markets. Fishing today is not, 
as in Soviet times, accompanied by social entitlements, so money itself 
assumes greater value. Fish are ascribed wildly divergent values according 
to their spatial reach on transnational markets. Zander, a predator 
with lean, white meat, is popular in filleted form in Europe, making it 
far more valuable to Aral fishermen than other fish. Fattier fish like 
bream can be marketed smoked or cured across the former USSR but, 
with little processing infrastructure in the Aral region, its value remains 
low. Moreover, prices, especially of zander, fluctuate over time as 
currencies fluctuate in relation to exogenous events. Crisis in the Eurozone 
in the early 2010s halved the price of zander. By contrast, the price of 
zander rose in early 2014 when, with the Kazakhstani economy under 
pressure from Western sanctions against Russia, the tenge was devalued 
to keep oil exports competitive.
In Chapter 4, we saw how an ethic of sharing was overlaid in the 
colonial and Soviet periods with an understanding of fish as commodities. 
Today the latter understanding predominates, particularly for zander, 
which is not rated locally as a foodstuff. Zander is described as zhūm- 
ysymyz, ‘our work/job’; a characteristic greeting at the receiving station 
is Balyq qalai? Tïstï bar ma? (‘How is the fish? Is there zander?’). On the 
Figure 6.1 Zander. Drawing by Amelia Abercrombie, after Zenkevich 
(1956).
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basis of zander, during my fieldwork, fishermen earned 150,000 KZT or 
more per month. Fishermen cannot fish all year round: in May fishing is 
banned while fish are spawning; in summer fish would spoil before 
reaching the factory; and for some weeks in spring and autumn, fishing is 
impossible while ice is melting or forming. Nevertheless, this is considered 
good money in a region where most salaries are around 45,000–60,000 
KZT per month – bucking the trend of rural impoverishment characteristic 
of postsocialist Eurasia (Leonard and Kaneff 2002; Toleubayev et al. 
2010; Trevisani 2010; Zanca 2010).
Chapter 5 showed how the restored sea has been entangled in 
postsocialist property and management regimes. Here I address the 
relationship between environmental and social change, focusing 
on Bögen. Two questions guide my analysis: why is zander caught in 
such high quantities, and how are the newly abundant postsocialist fish 
transforming social relations? This requires attention both to the formal 
Figure 6.2 Meirambek, fish receiver, shows off a huge zander, spring 
2014. Source: author.
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property regime and to how it is enacted in practice. I also look beyond 
the property relations to explore the fishery as a ‘socioeconomic system’, 
encompassing markets, technologies and so on (Campling et al. 2012; 
Durrenberger and Pálsson 1987; Howard 2017). I therefore follow the 
social lives of the fish once they are extracted from the water (Figure 6.2), 
including their afterlives as money. If Chapter 4 looked at how the 
chronotope of the plan reproduced and transformed that of tughan zher, 
here we see how the market sustains and transforms local practices of 
social reproduction and regimes of value.
Local perspectives on the fishery
The current system, formally mixing state and private regulation, rests on 
assumptions akin to Hardin’s (1968) influential thesis of the ‘tragedy 
of the commons’: because individuals acting rationally in their own 
best interests collectively produce results that are worst for everyone, 
fishing effort must be restrained either by state management or private 
property, or both, as on the Aral. Yet in practice fishing effort is not 
restrained: everyone acknowledges that above-quota fishing is pervasive. 
For inspectors and scientists, the problem is inadequate enforcement 
of the current system. Zaualkhan, the director of the Aral’sk branch 
of KazNIIRKh, blames inspectors, contending that Kazakhstan is in 
‘a transitional period’ (Ru.: perekhodnoi period); in future, when the 
law functions better, the system will be properly regulated. Inspectors 
agree that regulation is inadequate, but blame lack of funding. Conversely, 
Zhannat and Baqytzhamal, advocating co-management, blame the 
fishery’s hierarchical structure, which excludes fishermen from resource 
management. Were ordinary fishermen included, they argue, they would 
have an incentive to conserve the resource. This aligns with theoretical 
perspectives from new institutionalist economics (especially Ostrom 
1990) which, bolstered by empirical findings of anthropologists (e.g. 
McCay and Acheson 1987), suggest that both state and private control 
can create incentives for unsustainable resource use.
The ethnography below plots a course between these two explan- 
ations, showing how management is enacted in practice, involving neither 
a direct implementation of formal rules nor their negation.2 As we shall 
see, value formation plays a critical role in the practical enactment of the 
management regime. While Zaualkhan thinks about the present as a 
deviation from an ideal form that will be reached in the future, when the 
state will successfully regulate private interests, I instead examine what 
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is there now, the social processes through which categories of ‘state’ and 
‘private’ emerge.
Overlapping with these explanations for above-quota fishing 
are two contrasting stereotypes of fishermen among Aral’sk residents, 
often voiced by the same people. In one vein, fishermen are impoverished, 
exploited, alienated from resource management, paid a pittance for their 
labour. Alternatively, they are getting rich (richer than ordinary people in 
Aral’sk!), motivated only by greed, caring nothing for the future; cheap 
Chinese nets have made fishing too easy, resulting in a ‘tragedy of 
the commons’.3 Both stereotypes are simplifications, reductionist views 
of the village from the town, which tell us more about the concerns of 
townspeople than about the lives of villagers. Nevertheless, I find them 
useful for thinking through the transformations in social relations which 
have followed the sea’s return.
The first stereotype, implying class differentiation between 
fishermen and nature users, matched my pre-fieldwork expectations. I 
expected to find accumulation by dispossession, as Toleubayev et al. 
(2010) attest all over rural Kazakhstan. As Shreeves (2002) found in new 
private farms in Kazakhstan, I expected that labour would be increasingly 
commodified, disembedded from social relations as well as social 
entitlements. From the wider literature on postsocialist agrarian change, 
I expected a sense of exploitation in the extraction of surplus value and 
appeals to moral economy (Hann 2003; Hivon 1998). From ethnographies 
of fishing that show how differential access to quotas drives social 
inequality, I also expected resistance to quotas (Helgason and Pálsson 
1997; Minnegal and Dwyer 2011).
However, the picture is more varied across the Aral region, and 
the ongoing transformation is more complex than a uniform process 
of ‘disembedding’. In his ethnography of decollectivisation in Uzbekistan, 
Trevisani (2010) finds heterogeneous outcomes: while there is 
differentiation between peasants and private farmers, there is further 
differentiation within the peasant class between those with and without 
access to land via kinship networks. I will suggest something similar here, 
though the position of those lacking networks is less bleak than in the 
Uzbekistani case, because resources are abundant. Indeed, while quotas 
should create scarcity, in practice they are ignored so that there is no 
sense that fish are owned while still in the water, and relations are shaped 
by the abundance of real fish, not by the artificial scarcity of quotas.
The second stereotype speaks of the moral ambivalence about 
money in Aral’sk: zander are seen as easy money which corrupts local 
society, dissolving social ties, increasing individualist self-interest and 
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damaging the environment.4 Yet, while long-term social ties between 
fishermen are being weakened, this relates to the technologies money has 
facilitated, not to money itself. Generally, I found much less moral 
ambivalence about money in Bögen than in Aral’sk. The stereotype of 
fishermen as greedy individualists concerned only with the present 
ignores the local uses of money in sustaining ritual expenditure. If zander 
connect fishermen to the time and space of global capitalism, once 
translated into money, they are a means of reproducing local society. At 
the same time, this money is transforming patterns of ritual expenditure, 
as elsewhere in Central Asia. Zander’s migrations to Poland and Germany 
produce comparable effects to Central Asian labour migration to urban 
centres in Kazakhstan and Russia (Reeves 2012; Trevisani 2016): as local 
economies become increasingly monetised, ‘local structures of value’ 
(Reeves 2012, 122) are transformed. This intersection of chronotopes of 
market and tughan zher is critical to understanding the above-quota 
fishing.
Management by numbers
Since 2006 the state has devolved use rights for 10 years over different 
plots of the sea and lakes to private juridical bodies (‘nature users’). 
Nature users buy all fish caught on their plot at their prices, and should 
monitor for poachers. They provide boats but not nets or fuel. Fishermen 
therefore characterise the system as ‘private’ (zheke), expressing the 
absence of connection with the state which once provided boats, fuel and 
equipment. They associate the sea being private with the division into 
plots, which, except for Qaratereng fishermen who fish fertile waters near 
the delta, is regarded as an inconvenience.5 However, the state, in the 
form of the inspectorate, is by no means absent, monitoring the banned 
season during spawning time and the banned fishing zone in the Syr 
Dariya estuary. Nature users should also mediate between fishermen and 
the state, paying pension contributions and social tax. They also have, as 
we saw in Chapter 5, a series of obligations towards the state, codified in 
fisheries development plans. The inspectorate therefore monitors nature 
users, and it monitors fishermen themselves directly. Nature users have 
the right to fish up to an annually defined quota per species, which they 
purchase from the inspectorate.
Quotas are based on scientists’ assessments of biomass and fertility 
of spawning stock. More fertile, freshwater plots nearer the delta receive 
proportionally higher quotas than saltier plots. As numbers, quotas 
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perform both representative and constitutive functions (Verran 2010): 
they represent how many fish can be removed without damaging the 
future of the resource, and they constitute a form of property, ‘virtual fish’ 
(Minnegal and Dwyer 2011).6 Nature users are obliged to purchase their 
entire quota from the state, but they can choose when to take it. Virtual 
fish thus establish a relationship between nature users, the state and 
actual fish in the sea. This relationship, endorsed by the seeming 
objectivity of scientific knowledge, is both financial and regulatory.
Yet, as representations, numbers are imperfect. Accuracy of 
fish stock assessments is seldom better than a range of 30 per cent 
(Acheson et al. 1998, 396).7 In the Aral context, there are further 
complications. Zaualkhan stresses the role of pure science, but he also 
stresses KazNIIRKh’s financial constraints. Even the building of the 
institute, once in a prime seaside location, is crumbling. Independent 
ichthyologists are sceptical about the quality of KazNIIRKh’s work. 
Moreover, Zaualkhan told me that, because he knows over-quota fishing 
happens, it is better to set quotas low. Understanding the present as 
‘transitional’, he partakes in, and reproduces, a system where formal rules 
do not work. Meanwhile cynics in Aral’sk remark that KazNIIRKh is partly 
funded by nature users and, since they will overfish anyway, lower quotas 
suit them as they cost less. Moreover, the allocation of quotas by inspectors 
is flexible. The root of Baqytzhamal’s problems lay in this point: she was 
told that if she did not record 15 tonnes of flounder, she would receive a 
lower quota next time. This makes little scientific sense, but is linked to a 
different view of property, a moral sense that property must be exploited. 
Here the quota is more like a Soviet plan, a target rather than a limit.
There is therefore a mismatch between virtual fish and real fish. 
Lampland (2010), discussing early socialist Hungary, argues that false 
numbers are not necessarily deviations from a formal system, but are part 
of the process of formalisation: better to deploy wrong numbers in the 
right manner than to have no numbers at all. From this perspective, 
Zaualkhan’s numbers matter less as a representation of reality than as an 
enactment of a management system founded on the abstraction of nature 
as numbers. Current practices thus reproduce hierarchies of scientific 
knowledge over fishermen’s knowledge. No one believes that fishermen’s 
knowledge has any value for management, despite academic arguments 
to the contrary (Johannes et al. 2000; Pálsson 1994). Even as they fail as 
representations, numbers constitute the hierarchical system.
Nevertheless, the failure of numbers as representation also matters. 
Institutions need certainty, which depends on trust in the objectivity of 
science (J. Wilson 2002). While numbers are always produced socially, in 
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this context, the awareness of the social pressures and constraints within 
which they are produced undermines faith. The management system 
is constituted on an arbitrary foundation. If no one believes that the 
numbers which constitute virtual fish adequately represent fish in the sea, 
virtual fish are not respected. Virtual fish therefore only establish a 
financial relation between nature users and the state; the regulatory 
aspect of the relationship exists in form only. Fish play their part here in 
the corrosion of trust in the quota system: although everyone knows that 
quotas are not respected, catches (and quotas) have grown year on year. 
The formal institution of scarcity through virtual fish has little meaning.
The Bögen fishery
I turn now to how abstract categories of ‘nature user’, ‘state’ and 
‘fishermen’ are instantiated in concrete social relations and practices in 
Bögen (von Benda-Beckmann et al. 2006). Bögen fishermen work for 
Amanbai, a businessman from Qazaly, about 100 km away; before 2006 
he had no connection either to Bögen or to fishing, having made his 
money in rice in the 1990s. Most of Bögen depends on fishing for a living, 
although fishing households also keep some livestock (sheep, horses, 
camels), which remains a marker of social status, and can be translated 
into money if necessary for ritual expenditure. A few families make most 
of their livelihood from livestock, though some family members may 
sometimes fish. There are jobs for women only in the school and the 
nursery, and most women do not have formal jobs. There are four or five 
informal ‘shops’ in the village, selling groceries from Aral’sk or Qazaly at 
a healthy profit.
Bögen fishermen fish in plot number 8, with about 30 km of 
shoreline and a total quota of around 800 tonnes a year. There are three 
receiving stations, the main one at Shaghalaly, 12 km from Bögen over 
dried-up seabed. The other receiving stations are smaller, and fishermen 
from nearby inland villages fish there. Initially, poaching was common, 
and Amanbai faced competition from illegal traders (Ru.: kommersant) in 
the village, but today there is little poaching on the sea. This is partly 
because of better security along the shore, but it also relates to Bögen 
fishermen’s compliance: the fishing operation is well organised, with 
fishermen paid in cash every day and weather forecasts provided; fuel 
and nets are sold at the receiving station. Amanbai has also, in line with 
his development plan obligations, installed a refrigeration plant on the 
outskirts of the village, staffed almost entirely by people from Qazaly. 
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Other development plan obligations, such as building a pontoon and 
receiving station, remain unfulfilled.
The figures mediating Amanbai’s relationship with Bögen fishermen 
are the two fish receivers (priëmshchiki) at Shaghalaly: Zhaqsylyq and 
Meirambek. Zhaqsylyq, in his late fifties, is a former fisherman who rose 
to prominence, as we saw, through Aral Tenizi; he started working as a 
priëmshchik in 2012. Zhaqsylyq is the eldest brother of a large family; 
while other families have dispersed as family members have moved 
away to Aral’sk or further afield, all Zhaqsylyq’s younger brothers also live 
in the village. Zhaqsylyq’s three sons still live at home and also fish. 
One daughter is married to a camel-herder, and when camels are brought 
into the village and sold to villagers for meat, they are slaughtered in 
Zhaqsylyq’s pen. His wife Gulzhamal and daughter-in-law (kelïn) Gulnar 
informally sell groceries out of the house. The family has 30 angora goats 
and a prestigious hybrid nar camel.
Meirambek, in his thirties, is Amanbai’s nephew; he moved to Bögen 
in 2006. In 2009 Zhaqsylyq’s youngest daughter, Danagul, married 
Meirambek, putting Zhaqsylyq into a relation of qūda with Amanbai. 
Beyond Zhaqsylyq’s formal legal role as Amanbai’s employee, his authority 
within the fishery depends both on his social capital within the village 
and on this kinship connection with Amanbai; meanwhile, Meirambek 
and Amanbai too gain acceptance by association with Zhaqsylyq’s family. 
Meirambek has 11 horses roaming the steppe with the village livestock, 
and keeps some sheep in Zhaqsylyq’s fold. Beyond his immediate kin in 
the village, there are many others of the same ru (lineage) as Zhaqsylyq, 
Zhamanköz. Other ru in the village, such as Zhangbai and Teke, are also 
related, being subdivisions of the larger Külïk ru.8
Zhaqsylyq projects his authority through his imposing posture and 
unwaveringly stern gaze. Although not averse to physical work when 
alone or with close family, when others are around he barks orders, 
rarely demeaning his dignity by engaging in manual work. He has a 
strong sense of propriety: most people, even his contemporaries, are 
afraid to drink in front of him. He often remains aloof from con- 
versations, exuding authority through not engaging. But he is also 
capable, at appropriate moments, of boisterous banter, relaxing his 
dignity to generate a different sort of respect through mischievous 
humour. By contrast, Meirambek is consistently energetic and garrulous, 
always putting himself at the centre of everything. Whatever the context, 
Meirambek’s boisterous sense of humour asserts his centrality, often at 
the expense of weaker group members or outsiders – drunks, fishermen 
from other villages, me.
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The relation between fishermen and receivers thus goes beyond 
the sale of fish. Nevertheless, fishermen are aware that the system is 
hierarchical – and there is no expectation that it should be otherwise. 
Whereas the official catch translates not only into pay for fishermen, but 
also into pension contributions, the unofficial, over-quota catch does not. 
Fishermen report that their pension contributions are 3,000 KZT a month, 
which is considerably less than 10 per cent of the 150,000 KZT per month 
they earn. Their attitude is one of not asking questions. Indeed, there is, 
as we see below, a sense of complicity between fishermen and receivers.9
In general, fishermen must obtain formal permission from 
Meirambek to fish. Nevertheless, it is sometimes possible to fish without 
permission and not receive censure. Aikeldï, in his late forties, has a 
reputation of being a drinker, joker and hard-working fisherman. He lives 
near Zhaqsylyq and Meirambek, and sometimes fishes with Zhaqsylyq’s 
sons. In spring 2014 persistent ice floes and strong winds made fishing 
dangerous, so Meirambek was not giving permission. Aikeldï informed 
him that he was going to lay his nets anyway. Meirambek did not try to 
dissuade him. When Aikeldï returned, he told Zhaqsylyq’s eldest son over 
a bottle of vodka about where the fish were and the state of the ice – 
information which was later relayed on to Zhaqsylyq and Meirambek. 
Fishing in the banned season is also tolerated, so long as fish are sold to 
the plant.
Negotiations are always possible. One winter’s day, Meirambek was 
patrolling the ice. He came across a group of fishermen from Amanötkel. 
Although they were on good terms with Meirambek, they did not have 
permission. While they should have been fined, instead they gave 
Meirambek a sack of fish. Lake Tūshchy, near Bögen, is full mainly of pike, 
which is of very little commercial value. On one occasion, I met some 
Bögen fishermen fishing there who told me that they would sell their 
catch to local kommersanty; they had no fear of Meirambek – as a relative 
(Ru.: bratishka, ‘little brother’), he would not punish them for fishing 
there, although, they implied with a lewd gesture, fishing on the sea 
without permission would be another matter.
By contrast, when I accompanied Meirambek to the lake another 
time, we found two men, unknown to Meirambek, laying their nets 
through the ice beside an ancient Ural motorcycle. Meirambek, dressed 
in his state-issued camouflage suit, puffed himself up and demanded to 
see their documents. They did not have any. Meirambek declared that 
they should have requested permission. To their discomfort, he took a 
photo of them. The older of the two men had an air of quiet dignity. 
Addressing Meirambek as sen (‘you’ addressed to an equal or junior), he 
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talked quietly, patiently and at length, as if telling a story. He asserted 
their right to fish in various ways: bïz qazaqpyz, ‘we are Kazakhs’; men 
aqsaqalmyn, ‘I am an aqsaqal (white-beard/elder)’; bïz tengïzde auladyq, 
bïz dariiada auladyq, ‘we have fished on the sea, we have fished on the 
river’; kölïmïz, ‘our lake’. He told Meirambek at length about his various 
kin across the region. As the man talked, Meirambek’s demeanour altered: 
he listened patiently, his head bent slightly down, nodding, occasionally 
asking for clarification, addressing him with the respectful sïz. At one 
point he interjected to ask the man’s ru, before relapsing again into 
deferential silence. But the old man proved unable to find a connection to 
Meirambek. After about 15 minutes of conversation, Meirambek read 
out an official statement, though more patiently and respectfully. He 
also gave them his phone number so that next time they could request 
permission from him. He then dictated a confession for the old man to 
write out, so that the inspectors could impose a fine.
At stake were competing claims to the right to fish. Meirambek’s 
claim, bolstered by the state authority of the camouflage uniform, 
appealed to the law. But the old man, drawing attention to his white 
beard, challenged this authority through appeal to different normative 
frameworks: ethnicity, seniority and kinship. As his narration of past 
fishing experience reproduced a relation between persons and places, he 
laid a claim to the right to fish based on quite different categories from the 
formal rules. Ultimately, the authority of the camouflage costume and 
badge won. Had the old man found a kinship connection, the outcome 
may have been less clear.
Some weeks later I saw these two men again, fishing with 
Meirambek’s permission on the sea. At Shaghalaly, and at Amanbai’s 
other sites, there are fishermen from other villages working informally as 
hired workers. They do not receive boats or pension contributions. In this 
context of informal labour, labour is abstracted even from the meagre 
social benefits which should formally accompany it. The labour of these 
informally hired fishermen, lacking affective connections to Zhaqsylyq or 
Meirambek, is therefore more fully commodified than that of the Bögen 
fishermen. In winter, if they have UAZ jeeps, they can fish as much as 
anyone else. At other times of year, however, they must use their own 
boats, which are often small ‘lake boats’ made of corrugated iron, often 
without motors. Such boats, dangerous in open waters, cannot travel far 
out to sea; nor can they hold much fish.
I visited one of Amanbai’s new plots in spring 2014. It is in 
Saryshyghanaq bay, close to Aral’sk itself, and fishermen had come from 
Aral’sk, Qambash, Qazaly, even from Shymkent. They received no pension 
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contributions and no boats: they would fish here, I was told, as long as 
there was work, then they would move elsewhere. One group described 
themselves, with much hilarity, as ‘nomadic’ (köshpengdï): a mobile 
fishing proletariat, their labour thoroughly commodified. Strikingly, it 
was only in this context that I heard complaints about the prices of 
fish, on the basis that they ‘are not worth the labour’ (engbegï tūrmaidy): 
exploitation becomes visible when labour is fully commodified. For most 
Bögen fishermen, the process of commodification of labour is incomplete. 
To the extent that it is abstracted, exchanged for money, it is a commodity. 
But the relationship is more than purely economic – and they could not 
be easily fired. Different fishermen can relate to Zhaqsylyq and Meirambek 
in different ways, as kin, neighbour or fellow fisherman; and they construe 
the relationship, at least in part, in those terms.10
Extracting and commodifying fish
Arriving one winter’s day in Bögen from Aral’sk, I was surprised to find 
Zhaqsylyq’s house full of men tucking into a camel quyrdaq. A commission 
had come from the capital to inspect the fisheries. Because everyone uses 
monofilament, ‘Chinese’ nets (qytai au), they had all stayed at home: 
qūlaghymyz bar, ‘we have ears’, I was told. Instead of going fishing, 
they had stayed in the village to slaughter camels brought for sale by 
Zhaqsylyq’s son-in-law. Threatened by an external authority, fishermen 
and receivers acted together. Like explosive and electrocution devices, 
which are not used on the Aral, monofilament nets are illegal. Being 
cheap, they are readily discarded, left in the sea or on the shore. If 
fishermen cannot find them, it is not a major loss, and the nets get tangled 
on the seabed. Once stuck, they do not decompose. So abandoned nets go 
on catching fish. Because they are illegal, if unknown vehicles ever 
approach the shore, fishermen hastily throw all their nets into the boat 
and cast off; but otherwise there is no attempt to conceal their use.
In Knudsen’s (2008) ethnography of the conflicts between the 
practical knowledge of fishers and the expert knowledge of scientists in 
Turkey, he finds contrasting views on the sonar: fishers insist that it 
damages fish, while the scientists insist that it has no negative impact. 
While the scientists simply see it as a piece of technology, Knudsen 
proposes that fishers’ knowledge about the sonar constitutes a moral 
commentary on technology and social inequality. By contrast, with 
Chinese nets, rather than a clash of knowledge systems, there is a 
disavowal of knowledge, as in the following conversation:
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William: Why don’t they give permission [to use them]?
Küntughan:  I don’t know. If they are left in the water they don’t 
decompose, they say, there’s a storm or whatever 
and they can’t be pulled out … fish come and get 
stuck, they say, and they rot. When that fish rots, it 
pollutes the water, they say. Then diseases spread 
from it, they say. Therefore it’s forbidden to lay 
those nets.
After disavowing knowledge, Küntughan actually gave a full explanation, 
but at one remove, as someone else’s knowledge. On another occasion, 
I pressed a young Bögen fisherman as to whether he thought they were 
harmful. He replied: ‘Harmful, it’s said … but [broad grin] they catch fish 
well (ziangdy deidï ghoi, bïraq balyq tüseidï, lit. “the fish enter them”)’. He 
thereby delimited two domains of knowledge, claiming knowledge about 
the technology in the practice of fishing, but not about the technology’s 
long-term effects. In contrast to the meanings of the sonar to Turkish 
fishers, for Aral fishermen Chinese nets are just pieces of technology. As 
in Chapter 4, agency with respect to the environment is felt to be 
elsewhere. Here this point is empowering: the hierarchical form of the 
current system constrains fishermen not to think about resource 
management; at the same time, awareness of the wide gulf between form 
and reality means that rules can be readily ignored. Indeed, agency is 
dispersed beyond the fishermen who actually use the nets: although their 
import is banned, they can be imported as nets for catching birds, and, 
while in Aral’sk they are sold covertly, in Qazaly they are sold openly in 
the market.
Chinese nets, which can be laid by just two or three people, have led 
to a downsizing in fishing units. Moreover, the need for cooperation 
between households has also declined as rising incomes have enabled 
more households to acquire UAZ jeeps, facilitating access to the sea. In 
‘the time of flounder’ (kambala kezïnde), most access to the sea was by 
camel, and people would camp in groups by the shore. This matched 
wider trends in early postsocialist Central Asia where the maintenance of 
wide social networks was a crucial survival strategy amid economic 
breakdown (Kandiyoti 1998; Werner 1998). Today households are 
becoming more self-sufficient and less dependent on networks of friends 
and relations.
The fishing unit we saw in the introduction was an unusually large 
unit, involving Zhaqsylyq’s sons, a brother-in-law (bazha), two cousins 
and a neighbour. While the journey to the sea was a squash, the UAZ 
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effectively levelled differences between its owners and the other 
fishermen. But by the following spring Bolat had bought his own UAZ, 
and he, Aikeldï and Zhüman had formed a new unit. Mūkhtar was on 
military service, and Zikön and Maqsat were joined by their cousin Aibek, 
Müsïlïm’s son, and a brother-in-law (zhezde) from Qoszhar. Another large 
unit was Nauryzybai’s (Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Nauryzybai is in his early 
twenties. In early 2013 Nauryzybai drove his family UAZ to the sea with 
various maternal relatives collectively referred to as naghashy: two 
cousins and two uncles who had recently started fishing. The following 
year he was fishing with just one cousin, and with another cousin on his 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 Nauryzybai and colleagues, winter 2013. Source: 
author.
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father’s side who is fishing temporarily. So while the gradual increase in 
UAZ ownership could represent increased differentiation between 
villagers, the flexible formation of fishing units helps spread the benefits 
more widely. There is little sense that the owner of the UAZ is in command. 
In the long term, however, increasing UAZ ownership is reducing the 
importance of these horizontal ties between fishermen.
In the Introduction we saw the interplay of skill, local environmental 
knowledge, cooperation and hierarchy in the intricate process of laying 
nets through the ice. Nets of 45–50 mm are preferred for catching zander, 
but the Chinese net is not particularly discriminating, unlike the seine 
nets used in Soviet times. The process of hauling nets in (au qarau, ‘to 
look at the nets’) is more straightforward than laying them. Two holes are 
made in the ice with a lom, heavy work performed by junior fishermen. 
The net is retrieved with a hook and attached to a piece of string, which 
pays out down the first hole as the net is hauled through from the second. 
Fishermen extract the fish from the net, trying not to tear the net (not 
easy with low-quality Chinese nets!). This tends to be accompanied by 
conversation and improvised singing. Once all fish have been removed, 
the net is pulled back through from the first hole with the string.
Fish are thrown unceremoniously onto different heaps: bream, 
roach, zander, asp. This is the commercial catch, which will be handed in 
to the fish receivers. The least onerous work of putting fish in sacks falls 
to the oldest person present. There will also be a few small flounder, 
sabrefish and possibly also carp, catfish, pike; perhaps some of the exotic 
introductions from the 1960s, silver carp or belyy amur. Because their 
numbers are small, fish receivers do not take them. The smaller ones 
are added to the heap of bream where they will hopefully go unnoticed 
by fish receivers, while larger ones are put on one side. In winter the 
catch is driven straight to the receiving station at the end of the day, at 
9 or 10 p.m. In spring and autumn fishermen haul in their nets in the 
morning, and then they go ashore and extract the fish, put them in sacks 
and clean their nets. In the afternoon they take the catch round to the 
receiving station either by UAZ or by boat, before going out to lay their 
nets again in the evening.
As we follow the fish to the receiving station, other sorts of 
negotiation become evident, encapsulated in the proverb: ‘The fisherman 
doesn’t tell the truth, every day he takes one portion (bïr asym).’ This 
proverb is told with a smirk, reflecting the informality that is integral to 
fishing as a way of life. The exact wording is telling: ‘asym’ is a pot’s worth 
of food, the amount of meat needed for a besbarmaq. That is, the 
fisherman does not tell the truth because he is taking some of his catch 
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home to feed his household. It is not the same as taking some to sell to a 
kommersant. Not telling the truth is legitimated – within reason.
The receiving station consists of a set of Soviet-era scales and a 
Soviet-era ZiL truck (Figures 6.5 and 6.6). Zhaqsylyq chats affably with 
the older fishermen; Meirambek jokes with all and sundry. Formally, the 
Figure 6.5 Receiving station, Shaghalaly, spring 2014. Source: author.
Figure 6.6 Receiving station, winter 2013. Zhaqsylyq is on far left; 
Meirambek operates the scales. Source: author.
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relation between the receivers and fishermen is a monopsony, but the 
formal relation is fraught by uncertainty about what is and is not seen. 
Fishermen may haul in their nets and take their boat to a reedy bit of 
shoreline some kilometres from the receiving station, where they put the 
fish into sacks. One or two sacks may go into their UAZ. As the proverb 
suggests, they will take home the noncommercial fish, and maybe also a 
sack of bream or asp for domestic consumption. They then transport 
the commercial catch by boat to the receiving station. Zhaqsylyq and 
Meirambek, who are busy all day receiving fish, are unable to patrol the 
entire shore. It is also not practical to check that every sack contains what 
fishermen claim it contains. Zander are generally obvious, their pointy 
heads tearing the sack and sticking out of the sides. But a sack of bream 
will almost certainly also contain some flounder and other noncommercial 
varieties.
The fishermen unload the sacks of fish and pile them onto the scales. 
Fish are now valued as commodities as they are known in a new way, 
quantified by weight. Since this quantification rests not only on 
technology, the scales, but also on the fish receivers’ deployment of the 
technology, the process by which fish become commodities is embedded 
in social relations. The receivers ask what is in each sack, but they do not 
check. They also do not ask what is in the UAZ. Once the scales are loaded, 
one of the fish receivers adjusts the balance and reads off the weight 
(Figure 6.7). Meirambek operates the scales deftly; Zhaqsylyq tends to be 
clumsier. However, I only saw the result challenged once, when Zhaqsylyq, 
sliding the measure slightly too far, aroused an angry shout of Eeee, boldy, 
eeee! (‘Hey! That’s enough! Hey!’) – but there was no one else about, and 
Zhaqsylyq ignored it. On another occasion, a zander was rejected from 
the lorry because it was mangled; it was reweighed and its value deducted. 
Another fisherman who was looking on shouted, although it was not his 
catch, ‘It’s just one!’ Meirambek replied: ‘Yes, but that’s 500 tenge!’ Since 
everyone knows that what is visible is partial, the production of knowledge 
must always be negotiated. These minor incidents indicate the ‘social 
pressure’ (Hivon 1998) involved in these negotiations: the receivers’ 
capacity to exploit their position is limited by their need to maintain trust. 
While the social pressure failed in these very minor cases, I did not see 
more serious challenges to the receivers’ authority in Bögen. Indeed, 
fishermen usually ignored the operation of the scales.
While there are social pressures on the receivers, there are limits too 
on what fishermen can get away with. Not telling the truth may receive 
censure. Informal rules, albeit backed up by the formal authority of the 
camouflage uniform, shape relations between receivers and fishermen. 
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One day Zhaqsylyq was outraged to find that an entire sack of zander had 
been rejected by factory directors as it was full of juveniles, some 20 cm 
long. This is formally forbidden, as juvenile fish should be put back, but 
Zhaqsylyq’s outrage was financial. Too small for filleting, the fish had been 
rejected by the factory: they have no value as commodities. Zhaqsylyq pays 
fishermen himself, before being reimbursed at the factory, so he was out 
of pocket. That day, this sack was left near the scales, a few fish spilling 
out, and Zhaqsylyq drew attention to it as fishermen came in. Eventually 
the presumed guilty party arrived, and was sternly reprimanded by 
Meirambek and Zhaqsylyq, who stressed that the factory would not receive 
fish under 400 g. They did not mention the formal rule that juvenile zander 
under 38 cm should be put back. The fisherman defended himself, saying 
that he had laid 45-mm nets like everyone else, but he did not deny 
handing in undersized fish, nor did he dispute the cost of the sack being 
deducted from his day’s earnings. When he left, he made a point of saying 
a friendly goodbye to Zhaqsylyq, but Zhaqsylyq ignored him.
With a last act of shared labour, two fishermen heave the sacks into 
the lorry (Figure 6.8), perhaps with a helping shove from a third. Their 
brief relationship with the fish is severed. The cost is calculated, and 
deductions are made for fuel or nets purchased from Meirambek. The 
money is handed over to a senior member of the fishing unit (not 
Figure 6.7 Meirambek weighs the catch, winter 2013. Source: author.
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Figure 6.8 Loading the ZiL, spring 2014. Source: author.
necessarily the owner of the UAZ). During my fieldwork, bream and 
roach, which formed a large proportion of the catch, cost consistently less 
than 100 KZT/kg. Asp ranged from 100–170 KZT/kg. But the bulk of 
fishermen’s earnings came from zander: zander was 250 KZT/kg when I 
first arrived in winter 2013, and 500 KZT/kg by spring 2014, after the 
currency devaluation. The later social lives of the commodity fish explain 
the divergent value that fishermen extract from them.
Fish from factory to market
The commodity fish now travel in the ZiL across the dried-up seabed to 
the small refrigeration plant outside the village, where 50 people, nearly 
all from Qazaly, work. Sacks are hauled out of the lorry and slit open to 
reveal their contents. Exhausted men, working through the night, lug 
sacks of fish a few metres onto the scales. Zander are transferred into 
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crates and loaded into a modern container lorry for transport to Qazaly. 
Bream, roach and asp are taken into the factory, where they are washed 
in long baths before being fished out by strong-armed women and young 
men. From here they undergo sorting (sortirovka; Figure 6.9), as a 
different group of women knows them fleetingly as sizes. Then they are 
frozen. Later, a group of young men and women joking and laughing 
together will package them.
While the sortirovka is proceeding, factory bosses are adding up the 
figures, checking the weights against those recorded by the fish receivers. 
They also draw up official documentation, again translating fish into 
numbers. According to inspectors, it is here that a mismatch appears, as 
fish caught above quota is not reported. With just 10 inspectors, equipped 
with three UAZ jeeps, one Niva and two boats, they stress the difficulties 
of regulating reporting. Keeping two sets of records, one by the shore and 
one at the factory for the inspectors, is routine. Out of the water, fish lead 
double lives: as commodified frozen meat, and as official numbers which, 
again, perform both representative and constitutive functions (Verran 
Figure 6.9 Sortirovka, fish plant, Bögen, spring 2014. Source: author.
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2010). These numbers misrepresent the real fish, but they also constitute 
the relationship between nature users and the state.
From one perspective, then, the lack of state oversight is exploited 
by private actors. However, above-quota fishing also stems directly from 
the formal tensions in the property regime explored in Chapter 5. Given 
the acute financial constraints facing nature users, there is a strong 
incentive to fish above quotas. Indeed, the reliance on credit to fulfil 
fisheries development plans means that factories and refrigeration units 
are not built on the proceeds of fish which have been caught, but on the 
proceeds of future fish. Fish, translated into money, pay off the debt 
incurred in building the factories where they are processed. This in turn 
drives nature users’ high demand for fish, especially zander, which 
exceeds the limited ‘virtual fish’ they are assigned.
Let us return to the plant for the next stage in the social lives of the 
fish. Because most factories in the region do not do large-scale smoking 
and curing, the frozen bream, roach and asp are then loaded again into 
modern container lorries, bypassing Aral’sk, for export to Russia, where 
they will be processed, before finally being sold to consumers. Eventually, 
our Aral bream may be known as flavour and texture by beer drinkers in 
a bar somewhere in Russia. Meanwhile zander caught in Amanbai’s 
waters are on their way to Qazaly, where they will be filleted and coated 
in an ice glaze in Amanbai’s factory, which has an EU export code. In this 
form, they travel across Kazakhstan into Russia and eventually to Poland, 
Germany and Turkey. However, not all the zander caught in the Aral is 
processed in this way. For most of my fieldwork, Amanbai was the only 
nature user who had a processing factory fitting European standards as 
well as plots on the sea. Above-quota fish cannot be bought and sold 
legally, and factories without plots on the sea are obliged to buy fish with 
documentation. So the above-quota zander is mysteriously exported 
in frozen form and processed elsewhere in Kazakhstan or in Russia. 
Critically, it therefore bypasses Aral’sk, to the dismay of townspeople, as 
we see in Chapter 7.
As fish cross international borders, customs officials know them 
by code and documentation. Arriving in Russia, crates of fish are now 
stamped with different codes. Fish lying packed in lorries continue 
their double lives, as frozen meat, a commodity with exchange-value, and 
as official numbers mediating a relationship with customs officials 
(Figure 6.10). In the course of their migrations, the zander meet other 
Kazakhstani zander and are repackaged, eventually arriving in German 
and Polish supermarkets labelled as ‘zander from Kazakhstan’; they will 
then become entangled in central European taste, cuisine and sociality. 
ZANDER AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN BÖGEN 197
Demand for Kazakhstani zander in the EU is high, because the country’s 
freshwater bodies are relatively deep and clean, so the fish is of high 
quality. This final stage is crucial: high consumer demand maintains 
high prices.
Above-quota fishing, therefore, depends on fish’s valuation on 
distant markets. McGoodwin (1991) argues that when markets for fish 
are local, aggregate demand is finite; when fish feed regional and global 
markets, demand is infinite, creating incentives to fish without end. 
However, if, like Latour’s (1993) railways, markets are local at every 
point, extraction is driven by the sum of locally contingent processes of 
value formation. The divergent spatial reach of different fish depends on 
fluctuating prices in Germany and Russia, as well as the processing 
infrastructure in the Aral region. It also rests on the ‘atmosphere of 
intrigue’ (Anderson 2002, 161) surrounding sale of above-quota fish, 
which is created both by the formal tensions in the management system 
and by the obfuscation with which it is enacted. At each stage in fishes’ 
social lives, there is a new form of abstraction or (mis)translation. Nature 
users’ official statistics mystify the actual number of fish in the lorry, while 
the supermarket price mystifies everything that has gone before it. 
Meanwhile, at each stage of abstraction in fish’s migrations from sea to 
European supermarkets, value is extracted. Together, these processes 
drive the high extraction of fish from the sea. However, while agency is 
dispersed, intensive fishing also depends on fishermen themselves. In the 
next section, therefore, I explore how fishermen relate to the resource 
that their livelihoods depend on.
Figure 6.10 Fish in the back of the ZiL, spring 2014. Source: author.
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‘The fisherman dreams for the day’
Fishermen do not share the vision of scarcity on which regulation is 
premised. As the proverb goes, ‘the sower dreams for the year, the 
fisherman dreams for the day’. From day to day, fish are unreliable: bïrde 
bolady, bïrde bolmaidy (‘sometimes there are, sometimes there aren’t’). 
Laying nets is a project (zhoba): knowledge is imprecise; only God knows 
if there are fish here. But in the longer term, according to the dominant 
view, fish are abundant. Narratives of past abundance are a guide to 
future abundance: recall how Zhūbatqan’s narrative in Chapter 4 about 
the sea sustaining the starving in the 1930s was prompted by my question 
as to whether there would be fish in the future. Fishermen also draw on 
their own experience: every fish lays a million eggs, so of course there will 
be fish in the future. If there is water, there will be fish, and everyone is 
confident that there will be water, especially if the dam is raised. Images 
of natural abundance thus sustain a ‘politics of the present’. Though it is 
characteristic of hunter-gatherer societies, Day et al. (1999) identify such 
a politics among marginalised people in a range of contexts.
As I have suggested, in contrast to animal herding, catching fish has 
a certain immediatism, producing a sense of nature’s bounty, as Astuti 
(1999) describes for the Vezo of Madagascar in her contribution to Day 
et al.’s (1999) volume. Whether fishing for immediate consumption, 
for the plan or for the market, relations with fish are impersonal and 
transitory, unlike those with livestock. The politics of the present has 
also been reproduced by the hierarchical structure of both Soviet and 
post-Soviet fisheries, which constrain fishermen not to worry about the 
resource. Indeed, they express their lack of interest in quotas with 
a dismissive expletive. The history of environmental change further 
explains this point. Villagers have known the resource become scarce, but 
they know that the fish died out because the sea dried up, which was 
nothing to do with their actions. Over recent years, fish populations have 
been growing rapidly despite intensive fishing, reproducing an image of 
nature as inherently abundant.11
There are, however, dissenting voices. Some younger people are 
concerned about the possible development of oil – again, a threat to the 
resource from non-fishermen. Others express concern about the current 
intensive fishing, saying that only Allah knows if there will be fish in 
future. Düzbai, a senior fisherman in Tastübek, who now works as a fish 
receiver for Amanbai, is the only figure in a position of authority that I 
talked to who showed real anxiety about the future of the resource. He 
contrasted the modern fishing without limit to the past, when fishermen 
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would return from Balqash with little money but content with what they 
had received. When I asked whether there would be zander in the future, 
he replied quietly: ‘I don’t know … I’m not God!’ (Bïlmeimïn … Qūdai 
emespïn). To ensure fish in the future, he said, the sea must be properly 
monitored and controlled; Chinese nets must not be used; limits must be 
respected; the banned season must be enforced. He blamed the sea’s 
division into plots, arguing for a single factory with domain over the 
whole sea. Such anxiety is suppressed in the narratives of every fish laying 
a million eggs and of past abundance. While these narratives derive from 
experience, they also serve the social function of justifying fishing today 
without concern for the future. They constitute an ideology of the present, 
legitimising intensive fishing.
However, if Aral fishermen share a politics of the present with 
hunter-gatherers and other marginalised groups, there are, of course, 
important differences. Hunter-gatherers are famous for not working 
hard (e.g. Sahlins 1972), whereas Aral fishermen work very hard. This is 
partly because of the limited fishing seasons and the unpredictability 
of the weather. The Soviet valorisation of labour also helps explain why. 
But Düzbai also contrasts a Soviet past of moderation with a present 
dominated by money. To dig deeper into why fishermen work so hard, I 
turn now to the role of fish in local structures of value, showing how 
different sorts of fish reproduce and transform social relations in different 
ways, over different timescales.
Fish in Bögen
Let us return to the fishermen as they arrive home after a day’s fishing. In 
my first winter in Bögen, Zikön and his fellow fishermen would gather in 
Zhaqsylyq’s sarai to divide up fish, sort nets and relax over drinks. The 
non-commodity fish were divided not by individual fisherman, but by 
household. A large carp would go to Müsïlïm, as he was the oldest. Catfish 
would be sliced evenly, each household taking a share (Figure 6.11). 
Most of this fish is for household consumption; but some may also be 
given to relatives elsewhere who do not fish, entering long-term reciprocal 
relations. Furthermore, claims may be made on fish – mostly by relatives 
or friends but sometimes even by someone completely unconnected, 
where there is no long-term reciprocity. They may thus enter short-term 
immediate relations with no expectation of return: the hunter-gatherer 
practice of shares, whereby economic value is not assigned to nature’s 
bounty, persists where fish have low monetary value. Although there is a 
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sense that a gift of fish need not be reciprocated, most often, if fish is given 
to someone unconnected, vodka may be offered in return, but not money.
Despite the persistence of practices of sharing, there is no anxiety 
about the commodification of fish, particularly the translation of zander 
into lots of money. This is in striking contrast to E. Wilson (2002) and 
Nakhshina’s (2011; 2012) discussions of post-Soviet fisheries in the 
Russian Far East and Far North respectively: both describe communities 
where commodification is perceived to come from outside, and is resisted 
as immoral, contradicting local ethics of sharing. In both those examples, 
the object of contestation is salmon, which has high market value and 
is prized locally. By contrast, zander is not rated by Kazakhs. Popular in 
Europe for its leanness, it is unpopular among Kazakhs for the same 
reason: fat and oil are rated highly in Kazakh diet. The same material 
feature entangles zander in different ways in different regimes of value: 
with high monetary value but low local culinary value, zander is readily 
commodified by Aral fishermen.
While the non-commodity fish would be divided according 
to household, money from commodity fish would be divided equally 
among individual fishermen. At this moment they are all equal individual 
economic actors: they are momentarily disembedded. Some of this 
money would be consumed immediately, as the individual economic 
Figure 6.11 Aikeldï divides up a catfish, winter 2013. Source: author.
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actors now took turns to buy drinks, reproducing sociality between 
fishermen. Zikön, Aikeldï and Müsïlïm would drink vodka, while Bolat 
and Zhüman would drink beer (Mūkhtar and Maqsat did not drink in 
front of their seniors). However, most of the money is handed over to 
wives or mothers, and fishermen are no longer individual economic 
agents, but are embedded in their household. Indeed, when in Bögen 
outside fishing seasons, I would be called on to buy drinks and cigarettes; 
the litany was always the same: ‘no fish, no money’. When they were 
fishing again, I was promised, they would reciprocate. Evidently, they had 
no money which was not earmarked for household expenditure. The 
money that fish are associated with is specifically ready money.
Fish, money and social reproduction
It is November 2013. There is an air of excitement as fishermen return 
from the sea: Ghalymbek’s wedding (toi) is approaching. Over the next 
day, which is grey and windy, the air thick with dust, men are slaughtering 
livestock in preparation for the feast, the vodka flowing freely, while 
women are busy preparing inside the newly built family house. The day 
of the toi is cool and breezy. Beneath pale blue skies, the face of the bride, 
who is from Shymkent, is revealed, while a poet improvises with a dombra 
(a type of lute), singing about the wedding guests, who give a small gift 
of money. Not only are villagers present, but also Külïkter from further 
afield, from Aral’sk and Qyzylorda. The day includes various formal meals 
and a lot of informal drinking on the sidelines, culminating in the svad’ba 
(Ru.: wedding) in the evening: 1980s Soviet singers like Iurii Shatunov, 
Boney M. and modern Kazakh pop music blare from a sound system 
as everyone dances together, vodka continuing to flow on the sidelines. 
Then a master of ceremonies invites a series of tïlekter, brief speeches 
wishing the couple well, from Zhaqsylyq, Aikeldï, Gulnar and others, 
including the new qūda from Shymkent. As the master of ceremonies 
celebrates the presence of so many Külïkter and Zhamanközder, the 
wedding promises the continuation of the ru into the future. The wedding 
is a key moment in the reproduction of tughan zher, which today hinges 
on the intersection of abundance in the sea with transnational markets.
Fishing thus sustains this ritual economy which reproduces society 
over time. This is not its only significance. Money is also saved for 
investment in productive capital such as UAZs and GPS finders. Money, 
by facilitating access to these technologies, has brought some freedom in 
reducing the importance of affective ties and obligations. The importance 
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of networking as a survival strategy, crucial in the 1990s (Kandiyoti 
1998; Werner 1998), is declining as households become more self-
sufficient. However, the role of money in ritual expenditure is crucial to 
understanding social change in Bögen. It also marks a key difference from 
the presentism explored by Day et al. (1999): while the Vezo, for example, 
living for the moment, transcend durational time (Astuti 1999), most Aral 
fishermen are committed to the long-term order of social reproduction. If 
the fisherman dreams for the day, his family dreams for the next wedding. 
The influx of money through fishing has led to the increasing monetisation 
of this ritual economy. Indeed, weddings now cost 1–2 million KZT. 
Bridewealth (qalyng), which used to involve transfers of livestock from 
the groom’s to the bride’s family, is now usually cash – with figures of 
100,000–150,000 KZT cited as normal, sometimes higher. Money is also 
required for building new houses (essential if a wedding is approaching), 
with a house costing 2–3 million KZT. When I was roped into housebuilding 
projects in Bögen in summer 2013, everyone emphasised the cooperation 
and reciprocity involved in housebuilding: through enlisting other 
villagers in the institution of asar, collective help, people rally support in 
advancing their project. But housebuilding is also competitive; houses are 
judged on size and style, with evro-tip (European-style) preferred – that 
is, fronted with factory bricks, with PVC windows and new furniture. 
Because of all these factors, however much zander is caught, there is 
never enough money.
Overlapping explanations have been put forward for conspicuous 
ritual consumption in post-Soviet Central Asia. As financial capital is 
turned into symbolic capital, it reproduces and cements social differen- 
tiation (Kandiyoti and Azimova 2004; Koroteyeva and Makarova 1998). 
Accordingly, this long-term order in which society itself is reproduced is 
not only about solidarity, but is also the site of competition between 
households; as society is reproduced, it is differentiated. For Trevisani 
(2016), in Uzbekistan an ‘instrumental mode’ of ritual rationality is thus 
replacing a ‘communitarian mode’. In a different vein, in her discussion of 
migrant remittances in Kyrgyzstan, Reeves (2012) argues that ritual 
expenditure allows migrants both to affirm presence back home and to 
maintain networks that are crucial for navigating neoliberal labour 
markets abroad. Given the ongoing embeddedness of the fishery, social 
networks are still important in Bögen too. However, as I have shown, 
horizontal ties between households are becoming less salient, while the 
vertical ties between ordinary fishermen and Zhaqsylyq and Meirambek 
remain crucial. Networking still matters, but there is an asymmetry in the 
connections: Zhaqsylyq and Meirambek are considerably less dependent 
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on other fishermen than vice versa. As Botoeva, discussing the effects of 
an influx of money from hash on a rural Kyrgyz village, concludes: 
‘monetization of gift giving transforms social networks into more layered 
and stratified dependencies’ (2015, 545).
In Bögen, therefore, society is becoming differentiated as it is 
reproduced. At one extreme, there is Tolpash, a little older than Zhaqsylyq. 
He has no relatives in the village; his siblings left years ago; and his only 
son now works in Qazaly, although the youngest son is expected to live 
with his parents. He is not excluded from the fishery: he and two other 
elderly fishermen in a similar position fish in a boat provided by Amanbai. 
But his house is old and crumbling. His wife complains about the cost 
of groceries and the amounts charged by kommersanty in the village. 
Most families are much better off than this: with several members of 
the household fishing, it is possible to maintain a reasonable standard 
of living.
At the other extreme, Zhaqsylyq’s family has benefited most from 
the return of the sea: the position of fish receiver is lucrative; and all the 
sons fish. In summer 2013 preparations were being made for the family’s 
new house: 3,000 bricks were to be made. Zhaqsylyq’s bazha Müsïlïm and 
his sons were helping mix sand and clay. Müsïlïm stressed that they were 
helping as they were aghaiyn, ‘relatives’. What no one voiced was that 
Müsïlïm, who lives in Amanötkel, depends on Zhaqsylyq for access to the 
fishery. The following summer the new house was to be built, and soon 
Mūkhtar, once returned from the army, was to get married. The extensive 
financial capital the family accumulates in turn reproduces their symbolic 
capital, the wedding in the large new house serving as a performance of 
their new prominence.12
Conclusion
The restored sea, then, is transforming local social relations. As money 
from zander feeds the ritual economy, natural abundance intersects 
with opaque transnational markets to reproduce tughan zher. There 
are superficial parallels with Carsten’s (1989) account of a Malay village 
where fishing is a hierarchical, competitive activity, and the money earned 
from it attracts moral discomfort; however, as the money is symbolically 
‘cooked’, it feeds into the reproduction of household and community, an 
order governed by reciprocity. Carsten’s case study is an important instance 
of what Bloch and Parry (1989), contesting assumptions of a ‘great divide’ 
between gift societies and commodity societies, or between embedded and 
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disembedded economies, characterise as a divide within societies, between 
a short-term order based on competitive self-interest and a long-term order 
over which society itself is reproduced.
On closer examination, the Aral case diverges from Carsten’s study. 
After all, the everyday practice of fishing is marked by various forms 
of cooperation and claims based on social ties. Furthermore, different 
fish, with different material qualities, enter very different practices of 
exchange. Crucially, as elsewhere in Central Asia, the long-term order is 
characterised by competitive accumulation of symbolic capital. Helgason 
and Pálsson (1997) question Bloch and Parry’s (1989) assumption of a 
great divide within societies, proposing instead the metaphor of a single 
moral landscape, crisscrossed with different patterns of exchange and 
different moralities. While there are some processes of disembedding 
within the Aral region, if less advanced in Bögen itself, this is neither 
a transition from one sort of society to another, nor even a shift in 
emphasis from the long-term order of social reproduction to short-termist 
self-interest. Rather, this moral landscape is reshaped as the physical 
landscape is integrated into the time and space of contemporary 
capitalism. So too, the social relations that are reproduced within this 
moral landscape are being transformed as fishermen are differentiated 
from priëmshchiki and nature users, and as Bögen fishermen are 
differentiated from hired fishermen from other villages. Zander, in their 
entanglements with technologies of extraction (boats, nets, jeeps), with 
formal and informal property relations, and with transnational markets, 
are driving these transformations. During my fieldwork, as resources 
were abundant, no one was excluded from fishing, despite differential 
access to boats and other means of production. Were that to change, 
evidently the hired fishermen would be laid off first.
The stereotypes with which we began thus both contain a grain 
of truth. There is certainly social differentiation, though this is uneven 
(in some contexts, fishermen are more exploited than in others), and 
fishermen certainly are concerned about making money, because it is 
through money that social status is reproduced. At the same time, fishing 
is also a way of life, an identity – and the different forms of sociality at sea, 
at the receiving station and in the village cannot be reduced to competition 
between households.
Likewise, neither account of above-quota fishing is wholly wrong: it 
is neither that there is too much regulation, nor that there is too little; 
rather, above-quota fishing must be explained through the overlapping 
formal and informal norms, and the opaque market, which together shape 
how management is enacted in practice. The materialities of fish, in 
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the context of different sorts of consumer demand and processing 
infrastructure, shape different spatial trajectories and thus different 
patterns of value formation. Agency for above-quota fishing is dispersed 
across the whole fishery, as a socioeconomic system (Campling et al. 
2012). Even within Bögen, the intricate and shifting moral landscape does 
not support a reading of a ‘tragedy of the commons’, a free-for-all of self-
interested individuals. Nor is it a ‘tragedy of the private’, where a select few 
profit to the exclusion of others. The intersections of tughan zher and the 
postsocialist market entangle everyone in the rush for zander. Critically, 
the more zander are caught, the further social reproduction is monetised. 
As zander transform local society, they create further incentives for 
fishermen to go on catching them in ever greater quantities.
Notes
 1 During my fieldwork, total allowable catch for all species was just over 4,000 tonnes, of which 
10 per cent was zander. However, from my observations, zander made up 30–50 per cent of the 
fish received.
 2 I have related the Aral fisheries to the ‘tragedy of the commons’ versus ‘tragedy of the private’ 
debate in greater depth elsewhere (Wheeler 2017).
 3 This latter stereotype is far from unique to the Aral. As Howard (2017, 7) stresses, the 
stereotype of fishers as greedy and destructive ignores the market forces that structure fishing 
practices.
 4 As Bloch and Parry (1989) stress, such perspectives, often taken for granted by theorists, are a 
widespread response to processes of commodification.
 5 In practice, boundaries are not respected, though considerations of fuel and distance limit 
encroachments.
 6 Unlike individual transferrable quotas (ITQs) in the West, which can be traded as commodities, 
in Kazakhstan quotas can only be purchased by nature users from the state.
 7 Quotas in the West are widely critiqued: scientists increasingly argue that fish populations are 
chaotic or stochastic, so simply regulating quantity of fish caught is a blunt instrument 
compared to parametric management, that is, regulating gear and introducing banned 
seasons and zones (Larkin 1977; Ludwig et al. 1993; Pitchford et al. 2007; Wilson et al. 1994). 
However, KazNIIRKh also assesses fertility of spawning stock, so their assumptions are not, in 
theory, as simplistic as those critiqued by the authors cited; moreover, a banned season and 
banned zone should both support the reproduction of fish populations. 
 8 While people can make claims on rulas, fellow clan members, there is no sense that a ru is a 
corporate entity forming the basis of the organisation of production. For this point, cf. Isakov 
and Schoeberlein (2014) on Kyrgyzstan, and Trevisani (2007) on Uzbekistan.
 9 In other post-Soviet fisheries too, regulations are flouted, but the necessity of a hierarchical 
structure is not contested (King 2003; Nakhshina 2012; E. Wilson 2002).
10 Of course, embeddedness does not automatically translate into easier labour relations: in the 
village of Zhalangash, the nature user, LLP Asta, which lost its plot in 2014, was run by a former 
fisherman, who failed to fulfil obligations to provide boats, and was accused of making 
deductions from pay to subsidise quotas.
11 Comparative evidence supports this argument: Finlayson and McCay (1998) show that a 
paradigm shift in understanding the Atlantic cod fisheries only happened when stocks became 
scarce; Acheson et al. (1998) show how memories of overfishing produce social pressure for 
restraint even decades later.
12 Similarly, Batyrkhan, nature user in Qaratereng, who has also built a lavish new house with 
bricks from Almaty, held a huge feast in honour of his recently deceased son, involving sports 
contests, with cash prizes given to winners.
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Aral’sk today: fish, money, ekologiia
In summer 2013 I was roped into a school project in Aral’sk. The 
schoolchildren, aged between 10 and 14, were making a film about their 
region for a national competition. In the film they were to show a foreigner 
the sights of the town, with one of their teachers, Gulnar, translating into 
English. We began at a large white monument of a square-rigged sailing 
ship (Figure 7.1), near the station (although no such ships ever sailed on 
the Aral). It took several takes to get everyone in position, but eventually 
we could begin the dialogue. Following my instructions, I asked the 
children to tell me about this ship. One boy piped up his rehearsed 
lines: ‘Our region is primarily a fishing region, but the Aral Sea dried up 
(tartylyp ketken), and this monument is to commemorate our fishermen.’ 
But one of the teachers shouted from the sidelines that we would have to 
start again: ‘The sea is coming back (tengïz qaityp kelïp zhatyr)! Say that 
the sea is coming back!’ A few more takes (the cameraman’s patience 
wearing thin) and the boy had got his lines right, and Gulnar translated 
for my benefit: ‘The children think that the sea is coming back.’
The rest of the tour presented Aral’sk to a putatively global audience. 
It was instructive for both what was and what was not included. We 
steered clear of the Soviet-era Hotel Aral, despised by locals and visitors 
alike. We spent much time on the wide, clean central square, the site of 
the town and raion akimats and several banks. Some other schoolchildren 
were putting on a performance of traditional dancing accompanied by 
dombra (a type of lute). A drunk shuffled past smirking. One of the boys 
with the dombra told me that there would be a concert in Astana, 
conjuring up a connection between Aral’sk and the capital. We also filmed 
a Soviet-era monument of a fisherman.
We next followed the road towards the station, where Aral’sk’s 
few apartment buildings are located – elegant if crumbling two-storey 
buildings, and of no interest to our tour; we also, like most inhabitants, 
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ignored the mosque, which is on the same road. Our goal was the town 
museum, where we examined some traditional jewellery. We did not look 
at exhibits about the sea, or about Soviet times. We then visited a local 
jeweller, before heading for Independence Square. Formerly salt marsh, 
the square centres on a tall monument surrounded by some parched 
flowerbeds. Unlike the central square, which is frequently traversed 
by people on their business about town, no one walks across the centre 
of Independence Square, and it is something of a vacuum amid its 
surroundings. Around the flowerbeds, mud and dust give way to broken 
tarmac. One side is lined with workshops offering car repair and welding; 
on the other side taxi drivers vie for custom; beyond is the bus station, 
with Soviet-era buses serving local villages and long-distance second-
hand French coaches. Beyond the bus station is the bustling bazaar, 
selling local meat, fish, dairy and wool products; fruit and vegetables 
from southern Kazakhstan; and tat from China. Of all this, we just filmed 
the monument at the centre of the square.
We then drove round the town, along pot-holed roads and rutted 
tracks of saline mud and sand, to look at glossy new monuments of 
Kazakh national heroes, which are also sites for wedding photos. We 
ended at a small sports complex near the former harbour, which had 
recently been opened by a local businessman as a gift to the town. The 
dried-up seabed lying just beyond did not feature in the film. Nor did we 
visit any of the former Soviet enterprises examined in Chapter 3. In a 
sense, Aral’sk is a microcosm of Kazakhstan as a whole: pockets of shiny 
Figure 7.1 Aqkeme (white ship), autumn 2013. Source: author.
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newness purporting continuity with a distant pre-Soviet past, amid 
expanses of decay. Visitors mostly perceive the decay, but it was the 
newness that the children and their teachers wanted to display. In 
her ethnography of the nuclear town of Kurchatov, another remote 
Kazakhstani town scarred by its Soviet legacy, Alexander (2020, 4) 
writes of ‘a desire to be known, to be on the map’ for something other 
than what the town is notorious for. The children’s film spoke of a similar 
desire.
It is a desire that is often frustrated. The boy’s mistake at the 
beginning of the tour speaks of the sea’s marginality to Aral’sk today. Not 
only is the sea marginal to Aral’sk: Aral’sk is also marginal to contemporary 
Kazakhstan’s oil-based economy. Moreover, Aral’sk inhabitants are aware, 
often through intimate experience of ill health, of ongoing ecological 
problems. As residents juggle local pride with anxieties about unseen 
particles in the air and about economic insecurity, integrity is felt to be 
threatened at different scales: the integrity of the imagined community of 
the nation and that of local society; the integrity of persons, both moral 
and physical. This chapter therefore asks how subjectivities are shaped in 
relation to the environment. In particular, I am interested in the feel of 
living in Aral’sk, the corporeal sensations created by the environment, its 
‘material affects’ (Laszczkowski 2016; Mazzarella 2009; Navaro-Yashin 
2012).
As we saw in Chapter 5, while posters of Kökaral enrol the restored 
sea in the state’s ‘propaganda of emotion’ (Laszczowski 2016), the sea’s 
distance from the town is a source of frustration and dissatisfaction with 
the new hegemonic formation that the dam materialises. Most people are 
aware of the sea’s partial restoration and talk positively about 
improvements to the climate and flowers that have returned. Many hope 
that the sea level will be raised further, which will be good for the people 
(khalyq) and allow tourism to flourish in the town. At the more pessimistic 
extreme is Svetlana Mikhailovna, my Russian landlady, who declared 
firmly that the sea’s return was ‘drips’ (kapli), doing very little to resolve 
the town’s problems. In general, however, there is ambivalence, and few 
imagine their or their family’s future as connected with the sea. After all, 
if the official ‘propaganda of emotion’ relies on the positive affects 
emanating from the restored marine environment, this is frustrated by 
the sheer inaccessibility of the sea to most of the town’s residents. The 
nearest point on the sea is the boggy and reedy shallows at the north end 
of Saryshyghanaq bay, about 20 km away, and access is only possible by 
four-by-four. Summer days out for swimming, beer and shashlyk are 
generally to Lake Qamystybas, which, though further, can be reached by 
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tarmac road. Beyond the physical incompleteness of the connection 
between the town and the sea, the opacity of the fishery and the peculiar 
shape of the market (see Chapter 6) further marginalise Aral’sk from the 
restored sea, meaning that the sea’s return has not translated into large-
scale employment. Hence the comparison of Soviet times with today, and 
hence the sense that the sea’s return holds limited meaning for the town: 
there is a failed connection between the town and the sea.
At the same time, like Alexander’s (2020) informants in Kurchatov, 
Aral’sk residents continue to be affected by what they describe as 
ekologiia, ecological problems that affect the human body. As people 
complain about the extreme summer heat, the dust, the salt in the air that 
can be tasted in the mouth, there is a sense that ekologiia acts, that it 
might account for headaches, high blood pressure (davlenie), tiredness or 
low mood. For many, however, ekologiia poses a threat to their local pride, 
and some, feeling no ill health, question whether ekologiia exists. After 
all, unlike in Almaty or Astana, there is no air pollution from traffic or 
factories. In the second half of the chapter, therefore, I explore how, in 
Navaro-Yashin’s (2012, 18) words, ‘the environment exerts a force on 
human beings in its own right’. I will show how subjectivities take shape 
in the intersection, in the body, of the materiality of the environment with 
material conditions of economic insecurity. Though I assume that 
material affects can shape local subjectivities, I do not regard these affects 
emanating from the environment as prediscursive or presocial.1 Certainly, 
the penetration of particles of salt and dust reveal the material 
vulnerability of the body, its porosity and continuity with the world 
around. Nevertheless, I assume, in Bakhtinian vein, that this body is also 
rooted in a social reality. Experiences of ekologiia, which vary across 
different bodies, are always already located in the multiple, shifting ways 
of talking about it.
Marginality and threatened integrity
Where previously Aral’sk was incorporated into the grid of the command 
economy, post-Soviet economic transformations, driven by optics of 
‘seeing like an oil company’ (Ferguson 2005), have differentiated space 
again, marginalising Aral’sk in a new form of uneven development (Smith 
1984). These sea changes in the economy generate concerns about lack 
of employment, shortage of money, and corruption – concerns which feed 
the nostalgia we saw in Chapter 3. Indeed, there is a perception that there 
is ‘no work’ in Aral’sk, except in the state sector – the akimat, schools and 
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hospitals. State employees benefit from the ekologicheskaia zarplata, 
‘ecological salary’, the extra pay granted in an ecological disaster zone.
However, despite wilder estimates, Aral’sk is not beset with 
unemployment and stagnation. It benefits from its position on key 
transport routes. During my fieldwork, the trunk road passing the town 
was being upgraded in a massive World Bank project to connect Western 
China with Western Europe, providing some temporary work in the town. 
Most important, now as throughout the town’s history, is the railway. The 
railway is a source of jobs itself, and it also provides access to jobs, for 
those with and without educational capital, in shift work on oilfields in 
Aqtöbe oblast to the north and Qyzylorda oblast to the south. Such work 
allows people to stay living in Aral’sk, where land is abundant and housing 
relatively cheap. People also migrate further afield to Almaty or Astana 
on a longer-term basis. For example, Edïge needed to raise money to get 
married and renovate the family house, so moved to Almaty where he 
worked for international companies; he returned to look after his mother 
when she was ill.
There is also informal work in the bazaar and in construction 
around the town. Ownership of a vehicle opens limited economic 
opportunities: any car can be used as a taxi; a UAZ van can be used for 
ferrying wedding parties to distant villages, or for collecting fish for 
kommersanty, or even for taking tourists to the sea (if one has an 
acquaintance in the NGO); a KAMAZ truck is useful for transporting 
building materials. Some families keep livestock, though increasingly 
few as the cost of feed rises. Finally, growing numbers of people from 
Aral’sk fish in the nearby Saryshyghanaq bay, especially after these plots, 
which had previously not been exploited, were assigned to nature users 
at the end of my fieldwork in early 2014.
The perception that there is no work in Aral’sk, then, alludes both to 
the sense that economic opportunity is elsewhere and to the form of 
work: the predominance of temporary, informal jobs rather than the 
major enterprises and job security remembered from the Soviet era. Even 
access to the formal sector depends on personal connections and, often, 
bribes. There are also constant complaints about the cost of everyday 
goods relative to salaries, especially after the currency was devalued in 
February 2014.2 High prices are partly put down to the town’s remoteness. 
Only meat is relatively cheap because of the livestock in the region. By 
contrast, fish, of which there is very little in the bazaar, is considered 
scandalously expensive. Indeed, much of the fish in the bazaar is 
suspected to be Caspian fish: Aral fish shows its freshness by the glint in 
its eyes.
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Within this context of marginality and financial constraint, 
overlapping discourses seek to make sense of Aral’sk’s new place in the 
world. One day as we were drinking tea, a TV news story reported that a 
swarm of locusts had devastated land in Aqtöbe oblast. When I asked 
where they had come from, the reply (as I half-expected) was: ‘I don’t 
know … from China probably. Everything bad comes from China.’ There 
are stories about Chinese nets invading Kazakhstan and Russia and 
destroying the environment; accounts of sweets infected with worms and 
bananas with HIV coming from China; and complaints that China takes 
everything out of Kazakhstan without giving anything back. Not only oil 
and minerals flow to China: even the abandoned ships on the dried-up 
seabed, local heritage which, people stress, should have been preserved, 
are scrapped and sent to China. Another threat from the outside is the 
cosmodrome at Baikonur, which is leased to Russia: this is viewed as the 
source of contemporary environmental problems, and national integrity 
is felt to be threatened as Russian rockets spew their waste onto Kazakh 
soil, just as Kazakh lands were treated as terra nullius during Soviet times. 
The most common theme is corruption at all levels. Discourse about 
corruption veers from the local to top-level bureaucrats (Ru.: chinovniki) 
in Kazakhstan to global corruption. The money motive is imputed 
everywhere: the dam was not built higher because of the corruption of 
Kazgiprovodkhoz; local scientific institutions like the fisheries research 
institute, KazNIIRKh, or Barsakelmes nature reserve are, apparently, 
motivated only by money, to the detriment of science; any official or NGO 
projects are dismissed as money-laundering; love of money, apparently, 
drives fishermen to take reckless risks, while greedy nature users exploit 
the fishermen.
Such discourses, veering between the plausible and implausible, 
speak of an anxiety about the unseen movement of things. Inferences are 
made about an opaque world based on known effects. These inferences 
and speculation are not abstract forms of reason: speaking subjects draw 
on the different discourses available to them – Soviet discourses about the 
evils of money; Kazakh Islamic thinking about moderation (qanaghat); 
media stories. The forms of reasoning do not follow logical steps, hence 
the slippage between the plausible and the bizarre, especially when it is 
the integrity of the nation that is felt to be at stake. However, as Pelkmans 
(2006, Chapter 7) argues, such discourses rightly highlight core effects of 
postsocialist transformations – which transitologists would dismiss as 
side effects. Concerns about integrity reflect the different sorts of outside 
forces – flows of commodities and money – that shape and constrain 
people’s lives in Aral’sk.
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Fish factories
During my fieldwork, fish were scarce not only in the bazaar, but also in 
factories around the town, which is why the fishing industry is marginal 
to most townspeople, providing few jobs. Crucially, above-quota fish 
cannot be sold openly. Factories in Aral’sk are liable to checks from 
the prosecutor’s office, and thus face cripplingly high prices for material 
to process. Indeed, as one factory director told me, buyers must pay 
separately for fish and for documentation, through which ‘black fish 
becomes white fish’. Without documentation, it is possible to smuggle fish 
out of the region for processing elsewhere, as crates can be restamped 
with different codes. Anderson (2002, 161) finds in 1990s Siberia 
that, despite high local demand for meat, the market is shaped by an 
‘atmosphere of intrigue’ which channels meat in certain directions so this 
demand is not satisfied. Similarly, despite local demand for fish as 
food and as a source of jobs, the ‘atmosphere of intrigue’ that we saw in 
Chapter 6 shapes the market so that fish do not reach Aral’sk.
After Aralrybprom went bankrupt, it was sold off and dismantled. 
In 2007 Aimbetov, the last director of Aralrybprom, bought the derelict 
shell, ‘for kopecks’. Assisted by a state loan, he restored the factory for 
100 million KZT, and in 2010 the factory started production as Aral 
Servis, employing about 50 people. Until winning a tender for six plots on 
the sea at the end of my fieldwork in 2014, Aimbetov only had a small plot 
on the river, which limited his access to fish for processing. The main 
production is zander fillets, and the factory meets EU standards. But, 
during my fieldwork, very little of the old building was used: there was no 
smoking or curing, although such production is popular across the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Given the lack of fish, the 
output of zander was very low during my fieldwork, with the factory only 
exporting 104 tonnes of zander fillet in 2012, though this has apparently 
changed since Aimbetov acquired plots on the sea in 2014.
There are a few other small fish plants, including Kambala Balyk, 
which employs about 20 people. Aimbetov’s main competitor in the town 
is Atameken,3 near the shipyard and the old military town. Fenced off 
from a road running alongside a stagnant lake, this shiny, futuristic 
building is unlike anything else in Aral’sk (Figure 7.2). Indeed, it purports 
to be the only such processing plant in the CIS. Atameken was originally 
part of Atameken Holding Company, owned by a wealthy businessman 
originating from the Aral region; the holding has interests in construction, 
real estate, import-export and engineering across Kazakhstan and an 
international office in Paris. The factory, Atamekenrybprom, was built in 
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2009 and cost $12 million, of which half was a state loan (Redaktsiia 
‘Novaia Gazeta’ – Kazakhstan 2012). The factory is equipped with modern 
Korean technology, including an instant freezer, machinery for mincing 
offcuts and a smoking-chamber. But the first time the smoking-chamber 
was used, it filled up with smoke; the manufacturers have promised to 
repair it but have not yet done so. Today the factory produces some 
smoked fish on a small scale, unofficially, for the local market. Atameken 
also acquired an EU standard code in 2012 and exports zander fillets 
to Germany and Turkey. The factory was built with a capacity of 6,000 
tonnes output, and was to employ 300 workers. It has never run anywhere 
near capacity. Lacking a plot on the sea, it must buy fish from other nature 
users. In 2012 just 500 tonnes were processed – including fish bought 
from Balqash and the Caspian. Just 75 people work in the factory, and 
payment of salaries is fraught. In 2013 the manager was fired. It was 
reclaimed by state authorities and new buyers were sought.
Atameken occupies an ambiguous place in Aral’sk. Architecturally, 
it resembles the futuristic glass buildings of Astana, and generates similar 
positive affects to those Laszczkowski (2016) finds there. People would 
praise its beauty and modernity and, as a Westerner, I would be asked if 
I had seen it. ‘Even the director looks like a foreigner!’ beamed my friend 
Mira (referring to the director who was later fired). ‘Atameken’ means 
‘fatherland’, and, as a public–private partnership equipped with up-to-
date foreign technology, the factory embodied Aral’sk’s place in the glossy 
new global Kazakhstan, integrating the restored environment of the 
Small Aral Sea into the booming economic space of the country and 
Figure 7.2 Atameken fish factory, autumn 2013. Source: author.
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transnational markets. Fish were to play their part in this transformation, 
bringing jobs to a depressed region. So, when people talk about the 
fishing industry in the town, they usually talk about Atameken, not ‘the 
old rybokombinat’ (Aral Servis). Unsurprisingly, some older people 
criticise such a major enterprise factory not being state-run. When 
Svetlana Mikhailovna announced that there is no benefit to the town from 
the sea, it was because the factories were privatised, so all the profit 
goes ‘to one person’: her complaint reflected Soviet assumptions about the 
evils of private property. Most people, though, are more impressed by the 
external form than they are concerned about the ownership structure.
However, the hopeful affect exuded by the factory’s material 
appearance is contradicted by its chronic failure. There is a widespread 
expectation that all the fish caught on the sea should end up in Atameken 
– and frustration that this does not happen. The failure of fish to reach 
Atameken represents a failed connection between the town and the 
restored sea, which speaks of Aral’sk’s place in Kazakhstan as a whole. 
Rumours swirl around the factory. Recall the invisibility that pervades 
fisheries even when fish are out of the water: people in Aral’sk know that 
the sea has been restored, and they can see that some people are getting 
rich from it while the wider town stagnates, but everything in between is 
opaque. Rumours provide a means of reasoning in the absence of clear 
knowledge (Alexander 2009b). So, people complain that the fisheries 
inspectorate in Qyzylorda (headed by a man from Qazaly) rigged the 
tender so that all the fish should go to Qazaly, rather than Aral’sk.4 
However this decision was made, it is certainly true that Amanbai has 
three plots on the sea, and all his fish go for processing in his factory in 
Qazaly. Qazaly is nearer both Bögen and Qaratereng than Aral’sk, but as 
Aral’sk is the historical centre of the fishing industry, its marginalisation 
is resented.
There are also extensive rumours, encouraged by media reports 
(e.g. Naumova 2012), that kommersanty come to buy fish from poachers, 
and that the fish mysteriously disappears out of the region unprocessed. 
The provenance of these kommersanty varies – often they are said to come 
from Shymkent, the crime capital of Kazakhstan and source of all rumours 
about anything bad; sometimes from the Caspian or from Aqtöbe; and 
sometimes from abroad, from Russia or Georgia. On this view, Atameken 
is failing to deliver its promises because of penetration of the region by 
the outside. This forms part of the wider discourse about danger from the 
outside outlined above. However, if those complaints speak of Aral’sk’s 
place within Kazakhstan, the factory itself is not exempt from criticism. It 
is also suspected of carrying on more production than is declared, 
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cleaning and reselling without processing. People switch between 
praising the factory’s beauty and criticising the high turnover of directors 
who simply pocket the money, buy a fancy Japanese four-by-four and 
leave. In this register, the factory management is not victim but agent: the 
factory does not provide jobs in the town because its directors are only 
interested in their personal profit.
There is a final point which no one mentions: if quotas were 
respected, less than 500 tonnes of zander would be caught per year, 
which would not translate into any more factory jobs than there are 
today.5 However, zander makes up only about 10 per cent of the total 
allowable catch: the rest is not processed in the region, despite high 
demand for smoked and cured fish in the CIS. Developing infrastructure 
like smoking-chambers (or fixing the faulty one in Atameken’s case) 
requires capital, and given the difficulties of raising capital for investment, 
all the factories are geared only to processing zander, the most profitable 
sort of fish.
Across post-Soviet space, shiny new buildings (or new façades) 
gesture towards bright futures, leaving the grey Soviet past behind. In 
Pelkmans’ account of 1990s Ajaria, even when standing empty, new 
buildings are central to imagining the transition to a better future: though 
vehicles of dissatisfaction with the status quo, empty buildings are ‘early 
signs of that turn for the better, of a future of fulfilled dreams’ (Pelkmans 
2006, 207). In this vein, one well-educated young state employee who 
had worked in Almaty explained Atameken’s problems as intrinsic to the 
transitional present: though optimistic about the capitalist future, he 
argued that more state oversight is needed to ensure that factories like 
Atameken work properly.
However, in a more common register, the factory embodies a 
present which is felt to be stable, not a system-in-formation but a fully 
formed system where corruption is intrinsic. Indeed, in other ethnographic 
accounts, the failures of new buildings undermine the straightforward 
temporal progression they seem to promise. Alexander (2020, 12) 
describes how Kurchatov locals see an unfinished nuclear technopark, 
supposed to embody a positive nuclear future, as a ‘ruin’, aligning it with 
the wastes of the Soviet past. Atameken’s finished form does successfully 
break with the Soviet past. However, the frustration of the promised 
future speaks of a wasted present that contrasts negatively with the 
positive memories of the ruined enterprises that we saw in Chapter 3. For 
Laszczowski’s (2016) informants in Astana, while shiny new buildings 
exude positive affects that are enrolled in the ‘propaganda of emotion’, 
binding the nation-state together around the capital, these same buildings 
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also carry affects of sterility and fakeness that imbue the emergent 
political reality with instability. In the case of Atameken, there is rather 
an affective dissonance between the hope exuded by the building’s 
exterior and the knowledge of the emptiness inside, which speaks of a 
disordered present; a dissonance between the factory’s promise to put 
Aral’sk on the map of global Kazakhstan and the failed connection 
between the town and sea, the failure of the restored sea to integrate the 
town into wider economic spaces.
Indeed, the disordered present can point towards a darker future, as 
when I was talking to my landlady Ornyq, who told me about some 
Russian businessmen who had stayed with her four years earlier. There 
were lots of fish then, she said. I was surprised and asked if there were not 
plenty of fish now. She gave a dismissive click. Why are there not fish 
now? I asked. Because, she replied swiftly and confidently, they divided 
the sea up, and now they just fish and fish, only thinking about money. 
In a lull in her tirade, I said that the future of the industry was a key 
question for my research, at which she said instantly: ‘There is no future.’ 
She blamed the absence of the state: there should be a state factory, 
state control. I said something about the inspectors, but she was 
dismissive: you just take a licence, and fish and fish; some just get a licence 
because their cousin is a minister, and there is no control – everyone only 
thinks about money. She concluded by noting that there is corruption 
everywhere – Africa, France and especially in Kazakhstan. While Ornyq’s 
pessimistic account was contradicted by evidence of growing catches, the 
connections she made – between money, corruption and environmental 
degradation – were not unusual in Aral’sk, and find particular expression 
in discussions of ekologiia.
Ekologiia and money
Soon after returning to Aral’sk in June 2013, not long before the filmed 
tour of the town, I had been looking round the town for myself one sunny, 
breezy day. My walk was cut short by the rapidly rising wind. Soon the air 
was thick with swirls of dust and sand whipped up from the street. 
Whichever way I turned, the wind blew directly in my face, stinging my 
eyes; there was sand in my mouth, nose and ears, and I felt as though I 
was sweating sand. Barely able to see or to direct my body in a straight 
line, I floundered back to my accommodation, foggily aware, through the 
haze, of people around me walking about their business as if as normal, 
faces uncovered. Indeed, locals would tell me that, as former nomads, 
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‘we’ve got used to it’ (Kaz.: üirenïp kettïk; Ru.: my privykli), in contrast 
to the Russians, who had to leave. Such moments were, however, rare 
during my fieldwork, as dust storms have become less frequent over 
the years. Even so, even on some calmer days people feel that there is 
something wrong with the weather, and I would often be asked if I noticed 
ekologiia. I would usually reply in the negative: after all, the many 
glorious sunny days were welcome to a native of ‘foggy Albion’, and, 
aware of the negative connotations of ekologiia, I was keen not to offend 
my hosts. Looking back over my fieldnotes, however, I find comments like 
the following from times when I was feeling low and isolated:
As often in Aral’sk, I have this frustrating thing of feeling ill with 
very few or minor symptoms – hard to tell whether it’s to do with the 
climate, the food6 or just my general feeling of discontent.
Many of my informants struggled with similar questions. Serious illnesses 
– problems with lungs, kidneys or stomach – are readily ascribed to 
ekologiia, but with milder conditions too, headaches or even low mood, 
ekologiia is often posited as the cause. Yet for others, who feel healthy, the 
environment does not exert such agency, and sometimes, keen to dispel 
the stigma that comes with it, they question whether ekologiia exists. 
Affect, after all, is indeterminate: material agency is relational, affecting 
different bodies in different ways. Because of this indeterminacy, ekologiia 
is shrouded in ambiguity and uncertainty. The agency of matter, a 
theoretical question for social scientists, is also a question of acute 
concern to my informants. It is in how people make sense of ekologiia’s 
impact on their bodies, I suggest, that local subjectivities emerge.
Below, I sketch out the everyday lives of some key informants in 
Aral’sk, showing how ekologiia affects their lives and how they talk about 
it. In most everyday usage, ekologiia is explained not by the sea’s 
regression but by the rocket launches from Baikonur. Although kidney 
problems are also related to the polluted water which inhabitants drank 
for decades (Elpiner 1999), it is more common to blame present problems 
in the atmosphere. After all, clean drinking water has been available 
in Aral’sk since 1990, and was piped to individual households in the late 
1990s. Amid concerns about broken connections and threatened integrity, 
drinking water infrastructure created a powerful new connection between 
state and citizens. But such connections are noticed when they are broken, 
as Alexander (2007) finds when infrastructure was privatised in 1990s 
Almaty. They attract less comment when they are present, as ‘matters of 
fact’, predictable in their effects (Latour 2004). Ekologiia is a problem in 
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the present: the dust particles are a ‘matter of concern’ – unknowable, 
beyond control, with no clear delineation of cause and effect.
As a matter of concern, fuzzy around the edges, ekologiia is 
inseparable from the concerns about integrity that we saw above. After 
all, environmental problems and the political-economic transformations 
of post-Soviet Kazakhstan intersect in their effects on individual bodies. 
In Alexander’s (2009a) account of Almaty in the chaotic move away from 
state socialism in the 1990s, she describes how scandals connect influxes 
of foreign companies, rural migrants and viral infections, the discursive 
connections between them suggesting a homology between the economic 
and the ecological. Similarly here, as the unseen circulation of money and 
commodities materially shapes everyday social relations, and as unseen 
materialities affect individual bodies, ekologiia is experienced as already 
connected with concerns about money and corruption.
Ecological citizenship
Sasha and Svetlana Mikhailovna7 live in a house near the station, where 
they have a flourishing kitchen garden. They have three children, two in 
Togliatti and one in Almaty. The daughter in Almaty is a successful 
journalist, while the daughter in Togliatti is undergoing financial 
difficulties, and some of the money from my rent was sent to help her 
out. Svetlana Mikhailovna worked in a nursery, and has received her 
pension since retirement, but does not feel that its value matches the 
labour she gave the state over the years – nor does it match the ever-
rising cost of everyday goods. When the region was declared an 
ekologicheskii raion, retirement age was lowered, but this was cancelled 
on independence, so she had to continue working. Sasha kept working in 
the shipyard until it went bankrupt in 1995 when he was 45. From then 
until he could draw his pension in 2013, his only income was from 
repairing car batteries, for which he is known around town as 
akkumuliator Sasha; he claims that people trust him more than they 
would a Kazakh to do a good job.
While they do not have relatives in the town, both Sasha and 
Svetlana Mikhailovna talk about how respected they are, and the 
importance of mutual aid, which they relate to Kazakh hospitality, 
implicitly opposing this to the uncaring state. They are invited to Kazakh 
festivals like Nauryz, and reciprocate at Russian holidays. When I first 
arrived to stay, neighbours were helping Sasha get coal in for the winter, 
which was rewarded with a drinking session. Sometimes their friends 
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help pay for medicine. A neighbour sometimes assists them by printing 
official documents, which may be reciprocated with fish. Indeed, fish 
play an important role in maintaining these relationships. Sasha is 
renowned for curing roach, bream, sabrefish and so on, and for making 
khe, a Korean fish salad; he sends some to their daughters, but most is 
for renewing relations with friends around Aral’sk. Sasha still goes 
hunting and fishing whenever possible, departing with gun, rubber 
boat and vodka, and returning with game and fish. He also relies on 
fishermen friends in villages, including Tolpash in Bögen. On one 
occasion a rather tipsy Sasha told me at length how Tolpash had sent 
them fish; if in the future Tolpash was not fishing for some reason, Sasha 
would send him a sack of flour: ‘Exchange (obmen) … that’s how we live.’ 
But if, he went on, rubbing his fingers together, Tolpash had to go to the 
kommersanty in the village, then it would be expensive. Sasha would 
often use Tolpash as an example of the immorality and exploitation in 
the current fisheries. In his accounts of such everyday practices, Sasha 
contrasted relationships of delayed reciprocity with those mediated by 
monetary exchange.
While the couple painted a rosy picture of their integration into 
the town, the support they received was necessarily limited. Help could 
be rallied getting the coal in, but the cost of coal would eat up a month’s 
pension. In the past they have had electricity and phone cut off for 
nonpayment. Furthermore, while giving fish is important for maintaining 
reciprocal relations, getting hold of fish is not straightforward, but 
dependent on help from acquaintances. My research needs were a help 
here: a few times my komandirovochnye raskhody (business-trip expenses) 
covered trips for both of us to go to Tastübek.8 Once, I paid Sasha’s 
acquaintance Almatbek to take us in his UAZ, a trip which highlighted 
Sasha’s dependence. His friend in Tastübek had moved to Aral’sk and, like 
me, Sasha was awkward about demanding fish from people he did not 
know. We had to rely on the self-confident Almatbek, who had relatives 
in the village, to get people to give us fish. Thus, through Almatbek’s 
social capital, we returned to Aral’sk with a good haul, to be divided 
evenly between Almatbek and Sasha. However, back in Aral’sk, before the 
fish were divided up, neighbours and relatives of Almatbek took their 
share before the division was made. At that point, the larger fish all went 
to Almatbek.
Neither Sasha nor Svetlana Mikhailovna is in good health. Sasha’s 
troubles date from a motorcycle accident on a hunting trip, when he 
dislocated his shoulder. Svetlana Mikhailovna has extensive kidney 
problems, which she blames on drinking polluted water in the past, and 
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she recently underwent a month’s private treatment in Almaty, paid for 
by their journalist daughter. They are also sensitive to the health problems 
of others: Sasha will greet people in Kazakh with elaborate enquiries 
about their health. Svetlana Mikhailovna drinks milk for her health. She 
and Sasha used to buy it from trusted neighbours, but as these neighbours 
no longer keep cows, they buy from more distant sellers, who water the 
milk down. They have told the sellers, and asked if they are not ashamed 
(‘Allah is watching’), but to no avail. Svetlana Mikhailovna characterises 
this as ‘robbery’ (voruiut), the same idiom she and Sasha use to talk about 
the behaviour of high-up officials. As corruption impinges on local society, 
it affects Svetlana Mikhailovna’s own bodily wellbeing.
Svetlana Mikhailovna talks about how ekologiia affects her on a 
daily basis. Whenever a rocket is launched, she notes wearily that the 
weather has changed, a headache has started and her blood pressure has 
gone up. As she once explained to me, the sea used to absorb the pollutants 
in the air, but without the sea, there is no greenery, and no natural 
filtration. She continued that no one grew anything because Kazakhs are 
lazy, there was just bare steppe (golaia step’), and that is why it was made 
an ekologicheskii raion, and the pension age was set at 55 for women – the 
provision that was cancelled after the Soviet collapse, leaving her to work 
for several more years.
Svetlana Mikhailovna’s complaints echo the Russian tradition of 
cosmic forces arrayed against the hapless individual, and she frequently 
argues on the phone with pensioner friends in Russia about how much 
worse her lot is than theirs. They also draw on Soviet understandings of 
the proper relation between state and citizen. For Svetlana Mikhailovna, 
the term ekologicheskii raion implies rights and entitlements accruing 
to its inhabitants, a sort of ‘ecological citizenship’ resembling the 
‘biological citizenship’ afforded to Chernobyl victims who could prove a 
connection between cancer and radiation (Petryna 2002). However, 
the ekologicheskii raion only entails extra salary for state employees. It 
does not entail an addition to Svetlana Mikhailovna’s pension, or any 
recognition of her health problems, in contrast to the Chernobyl case. 
Her outlook is one of certainty: epistemological certainty that ekologiia 
exists and is responsible for her ill health, and moral certainty that the 
state is failing to honour its obligations towards her.9 Environmental 
affects, corporeally felt, shape Svetlana Mikhailovna’s subjectivity as 
they are apprehended as ekologiia, with its connotations of victimhood, 
rights and entitlements. The headache and rising blood pressure she 
feels when rockets go off are bodily reminders of her victimhood, of a 
world set against her.
ARAL’SK TODAY:  F ISH,  MONEY,  EKOLOGI IA 221
‘Ekologiia must be everywhere’
Ornyq works in school administration. Her husband Samat is a veterinary 
inspector, for which he is assigned a Niva (Lada four-by-four), and 
their unmarried son Zhakön works in the land registry in the akimat. 
Ornyq has two sisters and a brother, and their households are closely 
connected, often sharing meals and childcare. Her brother, Ertai, in his 
fifties, retired early as an invalid, suffering from kidney problems, like 
Svetlana Mikhailovna and many others. The kelïn (daughter-in-law) in 
Ertai’s household is roped into household duties for all the siblings, 
especially when guests are round. While the immediate family is close-
knit, Ornyq complains about the financial obligations towards more 
distant kin at ritual occasions. Ertai recently took out a major loan for his 
daughter’s wedding, and told me ruefully about the competitive aspect of 
ritual expenditure.
Although all three household members work, like everyone else 
Ornyq talks a lot about financial constraints, especially the impossibility 
of saving. In late perestroika, they had been saving up for a prestigious 
Volga, but when newly independent Kazakhstan switched from the rouble 
to the tenge, their money became worthless – since then, she said, they 
have not trusted banks. The family recently purchased an Audi on credit; 
they are paying back 40,000 KZT a month. While the Niva is used for 
Samat’s work, the Audi is а status marker for the family. Whenever 
possible, Zhakön drives very fast around Aral’sk with his friends listening 
to Enrique Iglesias at full volume. However, he is also at his mother’s beck 
and call, driving her every day to and from work, and he may be called 
upon late into the evening to buy her beer and sunflower seeds (semechki). 
Once the debt for the Audi is paid off, they plan to install a septic tank for 
an indoor bathroom.
Because of the credit repayment schedule, the household’s finances 
were stretched. A further complication emerged while I was there: Ornyq 
had, unbeknown to Samat, lent 150,000 KZT to her sister’s colleague, 
who had lent it to another woman whom Ornyq did not know. When the 
debtor had trouble repaying the money, Ornyq spent the evening on the 
phone to both women applying as much pressure as possible. The whole 
episode gave her a severe headache and sent her blood pressure (davlenie) 
up. The situation was resolved in the end, though I am not sure how. As 
such loans allow people to avoid the punitive rates of commercial lenders, 
money, as in other postsocialist settings, does not weaken social networks 
but puts them to new uses (Ledeneva 2006; McGuire 2014; Wanner 
2005). However, because of the complication that arose when the money 
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was lent outside Ornyq’s immediate network, the effect was to corrode 
trust.
Samat goes on regular work trips to Qaratereng. As he cannot drive, 
he is driven by Ornyq’s brother, Ertai. Ornyq and Ertai’s mother was from 
Qaratereng, so these trips are a means of maintaining relations with kin 
in the village. Hence Ertai and Samat often return with the car laden 
with fresh fish, which are distributed among close kin in Aral’sk or cooked 
in a besbarmaq or qarma. Ornyq avoids buying fish in the market as it is 
overpriced and not fresh. Like many others in Aral’sk, she waxes lyrical 
about the quality of Aral fish and meat, emphasising the beneficial effects 
of the salt in both the sea and the pastures. She told me proudly how her 
husband is not, despite his age, wrinkled, because he drinks sorpa (meat 
stock). Local pride is thus rooted in shared meals of tasty meat and fish, 
as well as dairy products like shūbat and qymyz.
Alongside this positive bodily engagement with regional products, 
Ornyq is also acutely aware of ekologiia. Once she asked me over tea about 
health problems in the UK. I talked a bit, then asked about Aral’sk. 
The health in the town is bad, she said: lots of asthma because of the 
constant wind and dust, and lots of davlenie and heart disease. But then 
she asked if that wasn’t the case all over the world. I made a noncommittal 
sort of noise, at which she declared that she had heard that was the case, 
before concluding, ‘So ekologiia must be everywhere.’ While Svetlana 
Mikhailovna insisted on the specificity of her fate in an ekologicheskii 
raion, Ornyq balanced her local pride with her awareness of ekologiia by 
denying that ekologiia singled the region out.
We talked a bit about drinking water, but our conversation was cut 
short by a news report on the TV showing a rocket exploding shortly after 
take-off, near Aral’sk. Ornyq was outraged. She told me angrily how this 
had happened last year too. Her relatives nearer Baikonur had seen a 
cloud of smoke, and immediately everyone’s blood pressure went up. The 
Kazakhstan government insisted that there was no risk to health. ‘But 
they get paid €50 million a year,’ she pointed out cynically, ‘and of course, 
that’s all money in the pocket (Ru.: den’gi v karmane).’ She then told me 
again how everyone in Aral’sk has high blood pressure, saying how her 
brother Ertai had recently collapsed, and had been lucky to survive.
As with remarks about Chinese goods infecting Kazakh children, 
national and bodily integrity are at stake. However, while the remarks 
about China were based on lurid rumour, this was rooted in direct 
experience: the dramatic newsflash broadcast across her kitchen, and her 
brother’s health crisis. But much too is opaque: the high-level circulation 
of money and the unseen environmental forces. As Ornyq posits 
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connections between official corruption, ecological damage and personal 
health, the integrity of Kazakh national territory is threatened by a 
corrupt government leasing out land to Russia, which threatens the local 
environment and her brother’s bodily health. If ‘ekologiia is everywhere’ 
downplayed the capacity of the environment to mark the region out as 
cursed, here the shared experience of davlenie, entangled in a discourse 
about rockets and national betrayal, shapes an intersubjective sense of a 
region vulnerable to outside forces.
‘Everything now depends on money’
Elmira and Samalbek are in their late thirties. Elmira was born in 
Qyzylorda but moved to Aral’sk in 1990 as her parents divorced and her 
mother was from Aral’sk. Samalbek’s father is from Tastübek and now 
works in Atyrau, on the Caspian, in a state organ, but will return to his 
tughan zher on his retirement. Elmira’s time is full looking after their six 
children; Samalbek works for the railway as a security guard. The family 
used to put tourists up via a contact in the NGO; during my fieldwork they 
were supplementing their income by housing an engineer working on the 
Western China to Western Europe road. He lived in the house, while they 
were squashed into the sarai (shed or summer quarters). Samalbek has 
recently upgraded to a newer and larger UAZ, with which he maintains 
close contact with his cousin Qydyrbai in Tastübek, who is a source of fish, 
camel meat, fermented camel milk (shūbat), saiga antelope meat and 
seagull eggs.10
Samalbek has two brothers and an older sister, Mira. She and her 
husband Zhūmakhan, the son of a former fisherman, are both religiously 
observant, saying namaz (ritual prayers), and fasting in Ramadan; he 
attends mosque every Friday. When the two families share a besbarmaq, 
Zhūmakhan is called on to say a prayer. Mira has a law degree from an 
Almaty university, but has chosen to devote her time to childcare. 
Zhūmakhan was offered shift work in a Chinese company, but it would 
have cost him a bribe of 90,000 KZT.11 He refused, he said, on religious 
grounds, but also because he would need credit to pay the bribe. 
Zhūmakhan once told me how his ancestors had fled to Karakalpakstan 
during the famine, but he concluded his narrative by saying that, despite 
the repression, Stalinist times were better than today, because there was 
work, and you did not need to pay a bribe to get it. So Zhūmakhan works 
informally as a welder, mostly making doors and gates. Materials are 
brought by bus from a depot in Türkïstan, south of Qyzylorda, but as all 
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metal is priced the same, he has to be on the lookout for metal which is 
brak (‘waste, defective materials’) or kitaiskii (‘Chinese’).
Mira and Zhūmakhan’s children, like Samalbek and Elmira’s, 
study in a Russian-language school, which is oversubscribed, economic 
opportunity being felt to depend on Russian language. The family watch 
Russian TV, and Zhūmakhan talks about the whole family moving to 
Russia, where he thinks there are more economic opportunities. However, 
if Mira and Zhūmakhan’s situation is insecure given the instability of his 
work, they are bolstered by their relationship with Samalbek. Indeed, 
during my fieldwork Mira and Zhūmakhan moved to a larger house, for 
which Samalbek gathered a loan from all his neighbours. Unlike the 
corrosion of trust that took place with Ornyq’s loan, this seemed more 
successful, at least for as long as I was there.
Mira and Zhūmakhan’s daughter has Marfan syndrome, a growth 
disorder, and Mira speculates as to whether ekologiia is the cause, which 
seems unlikely as it is genetic. They receive some state support for medical 
bills, and Mira stresses that she is grateful to Allah that they are alive 
today when such medical care is available. Mira herself often feels tired 
and unwell, and wonders if ekologiia is behind this. After all, the wind 
blows from spring and all through the summer, whipping up sandstorms 
that ‘irritate us all’: ‘We think that ekologiia acts, but we don’t know … 
Allah knows.’
One Friday I was having lunch with Mira, when Samalbek came 
round with some fish from Tastübek. Samalbek teased his sister by 
expressing surprise that they had a foreigner for lunch on a Friday. After 
some banter, he declared that he preferred whatever faith would allow 
him to make money, at which his sister hit him with a rolled-up magazine. 
Over lunch Samalbek asked with interest whether I noticed ekologiia. I 
said that I wasn’t particularly aware of it, and asked him what he thought. 
He talked about the extreme summer heat and winter cold, but did not 
attach much importance to it. I asked if it was worse when they were 
younger. He responded that they had not noticed anything. Then after a 
pause, he told me, part-reflectively, part-humorously (with a good deal of 
showing off to his giggling sister), how, when they were little, they would 
play all day long outside (no TVs or computers back then!); when they 
fell and cut themselves, they did not have time to go inside, so they would 
just sprinkle some sand on it and carry on playing – and they would heal. 
But at some point, he said, the sand ‘lost its quality’, perhaps because of 
ekologiia. Evidently, the siblings’ different ways of speculating about 
ekologiia relate to their differing bodily engagement with the environment. 
The time Samalbek spends outdoors in Tastübek with his cousin precludes 
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a sense of pollution or ruination, while Mira, spending most of her time 
indoors, is more sensitive to the irritation of the weather.
After this I asked whether they had seen TV programmes in the 
1990s which showed Aral’sk as the epicentre of an ecological disaster. 
They had – and were unimpressed. Samalbek said scornfully that you 
can find impoverished babushki (Ru.: ‘grandmothers’) everywhere in the 
world. Of course there are a few in Aral’sk, so the film-makers picked on 
them, waited three or four days for a sandstorm and then made their film. 
While not denying that sandstorms happen, Samalbek questioned how 
such material effects are enrolled in a discourse of catastrophe, a discourse 
which itself threatens the integrity of the region in which he feels pride. 
At this, Mira interjected that deformed children are sometimes born in 
the maternity hospital – that is so scary, she said. Samalbek instantly 
replied that such things happen everywhere. Justifying his assertion, he 
first cited the Nuclear Polygon in Eastern Kazakhstan, but then said that 
they happen everywhere. Mira agreed at once, saying: ‘Yes, because 
nowadays everything depends on money.’ Samalbek concurred, and a 
heated discussion ensued, largely about people being paid to donate 
blood.
The citation of the Nuclear Polygon suggests a link to critiques about 
Kazakh territory being used as terra nullius for Soviet projects. Instead, 
the conversation veered into more global issues. After all, this conversation 
occurred more than two decades after the end of the USSR, at a time 
imbued with global crises shaped by new geopolitical ambiguities. As 
with Ornyq’s ‘ekologiia must be everywhere’, the generalisation away 
from the local signals a refusal to single the region out. Strikingly, while 
Samalbek and Mira differed in their bodily feeling of the weather, and 
thus in their speculation about ekologiia, they concurred about money. If 
ekologiia is indeterminate in its affects, money is an ever-present concern 
in everyone’s everyday life – even if much of its circulation is unseen and 
unknowable.
Ethnographers of postsocialist societies have suggested that 
discourse about the corrosive effects of money, including rumours 
and conspiracy theories, is a means of coming to terms with what 
money is under capitalism (Oushakine 2009; Ries 2002; Verdery 1996, 
Chapter 7). For Oushakine (2009, 90), people living through postsocialist 
transformations fail to see money as a medium of exchange or a store of 
value, taking it instead ‘as a condensed metaphor of change itself’. Yet, in 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan, which has seen major bouts of inflation and 
devaluation of currency, money is hardly a reliable store of value. Nor is 
money an abstract, impersonal medium of exchange; rather, it is tangled 
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up with informal interpersonal relations, from the ritual economy 
through various shades of grey to straightforward bribery (Humphrey 
2002, Chapter 6; Humphrey and Sneath 2004; Ledeneva 2006; McGuire 
2014; Rigi 2004; Wanner 2008).
In such contexts, money is not a metaphor but a metonym of change. 
It is one tangible facet, present in everyday life, of opaque and 
incomprehensible change at different scales, which has reshaped spaces 
and transformed moral orders – and, as such, it is money that is used to 
reason about such change, as a pressing local concern that also ties the 
region into volatile global market relations. It is in this sense, I think, that 
we should approach Mira’s ‘Because nowadays everything depends on 
money’. Within this worldview, ekologiia, as a threat to bodily integrity, is 
not specific to Aral’sk, or indeed to Kazakhstan, as a toxic legacy of Soviet-
era dispossessions; rather, it is symptomatic – through unspecified, 
inferred connections – of a new world order for which money is a 
metonym.
The spectre of oil
If Mira and Samalbek were doubtful, others deny that ekologiia exists 
altogether. Daniiar, whom we met in Chapter 3 bringing fish from all 
corners of the USSR, regularly goes on illicit fishing trips (Figure 7.3). As 
he keeps this fish for personal consumption or to help out friends like 
Sasha, he characterises these trips as strictly moral, while the formal 
fishery is, like everything else in Daniiar’s vision of the contemporary 
world, scored with greed and corruption. In his seventies, Daniiar is in 
rude health, and is particularly strident about the absence of ekologiia, 
arguing, with some justification, that the prevailing wind is from the 
north, so most of the dust and salt from the dried-up seabed is blown 
away to the south. In Almaty, by contrast, the air is dirty and water 
recycled. Again, the integrity of the local is at stake, threatened not by 
ekologiia itself but by the discourse about it. When I asked him about the 
characterisation of Aral’sk as a disaster zone, he replied furiously:
When they start extracting oil from here, then it will be catastrophe 
… in Atyrau – have you been there? There aren’t even ants there, 
not just no birds, there aren’t even ants, no ants; not just no 
cockroaches, NO ANTS! My relative lives there, and I look – there 
aren’t even ants, THOSE are catastrophic effects … dirty … the 
atmosphere …
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‘But no one talks about that,’ I murmured. He went on: ‘But of course, it’s 
just money money money, they don’t think about their own health, just 
money money money.’ Not only is pollution elsewhere: it is also a 
threatened future, where lust for money threatens the integrity of nature 
and human health. If mainstream narratives link the Aral catastrophe 
to Soviet socialism, Daniiar turns this on its head by putting disaster 
discourse into dialogue with Soviet moralising about the evils of money.
Daniiar is not alone in fearing that oil will threaten the integrity of 
the local environment; nor is he alone in mixing this with the money 
motive. For some, concern about oil is embedded in worries about 
Kazakhstan’s relationship with other countries, especially China. For 
Zhūmakhan, oil extraction will turn Aral’sk into a truly ekologicheskii 
raion; when that happens, the family will have to leave. However, this 
is not the only way of thinking about oil. In 2002 NGO workers asked 
schoolchildren to draw the past, present and future of the Aral region. For 
the past, they imagined the sea full; the present showed dried-up seabed, 
skeletons of fish and rusting ships; their visions of the future included a 
Figure 7.3 Daniiar, with dried fish, autumn 2013. Source: author.
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full sea, but also oil rigs, and Aral’sk was a thriving town full of large 
buildings. Unlike Daniiar’s apocalyptic vision, the children imagined oil 
as part of a possible bright future for the town. The exercise of making 
schoolchildren draw past, present and future was repeated while I was 
there. This time there were no oil rigs. Indeed, I did not hear much about 
oil while I was there: if rumours and media reports had been rife 10 years 
previously, they were not when I was there, and oil was imagined, in all 
its ambivalence, elsewhere.
Bright futures
Ecological change, as we have seen throughout this book, does not come 
alone. Entangled with a market marked by invisibility and intrigue, the 
sea’s return has had variegated effects, and modernist assumptions that 
fish will bring a high-employment industry are confounded by the opaque 
realities of a financially constrained fishery. When invisible particles 
impinge on bodily health at the same time as unseen flows of money and 
commodities reproduce Aral’sk’s marginality, modes of apprehending the 
two are connected. The ethnography above casts light on the relationship 
between ecological affects and local subjectivities. Ekologiia, its affects 
felt in the body, shapes subjectivities through its discursive entanglements, 
as we saw with Svetlana Mikhailovna’s headaches that speak of failed 
ecological citizenship, or the widespread davlenie that, for Ornyq, signals 
local vulnerability to high-level corruption. At the same time, local pride 
is rooted in the shared pleasures of consuming Aral fish, meat and dairy 
products, which are felt to sustain local health. This pride is threatened 
not only by the bodily experience of ekologiia, but also by the stigmatising 
discourse about it. After all, if, following Bakhtin, discourse is rooted in 
material social encounters, then discourse too has the capacity to generate 
negative affects – hence Samalbek’s disgust at the films portraying 
ecological catastrophe.
Both the ecological and the economic define, in different ways, 
people’s place in the world. If living with indeterminacy is to occupy the 
ambiguous space between waste and value (Alexander and Sanchez 
2019), then both ekologiia and economic marginalisation pose the 
question of whether people can live worthwhile lives in Aral’sk. The 
unseen particles, indeterminate in their agency, and opaque flows of 
money and commodities together threaten the integrity of the local. 
Financial insecurity; corrosions of trust; dust in the air; health problems 
in the body – all are real, but the connections between them are unclear, 
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and the sorts of connections that are made speak of the worldviews with 
which people negotiate indeterminacy. As my informants grapple with 
ekologiia, questioning its existence or generalising it away from Aral’sk, 
they assert the value of the local even as they lament its marginalisation 
within a new world order dominated by money.
The tour with which I opened the chapter and the children’s 
drawings of the future suggest a different mode of imagining Aral’sk, as a 
site of pride and global interest, without the stigma attached. Although 
the 2013 depictions of the future did not include oil rigs, many included 
large modern buildings, including Atameken (Figure 7.4). While I was 
there, there was also a competition for pupils to think of ways to attract 
tourists to the town. Most of the projects explained the Aral Sea disaster 
(apat) in terms strikingly similar to the global discourse, though devoid 
of moral or political content, with at least one drawing on Wikipedia. 
Their descriptions also avoided the late Soviet fishery that older 
generations dwell so much on. Local history was felt to be of interest to 
visitors – but only distant history, not Soviet history. Overall, responses 
expressed pride and optimism for the region, and many went beyond 
their brief to imagine a future where unemployment was eliminated 
through development of light industry, food processing and local crafts. 
The fishing industry, in the form of Atameken, was present in just one 
Figure 7.4 Child’s representation of the future, November 2013. 
Source: author.
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presentation. Recent developments in the region – new buildings and 
monuments in Aral’sk, the Western China to Western Europe road – were 
included as sources of hope, new connections that would put Aral’sk 
firmly on the map.
If these imaginings – geared, of course, to the teachers’ expectations 
– represented a town with its economic problems eliminated, some pupils 
also expressed hope that the stigma attached to the ecological problems 
for which Aral’sk is known will go away. Most, however, ignored the 
region’s negative connotations altogether, focusing instead on its health 
benefits – the warm waters of Qamystybas (very few suggested taking 
tourists to the sea itself); hot springs at Aqespe and Aqbasty; the healing 
properties of wormwood from the steppe, and of dairy products like 
shūbat, qymyz and qūrt. Overall, these projects imagined a future free of 
the economic and ecological problems that preoccupy so much of the 
discourse of the town today.
Notes
 1 Cf. Mazzarella (2009) and Navaro-Yashin (2012), for whom earlier theorists’ insistence that 
affect is prediscursive and presocial (e.g. Massumi 1995) reinscribes the very mind–body 
dualism that they purport to overcome.
 2 Previously the currency had been devalued in 2009 after the financial crisis. In an economy 
based on raw commodities, such moves render Kazakhstan’s exports competitive, including, as 
we saw in Chapter 6, zander, while having crippling effects on imported consumer goods.
 3 Formally, the factory is no longer called Atameken, but it is still known as such across the town.
 4 See Naumova (2012) and Timirkhanov et al. (2010) on the opacity of the tender process.
 5 In 2012 the quota for zander was 407 tonnes, out of a total of 4,105 tonnes.
 6 Unlike my informants, I found that my body struggled with the diet of fatty, salty meat.
 7 Around Aral’sk, Sasha is referred to by the short form of his name, sometimes with a respectful 
Kazakh ending, ‘Sake’, while Svetlana Mikhailovna is known by her full name with patronymic.
 8 Sasha wanted to complete my expenses claims by pripiska, having ample experience of 
komandirovki from when he worked in the shipyard. As the ESRC research allowance 
constituted a ‘hard budget restraint’ (Kornai 1978), I felt compelled to refuse.
 9 Werner and Purvis-Roberts (2014) find a similar gap between the meagre entitlements for 
victims of nuclear testing in East Kazakhstan and state narratives which endorse their 
victimhood.
10 I never saw anyone but Qydyrbai eat seagull eggs, which are tasty, but with a strong odour of 
fish.
11 For this combination of informal, personalised relations and financial transactions in post-
Soviet Kazakhstan, see Oka (2015), Rigi (2004) and Werner (2000).
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Conclusion
Large-scale environmental disasters seem to strike with a singular force. 
When the earthquake or tsunami hits, everyone is affected. These are 
moments of clarity: as different people are affected to different degrees, 
the ‘revelatory crisis’ lays bare structural inequalities, revealing a truth 
about society (Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002). Such, for a few years 
during perestroika, was the Aral Sea catastrophe: a revelatory crisis that 
laid bare the failings of the Soviet state. Yet the sea’s regression was not 
given in advance as a catastrophe. Its emergence as catastrophe in the 
1980s, culturally recognisable in a distinctively Russian eschatological 
tradition, took painstaking efforts by activists and scientists, forcing the 
dried-up seabed and rusting ships into public view. Once established as a 
catastrophe, it assumed political agency, mobilising protest and hope for 
systemic change. This formation, however, was not stable. Following the 
marginalisation of environmental issues in late perestroika and the Soviet 
collapse, the ‘dead’ sea became associated with the defunct Soviet project. 
What the ‘revelatory crisis’ reveals depends on who is looking.
Entangled in post-Cold War power relations, the same material 
effects that had constituted catastrophe-as-utopian-hope became disaster-
as-vehicle-for-development. Much was obscured from the disaster- 
as-vehicle-for-development – not least the economic unravelling of post-
Soviet space – but in this form too, the Aral assumed political agency, 
mobilising projects, including, ultimately, the Kökaral dam. We can 
predict, to varying degrees, material changes in the environment; but 
what environmental change will become as it is caught up in historical 
processes is not given in advance, nor will it act in a unitary way.
Indeed, throughout the book, the Aral has emerged as a multiple 
object, entangled in diverse sets of relations. As a source of unexploited 
natural wealth, it ‘necessitated’ the development of infrastructure, 
sedentarisation and deportations that would maximise labour resources, 
serving progress through the quantitative growth of fish production. Yet, 
simultaneously, within the same modernist paradigm, it was an obstacle 
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to progress, a natural aberration, an embarrassing detail on the margins 
of Soviet Central Asia, its expansive surface area allowing evaporation 
that wasted precious water resources which could have been used 
productively in agriculture.
These two ‘versions’ of the Aral were not equal: the-Aral-as-
aberration was sustained by more powerful interests. Again, before the 
Aral burst into public view during perestroika as a catastrophe, the same 
material effects, interfering with the interests of regional bosses and 
fisheries managers, had been a bureaucratic ‘problem’ of employment 
and living standards. Precisely because of the dominance of the-Aral- 
as-aberration, the fact of the regression was sustained as limited, 
which relied on determined ignorance/ignoring: the crisis could not 
reveal much if no one was looking. Indeed, this bureaucratic problem 
was both fact and fiction, as we saw in Chapter 2 when the sharp 
discrepancy between the limitedness of the bureaucratic fact and the 
escalating problems experienced by the local population erupted in 
an angry letter to Gosbank. And yet, even this limited, obfuscatory fact 
assumed agency: the infrastructural developments and reorganisation 
of the fishery that it entailed would prove materially consequential 
for local people so that, looking back, the 1970s and 1980s were not 
‘catastrophic’, but a time of ‘Communism’. After all, those around the 
Aral’s shores were part of the entanglement that constituted the-sea-as-
economic-value, and through it they were integrated into gridded Soviet 
space, with its modernist promises of progress. For those who stayed 
after the sea retreated, the maintenance of the relationship between 
fishermen, fishing and the state afforded a level of continuity despite the 
sea’s devastating demise.
The Aral thus provides an apt site for re-examining arguments about 
the emergence of natural entities as multiple. The versions of the Soviet 
Aral that emerged within different entanglements may all have been 
real to those caught up in those entanglements, but they were not equal, 
nor were they equally true. Similarly, the postsocialist sea is both an 
object of management and a source of economic value. As an object of 
management, the sea is entangled with virtual fish, regulations, scientists 
and inspectors; and when virtual fish mediate between nature users and 
the state, they have, as Lien (2015) would argue, real effects that are 
irreducible to their status as abstractions. However, the-sea-as-object-of-
management is always subordinated to the-sea-as-economic-value, so 
that virtual fish are both fact and fiction. Their fictional quality itself has 
real consequences, undermining trust in the system – and shaping an 
opaque circulation of fish that largely bypasses factories in Aral’sk.
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As an object of economic value, the postsocialist sea differs from the 
Soviet sea that retreated. Abstracted in the gridded time-space of the 
plan, fish’s value was stable and connected with social entitlements, 
whereas within the flexible time-space of the market, there is limited 
connection between fishermen and the state, while value varies according 
to the spatial reach of the commodity fish, and fluctuates over time – 
hence the present limitless demand for zander. However, to locals, the 
sea is not just an object of economic value, but also part of tughan zher, 
the sustaining centre that fed ‘all people’ and saved them from famine. It 
is in the intersection between tughan zher and the-sea-as-economic- 
value that, where the retreating sea had seen a measure of continuity, the 
returning sea drives social change. In Chapter 6, I pointed to transform- 
ations in the ritual economy that sustains tughan zher: as zander monetise 
the practices of social reproduction, social relations are differentiated as 
they are reproduced. It is not just the shift from a socialist to a postsocialist 
sea that matters, but the articulation of this shift with the time-space of 
tughan zher.
Getting used to slow violence
In his account of the ‘slow violence’ of environmental degradation in the 
global South, Nixon (2011, 8) calls for environmentalists to interrogate 
the ‘post’ in terms like ‘postcolonial’, ‘postindustrial’, ‘post-Cold War’: 
‘For if the past of slow violence is never past, so too the post is never fully 
post: industrial particulates and effluents live on in the environmental 
elements we inhabit and in our very bodies, which are epidemiologically 
and ecologically never our simple contemporaries.’ Alexander (2020) 
makes a similar argument regarding nuclear pasts in Kurchatov: the 
material Soviet legacy is not readily contained in the past. However, 
Nixon leaves open the indeterminacy of material legacies of slow violence. 
The salt particles lingering in the air from Soviet ruination, the kidneys 
damaged by polluted drinking water: these are not ‘simple con- 
temporaries’ of my informants’ subjective lives. We are not determined by 
our environments or our bodies. If the material legacies of past slow 
violence continue to exert agency in the present, the agency of these 
‘environmental elements’ is entangled with the layers of social, economic 
and political change in between. The ethnography in the last chapter 
showed how subjectivities emerged at the intersection between the 
materiality of the post-Soviet environment and contemporary material 
conditions of economic insecurity.
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Similarly to Stawkowski’s (2016) self-professed ‘radioactive mutants’ 
claiming to have adapted to radiation, Aral residents claim ‘we’ve got used 
to’ (Kaz.: üirenïp kettïk; Ru.: my privykli) dust storms and other problems 
connected with the sea’s regression. The word üireny literally means ‘to 
learn’, and my informants claim that it was their nomadic heritage that 
helped them adapt – whereas other nationalities had to move away. They 
seem to highlight a capacity for adaptation and resilience, key concerns in 
the social science of environmental change (e.g. Adger 2000; Crate 
and Nuttall 2009). Chapters 2 and 4 brought a new perspective to this 
literature, suggesting that local resilience depended on, though was not 
reducible to, the top-down adaptation of the Soviet state. Here, however, 
I elaborate a rather different perspective on adaptation. Critiquing the 
focus in much resilience literature on bounded socioecological systems, 
Hastrup (2009) remarks that local worlds, never the bounded entities they 
were once assumed to be, are, especially amid large-scale environmental 
change, increasingly ‘perforated’. Resilience, then, is not just about 
‘practical’ adaptation, but also ‘a conceptual flexibility in perceiving 
the temporality or degree of “eventness” of the disaster as variable and 
contingent’ (Hastrup 2009, 28).
For my informants in Aral’sk, the local today is ‘perforated’ not only 
by particles of salt found as far away as Japan, but also by the Chinese 
nets, by the rusting ships – local heritage – exported for scrap, by the 
stigmatising discourse of ekologiia. If, however, these anxieties carry 
within them a yearning for a more bounded local, this local is not some 
‘pure’ pre-Soviet or precolonial identity, but a local that has been remade 
repeatedly as inhabitants have got used to, learnt to cope with, multiple 
perforations. Cast out as waste by the cotton-based project of Soviet 
modernity in Central Asia, superfluous to the extractive projects of 
Kazakhstan’s contemporary oil economy, inhabitants of Aral’sk occupy an 
indeterminate space that threatens to become a wasteland (Alexander 
and Sanchez 2019). To the outside eye, the Aral regression stands out 
spectacularly, but it came close on the heels of colonial dispossession, 
collectivisation and famine, mass deportations and two world wars. There 
was plenty to ‘get used to’ in twentieth-century Kazakhstan. In Chapter 4, 
we saw how traumatic memories of collectivisation were not transmitted, 
arguably a form of ‘getting used to’ new realities.1
Soviet uneven development marginalised the Aral, leaving it 
vulnerable to the myopia of the cotton vision. Yet the nostalgic discourses 
we examined in Chapter 3 reconstitute a bounded, knowable Soviet past, 
sealing off or domesticating, as far as possible, the destabilising memories 
of the ‘bad’ Soviet past. The remembered integrity of the local rests on 
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memories of ocean fish integrating Aral’sk into Soviet gridded space, 
materialising the social contract. After all, when the grid disintegrated, 
Aral’sk was marginalised anew and subject to new forms of perforation. 
Recall Ornyq’s dreamy vision of the sea returning to the town in Chapter 
3: the beach lined with tourists, the factory siren sending people off to 
proper jobs – in this vision, suspended between past memory and future 
dream, Aral’sk is made whole (again), secure in its place in the world.
I want to suggest, then, that we rethink the notion of adaptation as 
the messy, never finished process of ‘getting used to’ multiple, overlapping 
processes of perforation that remake local worlds. The sea’s retreat and, 
from the perspective of Aral’sk, failed return is just one form of perforation. 
As my ethnography has shown, getting used to the material legacies of 
slow violence is inseparable from getting used to large-scale political-
economic transformations. Nostalgic reconstructions of a past when 
things were whole, despite the ecological devastation, are arguably part 
of Hastrup’s (2009) ‘conceptual flexibility’. So too are the discussions and 
speculations about ekologiia. When Mira and Samalbek cast ekologiia not 
as a toxic post-Soviet legacy, but as a symptom of a corrupt contemporary 
world governed by money, they were perhaps making the claim that there 
is no further need to get used to the toxic legacy of the Soviet system; it is 
the new world where ‘everything depends on money’ that we need to get 
used to. Note the active work that goes into this separating of times and 
spaces which, as Alexander (2020) shows, threaten to leak into each 
other. Samalbek at first put the Aral in the same comparative frame as the 
Nuclear Polygon, evoking the time-space of the USSR, but immediately he 
and Mira together generalised ekologiia to ‘everywhere’ and ‘now’. This 
discursive ordering of material affects, times and spaces, I suggest, is part 
of the ongoing process of adaptation to multiple overlapping forms of 
change. The claim that ‘we’ve got used to’ the problems stemming from 
the sea’s regression – we’ve absorbed them and integrated them into our 
daily lives, we’ve adapted – perhaps represents a claim, albeit contestable, 
never finalisable, that the slow violence of the past is truly past.
The flounder at the end of the world?
Could I, with a nod to Tsing (2015), have entitled this book ‘on the 
possibility of life in state-socialist ruins’? At first sight, there is a parallel 
between the fishermen emerging from the wreckage of the socialist 
fishery, who caught flounder from a sea ruined by the scalable projects of 
Soviet agriculture, and the ‘collaborative survival’ Tsing describes 
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between Southeast Asian refugees living in a post-progress USA and the 
matsutake mushrooms that grow in its ruined industrial forests. But on 
closer inspection, the parallel does not hold. For Tsing, both the matsutake 
and the economy of picking it are instances of nonscalable relations, 
ecological and economic, ‘erupting’ from the ruins of scalable modernity. 
By contrast, the introduction of flounder to the Aral was a planned, 
if experimental, intervention. As we saw in Chapter 2, acclimatising 
new species was also about scalability, about abstracting organisms from 
their lifeworld entanglements and placing them in new contexts. To be 
sure, early acclimatisations, notably of stellate sturgeon, had ruinous 
consequences comparable to other projects of scalability. However, later 
acclimatisation practices differ from Tsing’s account of scalability, which 
is rooted in the history of the sugarcane plantation, where quantitative 
expansion rested on the interchangeability of planting stock, ‘com- 
paratively self-contained, oblivious to encounter’ (2015, 39). They differ 
too from the linear expansion of Norwegian salmon farms on the basis 
of anchovy pellets imported from the Pacific (Lien 2015). For Soviet 
ichthyologists, acclimatisation, while based on utilitarian principles of 
scaling up the production of commodities, was premised on the encounter 
between the species and its new environment. Growth of fisheries, serving 
human progress, depended on attention to the diverse lifeworlds of fish, 
mussels and worms.
This is not, of course, to suggest that the science was flawless. After 
all, the polychaete worms introduced in the 1960s may have become part 
of a rich, salt-tolerant zoobenthos, but they probably also reduced 
biodiversity by predating midge larvae (Plotnikov 2013). Assessments of 
postwar acclimatisations across the USSR are frustrated by the fact that 
lakes were already damaged by agriculture: the science of scaling up 
was applied in firefighting catastrophic declines in fish populations. 
Nevertheless, the successful – and expected – growth of the entangled 
lifeworlds of flounder, mussels and worms highlights the diversity of 
utilitarian projects of scalability. Certainly, across Central Asia as a whole, 
environments have been disastrously reshaped by the scalable promises 
of cotton plantations. Even so, we need more thick description of projects 
of scalability, highlighting, as we look ahead to Anthropocenic futures, 
those that have not proceeded ‘as if the entanglements of living did not 
matter’ (Tsing 2015, 5).
There is a further, more consequential, distinction between the two 
ethnographic contexts. Tsing’s (2015) theory of salvage accumulation 
provides a compelling account of how capitalist value is extracted from 
ruination. She separates the ‘pericapitalist’, nonscalable economic 
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relations between mushrooms, pickers and buyers from the process of 
inventorisation through which mushrooms are commodified and value 
extracted, feeding circuits of capital accumulation. Analysing the 
exchange between buyers and pickers not as a free capitalist market but 
as a cultural performance of freedom, she argues that, for pickers, 
mushrooms are not commodities but trophies. Commodification happens 
later, in the factory where mushrooms are sorted and inventorised. 
Salvage accumulation, then, predates on pericapitalist, nonscalable 
economic relations. In contrast to modernist, scalable forms of labour 
that integrated workers into promises of progress, these mushroom 
hunters are left picking through the ruins of progress while value is 
accumulated elsewhere. They are thus emblematic of what Tsing (2015) 
casts as a contemporary condition of universalised precarity. If the heroes 
of an earlier age of anthropology were the ‘primitive’ peoples living in 
harmony with pristine nature, the heroes of the anthropology of the 
Anthropocene are the ‘collaborative survivalists’ who make a living 
through their entanglements with the lifeworlds of ‘third nature’, the 
ruined environments left by modernity.
Central to the theory of salvage accumulation is that commodifi- 
cation happens at the point of inventorisation, not before. This point is 
beautifully illustrated by an ethnographic detail about discarding 
small mushrooms. While it is formally illegal to pick them, pickers collect 
them anyway, and they are discarded by the factory because they are 
too small for consumers (Tsing 2015, 128). Yet pickers go on selling them 
to middlemen; after all, as Tsing argues, the ‘sale’ is a performance of 
the market, rather than pure capitalist exchange. Compare this to the 
episode described in Chapter 6, when a fisherman was reprimanded 
for selling undersized fish. As with the mushrooms, it was formally illegal 
to have caught juveniles, but the reprimand related to the rule of the 
factory: they were too small for processing. Unlike Tsing’s mushroom 
pickers, however, the fisherman had the cost of the fish deducted from 
his pay. Commodification here happens earlier than the moment of 
inventorisation: it happens in the exchange between fishermen and 
receivers.
The consequences of this small difference are profound. Certainly, 
value is extracted elsewhere – by nature users, by intermediaries in 
Kazakhstan and Russia, by German supermarkets. Certainly, the fishery 
can be described as a ‘pericapitalist’ formation where economic practices 
are embedded in noncapitalist social relations. However, fishing families 
also have a stake in the value extracted, which transforms relations 
between people in the region, and between people and environment. 
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Moreover, while the grand progress metanarrative of Soviet socialism lies 
in the past, independent Kazakhstan holds out promises of consumerist 
abundance and private utopias. As the ‘project of the century’, the Kökaral 
dam is enrolled in this progress narrative and therefore carries expect- 
ations, which are haunted by the all-encompassing ‘expectations of 
modernity’. As these promises intersect with local structures of value, 
zander’s integration into transnational markets offers localised models of 
progress, whose promise is expected widely, but whose distribution is 
uneven.
For Tsing (2015), in a world after progress, we are all precarious. 
That may be so. Yet I remain troubled by Tsing’s universalising framing 
of the anthropology of the Anthropocene. Where localised offers of 
advancement entangle us in different ways in capitalist relations, we are 
also, to varying degrees, complicit: German consumers and Kazakh 
fishermen both have a stake in high levels of zander fishing. Nor are we 
equally precarious: should zander stocks collapse, Kazakh fishermen 
would be much more precarious than German consumers. How precarious 
the zander themselves are remains to be seen. As I write, further environ- 
mental restoration is promised as SYNAS-3 gets under way, involving the 
two-level variant of the sea as well as further rehabilitation of lakes, so 
perhaps their future too is bright, at least in the near term. As for my 
human informants in the region, their lives are more precarious than 
mine, but they are doing rather more than picking through the ruins.
Notes
1 Cf. Kindler (2018, 238), who talks of ‘complex processes of adaptation and psychological 
repression’ in the silence and collective forgetting about the famine.
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Appendix: sources for fish  
catches, 1905–80
The table below provides the sources for Figure 1.3 (page 46), which 
shows fish catches in tonnes in the whole Aral Sea (blue), and in the 
northern (Kazakh) part of the sea (red), 1905–80. The blue dotted line 
(1931–80) marks a curve taken from Zholdasova et al. (1998, 233; no 
data set provided). Data points from other sources are laid out below. The 
dashed lines (whole sea 1905–9; northern part 1905–30) mark informed 
estimates.
Years Source for whole sea Source for north
1899 Plotnikov et al. (2014, 56)
1909–
13, 1921
‘Zakliuchenie o vydelenii 
dolgosrochnogo kredit 




Postanovlenie EKOSO  
ot 23/IV – 1925 g., prot. 
No 71)’, n.d. but 1925, 
AFGAKO, f. 4,  
op. 1, d. 8, 26–9 (26)




KazSSR’, AFGAKO, fond 
4, op. 1, d. 8, ll. 1–17 (7)
(Continued)
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Years Source for whole sea Source for north
1929–31 Brigada Obkoma VKPb  
i Obl KK RKI, ‘Vyvody i 
predlozheniia brigady 
Obkoma i Obl KK-RKI  
o rezul’tatakh 
obsledovaniia 
Aralrybtresta’, n.d. but 
1932, AFGAKO, f. 7,  
op. 1, d. 12, ll. 2–12 (2)
1930–59 ‘Fakticheski [sic] vylov ryby po 
kolkhozami [sic] Aral’skogo 
Rybakkolkhozsoiuza /soglasno 
statotcheta/’, n.d. but 1960, 
AFGAKO, f. 4, op. 2, d. 10, l. 77
1939, 
1946








TsGARK, f. 1130, op. 1, d. 
1484, ll. 147–56 (148)
‘Aral’skoe more (sovremennoe 
sostoianie)’, n.d., TsGARK, f. 




Ermakhanov et al. (2012, 
7)
1974 Rybokombinat director K. 
Sarzhanov, ‘Vstrechnye plany 
na 1975 god Aral’skogo 
rybokombinata Ministerstva 
rybnogo khoziaistva KazSSR’, 
n.d. but 1975, AFGAKO, f. 4,  
op. 1, d. 491, l. 44
1975 R.S. Kuznetsova, Prilozhenie  
No 10 k prikazu Ministerstva 
rybnogo khoziaistva 
Kazakhskoi SSR ot 11 noiabria 
1976 goda No 334, ‘Ulov ryby 
– vsego po predpriiatiiam
(Continued)
(Continued)
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Years Source for whole sea Source for north
Minrybkhoza Kazakhskoi SSR 
na 1976–1980 gody’, 11 
November 1976, AFGAKO, f. 4, 
op. 1, d. 509, l. 54
1976 Sh.B. Baekeshev, Zakliuchenie 
po promezhutochnomu 
otchetu ob issledovaniiakh 
KazNIIRKha po teme No 100, 
‘Razrabotat’ nauchnye osnovy 
upravliaemogo rybnogo 
khozhiaistva Aral’skogo moria’, 
5 April 1978, TsGARK,  
f. 1130, op. 1, d. 1898, l. 77
1977 Sh.B. Baekeshev, Zakliuchenie 
po promezhutochnomu 
otchetu ob issledovaniiakh 
KazNIIRKha po teme No 100, 
‘Razrabotat’ nauchnye osnovy 
upravliaemogo rybnogo 
khozhiaistva Aral’skogo moria’, 
5 April 1978, TsGARK,  
f. 1130, op. 1, d. 1898, l. 77
1978 Letter from Minrybkhoz 
KazSSR to Minrybkhoz SSSR, 
‘Informatsiia o khode 
vypolneniia punkta I prikaza 
Ministerstva rybnogo 
khoziaistva SSSR ot 20 iunia 
1978 No 273’, 29 September 
1978, TsGARK, f. 1130, op. 1,  
d. 1861, ll. 118–19 (119)
(Continued)
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The Aral Sea is well known for its devastating regression over the second half of the 
twentieth century, and for its recent partial restoration. Environment and Post-Soviet 
Transformation in Kazakhstan’s Aral Sea Region is the first book to explore what these 
monumental changes have meant to those living on the sea’s shores.
Following the fluctuating fortunes of the pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet 
fisheries, the book shows how the vast environmental changes the region has 
undergone cannot be disentangled from the transformations of Soviet socialism 
and postsocialism. This ethnographic perspective prompts a critical rethinking of 
the category of environmental disaster through which the region is predominantly 
known. Tracing how the sea’s retreat and partial return have been apprehended by 
diverse local actors in the former port of Aral’sk and surrounding fishing villages, as 
well as by scientists, bureaucrats and international development workers, William 
Wheeler draws out the multiple meanings environmental change acquires within 
different contexts. This study of how people make their lives amidst overlapping 
ecological and political-economic upheavals is rich in ethnographic detail that is 
both rooted in Soviet legacies and alive to the new transnational connections that 
are reshaping the region.
Offering a rigorous political ecology of Soviet socialism and after, the book is a major 
contribution to the nascent environmental anthropology of Central Asia. It will be of 
interest to environmental anthropologists, environmental historians, and scholars of all 
disciplines working on Central Asia and the former USSR.
William Wheeler is Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in Social Anthropology, 
University of Manchester. He carried out fieldwork in the Aral Sea region of 
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